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The Nature of Law and Legality in the Byzantine Canonical Collections 381-883 
 
David Ferguson Wagschal 
 
The present work seeks to explore the nature of law and legality in the Byzantine 
canonical tradition through a careful reading of the central texts of the Byzantine 
canonical corpus.  The principal topics to be considered include the shape and growth of 
the corpus as a whole, the content and themes of the traditional prologues, the language, 
genre and style of the canons themselves, and the traditional thematic rearrangements of 
the canonical corpus. 
As a cultural-historical exploration of law, this work has as its goal throughout  
to trace the fundamental contours of how the tradition conceives, frames and "imagines" 
itself as a legal system: central themes and concepts, basic presuppositions, recurring 
patterns, and prominent contextualizations. Drawing on categories of modern legal 
theory and legal anthropology, this work is particularly interested in the nature of legal 
norms and their relationship to other normative systems, the place and role of technical 
rule-discourse, and mechanisms of change, development and interpretation. The 
relationship of the canons to the secular law will also be taken into account.  
The central argument of this work is that the picture of law that emerges from 
the Byzantine material is fundamentally at odds with many formalist/positivist 
expectations of modern western legal culture.  This dissonance had traditionally made it 
very easy to dismiss Byzantine canon law as "primitive" or "decadent".  If approached 
more sympathetically, however, this strange legal world can be read as constituting a 
surprisingly coherent and rich legal system that is characterized by 1) a deep investment 
in embedding itself in broader value-narratives; 2) the centrality of the idea of law as a 
sacred (and relatively inviolable) tradition; and 3) a strong orientation towards the 
realization of substantive justice, not formal consistency.  If taken seriously, this picture 
of law has a number of important implications for contemporary Orthodox canonical 
legal theory, the broader history of church law, and the study of late antique and 
Byzantine law generally. 
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ABBREVIATIONS, CITATION STYLES, EDITIONS, AND LEXICA 
 
For reasons of economy, canonical sources are cited throughout this work by one or 
two-word identifiers followed by canon number in Arabic numerals: e.g. "Trullo 23" = 
canon 23 of the council in Trullo; "Apostles 48" = canon 48 of the canons of the 
Apostles; "Dionysius 4" = canon 4 of Dionysius of Alexandria's canons.   
The identifiers are as follows: 
"Amphilochius" = Amphilochius of Iconium (d. 394/403)                                                   
"Ancyra" = council of Ancyra (314) 
"Antioch" = council in Antioch (traditionally dated 341; now thought to be c.330) 
"Apostles" = canons of the Apostles (compiled c.380, perhaps in Antioch) 
"Athanasius" = Athanasius of Alexandria (d. 373)                                                  
"Basil" = Basil of Caesarea (d. 379)                                                                 
"Carthage" = the so-called materies Africana, a compilation of 4th and 5th C African 
material presented in the tradition as the council in Carthage 419 
"Chalcedon" = council of Chalcedon (451) 
"Constantinople 394" = council in Constantinople (394) 
"Constantinople" = council of Constantinople (381; with later supplements as per the 
canonical collections) 
"Cyprian" = council of Carthage (251; extracts from council presided over by Cyprian) 
"Cyril" = Cyril of Alexandria (d. 444)                                                            
"Dionysius" = Dionysius of Alexandria (d. 264/5)                                                   
"Ephesus" = council of Ephesus (431; with later supplements as per the canonical 
collections) 
"Gangra" = council of Gangra (340-342?) 
"Gennadius" = Gennadius of Constantinople (d. 471) 
"Gregory Naz." = Gregory of Nazianzus (d. 390)                                                          
"Gregory Nyss." = Gregory of Nyssa (d. 395?)                                                               
"Gregory Thaum." = Gregory Thaumaturgus (210-270?)                    
"Hagia Sophia" = council in Constantinople (879) 
"Neocaesarea" = council of Neocaesarea (315/319) 
"Nicaea" = council of Nicaea (325) 
"Peter" = Peter of Alexandria (d. 311) 
"Protodeutera" = council in Constantinople (861) 
"Serdica" = council in Serdica (342) 
"Tarasius" = Tarasius of Constantinople (d. 806)                                         
"Theophilus" = Theophilus of Alexandria (d. 412)                                                  
"Timothy" = Timothy of Alexandria (d. 385)                                                       
"Trullo" = council under Justinian II "in Trullo", i.e. the Quinisext or Πενθέκτη (691/2) 
"II Nicaea" = council of Nicaea (787) 
 
Principal editions, translations or repertoria: 
ACO = E. Schwartz (ed.) Acta conciliorum oecumenicorum 431-879, 4 tomes in 14 
vols. Berlin 1914-1974 
Clavis = M. Geerard, Clavis Patrum Graecorum, 5 vols. with suppl. Brepols 1974 
Fonti = P.-P. Joannou (ed.) Discipline générale antique (IVe-IXe s.), Pontificia 
Commissione per la redazione del Codice di diritto canonico oriantal – Fonti, 
fascicolo IX, 4 vols. Grottaferrata 1962-1964 
 v
Kormchaya = V. Beneshevich (ed.) Древне-славянская Кормчая. XIV титулов без 
толкований, St. Peterburg 1906 
Mansi = J.D. Mansi (ed.) Sacrorum conciliorum nova et amplissima collectio, Florence-
Venice 1759-1798 
NPNF = H. Percival, (trans.) The Seven Ecumenical Councils, Nicene and Post-Nicene 
Fathers, 2nd ser., vol. 14. Oxford 1900 
Pitra = J.B. Pitra (ed) Iuris Ecclesiastici Graecorum Historia et Monumenta, 2 vols. 
Rome 1864, 1868. 
PG = J.P. Migne (ed.) Patrologia cursus completus. Series graeca, Paris 1857-1866 
PL = J.P. Migne (ed.) Patrologia cursus completus. Series latina, Paris 1840-1880 
RP = G. Rhalles and M. Potles (eds.) Σύνταγμα τῶν θείων καὶ ἱερῶν κανόνων, 6 vols. 
Athens 1852-1859 
Syn = V. Beneshevich (ed.) Ioannis Scholastici Synagoga L titulorum ceteraque 
eiusdem opera iuridica, Munich 1937 
 
Primary Source Abbreviations (separate recensions will be specified in-text) 
Basilica  = the Basilica (ed. H. Scheltema et al., Basilicorum libri LX. Series A.1-8 
(text); Series B.1-9 (scholia), Groningen 1953-1988) 
CJ = Justinian's Code (ed. P. Krüger, Corpus Iuris Civilis vol. 2, Berlin 1877) 
Includes the introductory constitutions Haec (p. 1), Summa (pp. 2-3), Cordi (p. 
4) 
CJC = "Corpus Iuris Civilis", a 16th C designation, but a useful shorthand for Justinian's 
Codex, Institutes, Digest and Novels 
Coll14  = the Collection in Fourteen Titles (edns.: Kormchaya, Pitra 2.433-649, RP 1) 
Coll25 = the Collection in Twenty-Five Chapters (ed. G. Heimbach, Ἀνέκδοτα. vol. 2, 
Leipzig 1840: 145-201) 
Coll50  = the Collection in Fifty Titles (edn.: Syn) 
Coll60 = the Collection in Sixty Titles (not extant) 
Coll87 = the Collection in Eighty-Seven Chapters (ed. G. Heimbach, Ἀνέκδοτα. vol. 2, 
Leipzig 1840: 202-234) 
CTh = the Theodosian Code (eds. T. Mommsen and P. Meyer, Theodosiani libri XVI 
com Constitutionibus Sirmondianis et leges novellae ad Theodosianum 
pertinentes, 2 vols. Berlin 1905). Trans. C. Pharr (Princeton, 1952)  
Digest = Justinian's Digest (ed. T. Mommsen, Corpus Iuris Civilis vol. 1, Berlin 1872) 
Trans. A. Wason et al. (Philadelphia 1985) 
Includes the introductory constitutions Deo auctore (pp. xiii-xiv), Omnem (pp. 
xvi-xvii), Tanta/Δέδωκεν (pp. xviii-xxvix). 
Ecloga = the Ecloga (ed. L. Burgmann, Ecloga: das Gesetzbuch Leons III. und 
Konstantinos V., Frankfurt 1983) 
Eisagoge  = the Eisagoge [formerly Epanagoge] (ed. K. E. Zachariä von Lingenthal, 
Collectio librorum juris Graeco-Romani ineditorum, Leipzig 1852: 61-217 = I. 
Zepos and P. Zepos, Jus Graecoromanum 2: 236-368 
Institutes = Justinian's Institutes (ed. T. Mommsen, Corpus Iuris Civilis vol. 1, Berlin 
1872) Trans. P. Birks and G. McLeod (New York 1987) 
Includes the introductory constitution Imperatorium (p. 2) 
N = Justinian's Novels (ed. R. Schöll and W. Kroll, Corpus Iuris Civilis vol. 3, Berlin 
1895) 
NC14 = the Nomocanon in Fourteen Titles (edns.: Pitra 2.433-649, RP 1) 
NC50 = the Nomocanon in Fifty Titles (ed. G. Voellus and H. Justellus, Bibliotheca 
iuris canonici veteris, Paris 1661: 603-660) 
 vi
Prochiron = the Prochiron (ed. K. E. Zachariä von Lingenthal, Ὁ Πρόχειρος Νόμος, 
Heidelberg 1837: 3-258 = I. Zepos and P. Zepos, Jus Graecoromanum 2.114-
228) 
Tripartita = the Collectio Tripartita (ed. N. van der Wal and B. Stolte, Collectio 
tripartita. Groningen 1994) 
 
Secondary Sources (common reference works only) 
BNP =  H. Cancik and H. Schneider (eds.) Brill's New Pauly, 15 vols. [trans. of Neue 
Pauly 1996-] Leiden 2002- 
Delineatio = N. van der Wal and J. Lokin, Historiae iuris graeco-romani delineatio: les 
sources du droit byzantin de 300 à 1453, Groningen 1985 
DDC =  R. Naz (ed.), Dictionnaire de droit canonique, Paris 1935-1965 
Historike = P. Menebisoglou, Ἱστορικὴ Εἰσαγωγή εἰς τοὺς κανόνας τῆς Ὀρθοδόξου 
Ἐκκλησίας, Stockholm 1990 
Peges = S. Troianos, Οι Πηγές του Βυζαντινού Δικαίου, 2nd edn. Athens 1999  
RE = Pauly, A. and G. Wissowa (-W. Kroll) (eds.) Real-encyclopädie der classischen 
Altertumswissenschaft 1894-1978 
Sbornik = V. Beneshevich, Канонический сборник XIV титулов со второй четверти 
VII века до 883 г., St. Petersburg 1905. 
Sin = V. Beneshevich, Синагога в 50 титулов и другие юридические сборники 
Иоанна Схоластика, St. Petersburg 1914 
Sources = H. Ohme "Sources of the Greek Canon Law to the Quinisext Council (692): 
Councils and Church Fathers" 2010: http://faculty.cua.edu/pennington/ 
OhmeGreekCanonLaw.htm1 
 
 
If not specified, canonical texts are drawn from Fonti, and systematic rubric texts from 
Syn (for the Coll50) and Kormchaya (for the Coll14). 
 
Length considerations, and the large number of canonical citations, have not permitted 
both Greek and English to provided for most texts.  Translation has thus been 
approached pragmatically.  Most lengthier texts, and texts where the Greek seems 
unnecessary, have been presented only in English.  Very short phrases, and citations 
made only to demonstrate particular lexical or grammatical points, have been left in 
Greek.  Occasionally both English and Greek have been supplied, as necessary.  
Translations are mine unless otherwise noted (as are emphases). 
 
Canonical numeration is according to Fonti.  Page and line numbers are not specified 
unless specially warranted.   
 
                                                 
1 This work is currently only published on the internet, ahead of its final version forthcoming in W. 
Hartmann and K. Pennington, eds. History of Medieval Canon Law: Eastern Canon Law to 1500 A.D. 
(Washington 2010).  However, as the most up-to-date survey of its kind it is already indispensable.  
Lacking pagination, it is referred to by sections. 
 vii
Volume, parts, page, and (where present) line numbers for all sources are indicated 
through successive separations by full stops.  E.g. Fonti 1.2.3.15-16 = Fonti volume 1, 
part 2, page 3, lines 15-16. 
 
Title and chapters in the systematic indices are indicated through successive numbers 
separated by full stops.  E.g. Coll14 1.17 = Collection in Fourteen Titles, Title 1, 
Chapter 17. 
 
Manuscripts citations are made as per convention, although locations have been 
anglicized and abbreviations have been kept as minimal as possible.   
 
A serious problem in the field of Byzantine law remains the lack of a dictionary of 
Byzantine legal Greek.2  The standard works of Liddell-Scott-Jones, Lampe and E.A. 
Sophocles do not give adequate coverage for late antique or Byzantine legal Greek.  
Supplementary lexical works consulted therefore include Avotins 1989, 1992 (both 
legal supplements to Liddell-Scott from the Novels and Codex of Justinian), Mason 
1974 (a study of Roman Greek legal terms – concluding, unfortunately, with 
Diocletian), Pitsakes 1976,387-424 (a short but exceptionally useful glossary of legal 
Greek appended to an edition of the Hexabiblos), Roussos 1949 (a Greek-Latin-French 
dictionary of ecclesiastical legal terms), and Preisigke (1925- with supplements, for the 
papyri).  For classical (Athenian) legal Greek the glossary in Todd 1993,359-402 is 
helpful. All of these sources will be cited normally, as necessary.  Frequently, however, 
I have had to manually back-track words through the Basilica (a 10th C compilation of 
6th C Greek translations and paraphrases of the CJC) to the Latin CJC and then to Latin 
legal dictionaries or textbooks (e.g. Berger 1953, Buckland 1963, Kaser 1955). 
 
At the time of writing no searchable electronic database exists for the entire Byzantine 
canonical corpus, although Syn, which includes the full texts of the Apostles, the 4th and 
5th C councils, and 68 canons of Basil, is on the TLG  (#2879).  Outside of these 
sources, lexical data, particularly in chapter 3, has been culled manually from Fonti, 
with reference to Kormchaya and Pitra. 
 
                                                 
2 So Stolte 2006,3.  
 viii
For non-canonical philological data I have very often had recourse to the Thesaurus 
Linguae Graecae (www.tlg.uci.edu), which is cited as TLG.  All searches have taken 
place between 2007 and 2010.  During this time no major additions relevant for our 
study have been made to the database, although the lemmatic search engine has been 
gradually improved; where this could affect my results searches have been re-checked 
as of April 2010. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The present work is an exploration into the cultural history of Byzantine law, and more 
specifically, the cultural history of Byzantine church law.  Its central concern is to 
illuminate the fundamental perceptions, categories, values, expectations, assumptions 
and structures that constituted the intellectual and cultural framework of Byzantine 
canon law –– a set of dynamics that, borrowing loosely from Harold Berman, we may 
term a culture's legal beliefs.1  In this, it seeks to complement more traditional legal-
historical approaches which emphasize the history of legal institutions, legal doctrines, 
or, more recently, the manifold negotiations of power in legal processes.  It is not, 
however, an attempt to illuminate the cultural history of Byzantium through law; it is an 
attempt to illuminate the cultural contours of Byzantine law itself.  It is, in effect, an 
exploration into the Byzantine legal imagination. 
Its particular task, experimental in places, is to unfold the cultural contours of 
law and legality from a close, at times almost literary, reading of the central texts of the 
Byzantine canonical tradition AD 381-883.  These texts include not only the Byzantine 
canons themselves, but also the principal prologues to the canonical collections, and the 
tradition's first forays into systematization.   From these texts – and, for the most part, 
from these texts alone – it will attempt to distill the fundamental legal architecture of the 
system as a whole.  It is thus an attempt to gauge the extent to which these texts can be 
read to describe and "think" about their own legal world as a legal world.   
 As a cultural-historical study, this work is above all interested in how law was 
understood and perceived: how it was supposed to work.  This is not unconnected from 
how it did work: expectations for the system's operations must be taken into account 
when evaluating evidence for its "real" operation. Nevertheless, this study is not directly 
concerned with the social or political-historical realities of the Byzantine system, except 
insofar as they help to illuminate cultural perceptions.  Our chief emphasis is instead on 
what the legal anthropologists might call the "formalities" of law, i.e. the realities of the 
cultural imagination of law.  As Kenneth Pennington has remarked, commenting on the 
traditional representation of Justice, "social historians record the number of weights on 
                                                 
1 Berman 1983,vii. 
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her scales but do not see justice through her eyes"2 – here we are very much concerned 
to look through Justice's eyes.  
The method employed in this work is not, however, that of traditional "history of 
ideas".  It is not – or at least not only – an inquiry into the meaning of particular 
concepts or ideas ("law" or "justice"), abstracted from their various contexts, and 
analyzed for their changing intellectual content over time.  It is instead more akin to 
legal ethnography.  It will thus attempt to read the central prescriptive texts of the 
Byzantine church as a set of legal phenomena that in their very structures, patterns of 
expression, strategies of composition and even stylistic tendencies reveal fundamental 
cultural-legal beliefs and categories.  In this type of reading direct assertions of legal 
belief and thought – definitions and statements of the nature of law and legality – are a 
critical, even controlling, part of the evidence, but still only a part.  Unstated, 
unconscious and implicit assertions are equally important, and thus questions of ethos, 
images, metaphors, and fundamental dynamics and "shapes" of legal thought must also 
be taken into account.  Only when all of these factors are considered can we hope to 
arrive at a nuanced and comprehensive, perhaps even cognitive, description of the 
Byzantine conceptualization of law and legality. 
This work has been conceived against the background of four major sets of 
disciplinary problematics.   
The first set of problematics is constituted by Orthodox canon law.  Written in a 
theology department, this study was originally conceived as a study in Orthodox canon 
law.  This (probably) remains its primary orientation and application.  It arose, in 
particular, in response to the highly ambiguous and contested status quaestionis of 
modern Orthodox legal theory.3  This problem may be summarized, albeit crudely, in 
terms of two competing positions.   
On the one hand, the mainstream academic discipline of Orthodox canon law, 
developed mostly in the eastern and southern European academies since the mid-19th C, 
and heavily influenced by the continental ius commune, has tended to treat Orthodox 
canon law in categories and terms derived from modern western formalist legal theory, 
                                                 
2 Pennington 1994,206. Justice receives her blindfold only in the 15th C. See Curtis and Resnik 
1987,1755-56; Ziolkowski 1997,18; cf. Maguire 1994. 
3 Recent overviews of the state of Orthodox canon law include Corecco 1992, Erickson 1991a, 
Meyendorff 1978, Ohme 1991, Patsavos 1981.   
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secular and canonical.4  Thus, to varying degrees, the many "manuals" of the discipline 
– the chief vehicles of this tradition5 – explore the traditional texts in terms of abstract 
categories of rights, duties and powers, and are concerned with questions such as the 
valid promulgation of legislation by competent authorities, the constitution of canon law 
as a valid branch of law, the disciplinary autonomy of law (versus theology), the formal 
mechanisms for legal change, the development of innumerable formal distinctions and 
definitions (e.g. ius sacrum and ius humanum; "doctrinal" canons and "disciplinary" 
canons, validity and liceity, potestas ordinis and potestas jurisdictionis) and, above all, 
the consistency and comprehensiveness of canon law as a logical system of formal 
norms.  Broadly, then, representatives of this tradition seek to explore Orthodox canon 
law as a "legal science", and as a result, the entire conceptual and value apparatus of 
modern continental formalist-positivist legal culture – on which more in a moment – is 
transferred to the traditional Orthodox texts.  
The "fit", however, of this apparatus to the traditional texts is uneasy, to say the 
least.  Very few of its concepts or distinctions are explicitly present in the Orthodox 
material, and few can be applied easily or consistently.  Indeed, Orthodox canonical 
texts are distinctly misbehaved by modern legal-scientific standards.  A classic example 
is the many attempts to establish the Orthodox equity notion, οἰκονομία, as a 
serviceable and consistent legal concept: the traditional usages of the term regularly 
evade convincing conceptual definition.6  This ill-fit has also been exposed even more 
convincingly by the various pleas (often by representatives of this manual tradition) for 
a modern Orthodox legal codification.  Such voices draw out at great length the 
dissonances of the traditional texts with modern expectations: contradictions, 
                                                 
4 No comprehensive history of the modern Orthodox discipline exists, although it is sorely needed.  For a 
sketch of the Greek experience, Troianos 2001; the Russian, Tsipin 2002,19-23; the Romanian, Stan 
1974; also, generally, Potz and Synek 2007,13-23. 
5 No comprehensive list exists, although see Milaš 1902,37-41 for 19th bibliography.  Those consulted 
here include Berdnikov 1889, Boumis 2003, Christophilopoulos 1965, Konidaris 2000, Milaš 1902 (one 
of the very few not restricted to one national tradition), Ostroumov 1893, Panagiotakos 1957, Pavlov 
1902, Rhodopoulos 2005, Sakellaropoulos 1898, Sokolov 1851, Troianos 2003, Tsipin 2002. The only 
manual currently available in English is a modified translation of Rhodopoulos 2005 (Rhodopoulos 2007; 
see also Patsavos 1975). These manuals are very similar to Protestant and Catholic canonical manuals of 
the 19th C. In Greece, the manual tradition divides, if sometimes roughly, into "ecclesiastical law" 
(treating broadly secular law relating to the church, and its relationship with canon law; so 
Christophilopoulos  1965 or Troianos 2003, for example) and "canon law" (treating the church's own law; 
so Boumis 2003 or Rhodopoulos 2005); for a list of Greek ecclesiastical law manuals, Troianos 2003,19-
20.  
6 See especially Thomson 1965; Erickson 1988, 1991b, 1997; Ohme 1991,235-236; also Meyendorff 
1978,104-105.  Further bibliography in Potz 2007,240-241. 
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repetitions, obsolescence, confusion.7  Even serious points of divergence in substantive 
law are often noted, and deplored, such as in the different treatments of rebaptism of 
non-Orthodox Christians in different Orthodox churches.8   
The other stream of Orthodox canon law reflection may be read as a response to 
this westernized "manual" or civilian tradition, and is almost a non-theory of law.  Much 
more diffuse, this view tends to emerge more as a background sensibility or set of 
recurring emphases than as a strongly held set of positions. 9  It is nevertheless centered 
around the conviction that Orthodox church law should not be conceived of – or at least 
not primarily – in "juridical" or legal categories at all.  The canons must instead be 
understood as only expressions of deeper  metaphysical realities, and as such are quite 
different from other types of law: "Although the holy canons constitute the Church's 
law, they nevertheless differ essentially from all other types of law...They are not to be 
understood as legal regulations, but as the practical application of the church's 
dogmas"10;  "[The canons] are not, properly speaking, juridical statutes, but the 
applications of the dogmas of the Church".11  Whereas the "manual" tradition thus casts 
Orthodox legal theory as an appendage of 19th C European legal science, this stream 
tends to cast canon law as an appendage of one or another modern ecclesiological 
formulations or of a generalized pastoral praxis.  Different authors articulate this 
conviction in different ways, but appeals are characteristically made to concepts such as 
"canonical consciousness",12 or "jurisprudence of the Holy Spirit",13 or various precepts 
of existentialist freedom,14 or a narrative of a pre-Constantinian non-legal legal purity,15 
                                                 
7 Most notably, and recently, Archontonis 1970, 43-61; see ibid. 33-41 for a history of the Orthodox 
codification movement. 
8 For a sampling of such problems, Archontonis 1970, 43-61; Christophilopoulos 1957; Erickson 1991b; 
see also n. 3 above.  
9 Examples of this type of thinking, ranging from express argumentation to passing expression, include 
Afanasiev 1933, 1936; Deledemos 2002; Erickson 1991a; Evodkimov 1959,185-187, 1962,181-183;  
Lossky 1944,175; Meyendorff 1966,111-112, 1978a,99-103; Patsavos (Kapsanis) 2003; Schmemann 
1979,33-34, 58-61; Yannaras 1970,173-193. Afanasiev and Yannaras are perhaps this position's most 
prominent proponents. See also the trenchant – if not always well-informed – critique of such positions in 
Correco 1992,70-77; also Ohme 1991,234-239.  The context and origins of this "anti-legal" trend in 
Orthodox thinking has never been investigated at length, but important context, especially as relates to 
tendencies in 19th C Russian thought, is given by Nichols 1989,1-33 and Walicki 1987,9-104.  The 
influence of J. Mohler (see Congar 1970,415-423) and R. Sohm (see below, and n. 26) may be suspected 
frequently, when not explicitly acknowledged.  On Sohm and Afanasiev in particular, see now Borbu 
2009. 
10 Patsavos (Kapsanis) 2003,186, 188.  This ecclesiological perspective may be found most elaborately in 
Afanasiev 1933, 1936, and also Christopoulos 1976,253-266.  
11 Lossky 1944,175. 
12 Very frequent; especially in Afanasiev. 
13 Meyendorff 1981,207-208. 
14 Yannaras 1970. 
15 Erickson 1991a. 
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or vague warnings against "legal mentalities"16 and "reducing" canon law to legal 
categories17. Not surprisingly, this position often emerges in the polemical context of 
establishing a "non-legal" eastern Christian identity over and against the "legalist" west. 
This stream of thought maintains as uneasy a relationship with the traditional 
texts as the manual tradition.  First, many of the concepts and categories (e.g. "canonical 
consciousness") employed by representatives of this "anti-legal" tradition find no 
greater resonance in the traditional texts than the civilian doctrines of the manual 
tradition.  More profoundly, these theories simply downplay the importance in the 
tradition of a large set of formal regulative texts and processes that in the tradition itself 
– as we will see – apparently occupy a very central, high-status, and even semi-sacral 
position, and seem to be understood to function as a real system of formal normative 
ordering.18  Instead, in these "ecclesiologizations" of canon law the canons tend to 
emerge as something to be bypassed or transcended: one must constantly strive to "go 
beyond 'canons' and 'canon law'"19, or one must attain to a higher "canonical 
consciousness" that is apparently above and beyond the canonical texts themselves.20 
This attitude is revealed above all in the almost complete lack of any attempts by 
representatives of this tradition to develop their theories into a workable system of 
canonical dispute resolution or ordering, or to address even the most basic questions of 
normative regulation (i.e. what are the rules, who makes the rules, who adjudicates the 
rules, who can change rules) – or even how their theories point to the resolution of 
contemporary canonical problems.  In practice, canon law is thus never more than a 
topic for an occasional article on ecclesiology.  Apparently, the canons, as a formal set 
of rules, are simply not worth the effort of sustained theoretical engagement.  The 
overall message seems to be then that "legal" reality is simply not a proper or important 
part of Orthodox reality – despite the presence in the tradition of a large set of texts that 
seem to suggest otherwise.   
Modern Orthodox legal theory therefore tends to be poised precariously between 
two problematic positions: church law is either 19th C civilian law, or it is no real law at 
all.21   
                                                 
16 Deledemos 2002 
17 E.g. Meyendorff 1978,103 
18 cf. Nichols 1989,4 on the high status of law in the early Russian tradition. 
19 Erickson 1991a,21. 
20 See Ohme 1991 for the hermeneutical difficulties of this type of theory. 
21 Cf. Erickson 1991a for an assessment of the tradition as composed of 'legalists' and 'anarchists', or 
L'Huillier 1964 on jurdicisme and spiritualisme. 
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This situation – which is much more nuanced and complex than this brief 
description implies – should be understood as the result of a struggle in modern 
Orthodox legal thought to find a language or set of formulas to take account of a legal 
tradition that simply does not fit into the categories of modern legal culture.  The 
manual tradition, keenly aware of the existence in the tradition of a prominent and 
detailed mass of formal written norms, and that this mass of norms is apparently a 
functional system of ordering and dispute resolution, attempts to make sense of this 
reality in the language and categories of modern legal science – but with only partial 
success.  The "ecclesiological" tradition, keenly aware of the extent to which the 
canonical tradition cannot be adequately described by the tenets of modern legal 
science, looks to ecclesiology or philosophy to find ways of articulating the legal 
dynamics observed – but in so doing tends to arrive at only vague formulations that 
mostly serve to marginalize and stigmatize close study of the church's formal normative 
tradition at all.  
Curiously missing on all sides of the question, however, is precisely our concern 
here: an examination of how the eastern canonical tradition itself defines and describes 
law and legality, that is, how the tradition talks about itself as law, thinks about rules, 
relates law to other types of knowledge, and sets expectations for the law's operation.  
The manual tradition starts with the categories of modern western civilian and canonical 
legal science, and then approaches the material; the "ecclesiological" positions start with 
modern ecclesiological presuppositions and then theorize about what the tradition 
should look like (and not what it does look like).  Neither side begins therefore by 
carefully reading the traditional texts for their own categories and presuppositions about 
law and legality.  Neither side, in short, examines the actual legal contours of the 
tradition itself, nor does either side submit its own formulations to the critique of the 
tradition itself: do the categories of modern legal science do justice to the texts? do 
modern ecclesiological theories adequately describe the position and nature of the 
canonical rules as found in the tradition itself?  Both sides also tend to assume that the 
only "proper" type of legal system is a modern formalist one – to be either accepted  or 
rejected.    
This thesis aims, in contrast, to provide the first steps towards the formulation of 
a new "introduction" to Orthodox canon law that takes its starting point from a careful 
and attentive reading of the traditional texts themselves.  In this canonical 
ressourcement I will suggest that modern legal anthropological and legal theory have 
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long opened new horizons for the appreciation and theorization of many of the strange 
dynamics present in the Orthodox legal texts.  If these tools are employed, the instincts 
of both major positions can be confirmed: Orthodoxy does have a real legal system, but 
it is a legal system that functions according to a very different set of presuppositions 
from what we are accustomed to.  The Orthodox legal-theoretical imagination simply 
needs a little expanding. 
The second set of problematics – a much more peripheral one – is constituted by 
historical theology or patristics.  Here our concern is simply to reaffirm and advance the 
study of the canonical texts as an important part of the patristic textual tradition.  Our 
central insight is the reminder that the canons are patristic texts, and that they are one of 
the primary – perhaps the primary – patristic witnesses to the perception of law, legality 
and order in the early church. (Also, I think, primary witnesses to exploring patristic 
attitudes towards power and social control.) The close examination of how these texts 
embody law, and how they "do" law, is thus an essential complement to more traditional 
explorations of what the fathers say about law – the theories they expound, or the 
concepts that can be unearthed in their works.22  In particular, it is important that not 
only individual sources or canons be examined for information on particular topics – 
"mined" for ecclesiological or sociological data – but that the tradition as a distinct legal 
whole, as embodying a legal culture, be taken into account.   In this the canonical texts 
must not only be read only in their original compositional contexts – a particular father's 
biography and opus, or the particular circumstances of a council – but also as placed and 
found within the canonical tradition itself.  The canons of Gangra, for example, need to 
be not only read in terms of 4th C debates over asceticism in Asia Minor, but also 
appreciated for their role in defining and establishing ecclesial rule and power culture 
for the next millennium (and more) as part of the core canonical corpus of virtually 
every major Christian tradition.  The after-life of sources as part of the canonical corpus 
is at least as worthy of investigation as their points and circumstances of origin.23   
 Third, this work seeks to contribute to the history of Christian canon law.  Here 
the work takes an almost post-colonial turn in its concern to carve out for Byzantine 
                                                 
22 Here it is important to recall that the discipline of ecclesiology is a late medieval and Reformation-era 
invention; before this time, the canonical texts are not so much an important source for ecclesiology as 
much as they are ecclesiology: they are the central and most concrete locus of the church's reflection on 
church order.  Cf. Lossky 1944,175; Meyendorff 1983,79-80.  On the origins of ecclesiology as a subject, 
Congar 1970,217, 270 et passim. 
23 Investigations of canonical Nachleben have been stymied particularly by the tendency to treat canon 
law as the step-daughter of Konziliengeschichte.  Here the influence of Hefele-Leclercq is no doubt 
pervasive; Hess 2002 is a modern (moderate) example. 
 7
canon law a more significant place in a field dominated by the narratives of the western 
Christian experience.  These narratives, although not generally hostile to Byzantine 
canon law (it is often little more than a marginal curiosity), have created very little 
space for its appreciation.  To put it a little, but only a little, crudely, the Byzantine 
experience tends to become submerged in two master narratives: 1) as a part of the story 
of the slow decline of church law from the original charismatic rule-purity of the pre-
Constantinan church into the corrupt legalization and secularization of the post-
Constantinian church (broadly a Protestant narrative);24 or 2) as a primitive and 
backward sideline in the story of the slow but inevitable and providential evolution of 
church law towards the 12th C western legal developments, particularly the development 
of canon law as an independent legal discipline (broadly a Roman Catholic narrative).25   
Very rarely has anyone – even the Orthodox, who tend to internalize one or other of 
these narratives – tried to consider how Byzantine canon law of our period might 
constitute a coherent, non-defective legal whole in and of itself, with its own particular 
sense of consistency, its own perfectly interesting, if sometimes odd, categories, 
concerns and agendas, and as quite content with its own "state" – i.e. not in permanent 
need of reform from decline or development into something else. In other words, rarely 
has the discipline explored Byzantine canon law, or even the western pre-12th C canon 
law (with which it shares many characteristics), as a mature legal world worthy of 
detailed exposition in itself, and with its own "narrative".26  This is precisely our 
principal concern here.   
 The fourth set of problematics is furnished by the history of late antique and 
Byzantine law.  These two disciplines – or perhaps this one discipline, as the two 
                                                 
24 Most notably Sohm 1923, but so Erickson 1991a, Hess 2002, Ohme 1998. 
25 Examples of this evolutionary reading of western canon law include Brasington 1994 (where prologues 
are studied as "evolving"  towards the values of sophisticated jurisprudence); Cosme 1955a,63 (with 
church law moving along the "way to internal perfection"); Fournier 1931,75-77 (with systematic 
collections marking "progress" in the still "embryonic" science of canon law); Gaudemet 1994,viii (the 
first millennium characterized as "a slow ascension", moving towards the "golden age) and Kuttner 1960, 
1-3 (pre-12th C law as "dissonance" followed by "harmony"); see also Cosme 1955; Ferme 1998,195-202; 
Kuttner 1975,199-207.  Sohm 1918,3-8 provides many examples from the older literature of the narrative 
of the "Unentwickeltheit und Ohnmacht" of canon law for a thousand years.  Such tendencies are, 
however, less marked in more recent surveys, such as Pennington 2007 or Reynolds 1986. See the 
criticism of Nelson 2008,303 of this type of narrative. 
26 The one ironic exception is Rudolph Sohm 1918, 1923.  Although a key expositor of the first thesis, 
Sohm's concern to black-ball the 12th C western developments as the critical moment in the church "legal 
fall" led him to consider the 4th-11th C developments in a more serious and sympathetic light. As a result, 
his concept of the "sacramental" altkatholische church law (1918,536-674; 1923,2.63-86), despite many 
problems, remains among the most insightful assessments of pre-Gratianic law, eastern or western, ever 
committed to paper.  For reflection, and extensive bibliography, on the tumultuous reception of Sohm's 
theories, Congar 1973; also Brasington 2001. 
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sometimes merge – provide the essential historical backdrop for any study of Byzantine 
canon law.  It is also in these fields, however, that the lack of an attentive cultural-
historical reading of the type aimed at in this work is sometimes most sorely felt.   
 It is (I propose) not too much of a simplification or exaggeration to suggest that 
the central problem of these fields has historically been the apparent defectivity of their 
subjects: late antique and Byzantine law simply do not seem to "work" as we expect 
them to.  In practice, because these fields have been traditionally dominated by 
academics with continental legal educations, this has meant that the expectations of 
modern legal formalism, as developed in western Europe since the 12th C, have not been 
sufficiently satisfied.  Expositions in both fields have thus traditionally centered on the 
law's many infractions of modern formalist propriety/piety: doctrinal coherence and 
elegance seems elusive; the system becomes oddly rhetorical; jurisprudential activity 
ebbs; facts and law and law and morality become "confused"; equity and substantive 
justice tends to win over procedural regularity; legislation becomes embarrassingly 
ornate and conceptually clumsy; juristic autonomy (from political interference) and 
creativity wane; the rule of law is poorly observed; and laws generally seem to lose their 
importance and efficacy as instruments of policy and dispute resolution.27   
 The traditional response to these "failures" has been the relegation of late 
antique and Byzantine law to the familiar narratives of decline/corruption or 
primitivism/ preservatism.28 In the former, late antique and Byzantine law appears as 
gradual slipping away from the conceptual heights of the classical jurists: "Roman 
classical law rises like a mountain above the common level of the others [other ancient 
laws] and it slopes down again to the previous level in the Byzantine period"29.  In the 
second, it appears as a static repository of ancient Roman traditions that are 
                                                 
27 For a flavour of these themes and assessments in the older literature, see for example Biondi 1952,1.1-
2; Jolowicz 1952,517-538; Kunkel 1964,150-154, 177-181; and see the discussion in Pieler 1978,351-
355, 361-365 (with many further references); 1997a,592-593; Ries 1983,167, 210-223.  In later Byzantine 
law, see above all Simon 1973, and the references in nn. 40-44 below. Some of these characteristics, 
particularly the loss of classical doctrinal and terminological precision and sophistication, were the basis 
of Ernst Levy's famous, but now mostly defunct (in its technical aspects), notion of Vulgarrecht.  On this 
concept, and its variety of its usages, see now especially Liebs 2008; also Wieacker 1988,2.207-218 and 
the references in n. 28. 
28 The idea of late antique and Byzantine law marking a "decline" is so commonplace as to hardly need 
comment; see the discussions in Garnsey and Humfress 2001,53-55; Honoré 2004,109-132; Humfress 
2007,2-3 (and Humfress 1998,8-10 with more examples); Matthews 2000,23-29; Pieler 1997a,565-566. 
The related idea of Byzantine law as a kind of ossified repository, looking forward to greater glory, is also 
common, as noted in Stolte 1998,266-269; 2005,58.  Pieler 1997a,566 stills opts for this latter view. 
29 Pringsheim 1944,60. 
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underappreciated and misunderstood: the Byzantines lack the "spirit" of Roman law,30 
and their law possesses a "poverty" of content with a tendency towards the total mixing 
of law and morality.31 However, it is conceded, the Byzantine at least preserved 
knowledge, which could await future use by those more capable – meaning the great 
flowering of 12th C jurisprudence and, beyond that, the European development of the ius 
commune generally (culminating, perhaps, in the 19th C German Begriffsjuriprudenz). 
 Recent scholarship, of course, has been much less inclined to resort to either of 
these narratives.  Here, however, a certain bifurcation in the discipline may be detected.  
The late antique wing of the discipline has tended to confront these narratives in one 
way, and the Byzantine wing in another.  The latter's approach has been very much a 
direct inspiration for my own. 
 The Byzantinists, particularly those associated with the Max-Planck-Institut für 
europäische Rechtsgeschichte in Frankfurt, have tended to address the problem of 
decline by completely rethinking the formalist cultural-legal paradigm that generated it 
in the first place.  Instead of trying to fit the observed phenomena into a formalist mold, 
and to find political or social excuses for its failures, they have tended to formulate a 
new paradigm to take account of the changes witnessed – i.e. to attempt to read the 
"failures" as conforming to a new and very different cultural ideal of law.   
The pioneering text of this stream of thought has been Dieter Simon's 1973 
essay Rechtsfindung am byzantinischen Reichsgericht.32  In this study, the decisions of 
a judge of the Hippodrome, Eustathius, preserved in a mid-11th C Byzantine legal 
textbook, the Πεῖρα, are analyzed in terms of modern continental legal-scientific 
Rechtsdogmatik.  Not surprisingly, Eustathius' decisions come off badly: terminology is 
varied for purely aesthetic reasons; decisions that could be based on laws are based up 
equity; similar cases are treated completely differently and with reference to different 
laws; laws are sometimes sought post-decision to provide a pre-determined penalty; and 
interpretative rules run wild.33  
To explain these results, Simon does not, however, declare the Πεῖρα an 
example of primitivism or decadence, nor even make recourse to the well-worn 
narrative of Byzantine political corruption.  Instead, he considers that the observed 
                                                 
30 Hammer 1957,1; cf. Stolte 2003,92 "never in any moment of its history did Byzantine law manage to 
surpass the intellectual qualities of its great Roman ancestor, the 'classical' Roman law of Antiquity...the 
encyclopedia [the Digest] was never spiritually digested..." 
31 Giaro 2006a,285-286. 
32 Simon 1973; and see especially the discussion and expansion on Simon's work in Pieler 1978,346-351. 
33 Simon 1973 13-23. 
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phenomena can be explained if we accept that rhetoric itself is the main dynamo of 
Byzantine Rechtsfindung, and that the laws are employed quite consistently if we 
consider them analogous to rhetorical topoi.34  In effect – although these are not quite 
Simon's words – Byzantine law is functioning as a grand literary enterprise, focused on 
justice, and with law as one (and only one) potential pool of literary tools for building 
an argument.  Other tools can also be employed, including any type of reasoned 
argument, or citations for classical authors; but, as Simon puts it, one never so much 
argues "from" the law as "with" the law.35  Indeed, the author of the Πεῖρα at one point 
remarks that "for this decision he [Eustathius] also cited laws"36 (apparently they are 
optional); and elsewhere a decision is praised first for its elegant and morally sound 
qualities, and then for the fact that it also included legal citations.37 
Laws nevertheless remain important in this world, and Simon includes many 
examples of quite sophisticated technical rule arguing and application. One reason for 
this is that they remain closely connected to the authority and person of the semi-divine 
emperor.  Indeed, Simon suggests, every Byzantine hearing is essentially an extension 
of the emperor's personal jurisdiction.38  But this itself tends to heighten the degree of 
equity in the system, as the emperor's decision is beyond rational critique or the demand 
for juridical consistency – it is always a quasi-divine statement in the realm of the Just 
and the Good.39  In effect, laws must always be read in light of a basically substantive 
criterion: the emperor's Justice. 
 In very few pages, then, Simon turns on its ear any expectation of a Byzantine 
legal formalism, and starts to sketch a reasonable alternative centered around the 
realization of the quasi-divine substantive justice of the emperor, and the ideal of the 
negotiation of legal rules in the context of much broader set of literary and cultural 
values, all loosely governed by the expectations of an ancient rhetorical education.  
Modern formalism not only does not appear as an ideal here, but its core values (on 
which, more below) make little sense: conceptual consistency is overruled by concerns 
for aesthetically pleasing and rhetorically and morally consistent decisions, and 
judgments are intended to realize extra-juridical ideals of justice.  The place here for 
many other features of modern formalist systems – an independent and "creative" expert 
                                                 
34 On this particularly, Simon 1973,18-23 
35 Simon 1973,20. 
36 Cited without reference in Simon 1973,21; emphasis Simon's. 
37 Cited without reference in Simon 1973,13. 
38 Simon 1973, 29. 
39 ibid. 
 11
judiciary, forensic agonism, technical jurisprudence, the rule of law, the autonomy of 
law, and even the ideal of submitting to formal rules at all – is far from clear. 
Numerous other studies in Byzantine law have since confirmed and continued to 
build upon this picture.  Studies of other juridical decision, for example, have tended to 
reinforce the low place of laws and technical legal concepts in legal processes: general 
extra-legal moral or metaphysical considerations, and the rhetorical know-how of 
presenting them, are often more prominent than the real juridical construction of 
justice.40  As Haldon notes: "Judges were not...expected to fulfill their obligations 
through applying the law, in a modern sense.  On the contrary, the law they applied was 
the morality of the society – this replaced the normative legal framework – interpreted 
through the prism of inherited legislation...."41  Law is essentially an exercise in applied 
morality.  Similarly, the degree to which later Byzantine legislation disappoints as the 
policy instruments of an active modern-like positivist legislator has become increasingly 
clear. Haldon agains puts it well: "the legal 'system' became less a practical instrument 
for intervening in the world of men...but more a set of theories which represented a 
desired...state of affairs...Imperial action was thus not directed at emending laws to 
conform to reality, but rather at emending reality to conform to the inherited legal-moral 
apparatus."42   Legislation thus emerges increasingly as a highly sacralized and 
symbolic production, more the product of God than a secular emperor, and with the task 
of providing a symbolic framework for understanding the world and impressing and 
internalizing moral and metaphysical lessons – not necessarily addressing "real" legal 
problems (although it does this too – occasionally).43  In this sacralized world, not 
surprisingly, standard legal abrogation principles such as lex posterior derogat legi 
priori – although known and understood – have disturbingly little meaning, and little 
consistent use (how do you abrogate a divine law?).44  Similarly the rule of law and the 
relationship between secular law and church law can never seem to find clear 
conceptual articulation or delineation.45  Consistent legal-dogmatic architecture of any 
kind is simply difficult to identify: legal concepts and techniques are known, and 
occasionally employed, but they are somehow not very important. 
                                                 
40 For example, Dennis 1994; Kazhdan 1994; Laiou 1994; Macrides 1990, 1992, 2005; Papagianni 2005; 
Pieler 1970. 
41 Haldon 1990,278. 
42 Haldon 1990,249. 
43 In addition to Haldon 1990 see Fögen 1987, 1989; Lokin 1994; Simon 1994; also Lanata 1989a. 
44 As n. 43; also Fögen 1993,67-68; Pieler 1978,346, 1991; Stolte 1991, 1991a, 2008,695. Cf. also 
Triantaphyllopoulos 1985,7-8 on the Greek principle of lex prior derogat legi posteriori! 
45 See Fögen 1993,68-72 for a summary of recent research. 
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 In late antique law, in contrast, the approach to confronting the narrative of 
decline has tended to take a very different tact.  Instead of rethinking the propriety of 
applying a formalist legal mould to late antique law, scholars have tended – with 
exceptions46 – to be more concerned to show that the "failures" of late antique law were 
simply not as bad, widespread or meaningful as they appeared: late antique law was not 
so corrupt as usually thought; jurists were still present and active; codification and 
legislation was still creative, even learned, and more doctrinally coherent than it first 
appears; juristic activity was not so closely controlled by the centralized state as 
sometimes thought; the rhetorization of legislation was not as complete, new or 
significant as it seems; the emperor was not so overwhelmingly in control of law as he 
seemed to be, or as arbitrary as he appeared, and participation in the legislative process 
was broader than often thought; laws were more efficacious than the old narratives 
allow; and (thank goodness!) there was still plenty of room for clever legal 
professionals to "play" the system.47 
All of this we must accept as true, at least for the 4th and 5th C, and perhaps 
somewhat later.  Nevertheless, it is difficult to shake a nagging worry that many of these 
recent studies are somehow "keeping up the legal appearances". Certainly the unstated 
implication of most of these studies seems to be that the only way late antique law 
might be possessed of a real legal experience is if it conforms to the demands of  a 
modern-like formalist-positivist system, complete with an ongoing and quasi-
independent juristic science, a responsive and creative legislative center still intent on 
effecting policy through laws, the rule of law, and a strong emphasis on resolving 
disputes through the consistent logical application of formal legal rules. Whether any of 
this, however, corresponded to the actual legal-cultural ideals of late antique society is 
rarely asked.  As a result, in their very attempt to confront the older narratives of 
decline, these studies often appear to have internalized the legal prejudices of these 
same narratives.  Certainly key legal-cultural issues are left unaddressed: to what degree 
were jurisprudence and jurists valued in legal processes? was doctrinal legal creativity a 
legal-cultural ideal?  was juristic autonomy an ideal? were carefully crafted and 
                                                 
46 The best example is probably Biondi 1952 who in formulating his "Christian" Roman law does seem to 
suggest a rethinking of the very fabric of Roman legal culture; in this respect – that of his overall 
approach – I think the importance of his work has not been sufficiently recognized.  Stroux 1949, and the 
broader conversation about the early rhetorization of Roman law, perhaps also opens the door to such a 
re-conceptualization of the nature of Roman law, but in practice seems to remain mostly confined to 
narrow questions of the influence of specific rhetorical concepts on Roman juridical doctrine. 
47 Here I would broadly count the approaches of, for example, Harries, Honoré, Humfress, Liebs, 
Matthews, Sirks and Voss; also Pieler 1997a. 
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doctrinally coherent legal documents more valued than more "rhetorical" ones, even in 
formal legal processes?  was anyone particularly bothered that the emperor was the sole 
font of law, and if not, why not – and what might be the legal theoretical reasons for 
this? was the "rule of law" a positive or useful value? what were ancient criteria for an 
"effective" law? was formal procedural consistency a value?  In short, rarely does 
anyone explicitly ask if modern-like instrumental legal formalism was itself a legal 
value in late antiquity and beyond.   
 Two reasons might be suggested for this difference in approach.  First, late 
antique law is undoubtedly simply more formalist in its general orientation than its 
Byzantine successor: the Romanist vision of a legal system is not so hopelessly 
dissonant with these texts as in the later Byzantine period.  It is certainly possible – and 
perhaps desirable – to maintain its ideals in the historiography of the late antique period. 
Second, and perhaps more importantly, much recent literature in late antique law has 
taken a distinctly socio-historical turn.  As a result, many scholars are simply no longer 
interested in exploring the intellectual architecture of late antique law, decline or no.  
More important is providing accounts of its socio-political realities, and in particular the 
varieties of negotiations of power of which law is both part and vehicle. Many recent 
studies thus may treat intellectual-cultural issues, often very perceptively, but their real 
argument is centered on affirming that, for example, late antique law can be read as an 
interesting, creative and diverse set of socio-political interactions; legislative processes 
were informed by a surprisingly dynamic set of figures and influences; or the rhetorical 
character of the legislation played an important role in broader patterns of power-
negotiation.  For these issues, the matter of the intellectual or cultural "decline" of law, 
or indeed, the nature of late antique law as a coherent cultural whole – the intellectual 
and cultural underpinnings of these phenomena – is simply not a terribly relevant 
question, and can be sublimated into descriptions of social practice.  Certainly the 
intellectual-cultural aspects of decline need not be addressed very directly. Further, the 
cultural-historical problems that are raised, such as the construction of authority, 
perceptions of punishment, the textures of imperial propaganda, or the role of law in 
identity-formation, tend to be more about the interface of law and culture than the 
ancient culture of law per se. 48  
There are, however, prima facie many good reasons to rethink whether or not 
formalist legal operations should be assumed as a particularly central cultural ideal even 
                                                 
48 For these last, see for example Harries 1999, 2000 or the studies in Matthisen 2001. 
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in late antiquity. The work of John Lendon and Peter Brown, for example, has 
demonstrated the extent to which late antique aristocratic power-culture was dominated 
by relatively informal, yet deeply internalized, codes of paideia, friendship and honour.  
Into this world technical legal dispute resolution fits only awkwardly.49  Late antique 
legislation too, with its sacral epithets, morally and religiously charged language, 
issuing from emperors who are increasingly stepping into the Platonic/Hellenistic (and 
now Christian) model of kingship as a semi-divine mediator between heaven and earth, 
the "law animate", hardly encourages the conceptualization of laws as the highly 
manipulable and  instrumental rules of a modern secular positivism/formalism; they 
seem much more like the numinous, divine mandates of a sacred law.50  Certainly the 
well-known rhetorical texture of the laws does not, in fact, easily lend themselves to be 
"used" in a logical rule-calculus; they suggest a much more literary manner of 
employment in a complex and sophisticated set of value negotiations. 
Perhaps most importantly, and to an extent that is not sufficiently taken account 
of in the literature, the entire classical Greek cultural tradition that underlies the late 
antique synthesis clearly does not privilege formal or "scientific" jurisprudential work at 
all – and as is well known, hardly contains any examples of it.51  Indeed, it is not 
difficult to find a downright stigmatization of formal rule-work and rule-reasoning, and 
of rules generally.  Plato's vision of law, for example, tends to view laws as somewhat 
unfortunate necessities, ideally to be transcended, but if not, only justified by their 
assimilation to educational tools and ideally merely the instrument of the divine 
philosopher-king.52  Strict rule adherence of straight commands is thus mostly a matter 
for slaves – not for the free, for whom law functions as yet one more means to the 
ethical education of the soul, and should be persuasive and rational.53  In any case, law 
is very much more about virtue than rule-adherence per se, subordinated to justice, and 
                                                 
49 Brown 1992,35-70; Lendon 1997,176-236. 
50 On this complex of image and concepts, its continuity and its (increasing) dominance in late antiquity, 
see Centrone 2000;  Dvornik 1966,2.672-723 (on the Christian usages; on the Greek, 1.132-277); Fögen 
1987, 1993,43-49; Garnsey 2000; Garnsey and Humfress 2001,25-51; Kelly 1998; see also Enßlin 1943.   
51 For example, Jones 1956, 292-308; Todd 1993,10-17; Triantaphyllopoulos 1985,31-35; Wolf 1975.  
52 On Plato's general legal theory, in a variety of contexts, Cohen 1995,43-51; Dvornik 1.179-183 (et 
passim); Jones 1956,1-23; Kittel 1993,1025-1035; Laks 2000; Letwin 2005,9-41; O'Meara 2003; Romilly 
1971,179-201; Rowe 2000; Schofield 2000. There are various ways of harmonizing Plato's sometime 
contradictory statements about law, but I think there can be little question that the Rechtstaat is a distinct 
second-best solution.  Certainly it must be firmly embedded in a strong extra-legal philosophical and 
pedagogical framework.  
53 See especially Laws 720-723. Cf. Lendon 1997,236, where it is noted that the mechanical-like 
operation of a modern rationalized bureaucracy is better compared to a Roman slave workhouse than the 
Roman government (which he likens to a soccer team).  
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part of a much broader pedagogical program.54 Greek rhetoric too, despite considerable 
attention to forensic oratory, and unquestionably the ability to function as a kind of legal 
technique,55 has a notably minor and even stigmatized place for real legal reason of a 
modern formalist flavour; argumentation is prototypically around questions of moral 
qualities of persons and substantive justice.56  Even classical Greek procedure, 
embedded and preserved for late antiquity in the canonical rhetorical speeches, seems to 
have had an allergy to much formalism, allowing considerable latitude to judges in 
arriving at decisions, unrestrained by technical and strict rule adherence and even laws– 
very like the Πεῖρα, in fact.57    
Whatever the classical Roman law's own formalist proclivities or potentials, 
therefore, there are at least a few critical indications in late antique culture that suggest 
that a formalist-positivist legal paradigm should not be too quickly or automatically 
assumed as a late antique legal-cultural ideal.  The "cultural cards" are at least in part 
stacked against it. This work, however modestly, and however restricted its scope, will 
hopefully serve as yet one more indication of this. 
None of these four sets of problematics are the explicit topics of this work 
(although we will return to them in the conclusion).  This study will instead seek to 
address each indirectly by providing a type of study that is hopefully valuable for them 
all: a careful description and analysis of the cultural and intellectual contours of at least 
one ancient Greco-Roman normative structure, Byzantine canon law, as a coherent 
whole, and as it may be read to describe its own legal world.  
The study will be divided into four chapters.  The first two chapters will treat 
how Byzantine canon law is framed by the tradition.  In chapter one, we will examine 
Byzantine canon law from a "bird's eye view", examining the overall shape of the 
tradition and the patterns of its historical development, and considering what the basic 
contours of this development reveal about the legal presuppositions of the texts.  In 
chapter two, we will turn to how the Byzantines themselves introduced their own 
tradition and set the parameters of its operation through various traditional prologues 
                                                 
54 See for example Plato Laws 630-1, 643e, 653b, 705d-6a; see also Gagarin 2000.  Aristotle's Politics 
tends in much the same direction. 
55 This is something of  a commonplace; see for example Calhoun 1944,58-63; Jones 1956,298-308, and 
more broadly Bederman 2000; Brasington 1994,227-228; Humfress 2007,9-28, 62-132 (and pp. 3, 25 for 
references to the older debate of the influence of rhetoric on Roman law; also, Humfress 1998,73-80); 
Winterbottom 1982.  Ancient rhetoric, if far from suggesting a formalist legal science, is fully capable of 
providing a quasi-technical framework for the operation of legal argumentation, as even brief 
acquaintance with stasis theory makes plain (see especially Heath 1995).   
56 Heath 1995,76-77, 141-142, 294; Morgan 1998,234-235; Todd 2005; Yunis 2005,202-204. 
57 Cohen 1995; Gagarin 2005a,34-36; Lanni 2005; Sealey 1994,51-57; Todd 1993,58-60; Yunis 2005. 
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and prologue-like materials.  In the third chapter we will turn to a careful reading of the 
Byzantine canons themselves.  Here the literary orientation of the work will become 
most evident as our concern becomes directed not so much towards an analysis of the 
canons' substantive content, but to how the forms, styles and types of language 
employed in the canons can be read as revealing of legal beliefs.  In the last chapter we 
will then consider the nature of the first Byzantine systematizations of the canons, and 
what these systems reveal about how the canons could be read, shaped, organized and 
otherwise jurisprudentially "digested".  Finally, in the conclusion, we will consider how 
the various patterns and emphases that have arisen might suggest a coherent cultural-
intellectual architecture of Byzantine canon law, and what this may mean for the 
problematics introduced above. 
Each section of the study will proceed through a simple process of description, 
historical contextualization and consideration of how the observed phenomena might be 
read as indicative of particular legal concepts or orientations.   
The determination of the "legal" – this last step – is, however, a hermeneutically 
tricky matter.  Our primary concern is to allow the texts to themselves define their own 
sense of legality, and as such we will not attempt to analyze systematically the text 
according to any rigid legal-theoretical or anthropological model.  Nevertheless, some 
type of pre-determined questions or criteria for identifying and examining "the legal" 
must be brought to the texts.  Although we might like to think that one can explore the 
legal textures of the Byzantine canonical texts "on their own terms", such a phrase can 
only be understood as a shorthand for a dialectical process of challenging modern 
preconceptions and expectations against the evidence within the historical texts. We can 
therefore entertain no illusions about approaching these texts without certain 
preconceived legal problematics or categories.  However, the hermeneutic crux of our 
method is simply that we allow the historical texts to challenge these preconceptions, 
and be prepared for surprises – our legal preconceptions must be employed in such a 
way as to allow points of difference to emerge, and to not simply set an agenda of 
conformance.  In this it is particularly critical that we be quite open about what type of 
legal questions and criteria we are bringing to the texts.   
The chief legal foil against which we are reading the Byzantine texts – as should 
already be apparent – is a composite construction of modern narratives, practices and 
perceptions that may be termed legal formalism, or perhaps better, positivist-
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formalism.58  This construction does not correspond to any real legal system, but is 
broadly descriptive of a set of practices and cultural ideals which have their immediate 
ancestors in 12th C western European readings of Roman law texts, and which have 
become characteristic of the "learned" and official law of most modern western legal 
systems (especially continental).  Its contours should be familiar.59  Law is conceived as 
an independent and abstract project or field of human (and academic) endeavour 
concerned with the application of a formal system of mostly written rules to a wide 
range of dispute and order-related factual situations.  These rules are conceived as 
ideally clearly established and defined by a competent legislative authority, and are 
treated as – and are intended to be – a closed and coherent systematic whole.60  Ideally 
the rules are as comprehensive as possible, even "gapless", and are meant to be able to 
address virtually any factual situation that may arise.  To this end, the rules are often 
exceptionally lengthy and detailed, with many provisions, exceptions and qualifications 
– and there are very many of them.  More importantly, the legal system (and it is 
thought of as a "system") is characterized by an advanced and sophisticated set of 
proprietary methods and techniques – a set of "secondary rules"61 – that governs the 
application and use of the primary rules and that try to ensure that these rules can be 
applied as widely and consistently as possible.  These rules can even generate new 
primary rules.  
Consistency and fairness of rule-application is a chief value of this system, and 
is related to a central conviction that one can find a more or less "right" legal answer for 
any situation solely from the disciplined and predictable operation of legal principles 
and concepts (the "forms" of the law can themselves produce correct answers – thus 
"formalism").  In effect, the rules themselves can be made to "think through" any 
situation.  Because of this, the system places great emphasis on internal logical 
coherence, and is exceptionally concerned about establishing clearly defined and precise 
definitions, concepts, and relationships between rules, and eliminating any 
                                                 
58 A very wide range of meanings can be attached to both these terms in modern legal theory.  See the 
comments of Posner 1993,9-26 (incl. n. 31); Wieacker 1952,342, and nn. 3, 5. Our usage is in its details 
proprietary and is defined by what follows. It conforms, nevertheless, to what I perceive to be a general 
disciplinary "folk usage" of formalism and positivism to refer to the main dynamics of modern 
professionalized legal culture in the western world. 
59 The following owes much to Berman 1983,7-10; Glenn 2007,118-152; Roberts 1979,17-29; Watson 
1995; Weber 1925, 61-64; 224-255 as well as numerous other works on legal theory and modern legal 
culture, listed in the bibliography. 
60 This does not require an actual code; Anglo-American law treats both statutory and case law as 
functionally witnessing to a coherent set of legal principles and concepts. 
61 A concept borrowed here loosely from Hart 1961,89-96, who borrowed it loosely from Wittgenstein. 
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contradictions, repetitions, or irregularities.  The system thus often seems to function 
like a "science", and the designation may even be welcomed. When the logical and 
consistent application of legal method and technique cannot find a proper legal answer 
judicial "discretion" must be invoked – but, it is held, hopefully very rarely and in a 
very controlled manner.  It is much preferable for the rule-system itself to produce an 
answer than to depend upon the whimsy of a fallible human judge.  Indeed, the 
controlling metaphor of the system is probably technological: law is idealized as 
functioning as a quasi-mathematical mechanism of legal doctrine in which rules may be 
impartially applied to different fact situations.62   It is recognized that such a formalist 
rule-mechanism will not always produce an obviously just solution for every problem, 
but this is accepted as an unfortunate but necessary element of the system.  Thus the 
critical distinction arises – and is accepted – between formal and substantive justice, that 
is, between a "legally" just solution (formally and procedurally correct) and a "really" 
just solution (according to the value judgments of a given observer or community, or 
various philosophical criteria). This can in turn encourage a certain amoralism in law's 
practice, where participants are expected to function not so much as truth-seekers as 
skilled manipulators of a kind of "rule game", defending "interests" in a strongly 
agonistic manner. 
Not surprisingly, this type of legal system, a complex system of rules and rule-
logic, is largely operated and developed by a professional caste of legal experts and 
academics.  These in turn function in the context of proprietary legal professional and 
academic infrastructures.  This professional caste tends to form a distinct class in 
society, with its own forms of education, its own career-paths, its own special 
qualifications, its own special professional language, its own special dress, and its own 
standards of conduct – its own "ethos". 
The presence of a well-defined class of legal professionals is, however, only one 
aspect of an even broader and central motif: autonomy.   Not only does law function as 
the domain of a clearly demarcated professional cadre, but law understands itself as a 
distinct field of human endeavour and study, separate from other fields and with its own 
language and special method of reasoning and thinking.  It is, in particular, constantly 
concerned with self-differentiation from other types of normative systems and forms of 
social control.  Especially characteristic is an ongoing preoccupation with distinguishing 
itself quite clearly from ethics/morality and politics (and in canon law, theology).  An 
                                                 
62 Justice's blindfold is a wonderful illustration of this.  The scale is now determining justice. 
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extremely important aspect of this autonomous self-perception – and a critical aspect of 
its formalism and positivism – is the idea and ideal that it is able to function legitimately 
with as little recourse to these "outside" narratives and values as possible.  It wishes to 
be as sealed as possible from outside interferences, bound instead by its well-defined 
legal rule-world.   
Finally, law is highly susceptible to patterns of construction and reconstruction 
as legislators or legal professionals shape and reshape it to conform to changing policy 
goals or value decisions (this is the principal expression of the system's "positivism").  
This may happen through a formal legislative process or through less dramatic 
philosophical or proprietary legal-academic discourses (a "jurisprudence", casuistic or 
deductive).  In all cases the law is in this respect very "secular": it is very much a 
malleable human instrument or tool for the effecting of broader agendas or goals, 
whether these be the whim of a despot, the consequences of a natural law theory, a 
social policy, or a concern for greater systematic consistency.  Provided that the correct 
formal procedures (formalism again) are followed, rules may thus be dismissed, 
replaced or modified quite easily.  The law is thus typically always "progressing", 
"advancing", or "growing" – change, even profound change, is fairly easy. 
This vision of the legal has long been recognized in both legal theory and legal 
anthropology as having no special claim as a source of universal categories to explore 
human law, nor even as embodying a particularly useful legal ideal.63  Nevertheless, we 
employ it here because it continues to dominate in one way or other the legal thinking of 
the four disciplines enumerated above.  More importantly it remains, even if weakened, 
the functional reality of modern western legal culture.  Most lawyers, legislators and 
judges in the western world (indeed, in most of the world; western legal formalism is 
one of the world's greatest imperial success stories) continue to think of their work in 
terms not so far from those just described.  Similarly, most citizens of western countries, 
despite frustrations and dissatisfactions, understand and expect the processes, ideals, 
values and struggles of this type of legal culture.  It thus captures better than any other 
specific theoretical model the parameters and points of reference of our culture's legal 
imagination: our legal instincts and habits, the "cultural plot" of what law is about.  It 
thus provides a heuristic backdrop of unparalleled richness and cultural "density" for 
                                                 
63 As to not having any special claim on providing categories for human law, this is the essence of the– 
Gluckman-Bohannan debate in legal anthropology; see Donovan 2007,100-122.  In legal philosophy legal 
formalism-positivism of the type described here is so dead as to have almost become the straw-man of 
legal wrongness, strongly contested by – to name a few – sociological jurisprudence, legal realism, 
pragmatism and critical law studies.  See for example the comments of Stone 2004,166-167. 
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any study of a non-western, non-modern legal system aimed at ferreting out contrasts 
and similarities of legal-cultural belief.  It is, in any case, unavoidable. 
Aside from this general formalist-positivist foil, a number of more specific 
questions are also persistent in this study's examination of "the legal" in Byzantine 
canon law, even if they do not always emerge directly from the sources.  The most 
prominent is the relationship between Byzantine canon law and contemporary 
Byzantine secular law.  This is an issue that in different ways is important to all the 
disciplines mentioned above.  Here our concern will be not only explicit theoretical 
articulations of this relationship (which are few in our texts, in any case), but also 
subtler textures of how the texts locate themselves in relation to the secular law through 
patterns of shared (or not) nomenclature, diction, patterns of thought, compositional 
forms, genres, and images.   
Comparison with western canonical tradition of the first millennium is also a 
recurring theme, although only sporadically. This is both inevitable and useful given the 
western orientation of much modern canon law historiography.  We will also very 
occasionally (mostly in chapter one) look east, to the Syrian and other "oriental" 
Christian worlds, considering ways in which Christian canon law can be read as a 
unified legal story.  In this we will be attempting to take a few modest steps towards 
breaking the parochialism of much modern canon law historiography. 
Finally, this study will be frequently informed, albeit usually indirectly, by a 
wide array of categories and questions derived from modern legal sociology, 
comparative law, law and literature studies, and, above all, legal anthropology.64  This 
literature has proven to be a fertile, and indeed indispensable, source of challenging 
questions and problems: do legal systems need formal norms? do the logical consistency 
and interrelationship of norms need to be privileged? are "facts" important in 
adjudication? must legislation emerge from a clear positive authority? must law be 
clearly delimited from other types of social regulation?  The importance of this 
literature is perhaps primarily to awaken one from any legal-dogmatic slumbering: no 
other literature is so useful for challenging one to take into account the enormous 
possible varieties of human legal experience, and so deeply illuminating of one's own 
legal presuppositions.  This study, however, in no way pretends to be a work of legal 
                                                 
64 Todd 1993,18-29 was a key inspiration in my investigation of legal anthropology. Among the works 
consulted include the introductory works of Donovan 2007, Roberts 1979, and Rouland 1988 and the 
studies of Bohannan 1957, Diamond 1950, Gluckman 1955, Hoebel 1954, Hoebel and Llewellyn 1941, 
Maine 1861, Malinowski 1926 and Pospisil 1971.  In the other fields mentioned important resources have 
included Glenn 2007, Ong 1982, Posner 2009, Weber 1925, Ziolkowski 1997. 
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anthropology or comparative law, just as it is not a work of legal theory – we are, to 
borrow a phrase from Richard Posner, "consumers", not "producers" of these fields.65  
Their questions and categories may nevertheless be felt constantly assisting us in the 
recognition and articulation of many of the legal textures and patterns we encounter.  
A few limitations have been imposed upon this study.  The first is chronological.  
The dates 381 to 883 have been chosen because the first corresponds (at least roughly) 
to the adoption of the so-called "Antiochian" corpus by the church of the recently-
triumphant Nicene orthodoxy, and therefore to the emergence of the collection of texts 
that will become the core of the Byzantine canonical tradition. The second marks the 
completion of the so-called Photian recension of the Collection in Fourteen Titles, 
which, in retrospect, marked the completion of the core Byzantine canonical corpus.  
These dates therefore encompass what may be fairly considered the central period of 
development of the Byzantine canonical tradition, i.e. the time during which the texts 
and text-structures were produced that even to this day are considered the heart of the 
entire Byzantino-Orthodox canonical tradition. These dates are, however, symbolic; 
material outside of these dates will be occasionally considered to illustrate broader 
themes and patterns. 
The texts from this period to be examined have also been limited very narrowly 
to the texts that emerge as the central corpus structures of the Byzantine canonical 
tradition.  The scope, definition, and development of these "central corpus structures" 
will be examined in detail in chapter one, but suffice to say they includes all of the 
canonical sources of the 883 recension of the Collection in Fourteen Titles, the 
introductory and rubrical structures of the two extant Byzantine systematic collections 
from this period (the Collection in Fifty Titles and the Collection in Fourteen Titles), 
and a number of other smaller texts from this period typically found in the manuscripts.  
These texts are not exhaustive of the canonical material of this period, by they do 
constitute its most important and prominent elements. 
Although this work is primarily conceived as a close and "closed" historical-
cultural reading of these canonical texts, its topic can only be meaningfully pursued 
with some attention to the historical contexts for the structures and patterns observed.  
Because the potential contexts for illuminating patterns of legal belief and imagination 
are enormous, these too have been restricted mostly to a pool of texts from this period 
that might be considered primary witnesses and influences on the Byzantine canonical 
                                                 
65 Posner 1993,xii. 
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texts as a formal corpus structure.  This pool is still very large, and includes virtually all 
of the secular legal collections of this period, as well as a wide variety of other texts that 
form the canons' most immediate and obvious contexts: the Apostolic church-order 
collections, literary/philosophical treatments of law, and Scriptural law-code-like texts.  
Unfortunately, the length restrictions of the modern doctorate have precluded systematic 
comparison with these texts, but the most significant parallels and differences will be 
noted. 
Despite these limitations, the scope of this work remains extremely broad, 
encompassing over five centuries of canonical material. This breadth is perhaps 
disconcerting.  However, the broad scope of this study is the result of a firm 
methodological conviction that the fundamental contours of legal belief – our principal 
topic – can only be convincing traced in categories, structures, and shapes of the 
traditional texts as they develop over the cultural longue durée.  It is only in the 
cumulative coherence of how the corpus takes shapes (chapter one), how the tradition 
frames its own endeavours (chapter two), how the central texts of the tradition 
themselves "talk" about their legal world (chapter three), and how the tradition 
organizes and arranges itself (chapter four) that the nature of law and legality in the 
canonical collections truly begins to emerge with any clarity.  More specific or 
impressionistic anecdotal treatments do not easily lend themselves to basic questions of 
how the system as a whole was perceived – and can even evade the challenge of 
considering the cultural whole at all.   
 Nevertheless, this broad scope has required certain economies.  To provide for 
sufficient analysis of the Byzantine canonical material itself, comparisons and 
contextualizations have had to be kept restrained – and too often relegated to the 
footnotes or appendices.  A number of translations, additional examples or data sets, and 
important, but supplementary discussions or illustrations, have also been appendicized.  
Finally, substantiation, particularly in the third and fourth chapters, has generally been 
kept representative, not exhaustive. 
One other, more important caveat must also be made: even as an exploration into 
Byzantine church-legal culture, this work can only be considered one piece of a much 
larger project.  It demands at least two companion studies.  First, the field desperately 
needs a much more thorough study of Greek patristic thinking on law and legality than 
currently exists, and this must include work on the influence of Roman legal thinking on 
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Greek patristics (Latin material has been much better served in both areas).66  Such a 
study must examine not only explicit expression of theory, but also track the use of legal 
metaphors, images and language, and consider broader legal symbolism and iconology 
(and even architecture).  Second, and perhaps more importantly, the field requires a 
thorough cultural-legal analysis of texts conveying forensic practice, similar to that 
performed by Dieter Simon on the Πεῖρα.  Important texts would include conciliar acta, 
other record of trials (e.g. of Maximus the Confessor), and even epistolary exchanges on 
church-legal matters (e.g. between Photius and Nicholas I).  For our purposes, these 
texts need to be examined not so much for what they may or may not reveal about what 
"really happened" socially or politically, but for the legal assumptions and values they 
assume and promote. 
 
 
 
                                                 
66 For example, Biondi 1952, Gaudemet 1957,163-176; 1958,467-483. See the treatment of this question, 
with many further references, in Humfress 2007,147-152. On the Greek fathers, see the very brief 
treatment in Stiegler 1958,97-101, and now Troianos 1992.  
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CHAPTER 1: THE SHAPE OF THE LAW 
 
The basic shape of the tradition as a textual artifact – its constituent texts and their 
structures, and the patterns and dynamics of their formation and growth – reveal much 
about the nature of Byzantine canon-legal culture.  Preliminary even to the conscious 
and explicit introduction and framing of the canon-legal texts, these aspects of the 
canonical tradition constitute the most basic way in which Byzantine canon law, as a 
normative system, presents itself to us and sets its own fundamental parameters.   
 
A. A preliminary problem: codicology 
 This question of the "shape" of the tradition immediately raises the problem of 
how the tradition was physically present and encountered by contemporaries, i.e. 
publication forms, size, circulation, typical manuscript contents, and text layouts.  In 
other words, it immediately raises the problem of Byzantine canon-legal codicology.   
 Unfortunately, a codicological description and analysis of Byzantine canon law 
has never been performed.  In fact, it is surprisingly difficult to find even basic 
codicological information in the modern literature: the physical shape of the tradition 
has never been a primary focus of interest.  This neglect is so dissonant with our own 
priorities that it requires some explanation. 
The basic problem is disciplinary: cultural history simply does not think 
codicologically.  Rarely does a discussion of Byzantine theology, for example, start 
with the question of what a typical Byzantine "theological manuscript" looked like, 
what it contained, and how it was structured – or even if it existed.  Instead, one tends to 
begin and end analyses with individual texts, extracted from the manuscripts, and 
possibly reconstructed.  This tendency is driven by two major disciplinary trends, both 
of which are broadly problematic for our study.   
First, modern historicism has tended to treat texts as anchored so firmly in 
original contexts that one can easily ignore their later historical relationships with each 
other and how, over time, texts become incorporated into larger cultural-intellectual 
wholes.  One instead focuses on discrete text, at one discrete moment.   
Second, and even more critically, an atomistic approach to ancient texts is 
strongly reinforced by the ideal of the modern critical edition.  This ideal – as evident in 
all the major primary source series – has tended to encourage the isolation and 
"disentanglement" of select individual texts from manuscript contexts.  As a result, 
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instead of reading whole manuscripts, and individual texts within the literal "con-texts" 
of the manuscripts, scholars tend to read, via the critical apparatus, single texts across 
different manuscripts.  The disposition of the relevant texts in the manuscripts – how 
often they are found, where they are found, next to what and how often, in what form, 
with what breaks and with what scholia – is distinctly side-lined.  The question can 
hardly even be asked how these factors might inform our understanding of how the texts 
were read and how the texts, in their manuscript setting, constituted (or did not 
constitute) a particular thought-world.   
This discouraging of interest in how texts were physically synthesized and 
related to one other in the manuscripts – and by extension, in the cultural tradition itself 
– has encouraged re-synthesizing and re-ordering these texts in relation to each other in 
ways that may have little resonance with the priorities, interests or textures of the 
historical cultural tradition itself.  A classic example of such a re-synthesis would be a 
"history of ideas" survey of ancient theology or philosophy that systematically traces the 
development of various discrete concepts and ideas through a patchwork juxtaposition 
of texts with little attention to whether the texts in question were ever much read at all, 
whether they were associated with each other, and whether they lend themselves to such 
systematic conceptual presentation in the first place.  In canon law, the 19th C Orthodox 
manual tradition represents such a re-synthesis.  The canonical manuals systematically 
extract rule content from the traditional texts and reorganize them under doctrinal 
headings derived from western canon and civil law.  The historical shape of the tradition 
is important only for clarifying and purifying the individual "sources" of this 
reconstruction – not for the architecture of the system as a whole. 
Further problems are presented by the extreme interest of critical editions in 
restoring only "original" texts – texts as found at one point in time, their origin.1   This 
again distracts attention from how texts develop over time, and thus how the texts were 
related to each other and digested over time – critical issues for cultural history.  The 
effect of these editions is to present not what ancient readers were actually reading – the 
critical starting point of cultural-historical analysis – but what modern scholars think 
ancient readers should have been reading.  The entire ancient textual tradition thus 
becomes a huge montage of reconstructed, disembodied semi-hypothetical "originals", 
                                                 
1 For broader critique of the concept of an "original" text, and the related ideas of "original meaning" see, 
for example, Epp 1999; Louth 1983,104-109; McGann 1983.  
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which may bear very little resemblance to what most, or even any, exemplars of the text 
actually look like.2   
This concern for originals also promotes a text-editing culture which sees 
variations and accretions as a "problem" that must be, and can be, penetrated, excised 
and dismissed in order to get to the "real" text.  Sometimes this real text might not even 
be an original, but simply those core elements of a text which are of particular interest 
of the editor.  In Byzantine canon law, Périclès-Pierre Joannou's edition of the canons, 
at present the best critical edition, provides an example of this tendency.3  It first 
disembodies or "cleans up" the tradition, stripping the canons of their traditional 
manuscript structures, appendices, indices, and scholia.4  It then goes on to include a 
source that is not found in any Byzantine canonical manuscripts,5 adds numerous 
rubrical headings not commonly encountered,6 and boldly re-arranges the sources such 
that the Apostolic canons are found prefaced to the "patristic" material – a disposition 
never encountered in the tradition, and quite contrary to its spirit.  The result is 
something that is neither particularly close to anything in the manuscripts, nor, indeed, 
to any "original".  These actions make sense in light of Joannou's primary interest – 
providing modern Catholic codifiers with the most important Byzantine canonical 
sources – but they do not result in a particularly useful window onto the Byzantine 
canonical tradition itself.  
In this respect, the older, and often inaccurate, edition of J.B. Pitra is superior.7  
Although the overall form of the edition does not attempt to approximate any Byzantine 
manuscript, Pitra was careful to include the standard "framing" texts of the manuscripts 
(prologues, systematic indices), some of the introductory apostolic materials, some 
appendix material, and some scholia.8  The much more accurate editions of 
Beneshevich are also more useful and reliable inasmuch as they attempt to convey t
whole of specific "originals": the original version of the Coll50 and the "Tarasian 
he 
                                                 
2 An excellent example is Scripture: it can come as a surprise to many scholars that even the New 
Testament only rarely forms a single physical book in the Greek manuscript tradition, and that the 
Catholic epistles almost always precede the Pauline.  Metzger 1981,54-56; Parker 2008,70-81. 
3 Turner 1899 is another example; the concern to compare texts has made it difficult to determine exactly 
what any one collection looks like. 
4 Even one set of "prologue" material, for Constantinople, is missing; see Appendix B (2). 
5 Constantinople 869 in Fonti 1.1.289-342.  Joannou carefully notes, of course, that this is an addition.   
6 See Appendix B (2). 
7 Criticism of Pitra's text is widespread: see Funk 1905,1.xxiii; Sources Introduction; Stolte 1998a,184; 
and above all Sbornik 24-25 and Sin 20-21, et passim.  Even casual use of the text will reveal many small 
errors. 
8 Beneshevich is also quite critical of Pitra's edition of the scholia (2.642-655): "крайне 
неудовлетворительно" (Sin 250-251). 
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recension" of the Coll14.9  Beneshevich is also concerned to convey scholia, albeit 
separated from the main body of the texts.10  The best representative of the shape
texture of the tradition is, however, Rhalles-Potles, the least critical of the major modern 
editions. It roughly approximates the typical order and content of a fairly full late 
Byzantine manuscript, with prologues, systematic index, full corpus with comment
and appendix materials – although without scholia.
 and 
ators, 
11   
                                                
The modern text-critical emphasis on the original, or even specific recensions, 
not only results in texts that do not necessarily look much like typical examples, but 
also entails the ingress of subtler assumptions of printed-text culture.  Print-cultures 
tend to think of texts first and foremost in terms of discrete recensions, on the model of 
separate editions and printings of modern publishing.12  This encourages us to think 
about change in texts in terms of distinct moments of "official" publication, and thus in 
terms of very discrete, intentional stages of development.  Manuscripts, however, 
suggest a much more gradual and continual mechanism of textual change: each 
manuscript copying is in a sense a new recension or a new edition, and variation is 
easily found – and tolerated – manuscript-to-manuscript.  Texts thus emerge as much 
more fluid, "living" phenomena than in printed-text cultures, subject to constant change 
over time. This demands attention, then, not simply to specific moments in the text's 
history, points of dramatic change, but also to slow and gradual patterns and tendencies 
in textual shaping over time.  Further, to appreciate the intellectual-cultural world of 
these texts, the values and characteristics of print-cultures, such as absolute precision, 
accuracy, identity of texts, attention to detail, and intentional logical change, must not 
distract from appreciating the dynamics of manuscript cultures: the gradual, the graded, 
the general, the similar, the subtle, the unconscious.  This sensitivity is particularly 
critical in legal studies, where many of the values of modern legal culture (precision, 
strict definition, categorical application, logical systematization, newer texts 
immediately abrogating the old) are closely intertwined with those of modern print-
culture.13  Doing law in a manuscript culture is a very different proposition from doing 
law in a print culture.   
 
9 Syn and Kormchaya. 
10 Syn 157-190; Sin 250-268; Sbornik 145-149; Sbornik (Prilozhenie) 3-80. 
11 This faithfulness to the manuscripts accounts for its continued dominance in Orthodox canon law 
studies. See Appendix A (1) for details.  
12 For what follows, see especially Parker 1987, also Eggert 1991, Jeffries 2008,92, Ong 1982 and Stolte 
1998a,187 (on the "living" nature of the nomocanonical recensions). 
13 Changes in writing technology have not infrequently been connected with changes in legal culture.  See 
Appendix A (2).  
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All of these codicological problems have not been entirely neglected in the 
modern disciplines of Byzantine law and Orthodox canon law, but they have not drawn 
much attention.14  The chief result of this is that the study of Byzantine canon law, like 
the study of western canon law, tends to be centered around source surveys that take as 
their central and fundamental narrative unit the individual source or collection, extracted 
and reconstructed out of the manuscripts, understood as constituting discrete published 
wholes, and analyzed almost exclusively in terms of original compositional context 
(author, place and date), discrete recensional stages, and narrowly-conceived source 
relationships with one another, i.e. the derivation of individual constituent texts.15  
Pieces of the manuscripts are thus privileged over wholes, compositional practices over 
reception and editing, and diversity over continuity.  Broader morphological and 
substantive patterns across the manuscripts and collections and how these patterns 
suggest a broader cultural-legal world – our very concern in this chapter – tend not to be 
considered at all.  The "shape" of the tradition, as encountered by most of its historical 
readers, becomes very difficult to discern. 
 Unfortunately, redressing these problems is not easy.  Codicological analysis of 
Byzantine canon law also faces considerable practical challenges.   
The first problem, for our period, is simple and glaring:  the extant manuscripts 
all date from the 9th C or later.  The very earliest Greek canon law manuscript is usually 
dated to the early 9th C.16 This is at precisely the end of our period of examination.  We 
thus have no direct codicological window onto most of our period of interest: we have 
no physical witnesses to the shape of the tradition.  
This problem is probably less serious than it first appears.  One of the 
fundamental characteristics of the Byzantine canonical tradition, as we will see, is its 
extreme conservatism and stability.  Combining Beneshevich's careful text-
archeological reconstructions of pre-9th C recensions of the Coll14 (and to a lesser 
extent, the Coll50), pre-9th C Latin and Syriac witnesses which often reflect older Greek 
originals, external textual witnesses, and various processes of extrapolation, it is 
possible, as we will see, to make very good guesses about the basic form of Byzantine 
canon law texts prior to the 9th C.  At the very least, one can extrapolate back to 
fundamental patterns and dynamics of the manuscript tradition, if not specific forms.  
                                                 
14 The main exception is Burgmann 2002.   
15 So, for example, Delineatio  and Peges in the east; Gaudemet 1985, Maassen 1871, Reynolds 1986, 
Stickler 1950 in the west. 
16 Patmos 172. Stolte, however, has reported finding an early 8th C, possibly late 7th C, fragmentary 
palimpsest of the Coll14; it is not yet published. Stolte 2002,194 n. 16 
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More problematic, in fact, is simply the practical state of affairs of modern 
Byzantine legal codicology.  Thanks to the efforts of the research group "Edition und 
Bearbeitung byzantinischer Rechtsquellen", founded in 1974 by D. Simon, virtually 
every known Byzantine legal manuscript, secular and ecclesiastical (at least until c. 
1600, but later ones have also been included; in total ~1000 manuscripts), has now been 
microfilmed and gathered at the Max-Planck-Institut für europäische Rechtsgeschichte 
in Frankfurt.17  An excellent and detailed manuscript description project is underway.  
But the volume on canon law has yet to be completed, and as a result it is still difficult 
to ascertain with absolute certainty even fairly basic information about codicological 
content (i.e. distribution of collections, predominate forms of collections, etc).   Until 
such time as this volume is completed, we must rely on a patchwork of older, 
sometimes unsatisfactory and incomplete catalogues, editions, descriptions and source-
histories – and, of course, a sampling of the manuscript themselves.18  This data is 
already sufficient to allow at least basic conclusions about the major contours of the 
tradition, our primary concern here; but many points of detail must remain tentative. 
 
B. The tradition takes shape: a survey of the textual history of Byzantine canon law 
Although much text-work remains to be done, considerable clarity and consensus now 
exists on the basic narrative of the development of the sources of the Byzantine 
canonical tradition.19   
 As is well known, the Byzantine – indeed, Christian – canonical tradition does 
not emerge as a coherent and distinct textual whole until well into the fourth century.  
At this time, earlier and more fluid patterns of written and customary regulation begin to 
congeal around the increasingly regular institution of conciliar legislation.  Local but 
ever more formal collections of written conciliar regulations (starting to be termed 
                                                 
17 For a description of the project, Burgmann et al. 1995,vii-xvii.  The project is now formally based in 
the University of Göttingen. 
18 See Appendix A (3) for an overview of the manuscript tradition, and of manuscripts examined. 
19 Byzantine law is in fact awash with source surveys, a situation that highlights the lack of any other type 
of modern history of Byzantine law since Zachariä von Lingenthal 1892 – whether traditional legal-
doctrinal/institutional or social-historical.  On this see Fögen 1987,137; Kazhdan 1989; Simon 2005; 
Stolte 2005.  Of the source surveys, Peges and Delineatio treat both secular and ecclesial law; Beck 
1977,140-147, 422-425, 598-601, 655-662, 786-789, is now outdated, but still useful in its level of detail 
and as a guide to older editions; it treats exclusively church law.  Pieler 1978 is restricted to secular 
material, but remains essential.  For the sources of canon law, Sources is now the most up-to-date, 
containing extensive references to early literature; Historike  is also essential.  Of the older surveys, 
Mortreuil 1843, although very much out of date, may still be valuably consulted because of his attention 
to the manuscripts; Zachariä von Lingenthal 1839 remains surprisingly useful.  Other more specific, but 
fundamental, discussions of the sources of Byzantine canon law texts include Schwartz 1936a, Sbornik, 
Sin and Schminck 1998. 
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κανόνες by the end of the 4th C) start to take prominent place alongside of the older 
customary and Apostolic church order traditions of regulation.20 
 Eduard Schwartz has shown that it is likely that sometime in the mid-fourth 
century a small corpus of local conciliar material from Asia Minor, presumably of a 
type not uncommon elsewhere, began to rise to prominence.21 Through a careful 
examination of the oldest Latin and Syriac material – the early stages of this process 
have left few traces in the Greek tradition itself – Schwartz was able to piece together a 
reasonably convincing narrative of this development.  It seems that sometime between 
360-378, perhaps under the direction of the Homoean Euzoius of Antioch (361-376), a 
small collection, probably Pontic in origin, was adopted in Antioch.  It seems to have 
included originally Ancyra (314) and Neocaesarea (319), perhaps Gangra (c. 340?), 
eventually Antioch (c. 330, traditionally considered Antioch ἐν ἐγκαινίοις 341, even in 
the early 5th C)22 and probably Laodicea (date uncertain; before 380).23   
This early "Antiochean corpus" seems to have been shaped primarily in an Arian 
milieu.  With the accession of the Nicene Theodosius in 379, however, this collection 
was apparently rapidly adopted by the Nicene party, probably first by Meletius of 
Antioch, who was restored to his see in this same year. At this time – perhaps not so 
long before or after Cunctos populos (February 380), at any rate by 381 – the canons of 
Nicaea were added to the head of corpus.  This move dramatically violated the 
chronological ordering of the sources that had prevailed hitherto (the councils of Ancyra 
and Neocaesarea were both known to predate Nicaea).  Echoes of this unusual move 
may be found in special headings extant in Greek, Latin and Syriac traditions explicitly 
explaining this aberration.24  Its effect was unmistakable: the Arian "Antiochian corpus" 
had become the "Nicene corpus".  
                                                 
20 I bypass here the many complex issues surrounding the origin of formal church regulations. For good 
recent discussions, see Hess 2002, L'Huillier 1998, Ohme 1998. Schwartz 1910, 1911, 1936a remain 
foundational. 
21 Schwartz' conclusions are mostly found in Schwartz 1936 and1936b, with further references. Valuable 
recent discussions of this early corpus may be found in Delineatio 24-30, Historike 21-32, L'Huillier 
1976, Selb 1967. 
22 L'Huillier 1976,59 and Sources Antioch, following Schwartz and Bardy; contra, Historike 356-366 (and 
also Fonti 1.2.100). 
23 On the date, Sources Laodicea; but its presence in the earliest collections, see Historike 23-25, 
L'Huillier 1976,61. 
24 Each version typically explains that Nicaea is placed before Ancyra or Neocaesarea because of its 
preeminent authority.  For the Latin and Syrian see most conveniently Schwartz 1976,174-175 (also 
Turner 1899,2.1.19, 48-49, 116-117; Selb 1967,377-378); for the Greek, see Kormchaya  229,238; cf. 
also the later Greek scholion to the Coll14, RP 1.11-12, which again feels obliged to explain the unusual 
pre-positioning of Nicaea as διὰ τὸ τῆς τιμῆς ἐξαίρετον. 
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The production of this Nicene corpus (I prefer to restrict "Antiochian corpus" to 
the pre-Nicene version of this body) would prove to be a definitive, indeed tectonic 
moment in the development of Christian canon law.  Within a century or so this corpus 
would constitute the undisputed canonical core of virtually the entire imperial church: 
Latin, Greek, and Syrian.  Its success must be attributable to a tacit understanding that 
just as the Nicene creed was the touchstone of Orthodoxy for all later doctrine, so the 
Nicene corpus – probably originally prefaced by the Nicene creed – was the standard for 
church order.25  It became, in effect, the official Nicene imperial canon law book for the 
official Nicene imperial church.  It is the first consistent and regular "physical" textual 
whole in the tradition.   
This corpus seems to have passed into the Latin west very rapidly, and no less 
than three times in the 5th-early 6th C: first with the so-called Isidorian translation (a 
version of which is commonly referred to as the Freising-Würzburg collection), perhaps 
the very collection sent west to Africa during the Apiarian affair (419; before 451 in any 
case); second, with the Prisca collection in Rome (c. 451-500); third, and definitively, 
with the translations of Dionysius, also in Rome (c. 500, perhaps as late as 523).26   
Through these three versions – and above all the Dionysiana, the most complete and 
accurate27 – the Nicene corpus will go on to form the basic core of most major western 
collections, and many minor ones, for the next four or five centuries.28 
The movement of the Nicene corpus into the Syrian east was likewise rapid and 
complete.29  Already in 399 (or perhaps 410) it seems to have been translated through to 
Laodicea for the Persian church, and these "western canons" are formally listed and 
confirmed at the council of Jahb Allāhā in Seleukia-Ctesiphon 419.  The corpus is there 
                                                 
25 On the presence of the Nicene creed, see chapter 2.A.1.  Schwartz was aware of the symbolic 
significance of the Nicene prefacing of the Antiochean corpus (e.g. 1936b,200), but does not consider its 
role in the broader – and extraordinary – spread of the collection; see also Ohme 1998,526-542.  
26 This is a simplification of what seems to have been a much more complex process of westward 
transmission; see especially Hefele-Leclercq 1938,3.1150-1200 for a detailed discussion, mostly building 
on Maassen 1871.  For this three-fold transmission see Gaudemet 1985,77-79; 130-137, with references 
to earlier literature.  Schwartz 1936b remains fundamental for the first collection, in particular.   
27 On Dionysius and the Dionysiana see now especially Firey 2008 and Gallagher 2002,9-18.  Three 
redactions of the councils are known: "Dionysius I" (ed. Strewe 1931); "Dionysius II" (ed. Voellus and 
Justel 1661,1.101-174 = PL 67:139-228); the third, "Dionysius III" is known only from its surviving 
preface (see Somerville and Brasington 1998,49). 
28 Especially the Dionysiana, Cresconius' Concordia (a reorganized Dionysius II), the Hispana, the 
Dionysiana-Hadriana, and the so-called Isidor Mercator collection. It is also the underlying core structure 
of the 6th C Brevatio canonum of Fulgentius Ferrandus, the 6th C Capitula of Martin of Braga and many 
other smaller handbook-like collections.  On all of these, see Gaudemet 1985, but especially Maassen 
1871 and his concept of "general collections", which he defined precisely as containing this Greek core 
(Maassen 420-421; collections described 422-797).  Note, however, that many of Maassen's systematic 
collections (798-900) also often exhibit this core structure as an identifiable "backbone" or framework.   
29 Selb 1967,371-383; Selb 1981,58-81, 83-94, 97-110; 1989,86-173, esp. at 98-109, 139-149. 
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significantly described as the "laws that have been drawn up by the blessed fathers and 
bishops for the catholic church in the entire Roman empire"30: the universality of this 
"imperial" core is explicitly recognized.  These canons were preserved even after the 
separation of the Persian Catholicosate from Antioch in 423, and this corpus, expanded 
to include Constantinople and Chalcedon, is attested at the synod under Mār Abā 
(539/40-552), and regularly thereafter. 
The west Syrian tradition would also adopt (or maintain) the imperial corpus.  Its 
tradition is more complex, evincing at least two major transmissions.31  One tradition, 
exercising considerable influence on later material, is represented by a second 
translation made c. 500 in Hierapolis (Mabbūg), probably originally in Melkite 
circles.32 This translation included the Nicene corpus through Chalcedon.  Other 
manuscripts count the synodal canons through Ephesus, with Chalcedon listed later afte
a series of patristic canons.  This ordering may date to a translation attested in 68
Other manuscripts show a number of other variants.  In all cases, however, the basic 
Nicene structure at least through Constantinople is evident, dominating the west 
Synodika as surely as the east Syrian.  
r 
7.  
Syrian 
                                                
Parallel processes of reception of the Nicene corpus will also be evident in other 
Oriental traditions, where the same imperial core in easily evident in the major 
collections of the Alexandrian-Coptic, Armenian, and Ethiopic traditions (and later in 
the Georgian tradition and Melkite Arab traditions, receiving Byzantine collections).33  
 In the Greek east itself, the reception of this Nicene corpus was rapid and 
complete – so much so, in fact, that the history of Byzantine canon law can quite 
reasonably be cast as the history of the expansion and development of this one 
collection.  Already at Chalcedon (451), a formal imperial council, it is cited as a matter 
of course.34  Thirty years after the Persian bishops in Seleukia-Ctesiphon had 
recognized that this collection was the "laws for the catholic church in the whole Roman 
empire" the Nicene corpus was clearly sufficiently established as the collection of an 
 
30 Selb 1967, citation at 374, without further reference, translated by Selb. 
31 Selb 1989,103-110, 140-149. 
32 Selb 1981,89.  Edition: Schulthess 1908. 
33 For a sense of the diffusion of the texts, and editions, see Clavis 8000, 8501, 8504, 8513-8527, 8536, 
8554, 8570, 8600, 8603, 8604, 8607, 8717, 9008.  For the Armenian tradition, see now Mardirossian 
2004; for the Coptic tradition, W. Riedel, Die Kirchenrechtsquellen des Patriarchats Alexandrien, Leipzig 
1900 (unavailable for my consultation); for the Arabic literature Graf 1944,1.556-621. For other oriental 
traditions, although out of date and in many ways unsatisfactory, Sacra Congregazione Orientale,1936. 
Now also Morolli 2000, 2000a, 2000b; Gallagher 2002,186-227. 
34 ACO 2.1.3.48, 60, 95-96, 100-101,107; cf. also ACO 2.5.51. Citations from L'Huiller 1976,54, and 
Historike 21-24. 
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imperial council.  Chalcedon 1 thus confirms this collection:  "We have judged it right 
that the canons set forth by the holy fathers in each synod until now are in force." (Τοὺς 
παρὰ τῶν ἁγίων πατέρων καθ᾽ ἑκάστην σύνοδον ἄχρι τοῦ νῦν ἐκτεθέντας κανόνας 
κρατεῖν ἐδικαιώσαμεν.)  In the older literature this canon is sometimes thought not to be 
approving the corpus as a clearly demarcated written body, but the basic norms that it 
embodies, or conciliar canons generally.35  Today, however, there is broad consensus 
that the regular citation of the Nicene corpus in Chalcedon itself and the later absolute 
dominance of this corpus, especially in the east, make this unlikely.36  The lack of 
specificity in this canon simply represents the well-established nature of this Nicene 
corpus: everyone knows what "the canons" are.    
Of course this Nicene corpus could not have entirely supplanted other local 
collections and traditions immediately or completely, even in the Greek east.  Certainly 
other local traditions existed, and presumably continued to exist alongside the imperial 
corpus for some time.  Within the later Byzantine corpus itself traces of these earlier 
local traditions may be detected.  The Apostolic canons – and of course the Apostolic 
Constitutions from which they were extracted – were likely a local Antiochian 
collection of the late 4th C, which themselves seem to have taken into account earlier 
conciliar legislation.37  The canons of Basil and Gregory of Nyssa undoubtedly reflect 
local Cappadocian traditions.  It is suspected that the large number of Alexandrian 
patristic sources in the later Greek corpus originally were part of a local Alexandrian 
decretal collection.38  Indeed, in the end, the later Byzantine corpus may in fact be 
considered a collection of local traditions: Asian, Antiochian, Alexandrian and 
Constantinopolitan (and eventually African material).  One manuscript also contains 
traces of a small local collection, tacked on to the normal sources, evidence no doubt of 
continuing canonical diversity.39  Other variants in the oriental collections, such as the 
frequent additions to Nicaea,40 also point to earlier canonical variety, probably 
representing Greek originals. 
 Despite this early diversity, the general movement of the eastern tradition, as 
already evident at Chalcedon, was unmistakably towards and around one corpus, the 
Nicene corpus, and its later expanded versions: it is the basic, universal, uniform set of 
                                                 
35 See van Hove 1945,144 n. 3. 
36 So Historike 25; L'Huillier 1976,55-56;  Selb 1981,84; 1989,140; Sources Chalcedon.  
37 Metzger 1985,1.14-62; Schwartz 1936a,199-200; Steimer 1992,87-88; Sources Apostolic Canons. 
38 For example, de Clercq 1937,1172. 
39 The famous "Canonicon" of Palladius in Patmos 172.  See Sbornik 235-240; Schwartz 1936a,182-186; 
Sources Basil; Turner 1913. 
40 On these canons, see for example Graf 1944,1.586-590; Selb 1981,100-1101; also Sources Nicaea. 
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canons of the entire empire.  In this respect it is telling that one has to engage in 
considerable textual archeology to detect signs of earlier diversity in the Greek material 
itself.  Even the pre-Nicene existence of the Antiochian corpus had to be uncovered by 
Schwartz using archaic Latin and Syrian traditions, preserving, in effect, memories from 
around the periphery of the empire.  The Greek tradition itself tends to present a picture 
of uniformity and homogeneity.  
The corpus used by Chalcedon was continuously numbered. No Greek exemplar 
of this type is extant.  Indeed, despite references in the acta of Chalcedon to this 
numbering system, it seems to have passed out of all memory in Byzantium by the 9th 
C.41  This numbering system does survive complete in Latin and Syrian witnesses, 
however, and likely dates from Meletius' Nicene appropriation.42  Variations in this 
system indicate that the text was early on expanded at least twice, first with the 
synodikon of Constantinople 381 (i.e. canons 1-4, outside of the continuous numbering 
in the collection used at Chalcedon, and in the Isidoriana; also Constantinople is absent 
in the 419 Persian listing)43, and then with the 27 canons of Chalcedon (outside of the 
continuous numbering in Dionysius II (c. 500), but inside in London BL Syr. 14528 
(500-501)).44  After the addition of Nicaea itself, these are the first indications of the 
tradition beginning to grow by "piling" of newer sources on top of the old as one ever-
increasing corpus structure.  As already evident, these "updates" seem to have passed 
into the west and east very quickly. 
After the Chalcedonian canons were added, the corpus began to develop in 
slightly different directions across the Christian world.  The dynamic, however, was 
everywhere the same: the gradual expansion of this core Nicene corpus by the addition 
of later, often more "local"45, but sometimes more general, material.   
                                                 
41 ACO 2.1.3.48 (canons "95" and "96" = Antioch 4, 5), 101-101 (canons "83" and "84" = Antioch 16, 
17).  Another reference may be found in a later letter dating to 457-458, ACO 2.5.51 (canon "83" again). 
Photius is famously confused by a reference to Constantinople 2 as "canon 166" in a 6th C letter. 
(Bibliotheca 228; reference from Schwartz 1936a,159-160).  See also Historike 31 n.2.  
42 L'Huillier 1976,60. 
43 See the useful listings in Historike 23-25, as well as the description of the Isidoriana in Gaudemet 
1985,77. On the absence of Constantinople in the Persian recension of 419, Selb 1981,88-89. 
44 Historike, ibid.  Cf. also Schwartz 1910,200-201on London BL Syr. 14526 and its omission of 
Chalcedon in the systematic index.  
45 We use the term "local" as a descriptive convenience for materials that do not pass out of their place of 
origin. These materials, which will include papal decretals in the west, and later Greek and Syrian 
councils and fathers in the east, were not necessarily understood as of "local" significance by their authors 
or collectors! 
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In the east, conciliar legislation shut down in the empire following Chalcedon, 
not to be restarted for almost two hundred and fifty years, at the council in Trullo 692.46  
The eastern corpus nevertheless continued to expand, but now through processes of 
consolidation and reception of earlier material.  The chief agents – or perhaps witnesses 
– of this expansion seem to have been new "systematic" editions of the Nicene corpus 
that begin to appear at the beginning of the 6th C, perhaps in connection with Justinian's 
secular codification (528-534).47 These editions of the canons are prototypically some 
version of the expanded Nicene corpus proceeded by a thematically arranged subject 
index (a "systematic index") of the canons.  In the manuscripts, and the reconstructed 
earlier recensions, they tend to the following form:48   
PROLOGUE(S) + THEMATIC INDEX + CORPUS + APPENDICES 
The prologues will be discussed next chapter; they can vary in number, and 
sometimes prologues from different collections are "stacked" closely together.49 
The "thematic index" is a series of individually numbered topics, usually called 
τίτλοι and/or κεφάλαια in Greek, with references to relevant canons.   
The "corpus" may be in either systematic form – in which case the entire 
thematic index is repeated and instead of simple references the full text of the canons is 
now written – or in straight corpus form, i.e. the texts written out in their traditional 
source order, without any thematic headings.  The Collection in 50 Titles (Coll50) is 
prototypically in the former form, the Collection in 14 Titles (Coll14) in the latter, but 
the reality of the manuscripts is more complex, as we will note in chapter four.  
The "appendices" are a more fluid concept, still not thoroughly researched, 
particularly in the canonical collections, but a well-recognized phenomenon of 
Byzantine legal manuscripts.50  It is thought, as we will see, that most Byzantine 
canonical collections were originally composed with at least an appendix of civil 
ecclesiastical legislation.  In the manuscripts, these appendix sections can become quite 
                                                 
46 Not surprisingly a similar silence falls over the imperial west, i.e. in Italy and Africa, both in the tailing 
off of papal decretal production (see Gaudemet 1985,95-96), and in the lack of local councils.  The last 
contrasts with the explosion of conciliar activity during this period outside of the empire in Gaul, Spain 
and Persia. Gaudemet 1985,96-121; Selb 1981,61-62,111-114,165-170. 
47  For these collections generally, see especially Sbornik and Sin as well as the recent surveys in 
Delineatio 51-54, 60-62, 66-70; 87-89; Historike 37-73 (with many references to the older literature); 
Troianos 131-135, 142-148.  Also important are Honigmann 1967; Stolte 1997, 1998. Still useful is 
Zachariä von Lingenthal 1877.  
48 See Burgmann 2002 for a broader discussion of the form of Byzantine legal collections. 
49 For example, the Coll50 and Coll14 prologues may both be found in Paris Coislin 34; Florence 10.10, 
Oxford Baroc. 185, Paris gr. 1324, Vatican gr. 2184.  Further examples in Sbornik 131-132. 
50 See especially Burgmann 2002,257, 261-264; Burgmann and Troianos 1979,199-200.  Burgmann notes 
regular appendix structures for the Ecloga, the Synopsis Major, the Prochiron auctum, the Ponema of 
Atteleiotes, the Syntagma of Blastares, and the Hexabiblos of Harmenopoulos.  
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large, typically including a variety of later patriarchal or synodal decisions, secular 
laws, penitential material, question and answer tracts, synodal histories, orders of 
thrones, tracts on heresies, and similar disciplinary-legal material (although doctrinal 
definitions, and even some liturgical material, occasionally appear).  Fairly stable 
"convoys" of such material have already been identified for a number of different 
recensions and collections.51 
  The first known Greek systematic collection, no longer extant, is the Collection 
in 60 Titles (Coll60), usually dated to shortly after 534. It is known only from the 
prologue of the Coll50, the next collection.  It may have been the first eastern collection 
to incorporate into the eastern corpus the 85 Apostolic canons, Serdica, a number of 
"canons" extracted from documents associated with Ephesus,52 and Chalcedon;53 
certainly the Coll50 seems to include these sources as a matter of course, i.e. as if they 
were already present in the tradition.54   
The second, and first extant, systematic collection of the Greek tradition, the 
Collection in 50 Titles (Coll50) of John Scholastikos, usually dated to c. 550, included 
the Apostles, the Nicene corpus expanded with Serdica, Ephesus and Chalcedon, and 
also now 68 canons of Basil the Great.55  The introduction of Serdica, whether now or 
earlier, into the midst of the old Nicene corpus (between Ancyra and Gangra) no doubt 
explains the dropping of the continuous numbering system, as van der Wal and Lokin 
have suggested.56  The last addition, Basil, marked the first formal and clear entrance of 
non-conciliar (or Apostolic) material into the Byzantine corpus. Although such 
"patristic" material was likely circulating earlier, in a variety of local traditions, perhaps 
as appendices, its inclusion in the Coll50 very clearly alongside the conciliar material 
seems to mark a new stage in the material's formal integration into the mainstream 
Greek canonical tradition.57   
                                                 
51 See especially Beneshevich Sbornik 130-177, Sin 26-69.  I borrow the term "convoy" from Burgmann 
1992,257, 261-4. 
52 The "epistula universalis" (Clavis 8717) of Ephesus, divided into 6 canon, and at least one other extract 
from the acta, seem to have been included in the original Coll50 (some manuscripts however indicate 8 
canons; see Beneshevich Syn 6); in the later Byzantine tradition two other acta extracts will also be added 
(see Clavis 8800).  See Historike 219-226; Sources Ephesus. 
53 Probably only 27 canons, as often the case in early collections (e.g. the Dionysiana, the Syrian 
collections, and the Coll50); three other canons, all extracts from the council's acta, will be included in the 
Coll14, and always henceforth. See Historike 256-275; Selb 1981,61; 1989,102; Sources Chalcedon. 
54 So Delineatio 42, Historike 38-39, Peges 131. 
55 Letters 199 and 210. 
56 Delineatio 53. 
57  On the possibility of a Syrian patristic collection of canons (translated from Greek, and including 
extracts from Ignatius of Antioch, Peter of Alexandria, Athanasius to Ammoun, and the full series of 
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The next thematic collection, the Collection in 14 Titles (Coll14), usually dated 
c. 580, and perhaps authored by Patriarch Eutychios of Constantinople, included 
probably nine more patristic sources, perhaps as many as 11, and added another letter of 
Basil.58  Even more significantly, this collection also saw the first – and last –admission 
into the eastern corpus of a major western canonical source, the so-called materies 
Africana or codex canonum ecclesiae Africanae (in the Byzantine tradition simply 
called the "synod in Carthage").59  An awkward translation of almost exactly the same 
compilation of African councils (with material from 345-419) used, and probably 
redacted or finalized by Dionysius Exiguus in his second compilation, this collection 
will become the single largest source in the eastern corpus.60  Undoubtedly the 
recapture of Africa in 534 and the establishment of the Carthaginian prefecture 
facilitated this unusual eastward transmission.61  A small excerpt from a council in 
Constantinople (394) was also probably added at this time.62 
                                                                                                                                              
Many of the additions of the 6th C thematic collections find parallels in the Latin 
and Syrian worlds; indeed, a parallel process of updating may be envisioned across the 
Mediterranean throughout the 6th C and 7th C.  In the Latin world, in particular, in one 
form or another, Apostolic material (only 50 canons), Serdica, and the materies 
Africana become a reasonably well established part of all major canonical collection 
sometime during this period.  In the west, they are already well apparent in Dionysius – 
although Dionysius marks all three as still of uncertain reception.63  In the Syrian world, 
the process of transmission and admission is obscurer, but Serdica will eventually make 
it into the west Syrian Synodika, and Apostolic material, eventually often expanded far 
beyond the 85 canons, will also start to appear.64  Carthage seems to appear 
 
Basilian canons) pre-dating even Chalcedon, see Sources Fathers, and Fonti 2.xvi-xvii, both following the 
data in Schwartz 1911,322-323. Cf. Selb 1989,110-118, 145-149. 
58 For details, see Appendix A (4).   
59 Edition (Latin): Munier 1974.  On this collection generally, Cross 1961, Munier 1975, Gaudemet 
1985,79-83 (where the Greek translation is erroneously ascribed to Scholastikos, following Munier 
1974,177), Sources Carthage.  Two other, more minor, additions to the corpus, are also from the west:  
Serdica, already mentioned, may be considered western (see below n. 151), and the short extracts from 
Cyprian's council, first attested in the east in the 7th C, are also African. 
60 On Dionysius and Carthage, Cross 1961,133-139; so also Hess 2002,88, for example. 
61 It may have passed east more than once, in fact; canon 81 is known in two different Greek translations.  
See Sources Carthage.  In the manuscripts, a number of abbreviated or selected versions are also known 
(see Sin 39-40, 100-101, Sbornik 247-249, 292-295). 
62 So Historike 62-63, Delineatio  61, Sbornik 86-87; see especially Honigmann 1961, Stolte 1998a,189.  
It is not mentioned in the collection's first prologue (see chapter 2.A.4); however, it is cited under a 
chapter in the systematic index (9.13) that otherwise would be empty.    
63 Most notably in his preface to his (lost) third collection; Somerville and Brasington 1998,49 (trans.).  
64 Selb 1981,104-110; 1989,92-102, 140-145; also Schwartz 1910, 200-201 on the possibly very early 
admittance of some of Apostolic material into the Syrian world.  Serdica does not seem to be attested in 
the east Syrian synodika. 
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occasionally, in fragments and epitome.65  As such, a large degree of continuity across 
the Christian world is still evident at this period.  In essence, all traditions are still based 
around a similarly-expanded Nicene corpus.  The textual shape of the Christian 
canonical tradition at this point may thus be conveyed in a single formula:  
APOSTOLIC MATERIAL + NICENE CORPUS (expanded to Chalcedon, and generally 
including Serdica and, at least in the Latin and Greek west, Carthage) + "LOCAL" 
MATERIALS 
At the same time, local differentiation starts to become more noticeable.  Some 
of the Greek patristic material will pass into Syrian canon law books, but not in 
precisely the same form; none will pass into the west.66  In the west, in its place, other 
local Latin materials, notably the papal decretals, will begin to be found regularly in the 
collections. These, with the increasing number of local Spanish and Gallic councils, 
never pass east.  In the Syrian east the synodika will continue to gradually accrete their 
own lengthy traditions of local eastern councils and Syrian patristic canons.67   
In the east, the mid-5th to 7th C cessation of canonical legislation in the empire is 
often explained by the large quantity of secular ecclesiastic legislation produced during 
this hiatus, particular by Justinian.68  Whether or not a true causal connection between 
these phenomena existed, there is no question that a central feature of the eastern 
canonical collections during this time is the admission of much secular ecclesiastical 
material.  It seems to have first taken the form of discreet collections appended to the 
corpus.  Three such eastern collections are known (all here given with their 19th names): 
the anonymous Collection in 25 Chapters (Coll25), an collection of excerpts from the 
Greek sections of CJ 1.1-4 and four novels (these last later additions); the Collection in 
87 Chapters (Coll87) of John Scholastikos, a more sophisticated topical collection of 
relevant Justinianic Novels, especially Novel 123; and the anonymous Tripartita, a set 
of topically arranged extracts from the CJ, Novels, Institutes and Digest.69  In the extant 
manuscripts, these collections tend to be found together, as a close adjunct to the 
canonical corpus, and in the order Coll87, Coll25, Tripartita.70  However, because John 
                                                 
65 Selb 1989,102-104. 
66 The eastern patristic material in later western collections is mostly from different sources.  On this 
material, see esp. Munier 1954. Also, Maassen 1871,348-382, and Appendix C (3).  For Greek patristic 
material in Syria, see n. 57. 
67 Selb 1981,59-64, 1989.110-132, 145-152. 
68 A very useful reference remains de Clercq 1949; see also Alivisatos 1913; Pfanmüller 1902; van der 
Wal 1998. 
69 See generally Delineatio 52-54, 61; Peges 137-142; van der Wal 1994.  
70 van der Wal 1994,xiii-xiv. 
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Scholastikos is attributed with the authorship of both the Coll87 and the Coll50, and in 
some manuscripts the two are closely associated,71 and because the Tripartita sounds 
very much like a legal collection mentioned in the prologue to the Coll14,72 and is used 
extensively as a source for the NC14, it is widely assumed that these two secular legal 
collections originally were attached as appendices to these two canonical collections.73  
By extension – following Zachariä von Lingenthal – scholars often hazard that the 
Coll25 (without the four novels) may originally have been an appendix of the lost 
Coll60.74 
Sometime between 612-629 material from the Tripartita, along with other 
Antecessor material (i.e. 6th C Greek translations of the Justinianic law books), was 
incorporated into the topical index of the Coll14 – i.e. under the topical headings – by 
an anonymous compiler known to scholarship as "Enantiophanes" or the "Younger 
Anonymous".75  The same "Enantiophanes" (the name is taken from a later scholiast's 
confusing the name of the author with one of his books, περὶ ἐναντιοφανῶν, "on 
seeming contradictions") – is known from fragments of a commentary on a summa on 
the Digest preserved in scholia to the Basilica and seems to have been the author of two 
secular legal monographs; he was evidently a jurist of some note, and is the last 
Byzantine until the 11th C to evince a sophisticated knowledge of the Digest.76   
At some point another collection of secular legal material, mostly drawn from 
the Coll87, was incorporated into the Coll50, to much the same effect. This latter 
collection, which seems to have undergone two later recensions, the last as late as the 9th 
C, is attributed to John Scholastikos in the manuscripts, and its earliest forms may well 
be his work;77 doubts, however, have been raised on this point, principally because of 
its rather clumsy composition.78 
                                                 
71 For example, Paris supp. gr. 483 and Vatican gr. 843. 
72 RP 1.7; see chapter 2.A.3. 
73 On this now Delineatio 53-54, 61: Peges 137-142; van der Wal 1994 xv-xvii;  Zachariä von Lingenthal, 
1877.  See also chapter 4.A. 
74 Zachariä von Lingenthal 1877,614-616; the later four novels are often thought to have been added by 
Scholasticos when the Coll25 and Coll87, in a second redaction, were added to the Coll50, perhaps c. 
565.  See Beneshevich Sin 288-324; Peges ibid.; van der Wal ibid; 
75 For the literature on the nomocanons generally, see above n. 47; the most recent surveys are Delineatio  
66-70; Peges 142-148. 
76 Delineatio 63-68; Stolte 1985; van der Wal 1980.  
77 Sin  292-321. 
78 So, for example, Delineatio 53, 67-68; Mortreuil 1843,1.200-201.  They believe that the collections 
were produced in the order Coll50, Coll14, NC14, NC50.  Most other authors retain the sequence Coll50, 
NC50, Coll14, NC14 (with perhaps the middle two switched), although scholars are often guarded about 
the NC50's exact origin or author; e.g. Gaudemet 1965,419, with older references; Peges 142-143; Pieler 
1997a,580. 
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In the 11th C Michael Psellus, in a poem, will call these mixed collections 
"nomocanons" (νομοκανών, var. νομοκάνονον, νομοκάνωνον), as they comprise both 
νόμοι and κανόνες.79  Originally, however, these collections seem to have had no 
special name, simply called by the variety of fairly generic terms shared by all canonical 
collections (σύνταγμα, συλλογή, συναγωγή, often with the number of titles of the 
collection also indicated).  In fact, none of the early Byzantine collections seem to have 
had consistent names.80   The first attestations of the term nomocanon, in the 9th, do not 
even clearly imply civil-legal content at all.81 Psellus aside, even well after the 11th C 
νομοκανών seems to have been a very broad term, applicable to a variety of other types 
of regulative collections, often including penitential collections and canonical 
collections clearly without civil law content.82  Only in the later Byzantine period is 
there a certain tendency evident to apply the term especially to the full Coll14, usually 
in its nomocanonical form, and sometimes as "the Great Nomocanon".83  Nevertheless, 
the exclusive use of the term for the Byzantine canonical-civil collections is 
characteristic only of modern scholarship.84 Even today, the terminology in the modern 
literature for these expanded indices can cause confusion as sometimes the term 
"nomocanon" is used to refer specifically to the thematic indices expanded with civil 
laws, while at other times it is used to refer to an entire collection in which such an 
index exists (i.e. prologue + thematic index + corpus) – or even, confusingly, like the 
Byzantine usage, to any systematic collection, even without  civil laws.85    
During the 6th or 7th C another important canonical sub-genre may have emerged 
for the first time: the canonical synopsis.86  Only one such work exists, although in 
multiple, gradually expanding recensions.  All are straightforward abbreviated versions 
                                                 
79 Περὶ νομοκανόνου, ed. Westerink 1992,77-80 
80 Sbornik 58-60, 104-115 and Sin ii-iii, 220-222 remain the fundamental discussions of terminology, and 
are the principal source of what follows.  See also Delineatio  66; Historike 71 n. 4.  On names of civil 
collections (with similar ambiguities), Burgmann 2002,258-259. 
81 In a question-and-answer of Theodore Studite and in the Pannonian Life of St Methodius. Sbornik 106. 
The last, in particular, probably refers to the earliest Slavonic Coll50 translation which does not have 
secular laws. The Methodian collection may have had a civil law appendix, however, which may account 
for its name. See Maksimovich 2007,9-10; also, Gallagher 2002,95-113. However, the concluding 
epigraph of the Coll50 in Moscow 432 and Patmos 205, refers to the proceeding work, without laws, as a 
νομοκανών (Syn 155) – so the "plain" Coll50 could clearly be called a νομοκανών.  
82  The best example is perhaps Aristenos' synopsis and commentary, frequently called a "νομοκανόνον" 
in its manuscript introductions (see those listed by Zachariä von Lingenthal 1887,255-256); for others, see 
Sbornik 109 n.1; also Naz 1957,1014.   Is it possible that originally νομοκανών did not mean "canon-and-
laws" but "canon of the law"?  See Appendix A (5). 
83 Sbornik 109-111. 
84 Delineatio  66.   
85 See the comments of Stolte 1989,115. 
86 See Delineatio 68-69; Menebisoglou 1984; Peges 135-137, 245-248; Zachariä von Lingenthal 1887. 
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of the corpus, proceeding source by source, although all, except that to which Aristenos 
attached his commentary, occasionally omit older or out of date canons, and show 
varying levels of re-ordering, re-numbering and compression.87  The text of the 
abbreviated rubrics themselves, however, seems stable.88  The contents and orders of 
the canons in the three best-known (i.e. published) recensions are as follows:  
In Voellus and Justel 
2:673-709 (= PG 114:235-
292)89, under the name of 
Symeon the Logothete:  
 
 
 
 
Apostles 
Nicaea 
Constantinople 
Ephesus 
Chalcedon 
Ancyra 
Neoceasarea 
Gangra 
Antioch 
Laodicea 
Serdica 
Carthage 
Basil 
Trullo 
In Voellus and Justel 2. 
710-74890 (= PG 133:63-
113), under the name of 
Aristenos (also attributed to 
a "Stephen of Ephesus"):  
 
 
 
Apostles 
Nicaea 
Ancyra 
Neoceasarea 
Gangra 
Antioch 
Laodicea 
Constantinople 
Ephesus 
Chalcedon 
Serdica 
Carthage 
Trullo 
Basil 
The synopsis to which the 
12th C commentator 
Aristenos attached his 
commentary.  It may be 
found in Beveridge v. 2 (= 
RP 2-4, and PG 137 and 
138).91  Normal order of 
this version:  
Apostles 
Nicaea 
Ancyra 
Neoceasarea 
Gangra 
Antioch 
Laodicea 
Constantinople 
Ephesus 
Chalcedon 
Serdica 
Carthage 
Constantinople 394 
Trullo 
II Nicaea 
Basil  
Within the manuscripts, however, considerable further variation may be found.  At its 
fullest extent, the synopsis will contain all of the sources of the standard 9th C Byzantine 
corpus.92 
                                                 
87 Cf. Delineatio 68. 
88 On this last, Menebisoglou 1984,78. 
89  From Paris gr. 1370.  Also known in numerous other manuscripts. See Sin 63 n. 2, col. 2; Mortreuil 
1843,3.407; Peges 245 n. 53.  
90 From Paris gr. 1302.  In the same order, but fragmentary (ending at Antioch), is a slightly different 
recension in Vienna theo. gr. 283, published by Kraznozhen 1911,207-221. See also Mortreuil 
1843,1.200-201. 
91 But not in normal manuscript order or appearance, distributed instead under the canons with the 
commentaries of Balsamon and Zonaras. Also, confusingly, the synopsis is labeled with Aristenos' name, 
and Aristenos' actual commentary is placed in subsequent paragraphs.  For the manuscripts, Mortreuil 
1843,3.408-410. 
92 From the available editions, the texts of the full form of the synopsis may be found by combining the 
synopsis entries under each canon in RP 2-4 together with the synopses of the Apostolic "Epitome" 
material and a few other para-canonical items, as published in RP 4.393-416.  These last supplements are 
likely to have been composed in connection with the 11th C Bestes/Michael recension of the NC14; see 
Peges 247-248, and the manuscript information in Mortreuil 1843,3.408-416 
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In the manuscripts (and printed editions) these works are attributed to a variety 
of figures: Stephen of Ephesus, sometimes considered to be a 5th C bishop, but more 
likely a 7th C hierarch of the same name present at Trullo93; Symeon the Logothete, a 
10th C author; and Aristenos, the 12th C commentator (no doubt because of the later 
attachment of his commentary to a later recension of the synopsis).  Scholars vary in 
attaching these attributions to various recensions of the synopsis, and more work will be 
required to sort out the text's history.94  It is clear, however, that the recensions of the 
synopsis preserve corpus configurations that are quite old and quite conservative, many 
not clearly reflecting any known configuration in the thematic collections or 
manuscripts.  The recension attributed to Symeon is particularly interesting in this 
regard, as Trullo is placed after Basil, strongly suggesting that the original was pre-
Trullan.95 Its placement of the four ecumenical councils at the head of Nicene corpus 
material is also extremely unusual in the Byzantine tradition, and suggests an archaic 
configuration.96    
Conciliar legislation resumes in the empire in 691/2 with the publication of the 
code-like series of canons of the council in Trullo.  These are followed a century later 
by the canons of the seventh ecumenical council, II Nicaea, in 787, and then by the 
"Photian councils" of Protodeutera (861) and Hagia Sophia (879).  This "second wave" 
of legislation, distinct in many ways from the earlier "first wave" material, is quickly 
added to the corpus in stages.  Again the principal agent/witness for corpus expansion is 
the thematic collections, but now as successive updated recensions – not the production 
of entirely new collections.  Thus, thanks to the work of Beneshevich, we can identify in 
the manuscripts pre-Trullan recensions to which Trullo has been added; then II Nicaea; 
then Protodeutera; then Hagia Sophia.97  In each case, "acceptance" seems to have 
entailed various combinations of entry into the corpus section, integration into the 
systematic references, and mentions and listings in prologues.  The Coll50 likewise was 
gradually updated, although the stages in this process have not yet been carefully 
                                                 
93 Peges 136. 
94 See Delineatio 68-69; Menebisoglou 1984,77-82; Mortreuil 1843,1.200-201, 3.408-410; Peges 245-
247. 
95 See. Delineatio 68; Peges 136-137.  Menebisoglou 1984,79 believes that the earliest recension of the 
synopsis may pre-date Chalcedon. 
96 In Delineatio 77 it is stated in error that the "Tarasian" recension had such an order.  It is clear in 
Sbornik 260-288, to which they refer, that it did not.  I know of only one other witness to this order: an 
incipit index to the Coll50 found in Oxford Barocc. 86 43r-49r, as per Beneshevich's description Sin 60 
(cf. Sbornik 83 n.3).  The four-council order is common in the west, where it has no little ideological 
significance: see the introductions to the Hispana and Mercator, Somerville and Brasington 1998,55-57, 
82-91 (trans.); also Congar 1960.  It is perhaps suggested by N. 131.1   
97 See below, section C.5. 
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identified nor correlated with specific events or dates – and typically the newer material 
is simply added after the older systematic corpus, not inserted into it.98  But later 
versions of the Col50 tend to contain very similar material as contemporary Coll14 
recensions.99 
A few other canonical sources also establish themselves in the corpus during this 
time.  An extract from the council of Carthage in 255 under Cyprian appears in a pre-
Trullan recension of the Coll14 corpus, placed after Nicaea 325 itself, i.e. as the first of 
the councils save Nicaea.100  It appears again in the corpus delineated by Trullo 2, now 
after all of the patristic canons.  Never terribly common in the earlier manuscripts, its 
fortunes will vary in later manuscripts, often absent, sometimes present but in different 
positions, either right at the end of the councils, or among the fathers, or in an 
appendix.101  In Trullo 2 three other patristic sources also now make a definite 
appearance, bringing the total to the symbolic number of twelve.  The number and order 
of the patristic sources listed in Trullo 2 will nevertheless vary throughout the 
manuscripts tradition, not settling until after the 12th C commentators.102 
Some of this "second wave" eastern material passes west, as per tradition, but 
now much more desultorily.  A thorough analysis has never been performed, but some 
of the Trullan canons, and some of those of II Nicaea, were accepted into at least some 
western collections; some will appear in Gratian.103  To my knowledge, neither council 
seems to pass into the Monophysite or Nestorian east, although they do, not 
surprisingly, appear in some later Arabic Melkite sources.104  Curiously, however, 
Cyprianic material does appear in the east and west Syrian synodika.105 
The recension of the Coll14 that admits the Photian councils – usually called the 
"Photian recension" although it is not clear if or to what extent Photius had any hand in 
                                                 
98 On this last Sin 250, although he notes a number of exceptions. Of these see especially Group G, Sin 
179-185.  
99 For example, see Beneshevich's Group C, D and G, Vienna hist. gr 7 (Sin 108-126), or Coislin 364 (Sin 
150-165).  "Soft spots" in the Coll50  tradition are similar to those of earlier recensions of the Coll14, and 
include Amphilochius, Gregory Nanzianzus, Cyprian, Hagia Sophia, and Carthage in full (selections are 
more common).  
100 In Patmos 172 (described Sbornik 230-236).  On this canon generally, and its fate in the manuscripts, 
see Delineatio 69-70, Historike 81-82, Fonti 2.301-303 (esp. n.1), Sources Cyprian.   
101 Compare its place, for example, in Beneshevich "Recensio Photio protoypa" (Sbornik 130-177), 
Jerusalem Cruc. 2, Laud.39, Florence Laur. 10.1, Vallic. F.10, Vatican gr. 829. 
102 See Fonti 2.xiv-xx; Sources Fathers. 
103 For Trullo, see now Kuttner 1995; for II Nicaea, see the index of Gratian's sources (Friedberg 
1879,1.xx). 
104  Graf 1944,1.598-600.  Dura 1995,238-240, however, claims greater presence in non-Chalcedonian 
circles. 
105 Selb 1981,110; 1989,102-104. 
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it – marks the closing of the Byzantine corpus of canons.106  Datable to 883, it 
corresponds neatly with what will, in retrospect, be a cessation of imperial ecumenical 
councils, and certainly of imperial ecumenical councils producing series of regulations.  
Official disciplinary legislation does not cease, but henceforth will take the form mostly 
of specific enactments of the Constantinopolitan ἐνδημοῦσα σύνοδος or imperial 
novels.107  These will slowly be collected and added to canonical manuscripts, but 
neither they, nor any other "appendix" type material added to the tradition, will ever 
truly penetrate the older canonical corpus itself, and be ranked with "the canons" proper 
in quite the same way as the older material – i.e. be incorporated into the Coll14 or 
Coll50 indices or tables of contents themselves.108  They will henceforth always appear 
in the manuscripts as a more variable outer valence of appendix material, around  this 
core, almost as an exegetical expansion of the earlier material – and indeed, in content 
most of this later material is devoted to sorting out details of the older tradition.109   
Further, in no case does any other later collection of canons ever comes even 
close to replacing or displacing the Coll14 corpus.  The later tradition is always written 
around this core, at more re-organizing it.  Despite a constant blurriness around its 
edges,110  then, the 883 corpus will emerge in the manuscripts as the regular and sealed 
"core" of the canonical tradition – a position it retains to this day in the modern 
Orthodox churches.111  
It is difficult to say, however, to what extent this closing of the corpus was 
perceived by contemporaries.  Certainly the Coll14 corpus, in any redaction, was not 
immediately considered the authoritative statement of the corpus, even after Trullo, and 
                                                 
106 Generally, Delineatio 87-89, Historike 83-91.  The extent of Photius' participation in this recension is 
debated; see Deledemos 110-112, Delineatio ibid., Historike 86-87, Meliara 1905-1906, Peges 145, 
Petrovitz 1970,34-38, Stolte 1997.  
107 Dölger 1925-1965 and Grumel 1972-1991 remain the standard repertories of the imperial and 
patriarchal material.  However, no thorough survey of the documents of this type typically found in 
canonical manuscript appendices – i.e. physically part of the canonical tradition – has yet to be produced.  
A selection of the most important may be found in RP 5; for the patriarchal decisions, a particularly 
convenient list may be found in Milaš 1902,157-165, and Peges  232-240, 295-297 is the most recent 
overview.   
108 There are exceptions of course; for example, the Coll50 Group G does add some prominent later 
appendix material under its references (Sin 179-185).  So also in one chapter of the Coll14 in Vat 827  
(Sbornik 252).  There are likely some others, but such instances seem to have been quite occasional, and 
more or less failed experiments, "testing" as it were the level of acceptance of this later material.  
109 The secondary nature of the later literature has been frequently remarked; see e.g. Beck 1977,142-147; 
Delineatio  97; cf. Peges 235.  The later reception of some of this material could be quite slow and 
uncertain. See Burgmann 1985. 
110 The varying presence of Cyprian, Athanasius, Gregory Nazianzen and Amphilochius, and even Hagia 
Sophia are the chief examples of this "blurriness". 
111 There is widespread consensus on this point; for example, Historike 91-100; L'Huillier 1996,7 n. 44; 
Meyendorff 1983,80-81; Milaš 1902,107-155; Tsipin 1994,30-31. 
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it is never "officially" established.112 It is curious, in fact, just how many witnesses there 
are to the slow reception of the Coll14  corpus.  John of Damascus in the 8th C, when 
listing "the canons", clearly cites the corpus of the Coll50.113  In the 9th C, a letter of 
Pope Nicholas to Photius seems to refer to the quinquaginta titulos as the Byzantines' 
official collection.114  The synopsis tradition likewise seems more or less confined to 
he Coll50 until the 11th C or so – even after it adds Trullo, which prescribes the furth
patristic sources.  Perhaps most telling, Michael Psellus, in a poem written for the to-be-
emperor Michael VII – i.e. in what we might expect to be a reasonably "official", or at 
least learned, statement of the corpus – will describe a corpus that is almost certainly an 
expanded Coll50, not the Coll14.
t er 
                                                
115  Even Aristenos in the 12th C does not comment on 
Protodeutera, Hagia Sophia and any fathers aside from Basil – i.e. his corpus looks like 
the Coll50 corpus expanded with Trullo, II Nicaea, and the first letter of Basil.116  
Indeed, Zonaras and Balsamon do not comment on exactly the same 883 corpus either 
(although their collections contain the un-commented canons): thus Zonaras does not 
comment on Timothy, Theophilus, Cyril, or Gennadius, and neither Zonaras or 
Balsamon comment on Amphilochius.117  All of this witnesses to the presence of a very 
strong, conservative impulse throughout most of the middle Byzantine period that was 
inclined to view the core of the core, as it were, as something closer to the original 
Coll50 corpus.  This does not mean that the later Coll14 material, confirmed at Trullo, 
was not present, known or used; indeed, by the end of the 11th C it seems to have 
become well entrenched.118  But at least its outer edges, the patristic material in 
particular, and the most recent conciliar material, seem not to have "settled" into firm 
recognition for some time. 
It was soon very clear, however, as noted, that the corpus would not 
substantially grow beyond its 883 revision.  The next major recensions of the Coll14, 
those of Michael the Sebastos and Theodore the Bestes in the late 11th C, only slightly 
 
112 On the "official" promulgation of 920 sometimes mentioned in the literature, see section C.6. 
113 PG 94.1432cd, cited in Sin 326. 
114 Mansi 15.176,263 cited Sin 326.  This section of the letter may not be original, however; see 
Deledemos 2002,76 n. 183. 
115 Westerink, 1992,77-80. So Menebisoglou 1984,88, Peges  249-250, Sin 327. Contra: Delineatio 106, 
who suggests it is the NC14, but this is almost certainly a mistake, perhaps even a typo. 
116 RP 2-4, checked against various manuscripts, e.g. Moscow 237, Vatican 840, Vienna iur. gr 10. 
117 RP 2-4, checked against Florence Laur. 5.1, Moscow Sin. 393, Vatican gr. 828, Venice app. 3.01, 3.03. 
There is a certain amount of variability among the descriptions and editions, however; new editions of 
Zonaras and Balsamon are sorely needed. 
118 Peges 241-242; Sbornik 109-111. 
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clean up and complete some of the corpus references of the 883 recension.119  
Substantial additions of new sources are only made to the secular legal material in the 
systematic section of the collection.120  The canonical portion of the collection was thus 
essentially frozen.  The next major recension of the Coll14 will not venture even this: 
Balsamon appends his commentary to the secular material after the traditional 
nomocanonical texts, just as he does in the corpus section of the collection.121  He does 
not seem to interfere with the existing tradition.  As such, Balsamon, along with the 
other commentators, effectively seal – or at least witness to – the ultimate ossification of 
the 883 corpus.122  It is probably at this point that the Coll14 additions – seven centuries 
after their articulation! – are finally accepted as beyond question.  The long-term 
success of the Coll14 corpus as the sacred core of the whole tradition was assured.   
 
C. Major contours of the tradition 
 
1. Unity, stability and continuity  
The single most striking characteristic of Byzantine canon law as a textual 
phenomenon is its uniformity and stability.  Contrary to the pervasive tendency in the 
modern literature to speak about Byzantine canon law as a succession of different 
collections,123 or as otherwise quite varied and diverse,124 the Byzantine tradition 
possessed in a very real way only one canonical collection.  This should hopefully 
already be apparent from the above narrative.  At the heart of this collection was the 
                                                 
119 It re-adds some Carthaginian and Basilian material that had been omitted, for example, along with 
other Apostolic texts; see Schminck 1998,379-383, and below section C.1, esp. n. 138.  According to 
Schminck, its basis seems to be Jerusalem Pan. Taph 24, which had included the omitted canons in a 
catch-all chapter in Title 14.  Schminck 1998 has revolutionized our knowledge of this recension – or 
rather, recensions.  It was known to previous scholarship as the recension of "Theodore Bestes".  
120 Published as the auctaria in Pitra. 
121 I owe this observation to Delineatio 111. 
122 In his commentary on Trullo 2 Balsamon famously condemns the use of the NC50 – although mostly, 
it seems, because of its selection of secular laws. RP 2.311  
123 Everywhere the tendency is to speak of multiple collections succeeding each other, instead of the 
growth and development of one collection over time. Hess 2002,54, for example, states that "[d]uring the 
sixth century the 'Antiochene Collection' was superseded by others, but it was fortuitously translated into 
Latin...before disappearing entirely from the Greek East".  Similar expressions may be found in 
Burgmann 2002,241; Feine 1954,83; Price and Gaddis 2005,3.94 n.6; Schwartz 1910,195; 1936a,159-
160. See also how Plöchl 1959,1.441 speaks as if Trullo constituted a completely new self-standing 
collection (so Ferme 1998,81;  Morolli 2000,313). 
124 For example, Nelson 2008,299; Stolte 2008,694; cf. Plöchl's similar (273-274) but cryptic, and rather 
odd, statement (repeated in Ferme 1998,78) that the sources of eastern church law reflect from the 6th C a 
fragmentation of the eastern church' unity (giving as an example the Acacian schism).  This is part of an 
older narrative – appropriate enough when restricted to the west – that tends to see the first millennium 
canonical tradition as a story of regional Partikularismus and fragmentation except, perhaps, where 
influenced by Rome; see for example Cosme 1955,1995a, Fournier 1931, Stickler 1950.   
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Nicene corpus which was gradually subjected to various processes of expansion but 
never replaced or substantially or permanently modified (selected or interpolated).  The 
entire Byzantine canonical tradition is simply the story of the expansion, confirmation, 
and re-issuing of this gradually growing and ever-ossifying central corpus structure.  
Indeed, this idea of a uniform core-corpus structure is probably the central conceptual 
structure of the entire tradition.   
This stability and uniformity becomes most obvious when one examines the 
extant Byzantine manuscripts.  Turner long ago noted that "[t]he most obvious 
difference between Greek and Latin manuscripts of Canons, taken in the mass, is the 
striking resemblance of the former among themselves contrasted with the almost infinite 
degree of divergence from one another which prevail in the latter.  The contents of 
Greek canonical MSS are always more or less the same...".125  Indeed, by manuscript 
standards, the Greek texts are strikingly uniform.  Most complete manuscripts follow a 
very similar pattern, starting with some type of prologue section, followed by a 
systematic index or two126 (perhaps in nomocanonical form), followed by the corpus 
itself.  The corpus in most extant manuscripts, whatever its exact form, or systematic 
index, is something approaching the full 883 corpus, perhaps with commentary and 
almost always followed by a selection of appendix-like materials.127  In some 
manuscripts, smaller Hilfsmittel  type works, it will sometimes be replaced with the 
synopsis and Aristenos – a kind of "mini corpus".128   
The texts of the corpus canons themselves, as Joannou notes, are apparently 
remarkably stable, and with little regular omission, re-ordering, paraphrasing or 
interpolation.129  Likewise the physical appearance and layout of the manuscripts, while 
slightly variable, almost never surprises.  They are mostly quite plain and functional, 
with bland and unremarkable breaks between the sources,130 simple marginal 
numberings for the canons, and, sometimes, marginal scholia.  Some elements of 
manuscript structures may be in slightly different order.  For example, the corpus 
                                                 
125 Turner 1914,161. 
126 See the list in Syn v-vi for pairings of the Coll50 and Coll14, in various forms. 
127 In other words, earlier collections in the manuscripts have generally been updated, to some extent, to 
approach the 883 corpus. 
128 E.g. Vatican gr. 840 
129 Fonti 1.5; reaffirmed by L'Huillier 1996,9-10.  Such statements should be considered tentative, 
however; the internal state of the texts have probably not yet been sufficiently studied.   
130 Typically simple undulating lines, perhaps with some floral motifs, occasionally developing into more 
complex, but abstract, decorations in blank spaces or section headings (e.g. Sinai 1112 4v or 77r; Rome 
Vallic. F. 47 23r). Further illustration and decoration (e.g. miniatures) of Byzantine canonical manuscripts 
is otherwise very rare; see Hajdú 2003,100-101 for an exception in Munich gr. 122 (small conciliar 
scenes), with further references. 
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sometimes precedes the systematic indices.131 The appendix materials, and to some 
extent the prologue texts, are also quite variable, although they tends to include broadly 
the same type of material.132  Throughout, then, the overall picture is very regular; there 
is a very recognizable and predictable "shape" and content to a Byzantine canonical 
manuscript.133  
It thus soon becomes apparent that one has, in effect, the same collection in a 
variety of different versions.  If one looks back over the sweep of the tradition as a 
whole, as related above, there seems to be little reason to doubt that this stability and 
uniformity had obtained in the Byzantine east for some time – and indeed, to a 
surprising extent, across the Latin and Syrian traditions as well.  This uniformity and 
stability has two aspects: in the general "idea" and morphology of canonical collections, 
and in the contents of a typical collection.  
As to the former, from the moment we first glimpse the Nicene corpus, all of the 
witnesses (Maassen's general "chronological" collections, the Syrian Synodika, all the 
Byzantine sources) point to one central idea of what constitutes a full, proper canonical 
collection: a canonical collection conveys "the corpus".  This corpus is a body of 
traditionally accepted legal sources, listed one after another, and with little or no 
significant selection or interpolation (this is particularly true in the Byzantine sources).  
The exact content and boundaries of "the corpus" will vary somewhat from place to 
place and time to time, but it is always nevertheless an identifiable structure at any 
particular moment (on this, more below).  In all cases, faithfully transmitting this core 
corpus seems to be the primary point of a full canonical collection.134   
The options for presenting this corpus are also few.  Generally, east and west, 
collections will include some type of prologue or prologue sections, then perhaps a 
systematic index, then "the corpus" of canonical materials followed by (or fading into) a 
much more variable and idiosyncratic group of appendix materials.  
 Smaller collections do exist that are much more selective among even "core" 
material, the text of which is often abbreviated.  These collections, however, are always 
clearly very practical Hilfsmittel type works, obviously built against the background of 
                                                 
131 For example, in a number of Beneshevich's "Group A" manuscripts of the Coll50 (Sin 59).  For the 
Coll14, see Vatican gr. 2198. 
132 See above, and the references in nn. 50, 51. 
133 There are some exceptions, but before the 16th C they tend to prove the rule: they are certainly very 
surprising when one stumbles upon them.  See Appendix A (6). 
134 In the literature this point tends to be recognized for the older chronological collections, such as 
Dionysius or the Hispana (e.g. Zechiel-Eckes 1992,1.29-30; Mordek 1975,3); but it equally true for early 
systematic collections; see below.   
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the proper libri canonum.  Perhaps constructed to address a specific topic or problem, 
they are handbooks to the corpus, from the corpus, which always remains a tangible 
structure to which they refer.  In the west, these minor collections are many, and will 
eventually become very diverse, especially north of the Alps, where the idea of "the 
corpus" seems to have become rather thin; in the east, the only substantial examples in 
our period are the synopses,135 and even they follow the contours of the corpus of their 
day very closely, as do some of the earliest such collections in the west, such as those of 
Martin of Braga or Fulgentius Ferrandus.136 
Early systematic collections, at least in the east in our period, and certainly in the 
beginning in the west as well (most notably in the Concordia of Cresconius137), do not 
represent exceptions or major transformations of this "idea" of a collection.  They are 
merely thematic recensions of "the corpus" which they convey in full.  While they do 
mark moments in which new material is introduced into the corpus, and they play a 
critical role in defining the corpus, their faithfulness is very marked in conveying 
complete and intact the material that at their point of composition is traditional.  Thus 
both the Coll50 and the Coll14 (and Cresconius) contain every canon of the corpus as it 
seems to have existed before their time; the evidence of selection (mostly in their 
references to the material under their topic headings) or abbreviation they display is 
only in the outermost fringes of the corpus, usually in the material they have themselves 
probably just added to the corpus – i.e. the newest, least traditional material.138 In this, 
these collections are very different from later western systematic collections, which 
ultimately emerge as moments of permanent substantive selection, synthesis and sorting 
of earlier material.139  The early Byzantine systematic collections are little more than 
glorified tables of contents to the corpus.  In this, any tendency to speak as if the earlier 
Antiochian or Chalcedonian collection "disappears" from the Byzantine tradition is 
extremely misleading: it simply changes form.  Likewise, the common narrative of the 
transformation of "chronological" collections into "systematic" (and of the two almost 
                                                 
135 Another example at the end of our period is the Slavonic translation of the Coll50 made (probably) by 
Methodius for his mission. It is abbreviated and shows evidence of selection, no doubt for convenience of 
the early Slavic mission; see Gallagher 2002,100-113.   
136 Gaudemet 1985,137-137, 152-153. 
137 Zechiel-Eckes 1992. 
138 The Coll50 in fact does convey every single canon of its corpus – and mostly only once.  It is almost 
literally a re-arrangement of the corpus.  The Coll14 omits some canons from Carthage and its new Basil 
additions (i.e. from the first canonical letter). Cresconius likewise omits only some items from Carthage, 
and elements from the decretals (see Zechiel-Eckes 1992,1.7,18). See Appendix A (7) for more details. 
139 Gratian's Decretum is the ultimate example; see the index of his sources  Friedberg 1879,xix-xli.  See 
Appendix A (8) on this curious Latin phenomenon.   
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competing) – borrowed from later western canonical historiography, where it is accurate 
– is problematic.140  Eastern systematic collections, like their early western imperial 
counterparts, are the old "chronological" corpora, but now merely with some level of 
systematic re-arrangement or indexing; they are not in any way replacements of it, or 
substantively discontinuous with it.  The earlier structures are always preserved, and 
completely so.  The extraordinary conservatism of these collections will be explored in 
greater depth in chapter four. 
As to content, "the corpus" is always – west and east – an identifiable recension 
of the Nicene corpus, in various stages of expansion.  The Nicene corpus is not "a" 
Byzantine collection of the first millennium; it is the collection of the entire early 
Christian world.  As already noted, its content from Nicaea through Chalcedon, usually 
with Serdica and some version of Carthage and the Apostles, is the common core of 
virtually all major "general" Christian canonical traditions, certainly around the 
Mediterranean.141  Even after the 6th C, when the Latin, Greek and Syrian collections 
begin to develop along separate paths, later developments emerge mostly as a matter of 
the gradual addition or expansion of this old Nicene corpus – and the thus the Nicene 
core is itself remarkably persistent. A striking unity in both the "idea" and content of the 
Christian canonical tradition is thus to be observed across the Christian world for much 
of the first millennium.142    
The tendency for the tradition to develop as a gradual expansion of Nicene core 
is particularly pronounced in the east.  In effect, at least from the 5th C onwards, 
between any two collections of core corpora, one will always contain the entirety of the 
other, i.e. the one is always simply an expansion of the other.  Variations may exist 
among appendix-like materials, but two collections are not to be found with entirely or 
even mostly different "core" materials – one missing perhaps Ancyra, or Nicaea, for 
example.  This stability and uniformity of development is easily demonstrated with a 
schematic of the corpora of the principal Greek collections (additions to each stage in 
boldface):  
                                                 
140 Assumed everywhere, but see briefly Zechiel-Eckes 1992,1.29-31; Fransen 1973,14-15; Maassen 
1871,3-4; Mordek 1975,4-16; Somerville and Brasington 1998,12-13. Fransen (ibid.) can thus, for 
example, call the collection of (Pseudo) Isidor Mercator the "last" chronological collection in the west – 
and these collections do stop being widely copied in the high middle ages.  But there is no "last" 
chronological collection in the east.  The traditional typology of collections as "chronological" and 
"systematic" is problematic in other ways as well; see Appendix A (9). 
141 Hibernensis, in Ireland, would be a major exception.  See Sheehy 1982. 
142 The lack of emphasis on this early unity is perhaps the single oddest characteristic of modern 
canonical historiography.  See Appendix A (10) 
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Antiochian corpus 
[ANCYRA] + [NEOCAESAREA] + [GANGRA] + [ANTIOCH] + [LAODICEA?] 
 
Nicene corpus (approx. as at Chalcedon 451) 
[NICAEA] + [ANCYRA] + [NEOCAESAREA] + [GANGRA] + [ANTIOCH] + [LAODICEA?] + 
[CONSTANTINOPLE I] 
 
Coll60 (c. 534?) 
[APOSTLES] + [NICAEA] + [ANCYRA] + [NEOCAESAREA] + [SERDICA] + [GANGRA] + 
[ANTIOCH] + [LAODICEA] + [CONSTANTINOPLE I] + [EPHESUS?] + [CHALCEDON] 
 
Coll50 (c.550) 
[APOSTLES] + [NICAEA] + [ANCYRA] + [NEOCAESAREA] + [SERDICA] + [GANGRA] + 
[ANTIOCH] + [LAODICEA] + [CONSTANTINOPLE I] + [EPHESUS] + [CHALCEDON] + 
[BASIL (68 CANONS)] 
 
Coll14 (c. 580) 
[APOSTLES] + [NICAEA] + [ANCYRA] + [NEOCAESAREA] + [GANGRA] + [ANTIOCH] + 
[LAODICEA] + [CONSTANTINOPLE I] + [EPHESUS] + [CHALCEDON] + [SERDICA] +  
[CARTHAGE] + [CONSTANTINOPLE 394] + [BASIL (68 CANONS)] + [~9-11 ADDITIONAL 
FATHERS, AND REST OF BASIL] 
 
Corpus of Trullo 2 (691) 
[APOSTLES] + [NICAEA] + [ANCYRA] + [NEOCAESAREA] + [GANGRA] + [ANTIOCH] + 
[LAODICEA]  +[CONSTANTINOPLE I] + [EPHESUS] + [CHALCEDON] + [CONSTANTINOPLE 
394] + [SERDICA] +  [CARTHAGE] + [12 FATHERS, INCLUDING BASIL] + [CYPRIAN] 
 
Corpus of 883 Coll14 recension (order of 883 Coll14 index ἐκ ποίων, RP 1.10-11) 
[APOSTLES] + [NICAEA] + [ANCYRA] + [NEOCAESAREA] + [GANGRA] + [ANTIOCH] + 
[LAODICEA] + [CONSTANTINOPLE I] + [EPHESUS?] + [CHALCEDON] + [SERDICA] +  
[CARTHAGE] + [CONSTANTINOPLE 394] + [TRULLO] + [NICAEA II + TARASIOS] + 
[PROTODEUTERA 861] + [HAGIA SOPHIA 879] + [~12 FATHERS] + [CYPRIAN] 
 
Corpus of 883 Coll14 ("systematic" order as typically found in Zonaras and Balsamon 
recensions) 
[APOSTLES] + [NICAEA] + [CONSTANTINOPLE I] + [EPHESUS] + [CHALCEDON] + 
[TRULLO] + [NICAEA II] + [PROTODEUTERA 861] + [HAGIA SOPHIA 879] + [CYPRIAN] + 
[ANCYRA] + [NEOCAESAREA] + [GANGRA] + [ANTIOCH] + [LAODICEA] + [SERDICA] + 
[CARTHAGE] + [CONSTANTINOPLE 394]  + [~12 FATHERS]  
 
Although this schema is simplified, and does not communicate isolated variations 
among individual manuscripts, it nevertheless conveys the general shape of the tradition 
as one collection that is slowly growing.  It is interesting that even differences in 
patterns of ordering of the material are few and restrained.143  Certainly profound 
change to existing corpus material is not in evidence.  Indeed, in the Byzantine tradition 
we may observe a striking rule: once a canonical source is accepted into the core corpus, 
                                                 
143 See below section C.5. 
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it never leaves.  Development will always tend towards accumulation and preservation 
of traditional sources, not processes of sorting, revising or selecting.144  Even quite 
clearly obsolete or apparently rescinded canons tend to continue to be copied.145  
Of course, the process of the definitive reception of sources into the corpus takes 
time, and thus among different recensions and manuscripts a certain "softness" may be 
detected in the transmission of more recent or marginal sources.  Carthage, for example, 
apparently first added in the later 6th C, is often present in abbreviated forms in the later 
expanded Coll50 recensions, and the references to this source in the earliest Coll14 
thematic index are not complete – its material is not yet inviolable.  Some of the later 
patristic canons, and also Cyprian, as noted, likewise will fade in and out of the corpus 
for some time.  But these sources eventually tend to become firmly established in the 
corpus; the Coll14's omissions in Carthage, for example, will be remedied in a later the 
Coll14,146 and after the commentators virtually all of the 883 patristic sources are well 
established.  Only in smaller handbook or extract-type collections are canons ever 
regularly abbreviated, omitted or interpolated.  In larger collection such instances are 
not entirely unknown, but they seem very occasional.147  Never do such changes turn 
into sustained, permanent  selection or interpolation of material in the tradition as a 
whole.  Omitted corpus material can and will always eventually resurface in any 
collections with pretensions to completeness.  The overall movement of the tradition is 
overwhelmingly towards complete, faithful transmission of a unitary traditional corpus.  
Real diversity among the Byzantine collections is thus always comparatively 
minor, at least by the standards of manuscript cultures.  Between any two given 
manuscripts or recensions, diversity is mostly restricted to framing material and newer 
materials that form the outer valences of the "core" – and slight differences in order.   
But these differences never extend to the point that one cannot recognize any two 
collections as fundamentally different versions of the same text.  Substantially different 
                                                 
144 This dynamic is frequently noted in Byzantine law more generally; for example, Burgmann 2002,263;  
Stolte 2008,692-693. 
145 For example, the rules in Apostles 37, Antioch 20 and Nicaea 5 on holding synods twice a year, 
despite the clear relaxation to once a year in Trullo and II Nicaea; or Ancyra 10, which allows deacons to 
marry, despite Trullo's clear rejection of this exception.  
146 See Appendix A (7) for details. 
147 Beneshevich occasionally notes some omissions, for example in Vallic. F. 47 in Trullo (Sbornik 264).  
I have also observed some omissions in manuscripts, also in Trullo (in Laud 39 157v; although the 
omission is noted by the rubricist).  The true extent of such omissions – and whether or not they tend to 
be limited to sources perceived as new or less certain (as possibly Trullo) – will hopefully become 
apparent in the upcoming survey of Burgmann and Schminck.  Radical and regular patterns of omission, 
however, seem unlikely: certainly they have not appeared in the editions. 
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"competing" corpora are present only inasmuch as an older and newer recension of the 
Nicene corpus circulate alongside of each other.   
The face that the Byzantine tradition presents as a textual reality is thus a highly 
hieratic and conservative one, centered upon the concept and reality of one continuous, 
unified, central core corpus.  This corpus structure gradually expands, and its edges may 
often be blurry, but at any given moment a core of inviolable material is always 
identifiable, and this traditional material is never significantly or permanently modified 
or omitted.  The central dynamics of this corpus-centered tradition are thus preservation, 
persistence and agglutination.  The Byzantine canonical tradition is above the story of 
one text: its expansion, its uses, and its interpretation.  (In this Byzantine canon law 
mirrors, if in a much more dramatic and exaggerated way, the Byzantine secular 
tradition's attachment to the Justinianic corpus.148)  
 
2. A Greek phenomenon 
The Byzantine canonical tradition is an overwhelmingly Greek phenomenon.  The 
Byzantine canons are not only found in Greek in the extant manuscripts,149 but most 
were originally composed in Greek, and in the east.   
A few important observations must be made about the "Greekness" of the 
canons. 
It witnesses first to the relative impermeability of the eastern canonical tradition.  
In the entire history of the tradition, even until the end of the empire, only three sources 
from outside the Greek east are ever able to penetrate into the corpus itself.150  All are 
from the west: Carthage, the "canon" of Cyprian, and Serdica.151  Only the first is 
                                                 
148 Which is never clearly replaced or abrogated in the Byzantine east, and always constitutes a kind of 
symbolic touchstone for the whole tradition; see especially Fögen 1993,67-68; Haldon 1990,258-264; 
Kunkel 1964,181; Lokin 1994,71-72; Pieler 1978,449-450; Stolte 2008,691-693. see also Prinzing 1986, 
and for the older discussion on the later validity of Justinian's law, Wenger 1953,720-723. 
149 Although a few Latin marginal notations to Carthage seem to have made their way into Moscow 432 
(Sin 86, 92). 
150 A few other Latin items may occasionally be found in the appendices, for example (fairly frequently) 
the letter of Leo I to Flavius on Eutyches (see Athos Panach.6-7, Cambridge Ee.4.29, Oxford Laud. 39, 
Vienna hist gr 7).  But this text is doctrinal in orientation.   The Donation of Constantine will also later 
appear in the tradition, most notably in Balsamon (RP 1.145-148); it will later be found as a regular item 
in the appendices to the secular 14th C Hexabiblos (Burgmann 2002,262).   
151 On the status quaestionis of the peculiar origin and transmission of the canons of Serdica, see Sources 
Serdica.  The recent renewal in Hess 2002 of the Ballerini's theory of a double-edition of the canons, 
taken down by Latin and Greek scribes, has not received universal acceptance (contra: Delineatio 122), 
but seems likely.  Whatever the case, the Serdican canons read in Greek as Latin translation material, are 
in the typically western "parliamentary" form, and are generally treated as western in the Byzantine 
tradition (for example in the scholion to the Coll14  Ἰστέον RP 1.12; see also scholia 217a, 228 in Sbornik 
Prilozh. 28-30).  
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significant in terms of size, and all will exist for some time as "soft spots" in the 
manuscript tradition, omitted, abbreviated, and in slightly subordinate or uncertain 
positions.152 
The admission of these western conciliar sources highlights one striking 
absence:  papal decretals.  This is a point that needs emphasis because of the 
overwhelming tendency of modern textbooks of canon law to speak as if canon law 
naturally has "two sources", even quite early: conciliar enactments and papal decretals. 
This double-source theory undoubtedly holds true in the west, but in the perspective of 
the history of Christian canon law a whole, it is unquestionably a local Latin 
phenomenon.  Even in the west this theory arguably reaches its apogee only in the high 
middle ages, when papal legislation finally becomes a central vehicle of western canon 
law (certainly of its development).153  In our period the papal material sits in the 
western collections, formally at least, in a markedly appendix-like position, i.e. paralle
to the patristic canons in the east, after all of the conciliar canons, even very local ones
and often among the most variable parts of the collections.
l 
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154  Canonical collections, 
Greek, Latin and Syrian, are always primarily Apostolic and conciliar in content and 
form – and then, in the Latin west, papal or, in the Syrian and Greek east, 
c/patriarchal. 
Greek corpus impermeability highlights another important dynamic in first 
millennium canon law: the movement of canonical material is overwhelmingly from the
Greek east outward.  In this, Greek canon law is in a sense the "central" tradition of the 
first millennium.  As we have seen, the core corpus of all Christian churches – at least in
the empire – emerges from the east, and is largely updated from the east.  This positio
as an active center of canonical production gradually fades but its legacy is clear: all 
major first millennium Christian collections, at least within the (old) imperial cultural 
sphere, contain as their clear core Greek Apostolic material and the sine qua non G
Nicene corpus.  As a tex
l phenomenon. 
This "Greekness" of canon law in the first millennium should not, perhaps, 
surprise.  In this, the textual reality of canon law is following a well-worn path of Gree
 
152 See further section C.5. 
153 "Le règne des Décrétales" according to Gaudemet 1994,375-407; significantly this material now 
becomes the "new law" of the church, in the phrase of Bernard of Pavia (d. 1213; Somerville and 
Brasington 1998,219) See generally Brundage 1995,53-56,160; Fransen 1972,11-14. 
154 See Fournier 1931,30 (and n. 2); Fransen 1972,17; Jasper and Fuhrman 2001,22-87; Zechiel-Eckes 
1992,1.7,18; also Maassen 226-308 et passim.. 
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to Latin/Syrian/etc. transmission, which Scripture, much theology, monastic writings, 
and numerous other types of Christian (and before them, pagan) cultural expressi
long followed.
on had 
ultural preeminence and vitality of the eastern 
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155   It reflects above all the Greek origins of most early Christian 
literature and the continued political and c
 throughout the first millennium.  
Nevertheless, the Greek character of canon law, even in the east, does surprise
little, and should perhaps not be taken for granted.  The one aspect of Greco-Ro
civilization that seems to be specially the domain of Latin is precisely law an
administration, and indeed, as F. Millar has recently strongly reiterated, the 
administration of the Greek east, at least at its higher levels and in formal expression, 
was still resolutely Latin throughout most of the 4th and 5th C – the time of the formation
of the core "first wave" material.156   Legal judgments still had to be formally issued in 
Latin until 397, many Latin notarial formulae remained in use throughout the 5th C, and
eastern imperial legislation starts to drift into Greek only slowly throughout the 5
not truly supplanting Latin until the 530s.157  In this context, it is perhaps a little 
surprising that, even in the east, the chief (internal) texts of order and administration o
the 4th and 5th C imperial church are not in Latin. This is true even of the texts of the 
highest order, the ecumenical councils – precisely where, ironically, as Millar points 
out, it becomes evident how meager the eastern episcopate's knowledge of Latin reall
was.158  Church order, therefore, unlike civil order, was a distinctly Greek affair.  In 
terms of the core content of the canonical collections, this was even true in the Latin 
west.  If secular law and order in late anti
th
 
3.  Size 
The next observation emerges mostly as a point of comparison with the western 
tradition, and has already been alluded to: the Byzantine canonical tradition is quite 
compact.  It is difficult to know how long early Byzantine canon law manuscripts may 
have been, and particularly how much appendix-type material, perhaps lost, might have
followed the various recensions of the corpus.  Nevertheless, if one takes almos
 
155 Marrou well reminds us that the image of antique culture as constituted by two parallel and equal Latin 
and Greek spheres is problematic: Latin culture is in many respects a subsidiary phenomenon of a broader 
Hellenistic reality (Marrou 1948,242). 
156 Millar 2006,84-107 et passim.  
157 See Delineatio 19; Jones 1964,988-991; Krüger 1894,312;  Matthews 2000,28-29. 
158 Millar 2006,85, 97-107. 
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the extant pre-10th C canonical material – i.e. everything that might have been 
prominent in a large manuscript of this time – the total is quite modest.  It includes th
prologues, two systematic indices, approximately 770 canons, a smattering of other 
material from the Apostolic Constitutions, the canonical synopsis, three comparatively
short civil law collections (in total approximately 620 separate fragments, varying
length from a line to several pages), the civil law material of the nomocanonical 
recensions (largely overlapping with the previous collections), perhaps some scholia
and some other isolated jurisprudential material.
ree 
 
 in 
,159 
 
 
he 
l 
secular Justinianic law corpus; the Digest alone is 
approx
tern 
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nd 
160  Exact calculations are difficult 
without electronic databases, but I estimate that taken together this material – the full 
effective canonical corpus of the eastern empire – comprises perhaps 150 000 words. 
This is perhaps three fifths the size of the Hispana – a major western collection from
two centuries earlier that does not include western civil ecclesiastical law material, 
scholia, or other appendix or framing material.161  It is closer to a third of the size of t
mid-9th C collection of Isidore Mercator, likewise containing only straight canonica
material.162  And of course it goes without saying that this material is minuscule in 
comparison with the Talmud, or the 
imately 800 000 words.163    
This distinction is equally evident in a canon-to-canon comparison.  The eas
core corpus, as defined more or less definitively by the 883 recension, will contain 
approximately 770 canons.  The shortest version of the early 7th C Hibernensis has 
roughly 1600 texts;164 the systematic versions of the Hispana include approximately the 
same number;165 Burchard's popular 11th C Decretum clocks in at 1783 items; Ivo's 11th
C Decretum at 3760,166 and the standard edition of Gratian (about half the 16th Roma
Catholic corpus) is usually counted to contain about 3800 texts.167  The division a
nature of the texts and fragments in the western texts may not always be directly 
                                                 
159 See n. 10 for editions. Uncertainty about the dating and completeness of the published scholia – man
of which seem to be quite regularly copied, almost a small glossa ordinari
y 
a – have generally precluded 
is work.  See Sbornik 145, 161; Sin 22-23. 
0 words from the Hinschius 1863 edition. 
our discussion of them in th
160 See below section C.6. 
161 Estimated at ~260 000 words from the González 1808 edition.  
162 Estimated at ~500 00
163 Honoré 1978,186. 
164 Reynolds 1986,403 
165 Gaudemet 1985,159 
166 Gaudemet 1993,83, 95. 
167 Gallagher 2002,158; Thompson 1993,xiii. 
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able with the relatively neat "canons" of the eastern collections, but the general 
disparity in size remains unmistakable.168 
More comprehensive comparisons also reveal this difference.  At the end of the 
empire, the full NC14, complete with secular material, prologues, corpus and the three
12th C commentators (i.e. most of RP 1-4, generously estimated at about 500 000 words)
is a little over three-quarters the length of the Friedberg edition of Gratian's Decretum 
and the decretal collection of Gregory IX,169 that is, about three-quarters the size of 
effective core corpus of the medieval church in the later 13th C.  If one were to make a 
closer like-for-like comparison, and include on the western side the post-Gregorian 
decretals
the difference would extend, I think, to at least a factor of ten, probably much 
more.   
As a physical textual presence, then, the Byzantine canonical tradition is stabl
conservative, and small.170  Indeed, one can fit the full Byz
c
sense, the majo
 
4.  Autonomy 
One of the simplest and most preliminary observations to be made of the extant 
Byzantine canonical tradition is that it constitutes a distinct and discrete physical textual 
tradition.  That is, the tradition is mostly constituted by "canon law manuscripts"
sole, or at least predominate, content of which is canon law.  As noted, the exact content 
of the extant manuscripts can vary, particularly in the appendices, but the basic 
structures and types of contents of canonical manuscripts – even aside from the c
themselves – are sufficiently regular and similar that one can always easily identify
"canon law" manuscript from, say, a Scriptural, or theological, or philosophica
manuscript.  Rare indeed are manuscripts which profoundly mix proper canonical 
collections with other types of content – i.e. in which a substantial part of the 
manuscript is given ove
 
168 Isidore Mercator is counted at 10 000 fragments!  Gaudemet 1993,32 
169 Conservatively estimated at ~650 000 words. 
170 Despite occasional comments to the contrary: Nichols 1992,416.  
171 So, for example, Florence Laur. 5.2 or Istanbul Topkapı 115. cf. Burgmann 2002,260.   
172 On the general "purity" of Byzantine juristic manuscripts, Burgmann 2002,263.  It is particularly 
difficult to find an example of a manuscript that combines a major non-canonical work – say a scriptural 
commentary, or philosophical treatise – with a canonical collection. The few exceptions seem to prove the 
rule. See Appendix A (11) for examples. 
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ing church law are usually purpose-made as canon law manuscripts, and are 
recognizable as such.   
Given earlier references in Chalcedon and Justinian to canons being read from 
"a book" or "books of the canons" and the relative absence of more mixed or 
miscellaneous manuscripts – and certainly of traditions of such mixed manuscripts – we
may tentatively
n the earlier Latin and Syrian manuscript traditions may help further illumin
this question. 
Only one consistent exception to this textual autonomy exists in the extan
manuscripts: secular and ecclesiastical legal materials do regularly appear togeth
not simply in the form of ecclesiastical secular regulation within the collections 
themselves.  Often a major ecclesiastical canonical collection will contain as an 
appendix a handbook of general secular law or vice versa.174  It is not clear if this 
pattern was evident before this 8th C, when the earliest Byzantine secular handbooks – 
the usual secular components – were first composed.  Nevertheless, it seem
end of our period the Byzantine legal imagination could easily envision secula
and ecclesiastical normative material sharing a common physical space.    
The Byzantine canonical collections also display a degree of internal textual 
autonomy in their relatively unmixed disciplinary content.  The earlier Apostolic church
order traditions evince a tendency towards encyclopedism: doctrinal/exegetical, mo
liturgical and disciplinary texts are synthesized into one literary whole.175  By contrast,
in the imperial church, these threads tend to be developed as separable and disti
textual traditions.  This independence does not mean that the canons will be wri
"pure" legal or disciplinary rules in a modern scientific-juridical sense, cleanly 
separated from theology or morality; as we will see, quite to the contrary, they 
frequently make juridically "inappropriate" recourse to doctrinal, moral, and even 
li
doctrinal or exegetical texts.  They constitute a proprieta
 
5. Structure, order and patterns of growth in the corpus 
 
173 In Chalcedon the canons are frequently read from "a book", βίβλιον or βίβλος: ACO 2.1.3.48, 60, 95, 
96, 100 (references from Historike 21-22).  See N. 6.4 for τὰ βιβλία τῶν ἐκκλησιαστικῶν κανόνων. 
174 The most important of these are described in Burgmann et al. 1995; for examples of the former, Athos 
Meg. Lav. B.93, contains the Coll14 with the Ecloga, and Oxford Laud 39 the NC14 with the Prochiron. 
175 On the genre of the Apostolic church orders, see Steimer 1992,155-335, also Metzger 1985,1.33-54. 
The best example of such liturgical and disciplinary "mixing" is probably the Didascalia apostolorum (ed. 
Funk 1905). 
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The structure of the Byzantine corpus of canons is constituted chiefly through the 
ordering of its constituent sources (i.e. Nicaea, Ancyra, Neocaesarea, etc.).  Witnes
to corpus orders may be found in five principal places: 1) actual orders of sources in 
manuscripts; 2) the order of sources cited under thematic rubrics in the systematic 
collections; 3) the orders mentioned in prologues, canons and external sources (e.g. 
Psellus or John of Damascus' references); 4) the orders of sources in manuscript table
of contents; 5) and the orders of sources in synoptic or later commentary works.  It 
generally assumed that the source orders of the last four types of texts represent real 
physical corpus configurations that at some point existed, and that have later been 
"frozen" in the textual tradition.  Whether this is always strictly true or not, certainly 
such witnesses at least suggest a structure which someone tho
ses 
s 
is 
ught should exist or could 
exist.  T tages of 
how th
 
T
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outh of 
h a 
t
e 
rces which are maintained more or less in their 
origina
                                                
aken together, all can be read as a series of witnesses into different s
e corpus developed over time as a concept and a text. 
Four fundamental patterns may be discerned from these witnesses.   
The first is less of a pattern than a constituent characteristic: the corpus is 
structured by sources. This may seem to be a banal point, but it is extremely important. 
he canons do not exist in the tradition as disembodied norms or abstracted rules.  
Instead, rules are consistently designated according to their original source: canon 2 
Nicaea; canon 4 of Gregory of Nyssa.  The canons are always issuing from the m
their original legislators. The corpus as a whole thus always emerges as very muc
self-conscious accumulation and compilation of traditional sources of canonical 
legislation.  In this sense, it is broadly florilegic in character: it is a collection of 
raditional authorities on matters of church discipline.176   In this respect the Byzantine 
corpus is quite unlike modern codes in which rules, deriving their authority from the 
issuer of the code, exist as more or less anonymous and rootless norms, and are easily 
subject to various levels of manipulation, reorganization and rationalization – and are 
easily modified, added or deleted.   The Byzantine instinct is instead always to keep th
corpus as a collection of traditional sou
l integrity.177  The authority of the sources seems to be linked to their issuance 
from their original, traditional source. 
 
176 cf. Gallagher 2002,39-40. This tendency is enforced by the practice in some manuscripts of including 
short ὑποθέσεις before the listing of each source's canons (most notably Beneshevich's Group A recension 
of the Coll50, Sin 26-69).  These ὑποθέσεις, of varying length, give various historical details about the 
council in question, and occasionally, of the father.  In the 12th C commentators, similar introductory 
comments can extend into sizable paragraphs.   
177 For two apparent exceptions to this rule, see Appendix A (12). 
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This general allergy to abstracting and presenting rules as detached from their 
traditional sources is also shared by the civil legal tradition.  The constitutions in the 
CTh and the CJ all retain attributions to their original legislators from whom they derive 
their continuing authority.  More surprisingly, even the fragments of the Digest, which 
are explicitly given their authority by Justinian, as if issuing from his own mouth,178 are 
still scrupulously sourced to their original (mostly pagan) authors – and so even in th
Basilica.
e 
 
rpus.  Real legislation always remains 
explici ywhere 
 
ly 
never 
  We may term this phenomenon "corpus persistence".  A similar, if 
weaker al 
in the 
rces.183  
This default is nevertheless regularly violated, and each violation may be read as 
179  The only real exception in the CTh/CJC  literature is the Institutes: but it is
merely a pedagogical handbook to the real co
tly connected to traditional sources.  Legal work in late antiquity is ever
broadly florilegic – certainly compilative.180 
The second pattern of structuring, already noted at length, is the basic 
mechanism of growth in the tradition: accumulation.  The structure of the corpus always
reveals that one always only adds new material on top of older material. New material 
thus almost never physically replaces or ejects older material: older material, once well 
established in the corpus, is eternal.181  Older rules may fall out of use, and be clear
marked and recognized as such, but traditional sources, and even parts of sources, 
actually leave.
, dynamic, has also been occasionally observed in Byzantine secular leg
literature.182   
Third, the ordering of the corpus evinces an ongoing dialectic between 
hierarchical and chronological ordering.  In the extant witnesses, the default ordering 
strategy is clearly chronological, just as it is in the disposition of laws under titles 
imperial codices, or, for the most part, in the Florentine index of the Digest sou
                                                 
178 Deo auctore 6 
179 And in the Digest, quite explicitly on account of "reverence for antiquity": see Tanta 10.  
180 The preservative and compilative nature of late antique law is a commonplace of late antique source
histories.  See for example Pieler 1997a,566-567, 580 (where he calls the Digest a "Florilegium of iu
591; see also the related narrative of (eastern) late antiquity's conservative and classicizing legal Geist, 
Kunkel 1966,153-154; Schulz 1953,278-285; Wieacker 1988,2.263-266.  These tendencies should  be 
understood within the context of the broader late antique and Byza
 
s"), 
ntine cultural penchant – almost 
 (with a 
ble; see Appendix A (13).   
of the lack of functioning abrogation principles; references in 
 its 
 Digest xxx-xxxii. 
cognitive tendency – for compilation and preservation.  See, for a variety of contexts and periods, Aerts 
1997a,648-649; Jenkins 1953,47-50; Lemerle 1971; Louth 2002; Maas 2005a,18-20; Odorico 1-7
critical review of older literature on Byzantine "encyclopedism"). 
181 The idea of "cleaning" the corpus is perhaps not altogether absent or impossi
182 See particularly the discussions 
Introduction n. 44. Lokin 1994,82 astutely compares this tendency towards legal accumulation, with
lack of a functioning derogation model, to the accumulation of church dogmas 
183 Published in
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conveying some ideological message about the nature of the sources.184  This 
hierarchization represents one of the very few ways in which the Byzantine corpus 
suffers
cyra 
r" of the 
ek manuscript witness exists to the corpus without this 
modific
 finds 
e core 
ent of these councils is 
explici
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, 
                                                
 – although quite superficially – a kind of systematic rationalization. 
  The first and prototypical violation, made at the tradition's onset, is the 
prefacing of the Antiochian corpus with the Nicene canons, despite the fact that An
and Neocaesarea were known to be older.  This is a very conscious, and explicitly 
marked move, as already noted, and clearly indicated the Nicene "take-ove
collection. No Gre
ation.185   
The next consistent violation will be the relegation of Serdica (341) and 
Carthage (419) to after Chalcedon (451) in the expanded Nicene corpus.  This is their 
standard position in the extant recensions of the Coll14, and the later tradition, and
resonance in older western and Syrian collections.186  The Coll50 however placed 
Serdica in its chronological position, following Neocaesarea, and thus "within" th
Nicene collection.  In the Coll14, the subordinate placem
tly glossed as a relegation or marginalization.187 
The third violation is the placing of all patristic material after the conciliar 
aterial.188  The former is clearly subordinate to the latter, as made explicit in the f
Coll14 prologue.189  At no point in the Byzantine tradition is the rule material thus 
considered so homogenous and generic that a true chronological corpus emerges in 
which the councils and patristic material are mixed in chronological order (e.g. Ancyra
Neocaesarea, Peter, Nicaea, Athanasius, Gangra, Antioch, Basil, Laodicea, etc.).  The 
 
04-110; 1989,92-
ce 
Καρθαγένῃ τῷ χρόνῳ τινῶν τῶν 
όδων προτερεύουσαι, μετ᾽ αὐτὰς ἐτέθησαν διὰ τὸ πολλὰ περί τινων ἐπιχωρίων ἤγουν τῶν 
184 As probably true for the privileging of Julian and Papinian on the Florentine list: the former is 
privileged as providing the  model digesta, the latter as simply a particularly respected jurist. Schulz 
1953,145,319. 
185 The only exception is perhaps Blastares' survey of the sources in his Syntagma (1335; RP 6.6-26), but 
this is an historical treatment, akin to synodical histories, not a listing of the corpus per se.  The east 
Syrian tradition, however, does later move Nicaea back into its chronological place. Selb 1981,88,107. 
186 Thus they appear in more marginal locations in the Syrian synodika (see Selb 1981,1
102, 140-145), and both are post-positioned after Chalcedon in Dionysius II, while in the non-extant 
Dionysius III both were apparently omitted explicitly because of doubts about their universal acceptan
("quos non admisit universitas"; see Preface III, Somerville and Brasington 1998,49). 
187 On account of their "local" western content: ἡ δὲ ἐν Σαρδικῇ καὶ ἐν 
λοιπῶν συν
δυτικῶν μερῶν διορίσασθαι.  (In the scholion ἰστέον to the table of contents of the Coll14; RP 1.12) 
188 Tarasius, however, generally follows II Nicaea in the manuscripts. 
189 RP 1.6. 
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patristic material itself tends to be arranged chronologically, however, as in Trullo 2, b
other orders, sometimes evading explanation, are not unknown.
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190     
  The fourth major violation is the movement of all later ecumenical conciliar 
material to a position immediately following Nicaea – i.e. before the older Antiochian
corpus sources.  This may be understood as another aspect of the general tenden
assimilate ecumenical material to Nicaea, and as an extension of the original Nicene 
prefacing.  Its effect is to create a new hierarchical distinction between "general" and 
"local" councils.  In the Greek tradition, this ordering is first certainly witnessed i
Nicaea 1 (787) and the recension Beneshevich associates with this council (the 
"Tarasian" or "systematic").191  It becomes a regular order in the manuscripts only
Zonaras and Balsamon, although even in these manuscripts it never entirely ousts
more traditional order of the Coll14 source listings (as found in Trullo 2 and the 
traditional table of contents of the Coll50 and Coll14) in which the later ecumenica
s usually follow Constantinople and Chalcedon, which themselves follow 
Laodicea.192  The result is that very often the two orders (or even more) co-exist 
together in the same manuscript – "piled" on top of each other – with the older o
the prologues and systematic references, and the newer one in the corpus itself.193 
The fourth major structural dialectic, and the most complex, is that between cor
material and appendix material.  This dialectic, implicit in our discussion until now, is a
phenomenon by which at any given moment one group of canons is marked as 
particularly standard, central and inviolable versus other material in the collection or 
manuscript that is marked as newer, more peripheral, variable, and perhaps optional – 
i.e. more appendix-like.  It is never a concept that is articulated doctrinally, nor does it 
lend itself to precise definition, but it nevertheless constitutes a consistent, tangible and 
essential part of the tradition as a whole.   It tends to emerge as a graded and diffuse 
spectrum of implied worth and value – rather as multiple concentric rings, ea
 next – indicated by a wide variety of markers.  Although the exact boundaries 
between different "levels" of sources can be blurry, it allows one at any given moment 
 
190 Joannou offers a brief survey, Fonti 2.xix-xx.  For an example of an order by rank of see, Coislin 364 
(described Sin 160-161); for an order in which Basil is favoured, but otherwise the rationale for the order 
is difficult to discern, see Rome Vallic. F. 47 (described Sbornik 266-7). 
191 The relevant section of II Nicaea 1 reads ..τοὺς θείους κανόνας ἐνστερνιζόμεθα...τῶν πανευφήμων 
ἀποστόλων, τῶν τε ἕξ ἁγίων οἰκουμενικῶν συνόδων καὶ τῶν τοπικῶς συναθροισθεισῶν ἐπὶ ἐκδόσει 
τοιούτων διαταγμάτων καὶ τῶν ἁγίων πατέρων ἡμῶν... The four-council order of the synopsis tradition 
associated with Symeon Magister may, however, represent an earlier version of this ordering strategy. 
192 Thus, for example, in manuscripts of the Tarasian recension, as edited in Beneshevich's Kormchaya. 
193 On this, see Stolte 1994,187. 
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to identify at least some material that is clearly of the "core" and some that is not.  It 
subsumes and presumes the dynamics of accumulation and hierarchization. 
over time. All 
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The markers of the core material are numerous, and change 
consciously or unconsciously function to distinguish some types of 
others.  They often overlap and contradict each other, which prod
a highly nuanc es: some sourceed, graded spectrum of sourc
one way, and not in others.  The ma
 numbering schemes which differentiate older core
presence and position of sources in prologues 
 presence and position of sources in manuscript tables of contents 
 presence and position of sources in systematic references 
 presence and position of sources in definition canons  
(i.e. Trullo 2 and II Nicaea 1) 
 mentions in other literature 
 presence and position in manuscripts themselves 
  The very earliest traces of this phenomenon may be detected in the use of
ous numbering in the original Nicene (and probably Antiochian) corpus, 
highlighted above.  Here an earlier "core" of material is demarcated by continuous 
numbering.  Newer material appear with individual numbering, quite obviously ma
as tacked-on or added: appendix-like, at least in appearance.  Eventually this material 
too is subsumed by the continuous numbering, in effect assimilated into the cor
In the 6th C, the continuous numbering system falls out of use in the Greek 
world, but a number of other signals now indicate core material.  Thus the prologue of
the Coll50 refers clearly, and quite casually, to what is already an established core 
structure; so much so in fact, that it even has a name: the "Ten Synods".194  The source
included in this "Ten Synods" are enumerated in the Coll50's corpus τάξις τῶν 
ν.  To this core it prefaces the Apostolic canons – apparently already a standa
addition – and post-fixes the Basilian canons.  The result is a three-stage corpus: first 
and foremost the Apostles, outside of the synodal list, which here probably implies 
precedence, an almost qualitative difference; then the neatly sealed Ten Synods; then, 
again outside of the synodal list, Basil –here almost certainly implying subordination. 
The introductory structures of the Coll14 also reference the Ten Synods as a 
standard core of canons, and then goes on to give a relatively long explanation for its 
major additions, including (very briefly) the Apostles, th
                               
194 See chapter 2.A.3. 
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umber of other fathers.195  Both in the prologue itself, with its differentiation o
the material (Ten Synods taken for granted; Apostles virtually for granted; Carthage and
fathers in need of explanation), and in the traditional listing, the πίναξ, where Carthage, 
Serdica, and the fathers are placed after the older Apostles + Ten Synod core, a clear 
sense of core and "new core" material is again evident. 
This pattern carries through in the patterns of referencing under the thematic 
titles of the Coll14.  As already alluded to, the original Coll14 see
ery canon of the older core Apostotlic + Ten Synods + 68 canons of Basi
the Coll50 core.  The only "selection" is in the newest stratum of material just attached 
to the core by the Coll14 author himself, i.e. in Carthage and the first letter of Basil.  
This material is thus again subtly "downgraded".  Later, this material will be added b
into the Coll14 references – it has achieved higher "core" status. 
Other patterns of core-appendix marking may then be found in the slow 
processes of corpus expansion evident in the later recensions of the C
, the recensions have been recoverable chiefly because the manuscripts contai
different fossilized orderings of the corpus sources such that the newest sources are 
utside an older "core", i.e. recensional form.)  Only gradually are the new 
sources admitted into the older cores, slowly moving up through the hierarchy of 
sources – which thus emerge as yet more inner rings within the core.  
The fortunes of Trullo in the manuscripts provide the best illustration.  In the
very earliest witnesses, Trullo appears physically virtually outside of the corpus, even 
after the patristic material.196 Later, however, it may be found to have leapt in front of 
the patristic material, but still after all the earlier conciliar material, even the relegated 
Serdica and Carthage (and Constantinople 394).197  This position will become its 
classical Coll14 position; it has a difficult time penetrating beyond this earlier core 
structure.  Nevertheless, in a few manuscripts attempts are made to do precisely this.  
Venice Nan. 226, for example, Trullo is now pushed before Carthage (Serdica remains
in the Coll50 place).  Similarly, in Oxford Barocc. 26 Trullo is placed after Serdica, 
before Carthage, and in Venice Bessarion 171 Trullo is placed immediately after 
Chalcedon (extremely unusually, Serdica and Carthage are here simply omitted).198 
 
e, and also the corpus references in Beneshevich's Coll14 index to the Tarasian recension 
danian and Coislin redactions (Sbornik 177-188, 188-191). 
195 See chapter 2.A.4. 
196 Beneshevich's First Redaction, (Sbornik 230-242); so similarly the Synopsis attributed to Symeon the 
Logothete, abov
(Kormchaya).  
197 Beneshevich's Lau
198 Sbornik 313-321. 
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ttempts may be viewed as experimental – they do not catch on.  Nevertheless 
they demonstrate attempts to "push" Trullo more clearly into the core.  Only with the 
hierarchical rearrangement of the corpus, in Beneshevich's Tarasian recension, will 
Trullo, as one of the general councils, finally physically appear right after Chalcedo
with all other councils following it.  Trullo has "made it" into the core of the core.199
Similar "journeys to the core" may be suspected for II Nicaea and the Photian 
councils.  For the former, in Oxford Laud. 39, which seems to contain one of the oldest 
recensions (and which is perhaps a 10th C manuscript), one finds II Nicaea separated 
from Trullo (which it usually accompanies) by Cyprian.200  In contrast, in another 
recension, Beneshevich's Partes Distributa, Cyprian has been gently pushed after II 
Nicaea.201   Protodeutera and Hagia Sophia also take some time to be accepted into the
collections – and the latter never seems fully integrated.  Both are mentioned in the 
prologue to the Coll14, but are missing, for example, in Oxford Baroc. 26, Rawl. G
(both 11th C).  In Vatican 2198 both are present but following Cyprian (after II Nicaea).
Hagia Sophia, in particular, is often absent, for example in Vienna hist gr. 56 (a. 1000),
or Oxford Baroc. 196 (11th C). In Athos Iver. 302 (14th C) Hagia Sophia is found, but 
curiously after Gennadiu
o make it into the table of contents of even the Photian redaction, and only 
sometime later, certainly by the 11th C, do references to it enter the Coll14 titles.202  In
the 12th C Aristenos still does not offer commentary on either council.  These counc
are thus not quite "marked" as sufficiently core material.  This only happens, it seem
with the commentators. 
This gradual movement of material into the core is very curious.  One might 
expect that one chance 7th C manuscripts might survive showing, for example, Trullo 
tacked on after the corpus for purely practical reasons – the newest legislation w
simply added to existing manuscripts.  But the fact that these manuscripts are much 
more recent and contain plenty of material following Trullo (II Nicaea, Protodeutera
etc.) indicate that Trullo is being left in a subordinate positions more intentionall
would have been exceptionally easy to have 
orpus, perhaps after Chalcedon, or certainly before the fathers, in every 
subsequent manuscript recopying since the late 7th C.  Instead, a much more hesitant, 
 
199 Sbornik 288-307. 
200 Sbornik 177-188. 
201 Sbornik 192-199. 
202 Sbornik 96-100. Pitra 2.450 does note one later manuscript (Vatican Barb. 568) that includes Hagia 
Sophia in the Coll14 table of contents. 
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conservative and gradual process of digestion and consensus-building is evident in 
which the new material seems to pass through a succession of strata before it is 
absolutely evidently part of the older core.  
Similar conservatism may be remarked in the persistence of the original Coll50
core.  As already noted, from a number of external references it seems to have remain
 highly impermeable "core of the core" in the tradition for some time, long after 
introduction of the Coll14 core. This is even evident within its own manuscript tradition
n which later councils are usually only tacked on after the systematic rearrangement of
the corpus itself, thus visually marking a distinct difference between the original 
material – placed under the titles – and the later additions.  Also, as we just
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 itself witnesses to the Coll50 core as an established authority, adopting it 
wholesale, and carefully not selecting amongst its canons in its topical references. 
Coll50's ordering of the pre-6th C material, save only the location of Serdica, will also 
lways be preserved in the πίναξ of the Coll14, even when the canons themselves will 
be rearranged in the manuscripts into the hierarchical general-local order. 
Both of the two principal corpus "definition" canons of the Byzantine traditio
(Trullo 2 and II Nicaea 1) also obliquely evince a sense of th
  Both list the traditional corpus, but do not include their own regulations
listing. They thus make an implicit distinction between 1) the core, traditional corp
and 2) their new canons.  The latter are presented as immediately following on from a
faithful to the former – which seems to precisely mirror their position in the earliest 
recensions: right up against the older core, but outside of it. 
As noted, the corpus of the 883 recension will ultimately ossify into the 
definitive core of the tradition.  Its status will ultimately be marked mostly by the 
hesitation of later recensions to add any more items to the Coll14's πίναξ or thematic 
references and a general change in the genre of later legislative material from synodal 
canons to synodal decrees.  The decision of the commentators to comment almost 
exclusively on this core will become a decisive marking of this core.  However, th
boundaries between a given core and its appendix material are always fluid, and this 
will always be true of the 883 corpus. (The exact delineation of the 883 core is mos
modern preoccupation.203)  Thus the Michael/Theodore recensions recognize the 88
recension as definitive, but they also consider that the material of the Apostolic Epitom
                                                 
203 For example, Historike 91-100. 
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should be part of it.204  As already noted, even the two major commentators will 
commentate on slightly different corpora (and Aristenos' is quite different). Physically, 
in the manuscripts, some material that is generally "in", such as Cyprian, Gregory 
Nazianzen, and Amphilochius in fact tend to flit in and out of the manuscripts and 
indices, while material that is generally "out" can sometimes appear to enter the core
For example, the ἀποκρίσεις of Patriarch Nicholas, or the penitential canons of John the 
Faster or Nikephoros the Confessor, which become fairly regular appendix items in th
later tradition, and often can be found following directly on the more tradition
.  
e 
al patristic 
materia
aterial – it is either in 
the out
s 
ers, 
ut of 
tionally 
tyle.  Until one 
ads a manuscript with the commentators – where the cessation of commentary is quite 
s 
e prologues and their corpus listings, the systematic references, and 
recognition.  That is, it is the mechanism by which the tradition slowly establishes 
consensus around the definition of "valid" law.  This very diffuse form of rule-
l, can very occasionally be added under some systematic rubrics.205  Similarly, 
Balsamon seems to have commented on the ἀποκρίσεις of Patriarch Nicholas.206 A 
certain amount of material thus emerges as a kind of transitional m
er valence of the core, or the innermost stratum of the appendix material.  It is 
"in" by the measure of some markers, or "out" by the measure of others.  
Similar core-boundary "blurriness" may be detected earlier in all of the variou
instances of "softness" we have noted: Serdica and Carthage, the non-Basilian fath
or even, at first, Trullo and the rest of the second-wave material.   
Finally, the blurriness in defining the corpus is reflected in the physical layo
the manuscripts.  In my sampling of manuscripts core material is not clearly and 
consistently distinguished from non-core material with, for example, an excep
dramatic bar-design or page break, or any other change of layout or s
re
obvious – the manuscripts shift very smoothly from core to appendix.  The core i
instead marked by th
often a genre-switch in the manuscripts (e.g. from the canons to the civil law 
appendices, and then back to paracanonical ecclesiastical material). 
 
6.  Is something missing?  The problem of official definition, jurisprudence and 
professionalization  
The phenomenon of core-formation may be understood as a very diffuse form of rule-
                                                 
204 In the longer prologue, text in Schminck 1998,361 
205 For an example of the latter, see Sbornik 252.  Nikodemos, by including them in the Pedalion 
(Kallivourtsis 1800), is thus following an old tendency in the manuscripts. 
206 RP 4.417-426; but see p. 417 n.1. 
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ition by turns reflects, explains, and perhaps enforces, the strikingly tenuous a
desultory role of one very essential and normal element of most modern positivists
theories of law: the assertion of a clear "official" authority to define the valid law.207   
Only once in the canonical tradition does something approac
 definition emerge: Trullo 2.208  It, however, can only very awkwardly and 
indirectly be cast as an exercise of true sovereign authority over the law, i.e. as an act of 
official definition of law in its strongest (modern) positivist sense.  
First, although rarely noted, the canon is primarily addressed to a very specific 
problem – the status of the Apostolic Constitutions in the corpus – and not to corpus 
definition per se.  The lengthy corpus delineation itself reads as almost an after-though
and should probably be understood as a consequence of the broader problem raised 
the Apostolic Constitutions: the intrusion into the corpus of pseudepigraphal and fals
material.  This concern is precisely the focus of the canon's conclusion,209 and is how 
the synopsist reads the canon – he does n
s not therefore so much creatively or actively defining the law as a wh
clarifying the mainstream tradition (which already has authority) and tidying up around 
its edges in light of specific problems.   
Second, as is often noted, its corpus delineation is little other than an 
unremarkable confirmation of a corpus that had been in existence for at least a century: 
it seems more or less to read down the corpus list of the Coll14, as it stood in the late 7th
C.211  The only thing it may be adding is Cyprian, since it goes out of its way to justify 
and explain its presence; but even this canon seems to have been in the tradition ear
few other peripheral patristic sources. Its general content and tone is thus almost entirely
                                                 
207 This lack of a clear moment of official definition of the eastern corpus so upset 19th C canonists 
(educated in modern civil and western canon law) that they invented one ("920"). See Appendix A (14). 
208 The definition in Chalcedon 1 is probably specific in intention, but not in form; II Nicaea 1 does little
more than list the major types of legislation.  Only one other more specific definition exists in the 
tradition, Novel 131.1, which confirms the dogmatic definitions and canons of the first four council
updated in the 9th C in Basilica 5.3.2 to include the seven ecumenical councils.  Even this imperial 
definition, however, is 1) not especially comprehensive; 2) it reads as
 
s. It is 
 only secondarily directed towards 
s 
t role in 
 per se –  in particular, it is surprising how rare a four-council core 
, is in the eastern tradition. Of course it undoubtedly contributed to the 
confirming the canons; 3) and it is mostly confirmatory in character: it sanctions and approves realitie
already established.  There is also little evidence in the texts that it played a particularly importan
defining the shape of the corpus
structure, implied in Novel 131.1
corpus' definition, and may be read as another "marker" of the core. 
209 ...καὶ μηδενὶ ἐξεῖναι τοὺς προδηλωθέντας παραχαράττειν κανόνας ἢ ἀθετεῖν ἢ ἑτέρους παρὰ τοὺς 
προκειμένους παραδέχεσθαι κανόνας ψευδεπιγράφως ὑπό τινων συντεθέντας τῶν τὴν ἀλήθειαν 
καηπηλεύειν ἐπιχειρησάντων.  
210 RP 2.311-312; so Aristenos. 
211 For example, Delineatio 69-70; Historike 73-74; Ohme 2006,32-33.   
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traditional and deferential, "sealing" what has gone before.212  Although it may be 
attempting to bolster the authority of the Coll14 additions vis-à-vis the older Coll50 
core, or simply to clarify the general tradition, it is certainly not working to modify or 
dramatically shape this tradition, and it is not granting authority to something that had 
none before.  It is thus more recognizing the law than actively defining it: contributing, 
perhaps, to a broader process of definition and delineation, and further heightening and 
sharpen
s, 
ther 
way aro
ive 
 
 
, 
ing a previous growing consensus.   
In fact, the canon's function is probably best read as garnering support for 
Trullo's own legislation: it is above all a proclamation of Trullo's fidelity to the canon
and thus the legitimacy of its own canons – and not the canons' dependency upon its 
sovereign legislative "approval".213  Trullo is seeking the canons' approval, not the o
und.  It is above all a statement of allegiance to the established tradition.214 
The most important "strike", however, against reading Trullo 2 as a definit
and categorical official definition of the law is simply its lack of influence on the 
tradition as a whole.  It will never, for example, mark a particularly definitive corpus-
boundary (i.e. there are few witnesses which embody the Trullo list as a definitive and
obvious core215), and indeed the manuscripts and recensions often ignore its exact list 
and order of patristic fathers, its addition of Cyprian, and its prohibition of any other 
Apostolic material aside from the Apostolic canons.  Certainly when the final shape of 
the core corpus does emerge, as we have seen, it is defined not by Trullo (or II Nicaea
1) but by a later anonymous recension of the Coll14.  Finally, as we have seen, many 
much later listings of the "the canons" hail more to the Coll50, and not the Coll14 at all
                                                 
212 The key dispositive, ἐπισφραγίζω (ἐπισφραγίζομεν δὲ καὶ τοὺς λοιποὺς πάντας ἱεροὺς κανόνας...) can 
denote "ratify" – in the sense of putting into active force – but it can also simply mean seal in the sense of  
"confirm" or "recognize".  (In the corpus, for something approaching the former, see Constantinople I 
Προσφωνητικός in Kormchaya 95; for the latter Carthage 55; see Liddell-Scott 663; Lampe 536-537)  In 
the context of the previous canon, however, to which canon 2 is clearly written as an addition (ἔδοξεν δὲ 
καὶ τοῦτο τῇ ἁγίᾳ ταύτῃ συνόδῳ...), the latter meaning is much more natural: just as Trullo 1 proclaims its 
allegiance to the traditional doctrinal definitions of the church, so now the council proclaims its allegiance 
to the church's canonical traditions.  Trullo 2 is thus no more truly putting into force or "defining" the 
canons than canon 1 is putting into force or defining the older doctrinal decisions.  It is proclaiming its 
allegiance to them.  Critically, in fact, Trullo 1 uses the term, among others, ἐπισφραγίζω, to "confirm" 
the older doctrines.  
213 Some modern Orthodox canonists, influenced by modern civil law doctrine, have been included to 
read in Trullo the affirmation of the positivist action of the absolute sovereign legislative authority of the 
ecumenical council (e.g.  Archontonis 1970,20-21; Christopoulos 1976,255-266; Gavardinas 1998,136-
138).  This is not the council's intention; see Appendix A (15). 
214 See further chapter 2.B.4. 
215 That is, that contain the following corpus: Apostles, Nicene Corpus to Chalcedon, Constantinople 394, 
Serdica, Carthage, the Trullan patristic list, and then Trullo and later councils.  Patmos 172 is very close. 
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in any form, including Trullo!  In short, no one seems to have been reading this canon
as the "official" statement of the tradition.   
Some scholars have recently seen this curious lack of "official" effect as 
evidence for Trullo's late or tenuous reception into Byzantine canon law, and have 
suggested that Trullo was not truly in force until as late as the 12th C.
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216  We must be 
careful, however, about imposing an excessively – and anachronistically – categorical 
and bivalent sense of legal validity and enactment, i.e. the idea that an a source i
absolutely in force, or absolutely not, and that this is status is meant to have imme
consistent, and system-wide consequences – and that a particular person or organ can 
determine this.  This presumes a concept of a definitive, positive definition of the valid 
and in-force law.  It is much preferable, however, to recognize that categorical, 
authoritative "official" statements of the law are simply not part of the Byzantine 
canonical legal imagination – indeed they do not seem to be clearly a part of anyone's
canonical-legal imagination before the high middle ages217 – and that "validity" in th
world appears much more as a graded and fuzzy calculus of traditional weighting.218  
this case, Trullo's effect and fortunes are perfectly normal, and even to be expected.  
New material, whatever its source, always starts outside the core of fully recognized 
traditional material, and needs to slowly work its way in.  In this sense it is true that 
Trullo is not fully "accepted" until the 12th C – i.e. it is not absolutely clearly seen as 
itself expressive of the tradition until this point.  But this does not mean that Trullo was 
not "accepted" per se as a real imperial ecu
ty (any more than would be true for the early papal decretals in the west, on 
account of their variability in the manuscripts).  The evidence is quite the opposite.219  
 
216  Sources Fathers; Fonti 2.xv-xx; Ohme 1990,332-44; 2006,34.  The background of this assertion is the 
interminable discussion of the "ecumenicity" of Trullo. 
217  "Prior to the thirteenth century, the very idea of a canonical compilation drawing its authority from a 
formal act of sovereign approval seems not even to have entered the mind of popes and canonists alike..." 
Kuttner 1947,387.  The seeds of this new idea are perhaps to be found in the Gregorian concern for the 
papal approval of genuine church legislation, as Kuttner goes on to discuss.  The first moment when a 
collection appears quite explicitly and certainly to have received some kind of "official" approval is 
Innocent III's confirmation of the compilatio tertia of Peter Collivacina in 1209/10; the first collection 
composed by official order seems to be Honorius III's compilatio quinta (1226). See Pennington 
2008,309-312. Gratian, however, is not formally promulgated until the 16th C.  
218 Cf. Burgmann 2003,252 n. 13, where it is noted that different levels of "officialness" could be 
encountered in the Byzantine secular collections.  The traditional distinction between "official" and 
"private" collections is Byzantine secular law is now increasingly questioned.  See Appendix A (16). 
219 For example, its citation in II Nicaea, in Leo's Novels, in citations at 861; see Dura 1995, Troianos 
1995. In the west it seems that serious objections to Trullo's validity as a whole were not raised until the 
Gregorian reforms – and even afterwards the council sees a scattered reception (e.g. in Gratian). Sources 
Trullo; Laurent 1965,28-39.  
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By virtue of its newness, it is simply, and quite normally, a "softer" point in the tradition
for some time.  And so with its definition. 
In sum, therefore, instead of a clear positivist action of sovereign legislative 
authority, a very different, much more diffuse – but no less real or effective – method o
rule recognition seems to have been operative in the Byzantine canonical tradition.  
trying to find a theoretical formulation for this method, Rudolph Sohm long ago put his 
finger precisely on the central assumption of this system: in this world, authoritativ
positive legislators do exist, but only in the past.
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Indeed  
 can 
his 
represent, as we will see, a modest level of jurisprudential production.  The former 
                                                
220  Only after a period of time can 
legislation become clearly recognized as absolutely authoritative.  Phrased differentl
tradition itself is the only real sovereign positive agent; only it has categorical rule-
recognition authority.  As such, nothing today can acquire absolute recognition – no one 
living has
eventually the authority that "was" present in this or that legislative process.  In practice, 
this process is thus very diffuse and seemingly almost unconscious.  Curiously, the 
manuscript tradition itself seems to function as its most direct practical agent.  Copy 
after copy, recension after recension, "the corpus" is slowly, and constantly, formed and 
defined. 
The curious lack of instances of clear official positive definition of the canon
sources points to a much broader and more conspicuous absence in the textual shape of
the tradition: jurisprudence.  Largely missing in Byzantine canon is a literature of the 
technical juristic discussion of the rules, their principles, their underlying concepts, 
their relationships with each other.     
Evidence of canonica
, it is present in the canons themselves.  As we will see in chapter three, canons
can sometimes be written in almost commentary-like style on older regulations, and
analyze in detail fine points of the nature and application of specific rules.222  T
material itself may cautiously be considered instances of a very desultory 
"jurisprudential" literature.  
Outside the canons themselves, the thematic collections and the synopsis also 
 
220 Sohm 1923,2.75-77. 
221 Unquestionably the early episcopal courts, attached to the civilian system, had constant contact with 
broader secular jurisprudential processes.  On the episcopalis audientia generally, see now especially 
Harries 1999,172-211 and Humfress 2007,153-173; also Wenger 1955,337-344.  On the gathering of 
episcopal judgments as precedents, see Garnsey and Humfress 2001,77-78. 
222 See esp. chapter 3.D.1. 
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involve some sorting and classification, for example, and the latter do involve 
paraphrasing the canons.  The extant scholia, if not all (or even mostly) within our 
period, witness to an ongoing process of explanation, reflection and even dissection
the canons as a coherent of rules. At the very end of our period, Photius produces a se
of canonical que
 on 
t 
stion-and-answer,223 and, just after our period, Arethas writes two short 
treatise
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jurispru nd 
ristic 
 
eferencing.  Even the 
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f a 
relief by its later emergence.  In the 12th C, in particular, a sustained jurisprudential 
s on the transfer of bishops.224  Earlier, Theodore of Studite had composed a 
number of letters that are more or less canonical answers.225  A small work on the 
election of bishops, attributed to a certain Euthymius of Sardis, may also date to the 
early 9th C.226   
But this production is very small, and hardly constitutes a sophisticated and
sustained project – certainly not a literature.  Unquestionably it pales in compar
with the extensive and advanced commentary work of the secular antecessors of the 6th 
C, which seems to have included a number of different genres of lectures, paraphras
and case-examinations – to say nothing of the classical jurists227  It is not even as 
creative 
dential activity, which still sees the development of comparatively creative a
novel manuals, compilations and even monographs.228  If similar technical-ju
conversations around the canons were taking place, they have certainly not left much of
a trace. 
The material that is extant is also usually fairly practical and simple, hardly 
going much beyond clarification, indexing and cross-r
dence embedded in the patristic material and second-wave legislation does not 
emerge as in any way a sustained "scientific" or systematic jurisprudential endeavou
It seems much more ad hoc, employed to deal with a problem or two, but not part o
continued and sustained methodological enterprise.   
This early absence of jurisprudential literature is thrown into particularly high 
                                                 
223 Grumel 1972-1991, #531, 539, 540, 542, 545. See Peges 253, also 154-156, 251, 256; Troianos 
2003,763.  
224 Ed.Westerink 1968,1.246-251. Peges  256.  
225 Epistles 40, 487, 489, 525, 535, 549, 552 (ed. Fatouros 1992). Troianos 2003,763. 
226 Ed. Darrouzès 1966,108-115.  Peges 156, 256. 
227 On the antecessors, the Greek schools, and their methods, Collinet 1925,243-256; Pringsheim 1921; 
; Zepos 1958. 
Scheltema 1970; van der Wal 1953. 
228 Delineatio 63-66, 71-76, 78-87; Pieler 1978,434-444, 452-469
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literature does emerge in the shape of three corpus commentaries.229  These join a 
number of increasingly detailed question-and-answer material and canon-legal 
monographs that had been growing in number throughout the 11th C.230  Later practical 
handbooks and manuals also exhibit more creative patterns of selection and ordering, 
more in line with later Byzantine trends of excerpting and epitomizing.231  There is no 
questio ure 
sticated 
e 
ianic 
es 
of 
omponent of the tradition.  The canonical 
traditio
n that Byzantine canon law does eventually acquire a kind of secondary literat
of formal rule-commentary and rule-reasoning – even if never extensive or sophi
in comparison to the post-12th C west. 
In light of this later development, the earlier jurisprudential silence becomes 
almost deafening.  The sudden 12th C flurry of commentary work is particularly 
mysterious: why now and not earlier?  It is hard to imagine that the need to explain 
some of the archaic canons of, for example, Ancyra or Carthage, was so much mor
pressing in the 12th C than the 9th C – or even the 6th C.  Further, the 6th C Justin
and 9th C Macedonian spurts of secular legal activity surely recommend themselves as 
at least as obvious moments for the stimulation of a real canonical jurisprudential 
literature as the (relatively obscure) 11th C revival in secular legal learning the 
presumably underlay the 12th canonical work.232  Most critically, the canons themselv
give evidence that canonical jurisprudential thinking and activity was taking place 
during these earlier periods, and there is every reason to believe that, on the model 
the 6th C and 9th C  literature, it could have if anything been more sophisticated and 
involved than what later emerged.  But if it existed it simply did not form itself into a 
lasting and distinct literature, a regular c
n in our period overwhelmingly presents itself as simply a series of primary 
rules: a secondary discourse around these rules, although evidently occurring, does not 
textually congeal in a significant way.  
                                                 
229 Overview in Delineatio 108-112 and Peges 249-270 (see this last especially on the "fourth" 
commentary, a reworking of Balsamon).  The only monograph remains Kraznozhen 1911.  See also 
Gallagher 2002, Pieler 1991, Stevens 1969, Stolte 1989, 1991, 1991a. 
me 
nd the latter proceeds through an exceptionally regular and rational progression of subjects.     
230 Peges  250-258, 303-306, 308-315 gives the most recent and thorough survey; see also for further 
references to the older literature Beck 1977,598-601, 655-662. 
231 The best examples are the two 14th C collections, the Syntagma of Blastares (in RP 6) and the Epito
of Harmenopoulos (PG 150.45-168).  The former adopts a method of organization known from earlier 
civil-law works (alphabetical listing of subjects; as found in the secular Synopsis Major and Synopsis 
Minor) a
232 On the 11th C revival see Angold 1994; Delineatio 98-104; Macrides 1990,68; Wolska-Conus 1976, 
1979. 
 74
This lack of a distinct jurisprudential literature is undoubtedly connected to 
another gaping hole in the "shape" of early Byzantine canon law: professionalization.233  
This is  
een 
ked something 
of the h
thing, but there 
ne 
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zantium. 
(i.e. 
s 
d there seem to have been no regular and 
widesp  their 
  Even 
one of the few socio-political realities of Byzantine canon law to be broached in
this work, but it is essential for explaining the tradition's peculiarities.   
Unfortunately, the topic of Byzantine legal professionalization has never b
the subject of sustained research, even in secular Byzantine law – much less so in 
Byzantine canon law.  Nevertheless, a few central facts may be asserted with some 
confidence.  
Byzantium did know secular legal professionalization, at least of a type.  Late 
antiquity, with its well-known law schools and "bars" may have even mar
igh water mark of formal Roman legal professionalization, certainly on a 
scholastic level.234  After the 6th C legal professionalizaiton is notoriously difficult to 
trace in any detail, and the documentary trail at times fades to almost no
is little question that at least in Constantinople itself throughout much of Byzanti
history one can detect professional notaries, advocates, and at least private teachers o
law; at the very least, the concept of the legal professional is present.235   
By contrast, it is far from clear that even the concept of a professional "canonist"
or "canon lawyer", parallel to the secular lawyers and jurists, ever existed in By
Without doubt it is elusive.  Certainly the basic infrastructures of legal 
professionalization were not present: there were no "canon law" faculties in the 
Byzantine "universities" (such as they were) with dedicated "canon law professors"; 
there were no canon law qualifications; there were no clear and defined "terminal" 
life-long) career paths; there were no canon law associations or guilds, with admission
policies and standards of conduct; an
read dedicated "canon law" positions in the dioceses that were designed for
occupant to make a living primarily from their canon law knowledge and perhaps as the 
chief proprietary staff of a widespread network of purely ecclesiastical courts.236
                                                 
233 On legal professionalization generally, and its connection to formal jurisprudential forms of thought, 
Weber 1925,199-222. 
234 On the shape (and ambiguities) of late Roman legal professionalization, see Brundage 2008,1-39; 
Garnsey and Humfress 2001,41-55; Heszer 1998,632-633; Honore ́ 1998,7-10, 2004,119-124 ; Humfress 
2007,9-21; Jones 1964,386-394, 499-516; Marrou 1948,310-312; Matthews 2000,23-36; Schulz 
1953,267-277. 
235  See now especially Goria 2005; the literature, however, remains scattered.  See Haldon 1990,254-279; 
Macrides 1994; Magdalino 1985; Pieler, 1978,429-431, 445-448, 473; Stolte 2002,201-202; Wolska-
Conus 1976, 1977; Zepos 1958. 
236 These criteria are drawn mostly from the post 12th C medieval western experience as explored by 
Brundage 1995a, 2008. 
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terms such as "canon lawyer" or "canonical jurist" (e.g. "κανονικοὶ σχολάστικοι", 
"σόφοι τῶν κανόνων", "νόμικοι τῶν κανόνων") are not, to my knowledge, anywhere 
attested in the Byzantine tradition.   
One can instead detect overlapping patterns of a) canonical specialization 
associated with certain ecclesial offices, mostly attested in Constantinople itself, and of
b) what we may term "borrowed professionalization".  Most of the evidence is, 
however, quite late.  The best example of the former is the patriarchal officers known a
χαρτοφύλακες, essentially chief notarial and archival officers who seem to have becom
the de facto canonical experts of many administrations. Balsamon is the chief examp
of such officers, but others have left "question and answer" material.
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which we often know frustratingly  little – also sound as if they may 
have be
 
s 
antique 
e that some had some canonical knowledge – the canons 
themse
 of 
professional secular legal training who are then applying themselves to church affairs, 
237  A number o
other offices – of 
en at least in part especially oriented towards canonical knowledge.238  But the 
pattern of specialization seems to be one of exceptional expertise in a particular set of 
text traditions – "canonical lore", as it were –  and not mastery of an autonomous field
of technical knowledge by which the officer was primarily making his living, and wa
formally qualified to pursue.  These positions are better described as administrative 
positions demanding canonical specialization than canon-legal positions within the 
administration.   
The pattern of "borrowed professionalization" is best exemplified by late 
ἔκδικοι (defensores).239  They appear to have been charged with various aspects of their 
church's secular legal relations, whether in defending its own interests in the secular 
legal courts, in assisting in the running of the bishop's own semi-secular jurisdiction 
(even functioning as a judge-delegate), or in acting as an advocate for the poor and 
widows.  We must presum
lves suggest a few duties for them.240  But they nowhere appear as "canon 
lawyers" per se, that is, as a specialized corp of proprietary lawyers of a parallel 
ecclesial legal system.   Instead they emerge as secular advocati with some type
including, probably, canonical matters.  These offices may thus be best described as 
                                                 
237 Darrouzès 1970,19-28, 334-353; Peges  250-258.  I regret that V. Leontaritou's work Εκκλησιαστικά 
αξιώματα και υπηρεσίες στην πρώιμη και μέση βυζαντινή περίοδο (Athens, 1996) was unavailable for 
 
consultation. 
238 For example, the πρωτονοτάριος, Darrouzès 1970,355-359 
239 On the late antique ἔκδικοι, see now especially Humfress 1998,155-170; 2001 (inter alia by the same
author). 
240 Chalcedon 23; cf. also canon 2. 
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secular-legal ecclesial positions. Much the same seems to be true of their often shadow
Byzantine successors.
y 
hin the 
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ee in the late Byzantine period, when the clergy 
virtuall t does 
tem, or 
(A 
thus 
241   
This pattern of borrowed professionalization is also broadly assumed by the 
system as a whole: the many points of integration of civil legal regulation and canonical 
regulation, whether in the nomocanons, the ecclesial courts, or even provincial 
administration, point to an ongoing need for advanced civil law knowledge wit
church.  Certainly formal – if not necessarily "professional" – civil legal training must 
always have been reasonably common in the higher echelons of the Byzantine ecclesial 
administration, as in the secular, where many offices mix secular and ecclesial duties.242
In our period, we may note that some of the most prominent figures associated with 
Byzantine canon law were evidently secular lawyers: John Scholastikos ("the 
lawyer")243 is the most famous example, but the so-called "Enantiophanes" who seems 
to have composed the first nomocanonical recension of the Coll14, was also evidently a
learned jurist.  Later two of the canonical commentators, Aristenos and Balsamon, will 
be νομοφύλακες, a civil legal position established in the 11th C,  as well as, respective
πρωτέκδικος and χαρτοφύλαξ.  This pattern of the clergy using and exercising civil 
legal knowledge will come to its apog
y take over the operation of the secular legal system.244  Yet even this las
not entail the envelopment of the secular system "within" a parallel canonical sys
vice versa.  The clergy are simply beginning to operate the secular legal system.  
curious result of this is that the one surviving patriarchal register, from the 14th C, has 
very little truly canonical content.245) 
Even this "borrowed professionalization" in the regular operation of the 
canonical system does not, however, seem to have involved a sophisticated and 
profound interpenetration of secular-legal juristic and canonical discourse.  One 
suspects the former came into play mostly when civil legal problems emerged.  It is 
revealing that the majority of canonical "questions and answers" literature, the closest 
                                                 
241 Darrouzès 1970,323-332 et passim.  It seems that at least in Constantinople a college of ἔκδικοι 
continued to exist, and the πρωτέκδικοι become fairly prominent officers in the patriarchate.  A similar 
dynamic is probably to be assumed for the later ecclesial δικαιοφύλακες, an office that could be bestowed 
-Conus puts it (1979,6), "Tout fonctionnaire, dans la capitale ou dans la province, est un 
eans "from 
r if certain positions are 
 secular or canonical matters (or perhaps both equally).   
on secular and ecclesial officials. Darrouzès 1970,109-110.  See also Macrides 1990,68-69.   
242 As Wolska
peu juriste." 
243 The epithet σχολαστικός does not inevitably denote legal training (Wolska-Conus 1979,5 n. 17; also 
Humfress 1998,75-76).  However, John is referred to as ἀπὸ σκολαστικῶν, which certainly m
the [professional] lawyers", "former lawyer". For his titles in the manuscripts, Sin 220-221 
244 Pieler 1978,473-476; Fögen 1987,157.  Very often, however, it is unclea
primarily treating
245 Peges 314. 
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texts we possess granting window onto the "real" operation of the system, are almost 
always fairly simple canonical questions directed from provincial bishops to isolated 
clerical specialists in the capital.246  The answers sometimes contain technical civil legal
principles, and sometimes do not, but the overall pattern is of a fairly informal rule 
discourse informed by occasional secular legal juris
 
prudence – and not of an ongoing, 
formal 
 and 
m, 
 system, from which it seems to have 
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nd 13t
tine 
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and technical church-legal conversation carried on by a large network of even 
"borrowed" secular legal professionals dedicated to church matters.  Even the canons 
themselves, and the thematic collections, while certainly evincing some quite technical 
moments redolent of professional legal composition, are in no way dominated by it.247  
Magdalino has also recently surveyed a number of well-educated 12th C bishops
discovered very little evidence of legal learning.248 
Generally, then, Byzantine canon law does not ever emerge as a distinct sphere 
of professional legal endeavour.  Its professional or academic infrastructure, such as it 
was, appears only as a kind of appendage to either the ecclesial administrative syste
mostly attached to Constantinople itself, and marked here and there by men especially 
learned in the canons, or to the civil legal
d
have always been the much more "amateur" struc
the figure of the bishops themselves, either individually or in synods, but always men o
(if anything) very general education – a pattern not unfamiliar from the pre-12th C 
west.249  Certainly the western explosion of canon-legal professionaliza
a h C has no parallel in Byzantium. 
 
D. Summary and analysis: a curious law indeed 
Even from this bird's-eye view of the textual shape and development of the Byzan
canonical tradition, some of the basic cultural contours of Byzantine canon law can b
discerned.  The picture that emerges is both fascinating and troubling.  
 The primary focus of Byzantine church law seems to be the collection and 
transmission of a limited set of traditional rule-texts – this is the fundamental focus of 
what the tradition is "doing".  The single-mindedness of the tradition in this regard, and 
the unity and stability that results, is quite striking.  Although by the standards of 
               
246 See Konidaris 1994. 
247 See chapter 3. 
248 Magdalino 1985,171-172. 
249 See Brundage 1995,41, 120-121; 2008,46-74.  
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develop
This strong emphasis on the preservation of traditional texts is odd by modern 
standards, and suggests an almost scriptural-like handling of the texts.251  Indeed, just as 
Byzantine (and indeed, all pre-modern) "theology" is mostly an ongoing cumulative 
                                                
 (printed) codifications the Byzantine manuscripts and collections can seem 
quite "messy" and variable, the tradition nevertheless easily reads as centered around 
one basic set of texts.  This corpus is always gradually expanding, and its boundaries ar
always subject to negotiation, but it is always discernable as the basic backbone of the 
entire endeavour. "The canons" in the Byzantine tradition, at any given moment, always 
have a reasonably concrete and unitary referent, and always are the central focus of the 
system. 
This corpus-centered culture of canon law seems to have been surprisingly 
universal.  When one looks west and east from Byzantium, the textual worlds of Latin 
and Syrian canon law look very familiar in both form and content.  Everywhere canon 
law seems to be mostly about the collection and transmission of "the corpus", and "the 
corpus" is similar east and west, at least in its core, and certainly its shape.  At least unti
the 9th C, and at least in the Mediterra
on "imperial" canonical culture.  
 One of the chief characteristics of this culture, certainly in the Byzantine e
its extraordinary conservatism.  This is a natural presupposition of the system's textua
unity and stability. Over the longue durée, if a source makes it into the corpus, it is there 
to stay.   It will never disappear, and its integrity will never be successfully challeng
on a physical level – i.e. canons never permanently drop out of the tradition, no mat
how obsolete they may become.250   
The system therefore develops and is constructed almost exclusively through 
accretion.  Its central value is preservation
s almost Talmud-like, with each new layer simply placed over upon the old.  
Thus the patristic material and Apostolic material are wrapped around the older synodal 
core; the systematic indices are affixed to or gently placed over the corpus; and the 
second-wave material is simply added as yet one more layer.  After our period this 
pattern will continue, with later synodal decisions and question-and-answer material 
simply stacked after the corpus, and, finally, the commentators' writings wrapped 
around the core corpus texts themselves. 
 
250 The canons are eternally valid, in the formulation of Konidaris 1994,133-134. 
251 Cf. L'Huillier 1996,10 who connects the stability of the texts with their attribution to divine 
inspiration.  
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exegetical engagement with scripture, a sacred "core corpus" of traditional texts, so 
Byzantine canon law emerges as above all an ongoing engagement with another sacred 
– if gro
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texts, is 
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fairly "amateur" personnel who seem to operate the system.   
                                                
wing – body of traditional texts.  Just as Scripture will never be replaced or 
"edited" by later developments, so with the core corpus of canons.  (It is also interestin
to note that the fuzziness of the canonical corpus around its edges is paralleled, if to a 
lesser extent, by the fuzziness and variability of the Scriptural canon.252) 
This extreme emphasis on preserving legal traditions, almost as sacred 
undoubtedly related to one of the most striking absences in the tradition: the lack of a 
sustained canonical jurisprudential literature (with the requisite professional cadres).  
This absence makes sense.  In a legal world in which preserving a semi-sacred set of 
traditions is paramount, the development of a discourse that might through its 
techniques and principles exercise some type of power over the laws, or perhaps replace
the laws, or otherwise actively reshape the tradition (as Gratian), is quite unthinkable, 
and even nonsensical.  The focus of the system will always be on returning to the co
traditional texts, and engaging with them, not "advancing" beyond them, or 
a more satisfying logical system from them.  Certainly such a discourse will always be 
comparatively ephemeral, around the
many traditional problems of jurisprudence are simply non-issues in the first place: 
sacred traditional laws cannot really contradict other sacred laws (certainly 
contradictions are more the reader's problem than the tradition's), and repetitions sim
make traditions more traditional.253  
 The lack of even a relatively benign, non-constructive jurisprudential literatu
i.e. of a more exegetical type, like much traditional Roman jurisprudence, and certainly 
like the later Byzantine commentators – also suggests, however, that the function of
jurisprudence in assisting in the application and interpretation of rules is not felt to be a 
particularly strong need.  In other words, the role of jurisprudence is already being 
performed by other discourses.  Despite its obvious textual autonomy, then, Byzantine 
canon law is clearly deeply embedded in other regulative disco
o be borrowing its secondary "rules about the rules".  What is more, the tra
is obviously not particularly concerned about defining precisely what these rules are
They are evidently rather well-known, and presumably can be well known even by th
 
252 For the variations in the Byzantine canonical lists of Scripture, see the synoptic table in Boumis 
1991,1.205-207. 
253 Cf. the references in the Introduction, n. 44. 
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The small size of the corpus is also probably linked to this expectation of 
embeddedness.  It strongly suggests that the system is embedded in other, external 
regulat
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very sm
                                                
ive discourses that can fill in any legislative "gaps".  Or, perhaps put better, it 
witnesses to a relative lack of concern about such gaps in the first place.  The system
can apparently survive quite well with a relatively small body of formal written rules. 
Another absence that the emphasis on "law-as-preservation-of-tradition" helps t
explain is the curious lack of official definitions of the law, or of any type of clear 
expression of sovereign positivist legislative authority over the law.  It seems that leg
authority must always speak from tradition and as tradition (and this is literally true: a 
rule is always a rule of St. Basil or of Nicaea – of some traditional authority).  This 
makes any "present" articulation of its shape, or assertions of radical change, rather 
awkward.  It seems that, in the present, one is mostly expected to confirm the existing 
tradition, i.e. to recognize authoritative decisions that have already taken place.  At be
one makes a few suggestions, clarifies a bit, and occasionally makes some addi
But true assertions of "present" authority over the tradition, such as radically to mo
or even categorically to define its shape, seem out of the question.  It certai
s.  The system instead encourages definition and change by the diffuse 
agglutinating addition of yet more tradition, perhaps contradicting and effective
editing or defining the older tradition, but never physically doing so.254     
Further, even adding new material is not very straightforward.  Certainly it 
seems quite different than what a modern positive legislator might expect. The 
definitive promulgation of laws seems to be a very diffuse action of the tradition itself
involving a long, quiet process of negotiation within the manuscripts in which valid law
eventually "just happens".  Positive legislation is thus a process of "offering" texts for 
the tradition's consideration.  This system of rule-production is thus also very slow.  
Making law – or rather, waiting for the tradition to make law – takes a very long time.  
This precludes frequent "instrumental" use of laws to effect immediate policy goals.  
Such action is not impossible, but it is not easy.  Looking back for earlier articulation
of a desir
all size of the corpus.)  In any case, the immediate, unqualified, system-wide 
acceptance of new material – as expected by modern positivism – is not particularly 
evident. 
 
254 See Glenn 2000,65-66 on this point. 
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Another modern expectation – the precisionistic demand for bivalence in the 
assertion of validity – also seems frustrated by this form of rule-recognition.  As strange 
as it may seem, the tradition overwhelmingly presents its sources as constituting
spectrum (!) of validity.  They are presented as a large array of diverse traditions with 
varying levels of "marking" as to their antiquity and acceptance.  At any given moment 
one can broadly discern what material is "in" the corpus, and what is "out", but the
line between them is hard to determine – and in any case its significance is not 
immediately clear.  Certainly the tradition does not en
 a 
 exact 
courage, and probably does not 
require  to 
lly 
 clear 
ential discourse.  Likewise, if 
law today is imagined as comparatively detailed and comprehensive, Byzantine law 
appears brief and compact; if law is supposed to be malleable, constructible, and 
instrumental, in Byzantium it seems rigid, conservative, traditional and even sacralized.  
Byzantine canon law does not have the shape we expect. 
, inquiring very closely into this question.  It is consequently also very difficult
determine if any of the hierarchical rankings of the sources that are evident in the 
tradition (e.g. councils before fathers, ecumenical councils before local) are actua
legal-doctrinal in intent; they seem almost symbolic. 
In sum, then, Byzantine canon law emerges in its broadest "shape" as a rather 
foreign legal phenomenon.  Many of the fundamental concepts, assumption and even 
instincts of modern formalism-positivism seem to be simply disregarded or even 
contradicted – or at least very oddly implemented.  One thus searches in vain for a
doctrine of positive sovereign legislative authority, or clear indications of validity, or 
even for a solid place for a technical professional jurisprud
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 CHAPTER 2.  INTRODUCING THE LAW: THE TRADITIONAL FRAMING 
MATERIAL 
 
In the previous chapter we explored the fundamental physical and historical contours of 
the Byzantine canonical tradition for what they can reveal about the fundamental beliefs 
of the Byzantine canon-legal tradition.  The next question is how the Byzantines 
themselves framed and introduced this tradition. 
The Byzantine canonical tradition contains relatively few texts that directly 
outline the purpose, nature, and scope of church law.  Those that do are therefore 
extremely valuable as windows onto Byzantine church-legal culture.  Every aspect of 
how they frame and portray the canonical endeavour is important: what is said, what is 
not said, what is emphasized, what is assumed, what the priorities are, and what 
contexts and points of reference seem most prominent. 
Unfortunately, little literature has been devoted to exploring how these texts 
shape and articulate a legal vision.  Although research on Roman and Byzantine secular 
law prologues, as well as early western canon law prologues, has begun to consider the 
legal-cultural aspects of these texts,1 the Byzantine canonical prologues have so far 
attracted attention only inasmuch as they can be used for reconstructing the textual 
history of the collections.2  The parts of the prologues that we may term – very loosely 
– "legal-doctrinal" are largely overlooked in both canonical and historical literature
despite their obvious prominence in the tradition generally and, in particular, in the 
prologues themselves (the most doctrinal sections of the prologues tend to come first!).  
, 
                                                
This is a serious oversight.  By late antiquity prologues are quite clearly and 
explicitly marked as an important and even essential element of legal literature – and the 
roots of this tradition run very deep.3   Plato, as is well known, made it quite clear that 
prologues are a necessary part of the law: "the lawgiver must never omit to furnish 
preludes [προοίμια], as prefaces both to the laws as a whole and to each individual 
statute"4. According to Plato, these prologues provide the "simple laws" (ἄκρατοι 
νόμοι) of normal legislation with the philosophical and pedagogical under-girding 
 
1 In particular, and of most value to this study, Aerts et al. 2001, Brasington 1994, Fögen 1995, Honig 
1960, Hunger 1964, Lokin 1994, Ries 1983, Scharf 1959, Simon 1994, Somerville and Brasington 1998. 
2 For example, Menebisoglou 1989; Petrovits 1970,17-53; Sbornik 52-86; Stolte 1998a; Zachariä von 
Lingenthal 1877. Exceptions include Deledemos 2002,79-82 and Viscuso 1989.    
3 For general discussions of ancient legal prooimia, Hunger 1964,19-35; Ries 1983. 
4 Laws 723b (ed. Burnet 1907). 
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necessary for their proper operation.5   Plato's own Laws thus included a lengthy 
introductory section, and Cicero followed suit, championing Plato's theory.6  Significan
prologues will later also be placed in the mouths of the semi-legendary lawgivers 
Charandos and Zaleukos, and Philo, in his description of Moses as an ideal lawgiver, 
notes that Moses too understood the need to provide laws with prefaces and epilogues.
t 
 
in short prologues.9   
                                                
7  
In Roman legal literature itself this concept does not show explicit expression until the
principate, but thereafter imperial constitutions and legal collections regularly include 
ornate prologues and introductory-like sections.8  Some elements of the Apostolic 
church order material also conta
Legal prologues are also exceptionally valuable because, in a certain sense, they 
are the only witnesses to Greco-Roman "legal theory" we possess from within the legal 
literature itself.  Outside of this literature, a number of highly theoretical philosophical 
or rhetorical treatments of law may be found; but within the legal literature, sustained 
general theoretical self-reflection is quite rare.10  The prologues – and more broadly, the 
introductory sections of the extant legal collections –  are thus one of the very few 
places where ancient Greco-Roman legal literature has an opportunity to articulate its 
own scope, purpose, priorities, contexts and nature.  They are particularly important in 
the Byzantine period, where explicit reflection of any type on law is very hard to find.11 
 For our purposes the Byzantine tradition of canonical introduction may be 
understood as constituted by virtually any text, or set of texts, that seems to frame the 
canonical material.  The most obvious and important of these are those texts that 
directly and consciously introduce the tradition, i.e. the formal prologues or epilogues 
 
5 Laws 721b-d, and more broadly 718a-724b. See Fögen 1995,1597-1599; Laks 2000,285-290; Ries 
1983,104-126, 212-223; Scharf 1959,68 n.2.  
6 Cicero Laws 2.6.14 (ed. Powell 2006); Ries ibid. Plato's prologue in the Laws may be considered to 
extend from 715e until 734e (of course, the Republic itself may be considered an enormous prologue). 
7 The prooimia of (pseudo-)Zaleukos and (pseudo-)Charondas are preserved in Stobaeus (ed. Wachsmuth 
and Hense 1884).  For Philo, see Life of Moses 2.51 (ed. Cohn 1902,119-268); see also 2.46-48 on the 
purpose of Moses' historical introduction. 
8 See Ries 1983,162-185; three prologues from Diocletian seem to be our first substantial surviving 
examples (Fögen 1995,1594). A list of the secular prooimia taken into account for this study may be 
found in Appendix B (1). 
9 Notably, and taken into account into this study, the short prefaces (and sometimes epilogues) of the 
Apostolic Tradition (and related sources), the Constitutiones ecclesiasticae apostolorum; the Didascalia 
apostolorum and the Apostolic Canons.  For editions, see Appendix D (4). 
10 That is, the jurists themselves do not seem to have produced any works of "Roman legal philosophy". 
The general lack of Roman legal theory is a commonplace observation; see for example Johnston 2000; 
Schulz 1953,69-70, 135; Stein 1995,1539. 
11 On this last, Aerts et al. (here B. Stolte) 2001,145: ...with the exception of the prooimia, there is no 
Byzantine reflection on law as a social and political phenomenon.... It is very hard to ascertain what the 
Byzantines thought about their legal system.". See Fögen 1993,72 on a similar state of affairs for 
Byzantine political theory. 
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attached to various collections.  Also important are introductory letters prefacing 
individual sources, and canons or topics in the sources and systematic indices that may 
be construed as broadly introductory in content or form.  Many extant manuscripts also 
contain identifiable introductory "sets" of articles that include not only the formal 
prologues, systematic indices and tables of contents, but also a varied selection of other 
introductory-type texts such as excerpts from the Apostolic church order material, 
synodal histories, lists of thrones, and sometimes doctrinal material.  A full schematic of 
the Byzantine canonical introductory tradition may be found in Appendix B (2).   
  The focus of the present study is the most substantial monuments of 
"introduction" of our period: the Nicene and Apostolic prefaces, the prologue to the 
Coll50, the first two prologues to the Coll14, the Trullan introductory complex, and II 
Nicaea 1.  These texts are distinguished by their prominence in the tradition (regularity 
and place in corpus structures and manuscripts), their depth of content, and/or their 
length.  Although quite varied, this material together provides a rich and reasonably 
coherent image of the nature and function of canonical regulations.  We will also briefly 
consider some of the more minor introductory texts found within the corpus itself. 
  
A. Content 
1. The Nicene Creed 
The first significant "prologue" to the canons was almost certainly the Nicene creed 
itself. Presumably it was added at the same time as the Nicene canons.12   It is to be 
found heading the canons in Schwartz' chief witnesses to his Antiochian corpus, most 
notably London BL Add. 14 528 (a. 500/1) and the Isidoriana translation of the 
Freising-Würzburger manuscripts; other witnesses are not difficult to find.13  In London 
BL 14 528, the creed is found amidst a number of other texts that head the collection:14  
 1. A note ascribed to Constantine  
 2. The edict of Constantine against the Arians 
 3. The Nicene Creed 
 4. The Constantinoplitan Creed 
 5. Subscription list of Nicaea 
                                                 
12 Schwartz 1936a,161-162, 193-194, 200-201, 225; so Delineatio 26, and also Ohme 1998, who even 
suspects (527-542, 579) that a homoion creed may have prefaced the early Antiochian corpus, later 
replaced by the Nicene.   
13 See Turner 1936,1.1.2.106-111, 154-155, 174-175. Cf. the close association of the two in Carthage's 
Apiarian Dossier (Fonti 1.2.426-247). Also Selb 1989,98 n. 71. 
14 In Schulthess 1908,1-4, helpfully described by Schwartz 1936a,161-162. 
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The presence of the Constantinopolitan creed in particularly notable.  In effect, a "credal 
section" seems to have been developing at the head of the corpus.  This is quite logical: 
one places the ὅροι of faith together with the ὅροι of discipline (to use the older 
terminology for church rules)15 – and the former function as a kind of ideological and 
theological framework for the entire work.   
This practice of creedal prefacing does not become normative in the later Greek 
tradition.  Occasionally in later manuscripts creeds will be included among a number of 
introductory articles, but this does not seem to have been a widespread practice.16  It 
does, however, find resonance in a much more general tendency of beginning 
collections, manuscripts and sources with some type of faith or theological topic.  This 
tendency is quite consistent throughout the tradition.  Thus, for example, Title 1 of the 
Coll14 starts with "theology" and "the faith" (imitating CJ 1.1), as does Constantinople 
1, Carthage 1-2, Trullo 1, the Epitome of Arsenius (12th C; title 1), and Blastares (14th 
C; Πρόλογος περὶ τῆς ὀρθοδόξου πίστεως).17  Some manuscripts may also be found 
with series of doctrinal ὅροι (if not creeds) stacked at their opening.18 In general, and in 
a tradition reaching back to classical antiquity, one thus tends to start the law with God 
and with the divine.19 
 
2. The Apostolic Material 
The Apostolic material plays an introductory and framing role in a number of subtle, but 
critical ways.  The only element of this material to achieve an assured place in the 
                                                 
15 See Schwartz 1936a,193. 
16  For example, Moscow Syn. 432 (in Latin!); however, the creed can also appear with the Nicene canons 
in the corpus, as in Athos Meg. Lav. B.93, or Oxford Rawl. G. 15.  
17 This last very explicitly keeps treats faith outside of, and ahead, of the collection's alphabetical scheme 
because of its preeminence. RP 6.46-49. 
18 Cambridge Ee.4.29 (11th C) is an excellent example, containing, among other confessions, the ὅροι of 
Chalcedon, Constantinople II, Constantinople III and Nicaea II; see also Vat gr 2184 (with a few doctrinal 
letters of Cyril) or Paris supp gr. 1089 (with an article on the filioque, and a confession of faith). These 
type of doctrinal articles may also be very frequently found in manuscript appendices; see Burgmann et 
al. 1995,264.  Here also might be counted various liturgical introductory articles (short commentaries or 
other instructions; e.g. in Escorial Gr. X.III.2, Milan E.94.supp, Paris gr. 1263; Vatican gr. 640, Vienna 
Hist gr. 7). It is further interesting that in the Greek acta of Chalcedon the canons, probably drafted in 
committee, are often placed as "session 7" after the creedal statements in "session 6": the faith/creeds and 
the canons always seem to be a pair.  See Price and Gaddis 2005,1.xiv, 1.81 n. 277, 3.92-94. 
19 This pattern is very common in ancient near eastern and Greek legal literature, and may be seen in 
everything from the tendency of starting legislation with an invocation to the gods (the simplest version 
of which is the θεοί heading ancient Greek constitutions), to treating the divine legitimacy and origin of 
the legislator and his laws (e.g. Hammurabi 28-41, ed. Richardson 2004), to, as here, beginning with 
matters pertaining to the divine – "faith".  This last Plato (Laws 715e-718a; 723e, 732e) understands as a 
natural imperative, and is very clearly expressed in Cicero Laws 2 and Zaleukos and Charandos' 
prooimia; the Ten Commandments start this way as do, broadly, Deuteronomy (1-11), and thus Philo 
Special Laws 1 (ed. Cohn 1906,1-265) (and also Josephus Antiquities 3, ed. Niese 1885-1892), CJ 1, and 
the Basilica.  See Hunger 1964,29-31; Ries 1993,11, 14, 20, 82, 88, 90, 98-99, 117-118, 120-121, 212-22. 
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Greek corpus are the 85 canons from the eighth book of the Apostolic Constitutions.  
Placed prominently at the beginning of the collection since at least since the 6th C they 
themselves constitute a kind of "Apostolic preface": the later conciliar material now 
reads as following from this original Apostolic disciplinary "conversation".  Canon-like 
material is flowing out of the very mouths of the apostles.20  The "Nicene canons" have 
become the "Apostolic-Nicene canons". 
More concretely, the Apostolic canons also contain a short but dramatic epilogue 
in which the Apostles themselves turn to speak directly to the bishops:  
Thus have these things regarding the canons been prescribed for you, O 
bishops.  If you remain steadfast in them you will be saved [or "preserved 
safe": σωθήσεσθε] and you will have peace; but if you are disobedient you 
will be punished and you will have eternal war with each other, earning 
the just recompense for your disobedience.  God, the only unbegotten and 
maker of everything through Christ, will unify you through peace in the 
Holy Spirit, and will prepare you for every good deed [Heb. 13.21] 
without deviation, blame or reproach, and will make you worthy of eternal 
life with us through the mediation of his beloved son Jesus Christ, our God 
and savior, through whom is glory to the God of all...until ages of ages, 
Amen.21 
This short text is sometimes lost in modern editions and translations,22 and it 
seems to be absent in some of the commentators' recensions,23 but in the older 
manuscripts it is usually appended to the last canon, sometimes as part of it, or 
often as slightly separated; it is in any case clearly an integral part of the text. It is 
perhaps most prominent  in the Coll50 where as part of Apostolic 85 it is attached 
to the final title, very consciously placed as the conclusion to the entire work.24 
 Its content is remarkable.  It begins with a small but critical identification: the 
primary audience of the canons is the bishops. This identification is largely consistent 
throughout the tradition.  The canons are above all rules for bishops (and secondarily, 
                                                 
20 cf. Schwartz 1936a,199-200.  Many small literary techniques in the canons dramatically enhance the 
sense of these canons issuing from the very (collective) mouths of the apostles. Thus, for example, in 
Apostolic 15, 26 "we ordain"; in 27 "our Lord";  in 29 "as Simon Magus was [cut off] by me, Peter"; in 
82 "as our Onesimus appeared ", 85 (a listing of Scripture) "our own books... and the Acts of us the 
Apostles".  See generally Metzger 1985,1.33-38; Steimer 1992,130-133 et passim. 
21 Greek text in Appendix B (3). 
22 For example in RP 2.111 it is relegated to a footnote; Joannou's handling of it is excellent, placing a 
line-break between it an Apostolic 85 (Fonti 1.2.52-53). The Pedalion (1800) incorporates it into its 
introduction (p. xix-xx) 
23 So Beveridge 1672,2.40 and Pitra 1.36, and so not in Istanbul Topkapi 115 nor Florence Laur.5.2. 
Unfortunately, most manuscript descriptions are not sufficiently detailed to make a clearer determination 
on the scope of this omission (e.g. only when Balsamon and Zonaras together in a MS?) 
24 See Syn 151-155.This is particularly evident in the versions of the work in which the canons are placed 
in corpus-order under the titles (see chapter 4.E): the Epilogue is here noticeably out of place. 
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more generally, the clergy).25  As to purpose, the canons are written for "salvation" and 
"peace", and disobedience will bring suitable chastisement.  This chastisement is 
perhaps understood chiefly as ecclesial disunity, but the canons clearly open up onto 
eschatological horizons: obedience leads to salvation – "eternal life" –  "with us", i.e. 
with the Apostles.26  This last suggests that canonical obedience is part of Apostolic 
mimesis.  The canons thus immediately emerge as very "charged" with salvific and 
metaphysical significance – and are clearly part of the "Apostolic" nature of the church. 
 Aside from the canons and their epilogue, one other set of Apostolic material 
also functions in the tradition in an introductory manner.  It is even more invisible in 
modern editions and translations of the canons than the Epilogue, yet even more 
obviously present in the manuscripts as introductory material.  This body of material is 
known to scholarship as the "Epitome of Book Eight of the Apostolic Constitutions".27   
Found only in canonical manuscripts, the Epitome is composed of five sections of 
excerpts from Apostolic Constitutions book eight: 1) 8.1-2 ; 2) 8.4-5, 16-28, 30-31; 3) 
8.32; 4) 8.33-34, 42-45; 5) 8.46.  In effect it contains most of Apostolic Constitution 
book eight save two large liturgical sections and the Apostolic canons.28  Like the 
Apostolic canons, three of these fragments self-present at common teaching of the 
apostles: 1) "Teaching of the holy apostles regarding charismata"; 2) "Constitutions 
[διατάξεις] of the holy apostles through Hippolytus regarding ordinations"; and 5) 
"Teaching of all the holy apostles regarding good order".  The other are presented as 
individual rulings: 3) "Constitutions of the holy Apostle Paul regarding ecclesiastical 
canons"; 4) "Constitutions of the holy apostles Peter and Paul".  
The origin of these texts as a separate unit is not entirely clear, but it seems 
likely they hail to the 5th C, and that in the canonical manuscripts they originally formed 
a whole with the Apostolic canons (which would follow after the fifth section, as 
section 8.47, in the Apostolic Constitutions).29   In the extant manuscripts, these extracts 
are among the most frequent introductory articles, often quite prominent as one of the 
                                                 
25 See, for example, the introductory epistles of Antioch and Gangra (in Kormchaya) as well as II Nicaea 
2; Carthage 18 refers to bishops and clergy. 
26 Cf. the strong warning of eschatological punishment for ecclesial disorder in the opening section of the 
Constitutiones ecclesiasticae apostolorum (or "Apostolic Ordinances"), ed. Arendzen 1901,60-61. 
27  Ed. Funk 1905,2.72-96, discussion at xi-xix.  Of the literature, see especially Schwartz 1910,196-213; 
Steimer 1992,80-86.  The synopsist's partial version may be found in RP 4.399-403. 
28 The text, however, differs from the received Apostolic Constitutions in a number of ways, which have 
led some scholars to doubt that it is a true "epitome".  Its exact relationship to Apostolic Constitutions 
book eight remains a matter of debate.  Bradshaw 2002,6; Metzger 1985,42 n. 2.; Steimer ibid. 
29 Schwartz 1910,196-213; cf. Sbornik 172-174, 180-187.  Schwartz believes that they may have been 
separated from the Apostolic canons when the latter were integrated into the Coll50. 
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very first items in a collection, even before the systematic collections' prologues.30  
Sometimes all five sections, in various levels of abbreviation, will be present in the 
manuscripts, sometimes fewer, and their order can vary.31 
Their persistence in the manuscripts is quite remarkable in light of their very 
mixed later reception.   By the 11th C, they are sufficiently common that Michael the 
Sebastos chides earlier redactors for not including the rulings of "Peter and Paul", and 
explicitly includes them in his redaction of the Coll14.32 The expanded synopsis 
associated with Aristenos also contains some of them.33  Other witnesses, however, are 
more negative.  Trullo clearly approves only 85 Apostolic canons – the only specific 
enumeration of canons in Trullo 2 – and condemns the rest of the Apostolic 
Constitutions, including, presumably, these extracts.  Zonaras reiterates this 
disapproval.34   
In terms of their introductory force, their primary function is to re-enforce the 
framing "message" of the Apostolic canons: the canonical project is first of all an 
Apostolic project.  Second, their content is broadly introductory.  Reminiscent of the 
introductory Amtsweisungen elements of ancient law codes, in which the duties of 
various offices are detailed near the beginning of collections,35 its overriding, if not 
exclusive, concern is the description and delineation of positions, offices and authority 
in the church.  The first section is thus concerned to regulate the status of those 
possessed of special χαρίσματα, including the clergy, and the relationship of the clergy 
and the laity – in a sense, a meditation on offices in general.  Section two then details, in 
descending order, the forms for the ordination of the clergy: bishop, presbyter, deacon, 
deaconess, subdeacon, etc.  Sections 3 and 4 are much broader in content, but section 5,  
Περὶ εὐταξίας διδασκαλία, a meditation on order in the church, returns to the general 
theme of hierarchical propriety.  It is significant that it opens with a central theme of 
Greco-Roman political thinking: "This we all in common enjoin, that each remain in the 
order [τάξις] given to him and not to exceed its bounds...."36  In effect, a commonplace 
                                                 
30 See, for example, the recensions described in Sbornik 116-230 or Sin 70-103.  Funk rightly refers to the 
"almost innumerable" manuscripts in which they appear. Funk 1905,xvi. 
31 Compare, for example, the selections described in Sbornik 131-132, 180-185. 
32 Schminck 1998,361. 
33 RP 4.399-403. 
34 RP 2.110-111. 
35 See chapter 4.F.  
36 Funk 1905,92 
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Platonic concept of justice, that each is to "do their [natural, class-restricted] thing",37 
has been placed in the mouths of the apostles – and this in a text that originally 
functioned as an introduction to the Apostolic canons, and later as a quasi-opener to 
entire canonical manuscripts.  This theme is then developed at length, with many 
biblical citations enjoining each rank of Christian to adhere to their position. The overall 
effect of the Epitome material is therefore to act as a kind of hierarchical manifesto, 
setting the canons in the context of a world-view which sees order and justice – and so 
law – as stemming first and foremost out of proper maintenance and description of 
hierarchical authorities.  This will resonate with the tendency of the sources and 
systematic collections to order their material first with Amtsweisungen-like material, as 
we will see in chapter four. 
 
3. The Prologue of the Coll50: Οἱ τοῦ μεγάλου θεοῦ 
The first extant formal prologue in the Byzantine canonical tradition is the πρόλογος of 
the Coll50, Οἱ τοῦ μεγάλου θεοῦ.38  Although short, it is a refined and erudite work, a 
compact rhetorical tour de force, written in a Greek sufficiently sophisticated as to 
border on obscurity.39  It even seems to evince a very regular prose rhythm.40  It may be 
divided into three sections: a general introduction with doctrinal and historical content 
(4.1-20)41, a technical discussion of the method of composition of the Coll50 (4.20-
5.16), and a short introduction and listing of the canonical sources of the collection 
(5.17-7.2).  These section divisions correspond to sentence divisions in the texts: the 
first section encompasses the first two sentences, 4.1-14 and 4.14-20; the second section 
the third sentence from 4.20-5.16 (although this perhaps should be divided at 5.8 οὐκ 
αὐτοὶ); and the third the remaining text from 5.17 until the end. 
 The first part of the prologue, comprised by two lengthy periods, is an 
exceptionally rich and densely woven amalgam of images and ideas.  It sounds a 
number of critical framework themes and narratives of the later tradition.  
                                                 
37 That is, τὸ τὰ αὑτοῦ πράττειν.  See especially Republic 433a-434c (and broadly from 369a onwards); 
cf. Laws 756e-757d. The basic idea is that justice is realized when each part of the city/soul is functioning 
in its proper (hierarchical) place and order.    
38 Edition in Sin 214-218 and Syn 4-7, the latter slightly more complete, and our source here.  On this 
prologue generally, see Sin 213-220; Menebisoglou 1989.  A provisional English translation may be 
found in Appendix B (4).  Russian translation: Zaozerski 1882; Latin: Pitra 2.375-378; partial German: 
Zachariä von Lingenthal 1877,617. 
39 On this point, see Sin  213. Beneshevich believes that this very complexity of diction and syntax may 
help account for the text's very stable transmission. 
40 Sin 213, n.1; some of Beneshevich's emendations are based on apparent violations of this rhythm. 
41 Page and line numbers are from Beneshevich's second edition. 
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 The elaborate first clause (1-3), setting up the period that resolves in line 6, 
introduces the agents of legislation: οἱ τοῦ μεγάλου θεοῦ...μαθηταὶ καὶ ἀπόστολοι καὶ 
μὴν καὶ...οἱ μετ᾽ ἐκείνους καὶ κατ᾽ ἐκείνους ἀρχιερεῖς καὶ διδάσκαλοι....  Both the 
"disciples and apostles" of Jesus Christ and the "archpriests [i.e. bishops] and teachers" 
of his church who "followed and were like" the disciples and apostles (οἱ μετ᾽ ἐκείνους 
καὶ κατ᾽ ἐκείνους – a striking phrase42) are brought together as the common agents of 
the canonical task.  Canonical legislation thus flows directly out of the evangelical and 
apostolic tradition, in a sweeping trajectory that has Christ himself at its source – albeit 
indirect source.  In effect, the canons are an apostolic project, with episcopal 
continuators.  A similar sentiment will be expressed in the Coll87 introduction, Εἰς 
δόξαν θεοῦ (a work also ascribed to John Scholastikos) where the canons are described 
as ...κανόνας τῶν ἁγίων καὶ μακαρίων ἀποστόλων καὶ τῶν τοῖς ἴχνεσιν αὐτῶν καθ᾽ 
ἐκάστην σύνοδον ἀκολουθησάντων ὁσίων πατέρων...43  The canons are written by the 
fathers who, in so doing, are "following in the steps" of the apostles. 
 The basic context of their actions is immediately made clear (4.3-5): the apostles 
and bishops have been entrusted "by grace" with shepherding the "multitude" of both 
the Jews and Gentiles who have "abandoned" the "diabolical deception and tyranny" 
and have "deserted to the King and Lord of Glory".  The canonical task is thus briefly 
but firmly placed within a very broad, indeed cosmic, narrative of salvation.  The 
canons are part of the "shepherding" of the entire flock of the Christian people in their 
movement from the deception of the devil to the kingdom of God. 
In 4.5-10 we finally meet the main verb of the first sentence as the shepherd 
imagery is continued, now becoming the controlling metaphor.  The apostles and 
bishops, far from seeking to harm wrongdoers, instead attempt to brave dangers for 
them: προκινδυνεύειν δὲ μᾶλλον αὐτῶν ἑτοιμότατα.  Here Christo-mimetic imagery of 
the good shepherd laying down his life for the sheep is unmistakable, and quite 
remarkable in a quasi-legislative context.44 Writing canons is part of self-sacrificial 
shepherding. The particular image and language here of προκινδυνεύειν, as a 
shepherding image, will later appear in the 9th C Eisagoge as part of the ἴδιον, or 
"particular property" of bishops.45   
                                                 
42 See Appendix B (4) for an alternative translation. 
43 Ed. Heimbach 1838, at 208. 
44 See John 10:15ff 
45 Eisagoge 8.2. ATLG search will reveal numerous other similar instances; see e.g. Athanasius, Apologia 
de fuga sua 24, Ignatius the Deacon Vita Tarasii patriarchae, 37. 
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The shepherding image is then significantly developed through an explicit 
contrast with the civil laws: the civil laws harm wrongdoers, while the canons seek to 
guard, guide and protect.  The canonical project, as distinct from the civil laws, is 
essentially a pastoral task. 
In the same phrase, language of pastoralism easily moves into road or way 
imagery: the apostles and bishops, "like the good shepherd", "hasten" to take care to 
guide and direct any wayward sheep that may be drifting from the straight path.  The 
canons lead Christian on their correct "way", a salvific image. 
Also smooth is the transition from legislators as good shepherds struggling 
(ἀγωνιζόμενοι) to keep their flock from harm to a set of medical images which 
constitute the first sentence's last clause (4.10-14).  Still probably building a contrast 
with the civil laws, the apostles and bishops are cast as interested only in the healing of 
spiritual illness, and the restoration of the sick to health.  Just as the shepherd imagery is 
clearly biblical in its immediate inspiration, the medical imagery is also explicitly 
Christianized by an allusion to Ephesians 6:17, "the knife of the Spirit, which is the 
word of God" (4.11), which is wielded by these canonical-healers. Notably, at the same 
time, the Spirit also enters as a necessary co-worker with the fathers in the restoration of 
the sick: "Thus by the grace and co-working of the Spirit they restored to their first 
health those who were ill." 
The next sentence (and the beginning of the third) turns to more mundane, but 
no less important, details of the "story" of the canonical legislators.  We learn that the 
apostles and fathers have taken forethought for those μετ᾽ ἐκείνους καὶ κατ᾽ ἐκείνους, 
and how they might – to resume the pastoral purpose of the canons – keep those who 
are ruled "unharmed" (4.14-15).  Their method of choice is made immediately clear: to 
convene in synods, which the divine grace arranges (τῆς θείας χάριτος οἰκονομούσης).  
"Grace" thus enters again as an active agent in canonical legislation.  Fathers, the 
prologue continues, have thus in various times met in synods and there set forth certain 
"laws and canons, not civil but divine" (4.15-18). The basic mode of legislation is thus 
clearly established as the council.  The terminology used for the legislation is also 
significant: νόμοι and κανόνες are used virtually synonymously, and the former is 
clearly used to refer to ecclesiastical regulation (as also in line 4.21, and the rubric of 
Coll50 48).  A distinction, however, is nevertheless – and once more –  made between 
civil and church laws, but not as a terminological distinction between "laws" and 
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"canons": instead the distinction is between "civil" and "divine".  The canons are thus, 
and in summary, divine "laws" produced by grace-inspired councils of the fathers. 
The sentence ends with a series of short epexegtical phrases glossing these 
"divine laws" (14.18-20).  The first, "regarding what ought to be done and what ought 
not to be done", περὶ τῶν πρακτέων ἢ μὴ πρακτέων, is a very stock phrase, a 
commonplace of legal definition broadly Stoic in origin and perhaps most notably, and 
relevantly, present in the second of the two Greek definitions of law in Digest 1.3.2 (that 
of Chyrsippus)46. This definition concludes: ὁ νόμος...προστακτικὸν μὲν ὦν ποιητέον, 
ἀπαγορευτικὸν δὲ ὧν οὐ ποιητέον.  Shorter versions, as found in Scholastikos, may be 
found in a large variety of ancient authors.47  
The sentence then continues by noting that the canonical work is directed 
towards the "life" and "manner" of each; its function is to rectify (ἐπανορθόω) both.48  
The canons thus have a very broad scope of action.  Road imagery then reappears as the 
canons "fortify" those on the "royal road", "punishing" those who "slip" to the side. The 
verb "to punish", ἐπιτιμάω, may here already be a quasi-technical word for ecclesial 
punishments, although it and its nominal forms may be found as a reasonably normal 
word for "punish" or "penalize" in Greco-Roman literature.49 Thus, although the canons 
of the church do not aim to "harm" (αἰκίζομαι) wrongdoers (line 4.6), they do 
nevertheless punish or "penalize" them.   
 The first clause of the third sentence, the first part of the more technical section 
of the prologue, turns to the circumstances that have occasioned the present systematic 
work (4.20-21).  The "laws and canons" are presented as having "of old" emerged as an 
essentially ad hoc activity: "issued by different men for different purposes and 
appropriate to different circumstances" (κατὰ καιροὺς ὑπὸ διαφόρων πρὸς διαφόρους 
καὶ διαφόροις ἁρμόζοντες [οἱ νόμοι]).  This should probably be read as a very short but 
striking reminiscence of the topos of varietas naturae remarked in some legal prologues 
as a way of justifying legislative changes, modifications and development.50 Here, 
however, the phrase is used to justify John's systematic work: because of the variety of 
the laws, John needs to put everything in a more user-friendly form (4.22-5.2). This 
characterization of the canonical process is also significant in itself.  The canons are not 
                                                 
46 Frag. mor. 314, ed. von Arnim 1903,3.77. 
47 See the list of such "Gebot-Verbot" phrases in Triantaphyllopoulos 1985,82. 
48 For similar usage of this language in another regulative-legal context, see Demosthenes' definition of 
law cited below. 
49 Liddell-Scott 666-667, Lampe 537-538. 
50 E.g. in Cordi 4, Tanta 18, N. 7.2; see Fögen 1987,142; Honoré 1978,27 n. 298, 299; Hunger 1964,171-
172; Simon 1994,19. On the philosophical underpinnings of the topos, see esp. Lanata 1984,165-187.   
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presented here as the product of an intentional legislative program, but instead as arising 
to meet the demands of various times, and as they emerge (ὡς ἀπῄτει τὰ κατὰ χρόνον 
ἀναφυόμενα; cf also a similar notion already in lines 4.15-16, ἕκαστοι κατὰ καιροὺς 
ἰδίους εἰς ταὐτὸ συνιόντες...).   
  In the same sentence John quickly reviews the central sources of legislation, 
the Apostles, the Ten Synods, and Basil (4.22-23), before continuing with a more 
detailed description of his actions in creating his thematic collection, which runs 
through 5.16.  This section will be discussed in more detail in chapter 4, but it may be 
remarked here that the overall tone of the section is curiously defensive.  John must not 
only repeat how chaotic the material is in origin (4.20-21, 24, earlier at 18, again in 5.3-
4), and emphasize how difficult it is to find anything (...ὡς ἐκ τούτου δυσεύρετον εἶναι 
κομιδῇ καὶ δυσπόριστον τὸ πρός τινων ἀθρόως περὶ κανόνος ἐπιζυτούμενον), but also 
emphatically note that he is not the first to do such a thing (οὐκ αὐτοὶ τοῦτο μόνοι καὶ 
πρῶτοι ποιῆσαι τῶν ἄλλων ὁρμήσαντες...no innovation here!), but that the previous 
attempt is defective, and needs replacing (5.11-12).  Everything, he notes, is of course 
done "by the grace of our lord and God and Saviour Jesus Christ" (5.2-3).   
 Most of these elements may be read as versions of justificatory and humility 
topoi, common for an ancient introduction, but one may also suspect a real unease in 
handling what was by this time already a very well established and prominent corpus of 
texts; it seems that one modifies this type of material very gingerly.  Scholastikos' 
handling of the material will in fact be marked by extreme conservatism and scrupulous 
concern for completeness (see chapter 4):  Scholastikos is truly only simply making 
things easier to find, as he is taking pains to stress.  
The prologue concludes with a listing of its sources, and especially an "Order of 
Synods".  As already noted, a rudimentary but clear hierarchy of sources is evident: the 
Apostles first, then the "order of synods", and then the legislation of Basil.  The three 
form distinct groups.  The councils are in the Nicene order: Nicaea first, then everything 
else in chronological succession.  The apostles are not counted as a first synod.  
Interestingly, within the synod listings, the canons are consistently described using the 
formula: Τῶν ἐν [council] πατέρων... κανόνες [a number]".  As such, agency of the 
"fathers" themselves is slightly emphasized, and the difference with patristic regulations 
slightly elided. This is coherent with the usage of the rest of the prologue, where the 
agents of legislation are always either the "apostles" or the "fathers": the councils 
themselves are not agents.   This literary "tic" may also be seen in a set of iambic verses 
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found concluding the Coll50 in one manuscript (Εἴληφαν ὧδε κανόνων τίτλοι τέλος / 
Ἀποστολικῶν ἅμα καὶ τῶν πατέρων),51 in the Coll87 (cited above), and may be often 
remarked elsewhere in the tradition.52  The canons are prototypically of "the apostles" 
and/or "the fathers". 
  
4. The Prologues of the Coll14: Τὰ μὲν σώματα and  Ὁ μὲν παρών 
There are three prologues (the last in two recensions) associated with the Coll14.  Two 
date from our period.53  Their disposition in the MSS varies: the first may be found 
alone, the two may be found joined together, the two may be separate (in a variety of 
different places), or the second may be written as a scholion to the first.54  In RP they 
are joined together: the first extends from Τὰ μὲν σώματα to μισθὸν ἀπενέγκασθαι, and 
the second from Ὁ μὲν παρὼν to πρᾶξιν προήνεγκεν.  Following Beneshevich, it is 
generally accepted that the first prologue originally included the prologue proper as well 
as a listing of the corpus sources (Ἐκ ποίων...), although probably not the scholion to the 
latter (Ἱστέον ὅτι...), which treats various violations of the chronological ordering of the 
councils in the list, namely the precedence of Nicaea, and the subordination of Carthage, 
Serdica and Constantinople 394.55  This scholion nevertheless becomes a regular part of 
the Coll14 tradition. 
The first prologue presents something of a textual conundrum.  Not all scholars 
are completely convinced it is original.56  The principal problem is that in its current 
form it seems to refer to the secular laws' having been placed under their appropriate 
titles – i.e. in nomocanonical form (line 5257).  Since it is widely believed that the 
original Coll14 was composed without any civil law placed under the titles, but only 
some gathered in a separate work in an appendix (i.e. as the Tripartita), then the first 
prologue as we possess it in all manuscripts must be interpolated.  Further, it is curious 
that the dating of the council of Carthage (419) is wrong (line 20).  The council is 
                                                 
51 Syn 155, n. (a) 
52 For example, Chalcedon 1, Trullo 2, N. 137.1. 
53 Sound critical editions do not exist for either. Pitra 2.445-451 remains the best, and our source.  
Kormchaya (1-4) also contains an edition of the first.  There seem, however, to be no major variants 
(Stolte 1998a,187).  A provisional English translation may be found in Appendix B (5). Russian 
translation: Narbekov 1899,2.7-19; Latin: Pitra ibid.; partial German: Zachariä von Lingenthal 1877,619, 
626-627. 
54 Sbornik 52-60, with examples.  On the Coll14 prologues generally, see Deledemos 2002, Stolte 1998a, 
Menebisoglou 1989.  
55 Sbornik 69-84. 
56 Most recently, Stolte 1998a. 
57 Line numbers refer to the version of Pitra, counting down continuously, not including titles, headers or 
footers.   
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presented as held under Honorius and Arcadius: this is in fact the correct dating for 
Constantinople 394, a council that was very probably added to the corpus with the 
Coll14, but that strangely is not mentioned in the prologue – is it possible some type of 
elision or copyist error has occurred?58 
The reference to the κεφάλαια in line 52 does not, however, absolutely have to 
refer to the Coll14 titles.  It is quite possible that it refers to the titles found in the 
Tripartita itself.59  Further, although it is widely thought, following Beneshevic, that the 
original Coll14 was not nomocanonical in form, there is still no absolute proof of this; it 
is still only a widely-accepted assumption.60  Finally, the dating error is not immense: 
the first πράξις is dated to Honorius and Theodosius – only one name is wrong.  Further, 
two of Carthage's πράξεις are dated to Honorius and Arcadius (those before canon 34 
and 86).    There is thus plenty of room for a simple slip. We needn't imagine a major 
elision.  It is also possible that Constantinople 394 was considered a "patristic" canon, 
and thus its lack of specific mention.  The extant prologue, then, may preserve perfectly 
well the original. 
In any case, the prologue clearly is pre-Trullan, and even if interpolated very 
likely dates at least to the early 7th C (i.e. the time of the nomocanonical recension).  Its 
author, as that of the Coll14 itself, remains unknown. 
The second prologue is, happily, explicitly dated (29-31) to 6391, i.e. 883.  This 
is one of the very few firm dates that can be attached to any early or middle Byzantine 
canonical collection.  In some manuscripts, this prologue is attributed to Photius; 
scholars are mixed in their reception of attribution.61  It is possible. 
 The first prologue, Τὰ μὲν σώματα, has the same basic structure as οἱ τοῦ 
μεγάλου Θεοῦ.  It begins with a doctrinal section (lines 1-17), moves to a technical 
discussion of the details of the collection's composition (18-57), and then concludes 
with a list of sources included in the form Ἐκ ποίων.  The second prologue consciously 
reads as an extension of the second part of the first prologue, although it does briefly 
reprise some "doctrinal" themes in its first sentence (1-7) before turning to the practical 
details of its own additions (8-50).   
The doctrinal section of Τὰ μὲν σώματα, like οἱ τοῦ μεγάλου θεοῦ, is written in a 
sophisticated Greek, albeit with fewer and less ornate periods.  It is composed of two 
                                                 
58 So Honigmann 1961,68-72; Menebisoglou 1989,232-234; Stolte 1998a.  
59 The more common reading; see Deledemos 2002,92-93; Menebisoglou 1989,236-238, also Petrovits 
1970,18-20 for further references. 
60 cf. Stolte 1998a,186, 193. 
61 See the references in chapter 1, n. 106. 
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brief meditations, both of which are presented as the motivations for the collector's 
work.   
The first (1-11) is an extraordinary little account of the anagogical ascent of the 
soul.  Its essence is simply that in order for the soul to rise up towards "higher visions", 
(θεωρίαι), to enter the "heavenly vaults" and enjoy not just "shadows" but "true good 
things" (οἱ ὄντως ἀγαθοί), and to have divine visions, it must be nourished with good 
thoughts and good deeds – thus the importance of the canons.  No direct source in 
antique philosophical literature for the narrative as a whole, or even specific sentences, 
has yet been identified, but in general content it is an entirely conventional late imperial 
anagogical account of the soul's heavenly ascent, synthetic in orientation, but broadly 
(neo)Platonic in diction, imagery and ideas.62  In standard Platonic fashion, the 
movement of the soul is contrasted and compared to bodily movements, with the soul 
being portrayed as ultimately moving upwards towards higher "visions", unrestrained 
by measure and time, and encountering in the "heavenly vaults"  not the shadows of 
reality, but the realities themselves. 
 The second "meditation" (11-15) then moves more directly to the nature of law, 
and is almost unique in the Byzantine tradition in providing something very close to a 
definition of canon law: the "divine decrees" (θεσμοί) are "a discovery and gift of God, 
the dogma of prudent and God-bearing men, the correction of willing and involuntary 
sins, and a secure rule for a pious way of living that leads to eternal life" There is 
nothing ambiguous about the ultimate source of this quotation: its pagan provenance is 
made quite explicit ("transferring to the divine statutes what was once said by one of the 
ancient σόφοι").  It is in fact a modified version of Demosthenes' famous definition of 
law in Against Aristogeiton 1 16.63   
Like Chrysippus's definition of law, vaguely echoed in the Oἱ τοῦ μεγάλου, 
Demosthenes' definition may be found in Marcianus' Institutes, preserved alongside 
Chrysippus in Digest 1.3.2.  We should not assume too quickly, however, that the 
Digest was the direct source for the Coll14 author.64  A potential allusion to Chrysippus' 
definition in the last line of the sentence (ἀσφαλῆ κανόνα, not in Demosthenes, but 
recalling the κανόνα δικαίων καὶ ἀδίκων of Chrysippus) does perhaps point this way: 
both are held together in Digest 1.3.2, and both here.  However, like Chrysippus' 
                                                 
62 See e.g. Plato Phaedrus 79b-e, 245-7; Republic 514-517 (and book seven broadly), Timaeus 90a-c.  
References from Deledemos 2002,79-80. 
63 Ed. Butcher 1907,770-800.  See Appendix B (6) for the full passage in Greek. 
64 As Deledemos 2002,81. 
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definition, Demosthenes' should almost certainly be regarded as a legal commonplace.  
It may be found, for example, twice in the Hermogenian corpus of rhetorical works, the 
single most popular rhetorical corpus in the late imperial period – including once in the 
progymnastic exercise "Introduction of a Law" in Aphthonius, the most popular 
progymnastic handbook.65  It will certainly eventually become a regular member of 
small groups of legal definitions in later Byzantine legal treatises.66 Finally, it should 
also be recalled that Demosthenes himself was among the most important, popular and 
probably well-read rhetor in the late imperial and Byzantine periods, and it is not 
impossible that the author took the extract directly from the original.67   
In content, the Coll14 version of this definition may be usefully compared to the 
original and to the form found in the Digest (italics indicates modifications; boldface, 
additions): 
Demosthenes Against 
Aristogiton 1 16 
Digest 1.3.2 (compared to 
original) 
Coll14 (compared to 
original) 
...πείθεσθαι προσήκει διὰ 
πολλά,  
καὶ μάλισθ’ ὅτι πᾶς ἐστι 
νόμος εὕρημα μὲν καὶ 
δῶρον θεῶν,  
δόγμα δ’ἀνθρώπων 
φρονίμων,  
ἐπανόρθωμα δὲ τῶν 
ἑκουσίων καὶ ἀκουσίων 
ἁμαρτημάτων,  
πόλεως δὲ συνθήκη κοινή, 
καθ’ ἣν πᾶσι προσήκει ζῆν 
τοῖς ἐν τῇ πόλει 
 
...προσήκει πείθεσθαι διὰ 
πολλὰ,  
καὶ μάλιστα ὅτι πᾶς ἐστιν 
νόμος εὕρημα μὲν καὶ 
δῶρον θεοῦ,  
δόγμα δὲ ἀνθρώπων 
φρονίμων,  
ἐπανόρθωμα δὲ τῶν 
ἑκουσίων καὶ ἀκουσίων 
ἁμαρτημάτων,  
πόλεως δὲ συνθήκη κοινή, 
καθ᾽ ἣν ἅπασι προσήκει 
ζῇν τοῖς ἐν τῇ πόλει. 
 
πεπεισμένος τούτους  
 
 
           εὕρημα μὲν καὶ 
δῶρον εἶναι θεοῦ,  
δόγμα δὲ φρονίμων τε καὶ 
θεοφόρων ἀνθρώπων, 
ἐπανόρθωμα δὲ τῶν 
ἑκουσίων καὶ παρὰ 
βούλησιν ἁμαρτημάτων,  
καὶ πολιτείας εὐσεβοῦς τε 
καὶ πρὸς ἀτελεύτητον ζωὴν 
ἀγούσης ἀσφαλῆ κανόνα 
 
 
Aside from a few minor stylistic features, the only substantial modification of the Digest 
text from the original is the placing of "gods" in the singular.  The Coll14 text has also 
retained much of the substance of the original.  The canons are ultimately divine in 
                                                 
65 Hermogenes On Ideas 1.6 (ed. Rabe 1913,213-413); Aphthonios Progymnasmata 14 (ed. Rabe 1926,1-
51).  In both places it is found in a truncated form, but it seems reasonably clear, especially in the first 
instance, that the author expects familiarity with the quotation.  On this corpus in the later Greek east, 
Jenkins 1963,43-44, Kennedy 1983,54 et passim. 
66 For example, from the TLG, Eisagoge (Epanagoge) 1.1; Epanagoge Aucta. Proem.1 ; Basilica 2.1.13-
14; Ecloga Basilicorum  2.1 13-14; Prochiron Auctum 40.53; Michael Attaliates Ponema Proem.2; see 
also Triantaphyllopoulos 1985,10 for further references.  
67 See his preeminence in Hermogenes' On Style, for example. See broadly Gibson 2002; Marrou 
1948,161-165; Kennedy 1983, 1994. 
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origin, and they are the production of "wise men".68  The canons also correct the 
"wrongdoings" or "sins" of men.  (The retention of the "persuasion" terminology is also 
interesting; in the Coll14 paragraph this reads very oddly until one realizes that it is part 
of the quotations – which undoubtedly indicates that the Coll14 author expected his 
authors to know the original citation). 
A few important modifications have nevertheless been made.  First, the author 
adds "god-bearing" men.  While laws are the decrees/judgment of wise men in general, 
the canons are those of god-bearing men, i.e. of the Christian fathers who are saints, 
holy men.  The canons again emerge from holy men. 
The next change of ἀκουσίων to παρὰ βούλησιν is curious, but likely simply 
stylistic. 
 The changes in the last phrase are the most significant.  The basic roots – and 
root ideas – of πολι- and ζω/η- are retained, but are clearly moralized and 
eschatologized, and purged of any notion of, as it were, "social contract".69  Thus the 
secular idea of the laws as emerging from a "common covenant" for the good of those 
living in the city is clearly removed: the church is not a divine city with a kind of divine 
"common covenant".  Instead, the Chrysippian idea of law as a "rule" is invoked 
(κανόνα τε εἶναι δικαίων καὶ ἀδίκων)70, but here, unlike in Chrysippus, it is a rule of a 
"pious" – i.e. properly religious – way of life that has an eternal end.  Πολιτεία here 
undoubtedly retains some sense of "citizenship", but its very common, more generic 
meaning as "way of life" is more obivous: canon law provides a rule for moral, pious 
living. 
 Across both "meditations" the canons thus emerge as divine, oriented towards 
the whole moral "life" of their subjects, emerging from sacred origins and clearly part of 
a dramatic eschatological ascent of the soul towards "higher visions". 
 After the Demosthenic definition the author rapidly moves to more practical 
issues, with the two meditations presented as precisely the impetus and rationale for his 
"eager" endeavours at compilation: "considering these things...and persuaded that...I 
have with zeal attempted to gather..." (11-17).  His description of his compilation 
activities (15-18), although brief, is very similar to the corresponding section of 
Scholastikos, and thus suggests that he writing to a kind of formula: he a) immediately 
                                                 
68 We should probably not hear a reference to Aristotelian "practical wisdom" (Nic. Eth. 6.5, 7) here. See  
Auberque 2008.  Cf. however O'Meara 2003,136-138. 
69  Perhaps to the disappointment of those seeking traces of a Byzantine "perfect society" ecclesiology. 
70  Digest 1.3.2 
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turns to the question of sources which are b) introduced as arising in "different" times 
(with the same διάφορος vocabulary), and c) his focus is the "Ten Synods".  He cannot 
resist, however, along the way, another quick epexegetical gloss of the purpose of the 
canons of these synods: they "confirm" the divine dogma of the church and are useful 
"teaching" for all men.  This could be read as a paring of faith and moral discipline as 
twin subjects of the canons; in any case it again confirms the canons' broad intellectual 
and moral scope. 
Unlike Scholastikos, he then engages in a long source-critical aside on three 
sources: the Apostles, Carthage, and the patristic material (18-41).  Each seems to have 
excited some controversy, and the author feels obliged to justify their inclusion.  Only 
the Ten Synods seem to be admitted without question.     
The Apostolic canons are treated first, but quite summarily.  He simply notes 
that he will include them, "even if" some have thought them to be ἀμφιβόλοι.  
Hesitation about their authenticity is, however, perhaps conceded: τοὺς λεγομένους 
[κανόνας] τῶν ἁγίων Ἀποστόλων may have the sense of "so-called".  But concerns 
about them are simply dismissed.   
Carthage is treated at much greater length.  The "synod in Carthage", the reader 
learns, is to be accepted, but only with a lengthy proviso on the local nature of some of 
its regulations, especially those regarding married clergy, which receive a rather 
elaborate critique (25-29).  The general reason for their acceptance is explained, 
however, with an interesting aside:  the author has found in them much ordained "which 
is profitable for life", πολλά τε καὶ πόλλην ὠφέλειαν εἰσάγειν τῷ βίῳ δυνάμενα (21).  
Again, the canons function in the realm of "life". 
Next, the propriety of accepting writings of individual fathers as canons is 
addressed (29-41).  Their acceptance is clearly problematic, and the author admits 
knowing that both Basil and Gregory forbid canonical regulations from individuals: 
they must be issued by "many holy fathers coming together in the same place", testing 
and debating matters at length.  Here then, as in the οἱ τοῦ μεγάλου θεοῦ, canons are 
clearly first and foremost conciliar canons; others must be justified.  However, he feels 
that patristic material contains much "piously said" that may still be regarded "in a 
certain way" as providing a κανόνος τύπον, "type of rule".  He then offers a few 
reasons.  First, he notes, the patristic writings often simply clarify the synodical 
material, and when they add something new they do not contain anything contradictory 
in either letter or meaning (56-62). (One may remark here the passing reference to the 
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common rhetorical and legal hermeneutical categories of "letter" and "meaning" κατὰ 
λέξιν ἢ νοῦν.)  Furthermore – and this seems to be the clinching argument, built up in a 
series of dramatic clauses – patristic judgments are not to be rejected because of the 
spiritual stature of the fathers, whose words "flash forth" with the light of the Holy 
Spirit: ἔκ τε τῆς τῶν προσώπων ἀξιοπιστίας, ἔκ τε τοῦ πνευματικοῦ φωτὸς τοῦ κατ᾽ 
ἐνέργειαν Θεοῦ τοῖς εἰρημένοις ἐπαστράπτοντος...(39-41).  Again, holiness of divine 
men, and the action of the holy Spirit, emerge as key factors in canonical legislation.71 
Having defended and outlined his sources, he then discusses his systematic work 
of dividing the material into fourteen chapters (41-57).  Like Scholastikos, he must 
again articulate his work in part with critical appraisal of "certain" forbearers, τινες τῶν 
πρώην (49-50).  He disapproves in particular of the tendency in older works to write out 
canons in full under the titles, instead of simply giving references to the appended 
corpus.  This results in the repetition of canons, and even their fragmentation under 
different titles, which he finds completely unjustified.  This criticism is usually thought 
to refer to Scholastikos, who did indeed write out the canons in full under his titles 
instead of providing a straight corpus collection.  However, it must be remarked that this 
is not a particularly good description of Scholastikos.  Scholastikos in fact very rarely 
repeats or divides a canon; he is much more remarkable for not repeating or dividing.72 
We may wonder if these criticisms should be taken as more symbolic than concrete, a 
necessary element in a justification for anything new.73  In any case, they do function to 
express a rather extraordinary conservatism vis-à-vis the integrity of the corpus: it is 
better to leave the straight corpus as it is, with only references in the titles. 
After a brief description of his secular-legal additions, the author concludes with 
a brief invocation for the success of his venture, with the help of God and the prayers of 
the saints (55-57).  His assertion that his work is meant to provide "something useful" 
"mostly for himself", but also "for others", should be taken as a humility topos, and not 
a doctrinal statement of the "private" nature of his collection. 
The much later second prologue, ὁ μὲν παρὼν πρόλογος, has as its main task the 
description of the 883 recension's additions.  It begins with a survey of the content of 
                                                 
71 There is also a certain irony – that encapsulates very much about the Byzantine canonical world – 
present in this work's concern about the legitimacy of the patristic legislation.  The author's worry is 
explicitly based in the prohibitions of Basil and Gregory – and yet these very prohibitions are in the 
canons in question! (Basil 47, Gregory 6) In a sense, the author assumes the authority of the canons 
whose authority he is debating.  Real authority in this world is always in traditional rules, whatever their 
formal qualities. 
72 See Appendix B (7) for details. 
73 See Sin 324-325, who also seems slightly tentative about this attribution. 
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the first prologue.  Echoing the first few lines of Scholastikos, the author portrays the 
canonical endeavour as constituting a continuous trajectory of development from the 
time of the Apostles onwards  (1-3). (The Apostolic canons are also obviously accepted 
without comment, as we would expect by this time.)  The original author is thus  
commended first for his work in gathering the synodal canons from Apostolic times up 
until the "fifth" council – the priority of conciliar canons as "proper" canons is assumed 
– but his decision, and its criteria, to include some individual, καθ᾽ ἕνα, authors is also 
approved (2-7).  
Turning to its own content, a quasi-varietas naturae topos again briefly and 
obliquely emerges, with the typical διάφορος vocabulary, to describe how since that 
time many events "of life" have transpired, and synods have been convened for 
"various" reasons (8-9).  Unlike the earlier prologues, however, this author now states 
that he will not criticize his forbearers – he will instead happily follow in their footsteps, 
attaching the new material to the old.  A very traditional, conservative note is thus 
struck: this author does not wish "to inflict indignities upon the works of the ancients".  
He will simply add to their work. 
He then lists his main additions, Trullo, II Nicaea, Protodeutera and Hagia 
Sophia.  The ordinal numbering is used for the ecumenical councils, and Trullo, as is 
common at this time, is termed "the sixth" council.  The description of the contents of II 
Nicaea, briefly detailed, contains one striking phrase: its canons are presented as 
rectifying τὴν ἱερὰν πολιτείαν.  It is tempting to hear in this phrase the 
conceptualization of the church as a "sacred polity", a state-like constitutional body, or 
at least a body approaching some idea of a "perfect society".  However, "sacred way of 
life", meaning the  "Christian way of life" or "life of the church", is probably a more 
accurate reading, and it may even refer to the life of the empire as a whole.  It may also 
refer to monasticism as II Nicaea does contain an important series of monastic canons, 
from 17 to 22.74   If it does bear any of the stronger, more constitutional connotations of 
"sacred polity", it is one of the very few references of its kind in the canonical 
literature.75   
The prologue concludes with a short mention of the addition of certain secular 
legal precepts, and a careful dating. 
 
                                                 
74 Cf. a similar usage in (from the TLG) Diadochus Capita centum de perfectione spirituali.51; John 
Climacus, Scala paradisi 26 
75 Possibly also in Blastares RP 6.1; cf. Viscuso 1989,206-207. 
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5. The Trullan Complex 
It is fitting that the first canonical legislation after a hiatus of almost 250 years should be 
prefaced by an elaborate introductory complex.  In this respect, as in others, Trullo may 
be read as recapitulative and retrospective in tone, symbolically "taking stock" of the 
tradition as a whole, but also creatively re-expressing and re-formulating it.   
This complex is three-fold, containing a prologue-like προσφωνητκὸς λόγος and 
two introductory canons surveying Orthodox doctrine (Trullo 1) and the canonical 
corpus (Trullo 2).76  This structure, as a unified structure, is most apparent in the many 
manuscripts where canons two and three are separated by the topical rubric περὶ ἱερέων 
καὶ κληρικῶν, referring to canons 3-39.77  This gap breaks the introductory complex off 
from the main body of canons, and reveals the true structure of Trullo as a whole: a 
century of "proper" canons (3-102) prefaced by the λόγος and two introductory 
canons.78 
 The first element in the manuscripts, the προσφωνητκὸς λόγος (Τῆς ἀῤῥήτου καὶ 
θείας χάριτος...) is, in genre, a standard address to the emperor requesting his 
ratification of the council's work.   It is modeled on the much shorter προσφωνητκόν 
found in the manuscripts before Constantinople I, which it cites verbatim in its final 
formal request (54.18-55.7)79.   Although ultimately focused on the emperor and the 
matter of ratification, and thus not a prologue in quite the same sense as the previous 
texts, it nevertheless offers a dense and extended representation and contextualization of 
the council's canonical work.   
Like the earlier prologues, it is characterized by a sophisticated literary style, 
with numerous complex periods.  Its general composition, however, differs from these 
earlier works (and particularly the first Coll14 prologue) in one fundamental way: 
unlike the earlier prologues, it employs Scripture intensely, through both numerous 
direct quotations and allusions.80  It may be considered, in fact, as chiefly an exercise in 
the Scriptural glossing of the canonical process and the key canonical "players": the 
bishops and the emperor.  This difference finds an analogue in the much greater use of 
Scripture and Scriptural imagery in later Byzantine secular legal prefaces as compared 
                                                 
76  The best text is now Nedungatt and Featherstone 1995, a slightly corrected version of Joannou's. 
77 On these rubrics, see chapter 4.F.  
78 On the genre of the century, originally apparently monastic in origin, see Louth 2007. 
79 Page and line references to Nedungatt and Featherstone 1995. 
80 It contains at least fifteen direct quotations, noted in Nedungatt and Featherstone 1995.  The first 
"doctrinal" section of the Coll14, in contrast, aside from the reference to Demosthenes as one of those 
"from outside", contains virtually nothing overtly Christian. 
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to Justinian's prologues.81  It is part of a much broader "Scripturalization" – and 
especially "Old Testamentization" – of discourse sometimes remarked of the late 6th and 
early 7th C, both east and west.82 
The logos may be divided into four sections. In the first (45.17-49-12), the 
canons are set into a detailed narrative of salvation history, similar to that glimpsed in 
Coll50 (3-5), but now finding much fuller expression.  The treatise thus begins with a 
brief summary of Christ's salvific work and its consequences: the truth has come to all, 
the first serpent, "the great mind, the Assyrian", has been captured, and proper worship 
established (45.17-47.10) – "in short, all has become new". (2 Cor 5:17).  "But" (47.11) 
the devil, enraged by our salvation, has not ceased from trying to attack us.  His attacks 
are effected, in particular, by means of our passions, τὰ παθή (47.21) – and thus have a 
strongly moral dimension.  But God has not overlooked our helplessness, but has raised 
up in "each generation" (48.6-7) those who "in the stadium of life" fight against the 
devil.  Here shepherd and road imagery, and the "spiritual knife" of οἱ τοῦ μεγάλου θεοῦ 
are reprised as these "leaders of the flock" (48.15), drawing upon the "knife of the spirit, 
which is the word of God", wrestle with the evil one, shattering his "tyranny", and 
"setting us straight upon the road of the Lord", lest we slip (ὀλισθάνω language again) 
down the "cliff of ἀνομία" because of "ignorance of the better".   
This last idea, of moral corruption being connected to ignorance, a standard 
Platonic notion, introduces the concept of canons-as-teaching, which the next sentence 
develops in a rather philosophical vein: while we have been granted being (εἶναι) by 
God, it is also necessary that he show us the path to well-being (εὖ εἶναι), and this he 
has done through the "luminaries and teachers of the church, who illuminate for us 
(φωταγωγούντων)  the ways of God and urge us towards the Gospel – and whose "life is 
in heavens" [Phil 3:20], according to the divine Apostle."  Canonical work is thus the 
(philosophical) work of divine teachers, aimed at leading us to "well-being", and all 
more or less understood in highly moral terms. 
"Whence", the second section (49.13-51.12) begins, Christ, the "helmsman of 
that great ship of the present cosmos",83 has appointed the emperor as a pilot 
                                                 
81 It begins intensely with the Ecloga, and is very prominent in the introductions to the Prochiron and 
Eisagoge.  Cf. Scharff 1959,70-72.  For the more generic appeals to the divine in the Justinianc prologues, 
see the references in n. 113. 
82 In the west, see Kottje 1970; for the east, Pieler 1997 and also, with further references, the comments of 
Brandes 2002,19 on the "Davidic ideology" of the Heraclean period. 
83 ὁ...πηδαλιουχῶν....Χριστὸς... This is surely the source of both the title "Pedalion" and frontispiece 
image of the famous work of Nikodemus the Hagiorite (Kallivourtsis 1800), despite some speculation of 
a Russian origin from кормчая (on which, Chernesheva 1998, Žužek 1964,10-13). 
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(κυβερνήτης) over us – we, who have been living "rather lazily", and whose virtue, 
ἀρετή, has been slowly stolen by the enemy (49.13-19).  The emperor's office is then 
extensively glossed by a series of Scriptural and standard Greco-Roman gubernatorial 
metaphors and epithets:  the emperor is pious, "working judgment and justice in the 
midst of the earth", "walking in a blameless way" [Ps. 118:1 – the "law" Psalm, note], 
born from wisdom, full of the divine spirit, the eye of the oikoumene, meditating on the 
law night and day [Ps 1:2], and so on.  Finally the central point is made: given all of 
these qualities, he is not only to look not to his own life, but to the spiritual safety of all 
of his subjects (51.4-12). 
In the third section (51.13-54.7) the transition is made to recent history, and the 
more concrete details of the request.  The last two ecumenical councils had not issued 
canons, with the result that corruption and decay had set in (51.13-52.20).  Here another 
quasi-definition of the canons and their effect is offered:   
...[the fifth and sixth councils did not write canons] through which 
the people might desist from their worse and lowly conduct and might be 
brought to a better and loftier life; and thence it follows that the holy 
nation, the royal priesthood [1 Pet 2.9] on whose behalf Christ died, is torn 
asunder and led astray through by the many passions resulting from lack 
of order [ἀταξία] and is detached little by little and cut off from the divine 
fold, having slipped away from the achievements of virtue through 
ignorance and neglect; in the words of the Apostle: "They have spurned 
the Son of God, profaned the blood of the covenant by which they were 
sanctified, and outraged the Spirit of grace" [Heb. 10:29]. (52.3-20; trans. 
Nedungatt, modified)84 
Again, a rich tapestry of behaviour, morality, life, virtue and good-order associations is 
the focus and "realm" of canonical legislation.  Interestingly, the absence of canonical 
regulation is quite serious: it results in behaviour that treats the blood of the covenant as 
"common", and – finally the main verb is reached in the original! – is an insult to the 
grace of the Spirit. 
The emperor, however, the treatise continues (52.20-53.16), in imitation of the 
good Shepherd, has desired to gather the "special people" (περιούσιον λαὸν; Deut. 
14.2/Tit 2:14) again and persuade them to keep the "commandments and divine 
ordinances" (τὰς ἐντολάς τε καὶ τὰ θεῖα προστάγματα, common Old Testament 
regulative terms) – thus he has called the ecumenical council.  The canons are thus 
significantly assimilated to Old Testament regulations, and the emperor appears almost 
Moses-like.  At the same time, these commandments also move in a New Testament 
                                                 
84 Greek in Appendix B (8) 
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valence: they remove us from dead works, and make us alive (52.4-6, cf. Heb. 9:14) 
After a few more biblical glosses of conciliar process, the formal request for the 
emperor to ratify their canons is made (54.8-55.7). 
 Trullo 1, the first introductory canon, is a lengthy survey of doctrinal heresy, and 
its history of condemnation.  It is most interesting for its very self-conscious articulation 
of the precedence of doctrinal matters as a subject for canonical regulations.  It begins: 
"The best order when beginning any treatise or matter is to begin with God and to end 
with God, according to the words of the Theologian". This line is an explicit and literal 
borrowing from Gregory Nazianzen.85  Trullo must begin with properly "theological" 
matters, i.e. doctrinal matters relating to God.  The rest of the canon is a lengthy 
profession of faithfulness to tradition, running through the condemnations of every 
ecumenical council to date. 
 The second canon is of most interest for our purposes.  Indeed, as the only 
"official" articulation of the Byzantine corpus, this canon is one of the most commented 
upon in modern Orthodox canonical literature. 
 The canon begins as a continuation of the first: ἔδοξε δὲ καὶ τοῦτο...  The two 
are, in a sense, written as a pair.  Unlike the first canon, however, its primary intention 
is not provide a general survey, but, as already noted, is rather more specific: to 
condemn the Apostolic Constitutions and to confirm and clarify the acceptance the 
Apostolic canons, one element of the corpus.  The criterion for their acceptance is 
notably entirely traditional: they have been "received" and "ratified" (ἐπικυρόω) by the 
"holy and blessed fathers".  Once more the canons are the product of the "divine 
fathers".  The canon goes on to explain that while the eighty-five (a rare enumeration) 
Apostolic canons are to be accepted, the Apostolic constitutions are not to be received, 
because of various doctrinal corruptions. 
Within this initial ruling is a very short, easily missed articulation of the purpose 
of the canons: [the canons are]"for the healing of souls and curing of passions" (64.20-
65.1).  Once again the discourse of healing emerges, and particularly on the moral level 
of the "passions" and "soul".  The medical imagery will be briefly reprised at the very 
end of the canon: one who tampers with a canon will be subject to the penalty that 
canon pronounces, "thus being healed [θεραπευόμενος] by that in which he stumbles" 
(69.8-9). 
                                                 
85 Gregory Nazianzen Apologetical Oration 2.1 (PG  35:408-513). The sentiment is something of a 
commonplace. Cf. the opening lines of Charondas Prooimion or the (Pseudo) Pythagorean Golden Verses 
(ed. Thom 1995; see commentary 102-106).  
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 Once this particular matter is addressed the canon moves on to "seal" the rest of 
the corpus: ἐπισφραγίζομεν δὲ καὶ τοὺς λοιποὺς πάντας ἱεροὺς κανόνας....  A list of 
sources then follows which, as has long been noted, is nothing other than – more or less 
– the table of contents of the Coll14.  The councils are again listed in the form that 
stresses patristic agency, as in the Coll50: the canons of the (x) fathers, gathered in 
place (y).  In no case is the number of canons enumerated: these are it seems, too well 
known.  They are, in any event, enumerated in the traditional Coll14 Ἐκ ποίων... table 
of contents which the canon likely presumes. 
  
6. II Nicaea 1 
The final major introductory structure within the corpus is one of its most important and 
interesting.  Like Trullo 2 and Chalcedon 1, II Nicaea 1 is broadly a "confirmation" 
canon, affirming the corpus.  Its emphasis, however, is much more obviously on 
confirming loyalty to the tradition than confirming the tradition per se.  Its chief focus is 
exhorting the clergy to canonical obedience, an idea that is continued in II Nicaea 2, 
which prescribes (among other types of knowledge) canonical learning for the 
episcopate. 
Like Trullo's προσφωνητικὸς λόγος – but even more so – the canon is dominated 
by Scriptural references.  Indeed, the content of the canon is mostly conveyed through 
an extraordinary series of Scriptural "glosses" by which the canons are dramatically 
assimilated to the Scriptural texts. 
The canon begins with the assertion that "the patterns of the canonical 
constitutions are the testimonies and instructions for those who have received the 
priestly dignity" (τοῖς τῆν ἱερατικὴν λαχοῦσιν ἀξίαν μαρτύριά τε καὶ κατορθώματα αἱ 
τῶν κανονικῶν διατάξεών εἰσιν ὑποτυπώσεις). The term μαρτύρια, "testimonies", is a 
common biblical term for "laws": the canons are thus biblical laws for the clergy. The 
biblical origin of the former term is made immediately explicit by a series of glosses 
from Psalm 118 each of which mentions "testimonies" (vss. 14, 138 and 144 combined, 
and, allusively, 141):  
...which [the "patterns of the canonical constitutions"] gladly receiving we 
sing to the master with the God-revealing David 'I delight in the way of 
your testimonies as upon great wealth' and 'you have commanded justice, 
your testimonies unto the ages; give me understanding and I will live 
forever' and 'unto the ages' the prophetic voice has commanded us 'to keep 
the testimonies of God and to live by them' 
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The clergy are thus exhorted to embrace "gladly" the canonical constitutions just as 
David embraced the μαρτυρία of the law – a message significantly conveyed with Psalm 
118, the classical Davidic meditation on the law.  Further, characteristics of the Old 
Testament are now transferred to canon law: they are eternal and they pertain to justice 
and "life" – indeed, to eternal life ("I will live forever"). The effect is thus a quite blatant 
and striking assimilation of canon law to the Old Testament law.   
This assimilation is heightened in the next line, where the clergy are exhorted to 
maintain the canons unchangeably86 "because the God-seeing Moses thus says 'it is not 
possible to add anything to them nor to take anything away from them'". This citation is 
from an even more legally-charged source, Deuteronomy, and is nothing other than 
Moses' injunction to not add or take away from the law (Deut. 4:2; 12:32; the first, 
especially, is in a preface-like position; cf. also Rev. 22:18-19).  In Trullo 1 it had been 
earlier applied only to doctrine, but here it is applied to the canons. 
The climax of the section comes with the next Scriptural glosses, now from the 
New Testament.  Here 1 Peter 1:12 and Gal 1:9 – "'into which things angels long to 
look' and 'if an angel should preach to you another gospel contrary to that which you 
received, let him be anathema'" – are cited.  In their own contexts, these passages refer 
to the Gospel message itself.  Here they are made to refer to the canonical regulations.  
The anathema reserved for those who preach a different gospel is now referred to those 
who violate the canons.  The canons have been assimilated even to the Gospel. 
 In the second section, marked by τούτων οὖν οὕτως ὄντων, the canon turns to its 
listing of the canonical sources, which its authors "embrace to our bosom with 
gladness".  Yet again, however, this passage begins with a reference to Psalm 118:162, 
again applied to the canons, now to gloss the "embracing" of the canonical tradition by 
the council: "rejoicing in them as one who finds great spoil". Then follows a listing of 
the elements of the corpus, but only in broad groups: Apostles, six ecumenical synods, 
local synods, and fathers.  (This is the first witness for the "Tarasian" order dividing 
general and local councils.)  The church, the canon makes very clear, adheres to these in 
their completeness ("we hold fast to their commandment, complete and unshakable"), 
"for,"– in another dramatic statement of the canonical sources' divine and spiritual 
origins – "they [the sources] have all shone forth from one and the same spirit".  
                                                 
86 ἀκράδαντα καὶ ἀσάλευτα, unshaken and unmoved.  A very rare pair that, curiously, also occurs in 
Philo, Life of Moses, 2.14, precisely in the context of describing Moses as the ideal lawgiver and his laws 
as eternal and unchangeable. 
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Inspired by the "same" spirit, all of the traditional sources are authoritative, and all must 
be adhered to in their integrity. 
The canon concludes with a clever literary appropriation of a conciliar topos of 
loyalty to tradition.  Throughout the conciliar tradition, it is common to proclaim that 
"as the fathers have condemned [such and such]... so we also condemn..."87  This is an 
important way in which the councils articulate their fidelity and continuity with 
traditional teaching: the members of the councils are carefully locating their 
pronouncements within the trajectory of traditional articulations of the faith. Here, 
however, the canon creates a canonical version, by mimicking this formulation with 
four most common canonical punishments:  anathema, deposition, excommunication, 
and "penance" (ἐπιτίμια). Thus, the canon continues, "those whom they placed under 
anathema, so we anathematize, and those under deposition, so we depose, and those 
under excommunication, so we excommunicate, and those given over to penance, we 
subject to the same penance".  The council of II Nicaea, clearly, is entirely loyal to the 
canonical tradition.  
The canon then immediately concludes with a citation of Hebrews 13:5: "for 'let 
your manner be free from love of money, content with what you have' [ἀφιλάργυρος 
γὰρ ὁ τρόπος αῤκούμενοι τοῖς παροῦσιν] clearly proclaims the divine apostle Paul who 
ascended to the third heaven and heard unutterable words".  This point of this passage is 
a little obscure, and even the 12th C Byzantine commentators seem unsure what to make 
of it.  Zonaras' suggestion, that it is meant ("I think") to imply that the canons are not to 
be added to, on the model of someone who is always grasping to add more money to his 
store, is quite likely.88 This reading is coherent with the earlier citations from 
Deuteronomy, and the immediately proceeding professions of mimetic penal loyalty.  It 
is obviously not, however, intended as a categorical, doctrinal prohibition of future 
legislation: this canon is, it must be remembered, followed by 21 new canons.  Instead, 
it is a simple admonition to continued loyalty to the traditional corpus – no other corpus 
is to be admitted, or any other irregular additions.  In this, it sums up the canon nicely: 
in accordance with Scripture, one is to be entirely "content" and loyal to that which has 
been handed down.  The canons must be maintained and adhered to in a fashion 
                                                 
87 For example, in Trullo 1; the TLG reveals numerous instances, for example in ACO 1.1.7.66 orACO 
4.1.2.9. 
88 RP 2.559; Balsamon simply copies Zonaras.  Aristenos seems to paraphrase it in the same way, 
although his meaning is not entirely clear. RP 2.560. 
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appropriate to their identity, which – the message of the canon as a whole – is nothing 
other than quasi-Scriptural. 
 
 7.  Minor texts 
A few more minor introductory structures may be noted within the corpus itself.  Some 
are little more than phrases in introductory sections of canons; others are more 
substantial.  A number witness to important elements of the broader Byzantine 
conceptualization of canon law. 
 Within the conciliar literature, four sources possess formal introductory 
structures.  The most elaborate is the oldest, a synodal letter from the bishops at Gangra 
to their brethren in Armenia. It includes both a section before the canons, and a closing 
epilogue.  The former details the circumstances of the synod, listing the problems that 
provoked its disciplinary decisions (in a slightly different order than the canons that 
address these problems).  The list concludes with a significant summary of the 
Eustathian's misbehaviour: "For each of them, since they went out from the 
ecclesiastical canon [ἐπειδὴ τοῦ κανόνος τοῦ ἐκκλησιαστικοῦ ἐξῆλθεν], kept their own 
individual laws [νόμους ἰδιάζοντας ἔσχεν], for there was no common opinion among 
them, but whatever each one conceived, this he added, to the slander [διαβολή] of the 
church and to his own harm". The flow of associations is notable: to fall away from the 
general "ecclesiastical canon", here in the sense of "general rule of church order", is to 
set up "laws" for oneself (although νόμοι here perhaps tends towards its sense as 
"customary practices") and to fall into individualistic ideas, which in turn leads to 
shame for the church and harm to oneself.  Proper church order thus implies a unified 
and common set of regulations, and violations of this end in both shame/accusing/ 
dishonouring of the church and personal harm.   
 Following the canons, the lengthy epilogue (ταῦτα δὲ γράφομεν) clarifies the 
council's position: the bishops are not condemning asceticism per se, simply its 
excesses.  One sentence is particularly notable for our purposes: the council is 
condemning those who "are introducing novelties against both the scriptures and the 
ecclesiastical canons".  The pairing of "scriptures" and "ecclesiastical canons" is 
significant: the two apparently constitute basic reference points for the question at hand, 
separate but clearly complementary.  (The use of the singular, generic "ecclesiastical 
canon" in the preface, and the plural "ecclesiastical canons" here, is also notable; the 
two usages are obviously interchangeable, or at least not mutually exclusive, even if 
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neither is necessarily referring to concrete written regulations.89  The "canon" implies 
"canons".  We will return to this in chapter three.).  Finally, all errors are innovations: 
καινισμοί.  Right regulations are traditional.  The whole phrase is echoed again in the 
epilogue's concluding sentence: "and so, in summary, we pray that everything that has 
been handed down from the divine Scriptures and the apostolic traditions be observed in 
the holy church." Proper discipline – as expressed by the council in its canons – is above 
all part of faithful adherence to Scriptural and Apostolic traditions. 
The next introductory structure of the corpus, the letter prefacing Antioch, is 
most immediately notable for its very strong rhetoric of harmony and unity, ὁμονοία 
and συμφωνία, both common concepts in late Greco-Roman discourse of governance 
and order.90  The canons also clearly effect, and presume, harmony.  Also prominent is 
a sense of the Spirit/God's agency: the "grace and truth" of Jesus is thus the immediate
subject of the "correction" of matters in Antioch, binding the church together in unity 
with harmony and concord "and a spirit of peace"; indeed, "in everything" correction 
has been accomplished "by the assistance of the holy and peace-giving Spirit".  The 
council has thus gathered "believing in the grace of Christ and the Holy Spirit of peace, 
that you yourselves [the letter's recipients] will also be of the same spirit [συμπνεύσητε] 
united to us in and present together with the Holy Spirit and thinking the same thing 
with us... sealing and confirming that which has seemed correct to us by the concord of 
the Holy Spirit".  Canonical legislation is overwhelmingly a task of the Holy Spirit, both 
in its formation and its acceptance. 
 
                                                
The short προσφωνηκτικόν of Constantinople, directed towards asking the 
emperor's ratification of the bishops' canons, is perhaps most notable for a short gloss to 
explain the purpose of the canons: ὑπὲρ τῆς εὐταξίας τῶν ἐκκλησιῶν.  The canons are 
for the "good order" of the church.  The concept of εὐταξία is a completely 
commonplace notion of Greco-Roman political discourse.  Also of interest is the basic 
subdivision of the council's work: first, the bishops explain, after "renewing harmony 
with each other", they "ratified the faith" of Nicaea, and "anathematized heresies that 
have appeared against it", and then, "in addition to these things...we defined the said 
canons".  Here again "faith" and "canons" appear held together as a pair as the two 
fundamental tasks of a council – the former, of course, clearly precedent.   
 
89 cf. Ohme 1998,401. 
90 The latter most famously in N. 6pr; also, for example, N.132pr.  On the former, especially, see 
Schofield and Rowe 2000 passim. 
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Carthage, a compilation of compilations, is quite sophisticated in its historical 
composition.91  Happily, it presents itself in the corpus rather simply, as a dossier of 
material from the council of 419 treating the Apiarian affair at which are "read" two 
series of canons, the first from the Apiarian council itself (1-33), and the second (34-
133) a compilation of earlier African councils, often separated by short introductory 
acta extracts.92  The Apiarian acta themselves enclose these two "readings", before and 
after.   
As a composed/compiled whole, the most important "introductory" material is 
the first two canons, extensions of the first set of Apiarian acta.  Their content is simple 
and unsurprising: the first confirms the Nicene creed and the Nicene canons, just read in 
the proceeding acts; the second likewise confirms that the faith/creed "handed down" is 
to be confessed, and "then", second, that "ecclesiastical order" is to be maintained.  
They thus both cover, in a sense, the same ground as Trullo 1 and 2 – confirmation of 
the faith and then canons – but in a very abbreviated form.  Again "faith" and "canons" 
are held together as a natural pair. 
Finally, a last conciliar introductory structure, Chalcedon 1, as already noted, is 
a short general confirmation canon: Τοὺς παρὰ τῶν ἁγίων πατέρων καθ᾽ ἑκάστην 
σύνοδον ἄχρι τοῦ νῦν ἐκτεθέντας κανόνας κρατεῖν ἐδικαιώσαμεν.  Its probable referent 
has already been discussed.  The usage of referring to the canons as "of the holy fathers" 
in synods is present here as well: the canons are always first and foremost productions 
of "the fathers".  
Within the patristic canons, four sources contain reasonably prominent 
introductory structures: Cyril, Basil, Gregory of Nyssa, and Dionysius. 
Cyril's letter to Domnus contain a brief and elegant introductory sentence that 
comments upon the function of canonical order:  "Each of our affairs, when properly 
transacted according to canonical order, breeds for us no trouble and delivers us from 
the ill-words [δυσφημία] of any, but rather procures for us praise [εὐφημίας] from right-
thinking men". Here again the language of εὐταξία emerges, but also now closely 
connected with shame/honour-type language: good canonical order brings εὐφημία, bad, 
δυσφημία.   
                                                 
91 See especially Cross 1961; the synoptic table in Fonti 1.2.194-196 is extremely helpful.   
92 The first series is prefaced at Fonti 1.2.214.1-6 by ἔπειτα τὰ ἐν ταῖς συνόδοις τῆς Ἀφρικῆς 
νομοθετηθέντα τοῖς παροῦσι πεπραγμένοις ἐντιθέμενα γινώσκονται.  The second at 1.2.249.3-5 by 
ἀνεγνώσθησαν ἔτι μὴν ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ συνόδῳ διάφοροι σύνοδοι πασής τῆς τῶν Ἄφρων χώρας. 
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The Basilian corpus contains three "framing" structures: a preface each to letters 
188 and 199, and an epilogue, canon 84, the last canon in letter 217. 
 In both epistolary prefaces the most striking and central emphasis is teaching.  In 
the simple and short preface to letter 199 Basil commends Amphilochios' desire to learn 
– especially as Amphilochios (as a bishop) has been entrusted with teaching (2.117.5-
16). The preface to 188 is more involved.  Teaching is immediately the focus as well, 
and now in the leading sentence, set in the (biblical) context of acquiring wisdom: 
"Wisdom will be reckoned to the foolish person who asks questions" (Prov 17.28).  
Amphilochios is asking a question in order to gain wisdom: canonical knowledge is a 
matter of wisdom, which must be taught.  Basil then notes he too becomes wiser in his 
efforts to answer, "learning many things I do not know", πολλὰ ὧν οὐκ ἐπιστάμεθα 
διδασκόμενοι.   Here Deferrari has deftly detected an important allusion to a saying of 
Solon: γηράσκω δ᾽ ἀεὶ πολλὰ διδασκόμενος.93 Consciously, or even unconsciously, 
Basil is presenting himself and his work as an imitation of the great Athenian lawgiver – 
and, more so, in precisely the aspect as a learning/ed lawgiver-sage. The basic theme of 
lawgiving as wisdom learning/teaching is thus subtly, but very effectively, reinforced 
The phrases πολλὰ ὧν οὐκ ἐπιστάμεθα διδασκόμενοι is not simply a rhetorical 
flourish.  It also introduces Basil's very real disposition in issuing his answers, revealed 
in the next few lines.  Basil is going to learn from Amphilochios' questions because he 
himself will try to "remember" if ever he heard something of the "elders", and, if not, to 
reason out to similar conclusions from what he has been taught.  Basil's wisdom-
lawgiving activity is thus primarily about making recourse to the tradition, remembering 
it, and then reasoning from that tradition when it is silent on particular questions.  In 
fact,  Basil's canons do in fact read as conveying traditional regulations and 
commentating on those regulations.94  Law is very much about remembering tradition, 
and talking about tradition. 
Gregory of Nyssa's canonical letter comprises one of the most sophisticated and 
carefully structured elements of the Byzantine canonical tradition.  It begins with a 
significant introduction, the setting of which is dramatic: Pascha.  Gregory begins by 
noting that it is one aspect of Pascha that the church can "perceive the lawful and 
canonical oikonomia [ἔννομός τε καὶ κανονική οἰκονομία] of those who have 
                                                 
93  "I grow old ever learning many things". Deferrari 1926,7 n.1.  The reference may be found in 
collections of apophthegmata attributed to Solon as one of the "seven sages" (ed. Mullach 1860,219-235); 
it may also be found (from the TLG) cited in Plato Laches 189a, Plutarch Life of Solon 31, and 
elsewhere. 
94 Basil 1, 8, 9, 13, 18, 21, 30, 34 etc.   
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committed transgressions, so that every spiritual weakness that has occurred by some 
sin may be healed". (Fonti 2.203.16-20).  He explains further that Pascha, as the feast of 
the resurrection [ἀνάστασις] of the fallen, is thus also the moment of the rectification 
[ἀνόρθωσις] of those who have sinned, when not only the new catechumens are 
baptized, but penitents reconciled to the church: "those who through repentance and 
turning from dead works return to the living road" and "are lead to the saving hope". 
(204.10-19) In light of this, he continues, it is his task, to present a coherent and 
systematic account of the weaknesses that lead to penance, and how they may be healed. 
 The canonical task is thus intimately presented as naturally intertwined with two 
major discourses.  The first is the central salvific discourse of Christianity itself: death 
and resurrection, and particularly as mediated and experienced in the church's central 
liturgical Paschal experience.  The basic penal dynamic of the canons, 
excommunication, is thus significantly glossed as nothing other than a movement from 
death to life (...ἐπιστροφῆς ἀπὸ τῶν νεκρῶν ἔργων εἰς τὴν ζῶσαν ὁδὸν...) (204.15-16).  
Here the familiar themes and images of "life" and "road" re-appear.  They are set for the 
first time, however, explicitly within the context of the new Paschal life of the 
resurrection.  The penitential discipline of the church participates in the Paschal rhythm 
of the church's life. 
The second discourse is that of medicine and of the healing of the soul.  
Developed at great length into the organizing scheme of the entire letter (discussed in 
chapter four) it casts the canons as addressing the three fundamental types of spiritual 
diseases: intellectual, the desirous, and the appetitive.  The debt to ancient psychology is 
obvious. 
One of the oldest introductory element in the corpus is the epilogue to Dionysius 
of Alexandria's canonical letters (Fonti 2.14.3-18).  Here again teaching is prominent, 
although denied as part of a humility topos: Dionysius has responded to the questions 
Basilides, setting forth his mind "not as a teacher but with much simplicity, as befitting 
for us to converse with each other".  Of course, Dionysius has been teaching Basilides.   
This humility topos is nevertheless interesting, and highlights another theme – or 
almost tonality – that runs through some of the introductory material.  While Dionysius 
is here teaching Basilides, the tone of the epistle as a whole does nevertheless suggest a 
level of real bilateral conversation, or at least, of a fairly humble sharing of opinions.95  
                                                 
95 Especially "ταῦτα μενοῦν ὡς φρονῶ καὶ συμβουλεύω περὶ τούτων ἔγραψα" at Fonti 2.11.17-19; also 
perhaps at 12.4.   
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Dionysius is probably truly offering his opinion to his brother bishop, Basilides, who is 
then exhorted to judge for himself, and write back should he consider another answer 
better (14.11-15).   
This "dialogical" sentiment – a sense that law is emerging out of a fairly polite 
discussion – should probably be understood in the context of broader antique traditions 
of philia, by which normativity and regulation tends to be stylized as a fairly polite 
affair, focused on consensus, friendship and persuasion, not coercion.96  It is most 
obvious and blatant in Dionysius, but it is also present elsewhere.  In the letters in 
Antioch and Gangra, for example, the bishops are "asking" their brother bishops to 
adopt their canons.  Another example is the almost "chatty" form of the parliamentary 
process embedded in Serdica and parts of Carthage – Hess's dixit-placet form.97  The 
bishops are (notionally) "talking around" the issues, and the canons read as such.  Even 
Basil and Gregory of Nyssa, although their writings are more obviously cast as answers 
from superiors to inferiors, retain a sense of it: legislation emerges out of a discussion 
between student and teacher, or father and son.  Gregory of Nyssa's epilogue, in 
particular, makes clear that his work is composed in a spirit of fraternal concern (Fonti 
2.226.12-17: διὰ τὸ δεῖν τοῖς τῶν ἀδελφῶν ἐπιτάγμασι πείθεσθαι κατὰ σπουδὴν).    
This dialogical stylization of legislation is much less evident elsewhere in the 
tradition, but it is not entirely absent.  A highly sublimated form of it may be recognized 
in the subscription lists.98 In these lists, every bishop individually attaches his name to 
the council's acta, sometimes adding his own statement of assent.  The canons are thus 
framed as emerging very much as a communal effort, and having garnered widespread 
support (whatever the reality).  The effect of these lists is quite powerful, fully 
appreciated only when one flips through page after page of them in the manuscripts, 
marveling at both the amount of time such lists must have taken to create, and copy.  It 
may also be noted that these lists serve to realize the "patristic" mode of referring to 
conciliar canons: the canons do seem to emerge from the fathers of the council. 
                                                 
96 See Brown 1992,35-70, and the references above on Plato's concept of the prooimion (n 5). On 
consensus in the early church, Hess 2002,29-33.  In light of these close connections between law, moral 
suasion, and consensus, Hess' tendency to oppose the first to the latter two (79-81, 89), part of his 
narrative of the "legalization" of canon law, is not convincing. 
97 Hess 2002,24-29; he closely connects it with the concept of consensus at 72-74.  
98 In the extant manuscripts, however, the only substantial list to be found is that attached (sometimes) to 
Trullo. See Ohme 1990.  Carthage also sometimes contains a short list (Fonti 1.2.407-410). Earlier, they 
were more common, as Balsamon notes (RP 2.300-301), and as translations in older Syrian and Latin 
manuscripts indicate. For these last, see the Clavis entries in chapter 1, n. 33. 
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Even more abstractly, a kind of dialogue is also present in the pervasive 
discourse of tradition: a dialogue with the dead.  This is a discourse that will be 
explored in greater depth next chapter, but already we can see that even Trullo and II 
Nicaea, self-consciously authoritative ecumenical councils, must speak out of and with 
reference to the "fathers" of the past, and indeed, must emphatically profess their loyalty 
to the past in their introductory canons.  Deference to tradition is, as we have seen, a 
theme of many of the texts examined above.  It is also possible to read this deference as 
a form of persuasion: the constant professions of faithfulness to the past evince a need 
to persuade, and appeals to tradition function to reassure and convince the reader of the 
legitimacy of the legislation.  This persuasive effect is best appreciated in comparison to 
modern modalities of legislation, where there is little evidence that law-writers feel they 
must persuade their readers of their legitimacy in any way.  Their authority and 
legitimacy is grounded not in an ongoing conversation with the past but the formally 
and absolutely defined powers of their office/institution. 
 
B. Central Themes, Priorities, Problems 
1. An Initial Problem: "rhetoric" 
Taken as a whole, the Byzantine introductory material sets the canons into a 
complex and rich matrix of images, concepts and associations.  At times bewildering, 
these images and concepts nevertheless coalesce around a number of central themes and 
ideas that are deeply revealing of the legal imagination whence they emerge. 
The most immediately striking aspect of these texts, however, is not a specific 
theme or idea, but instead their general style and tone. Whereas crisp and precise 
conceptual prose might be expected of a modern code or legal introduction – certainly 
modern Orthodox canonical manuals read this way – the Byzantine introductions are 
extraordinarily ornate, allusive and imagistic, sometimes to the point of obscurity.  This 
is particularly true of the doctrinal sections of the formal prologues, where the nature of 
church law is most directly addressed.   
 This "rhetorical" orientation of the introductions is hardly surprising within the 
broader context of late antique and Byzantine literature.  But whereas in theological, 
epistolary, historical or philosophical texts we might expect and understand such a 
mode of writing, in legal literature it is somehow more disconcerting.  Yet even in legal 
literature the rhetoricization of law is one of the stock "vulgar" characteristics of late 
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antique and later legislation – and no where is it more pronounced than in the legal 
prooimia.99   
This oddly rhetorical style makes it exceedingly difficult for modern scholarship 
to read these introductions as seriously expository of legal realities.  Indeed, in the 
literature, such introductions tend to be consigned to merely subsidiary propagandistic 
or symbolic functions, important in themselves, but somehow extrinsic to real legal 
concerns.  These texts are thus easily explored as "mirrors" of imperial ideology, or of 
changes in political structures (mainly as part of the legitimization and enforcement of 
new structures), or of Byzantine culture generally – but, strangely enough, not as 
mirrors of the law itself.100  In other words, rarely does anyone asks what it might mean 
for the nature of a legal system, on a theoretical level, to be so highly invested in such a 
literary form of self-fashioning.101  Instead, the "law itself" is always assumed to be a 
constant modern-like technical-formalist reality underlying this rhetorical "decoration", 
and perhaps manipulated by it.  This outer layer of literary fluff is, at best, to be mined 
for bits and pieces of "real" legal doctrine that might be buried within – as if the 
introductions really mean to be speaking like the introductions to modern statutes, but 
just happen to be constrained by the (decadent) rhetorical mores of Byzantine culture.   
 It is, however, preferable to allow that in these introductions the Byzantines 
might have been doing exactly what they wanted to be doing: framing and locating legal 
normativity in an intentionally ornate, literary manner, i.e. "rhetorically".   
If this perspective is adopted, one of the most basic and curious characteristics of 
these introductions – perversely enough –  suddenly becomes their lack of interest in 
clear conceptual formulation of canonical jurisprudential "introduction" at all.  
Sustained and clear theoretical articulation of fundamental legal distinctions, categories, 
or doctrines simply does not seem to be a priority. 
 It is in fact exceptionally difficult to identify even one clearly and definitively 
expressed legal concept, distinction or principle in these introductions.  With a little 
effort, it is possible to distill – to "mine" – something of a source theory: legislative 
authority is formally conciliar, canonical legislation is to be authentic, validity may be 
                                                 
99 See the references in Introduction nn. 27, 28, especially Ries 1983 and Pieler 1978; also Corcoran 
1996,3-4; Fögen 1995; Honig 1960; Hunger 1964; Lanata 1989; Voss 1982. 
100 This is broadly true, I would suggest, of the studies of Fögen 1995, Honig 1960, Hunger 1964, and 
Ries 1983.  This is part of a much broader tendency to see any complex literary fashioning of legal texts 
as a de-legalizing of these texts.  See also Honig 1960,39-40 on the earlier work of E. Vernay. 
101 Again, Stroux 1949 is to some extent an exception (and following him Honig 1960, see esp. at 40-41), 
but these treatments tend to be focused on the doctrinal influence of fairly specific rhetorical concepts and 
techniques, and not the texture of the system as a whole. 
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universal or regional, and a vague hierarchy of sources may be discerned (councils, then 
fathers).  Other quasi-technical legal or legal-like concepts also appear: the distinction 
between the "letter" and "mind" of the law (in τὰ μὲν σώματα 37),102 or the idea of 
ratification (e.g. κυρο- vocabulary in Trullo 2).  But all of these ideas are mostly 
occasional and vague, not pursued in any length or sophistication, and appear almost in 
passing: it is certainly not a primary concern of the tradition to provide a clear, 
consistent exposition of the sources of law, 103 or the criteria for formal validity, or the 
nature of legal interpretation. 
 Instead of sustained formal legal-doctrinal exposition, the energies of the 
introductions seem to be directed elsewhere, towards a much looser, much more ornate 
and literary presentation of the law.   
This immediately raises the thorny legal-theoretical question of what might be 
gained by the framing and locating normativity in such an ornate, literary manner. 
The answer may be very simple.  This "rhetorical" or, better, literary mode of 
presentation is very good at doing exactly one thing: embedding or enmeshing 
normativity in broader narratives.  Although anathema to modern formalist instincts, 
this embedding of the law within a fluid, polyvalent literary framework is perhaps the 
single most obvious and central dynamic of the introductions.  The literary fashioning of 
law consciously places the emphasis on connectivity with multiple contexts, and keeps 
the normative processes firmly anchored in, and in a sense subordinate to, a broader, 
more generalized set of values and world-view.  Law becomes, in effect, one more 
aspect of broader narratives of the right and wrong, of justice and injustice – and indeed, 
of ancient literary paideia generally.  It has sometimes been remarked that the tendency 
in antiquity is to transform almost all realms of knowledge into a subset operation of 
general literary learning104 – it seems that law is no different.   
 The results are conceptually messy, but in a world view which may place more 
emphasis on cultural and educational control of behaviour than rule-control, 
understandable, and probably effective.105  Certainly this tendency points towards an 
overall legal-theoretical orientation favouring the resolution of disputes and the 
maintenance of order via substantively equitable solutions and negotiations – i.e. as in 
                                                 
102 Τhis is, of course, a very general rhetorical and philosophical concept; see Stroux 1949; 
Triantaphyllopoulos 1985,23-24. 
103 Certainly nothing contradicts Stolte's judgment that "the Byzantines never reached a fixed theory of 
legal sources" Stolte 1991b,545 n. 5; see also Stolte 1991a and Burgmann 2003,252 n. 13. 
104 See especially Marrou 1948 passim., but also, for example, Brown 1992, Carney 1971,91, Morgan 
1998,94-95.    
105 See Brown 1992; Lendon 1997.  
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Weber's "substantive rational" systems, where the truly just solution to every problem is 
sought – and not via formally correct techniques, doctrines and procedures that produce 
"legally" or conceptually correct solutions – i.e. Weber's "formal rational" systems.106   
In such a substantive system, the critical problem is not legal-conceptual coherence or 
consistent application of legal language, techniques and doctrines, but maintaining 
consensus around the broad metaphysical narratives of justice that must be constantly 
invoked to demonstrate a given judgment is "just".  For such systems the primary focus 
must thus necessarily be the constant embedding of legal discourse in these narratives of 
substantive justice – this is a functional requirement for the system.  And this is 
precisely what the Byzantine introductions seem to be doing.  Clear concepts and bare 
rule-content may well exist in this world – as they do in Byzantine canon law – but they 
are not the primary concern of legal exposition.    
The rhetorical character of the introductions should not therefore be considered 
extrinsic to their legal substance, but an essential element of it, and indeed a critically 
important guide to the nature of Byzantine canon law.  The legal "message" of the 
introductions is precisely that law qua law is supposed to be rhetorically framed, that is 
carefully embedded in broader value narratives – and indeed, it must be.   
Finally, we must not overlook a further, rather unintuitive implication of this 
literary stylization: law is supposed to be beautiful.107  Although the tortuous periods of 
Scholastikos or the Trullan Προσφωνητικός may no longer seem as elegant as they once 
did, the intention is undoubtedly to fix the canons in a suitably aesthetic setting.108  This 
further emphasizes the belief that law not be considered as a "plain" and technical 
formalist mechanism of rules, but as part of a much broader cultural discourse where it 
is essential that good ordering and aesthetic expression be connected.  We may also 
remark that what would seem to be the most fundamental concepts in the introductions 
– those pertaining to the very nature of canon law, set at the beginning of the prologues 
in the "doctrinal" sections – are generally the most ornamented and "beautiful".  As odd 
as it may seem, in this world, the greater the content, the greater the rhetorical 
stylization.   
 
                                                 
106 Weber 1925,224-256 et passim. 
107 See Tanta on the laws in the Digest coming to a novam pulchritudinem (liv.11), or Deo Auctore on the 
Digest: ...oportet eam pulcherrimo opere extruere... (xlvii.12); cf. Pieler 1978,351-362 ("Rechtliteratur als 
Kunstform?").  
108 In this connection it is interesting that Beneshevich reports a number of scholia that are directed to 
pointing out aesthetically pleasing constructions in the canon. Sbornik 145 n.2. 
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2. Embedding the canons: fundamental contexts and referents 
The Byzantine introductory tradition is best conceived as an attempt to locate the 
canonical endeavour within a number of significant contexts and narratives.  As already 
suggested, one of the most significant aspects of this process is that the introduction 
contain very little that is narrowly technical or specialized, legally or otherwise.  Most 
of these contexts, images and motifs invoked are instead quite commonplace.  The few 
semi-technical legal terms and concepts that are present (aside from the κυρο- 
vocabulary, and references to "word" and "mind" of texts mentioned above, we might 
also note the semi-technical "referring" language of ἀναφέρω in Constantinople and 
Antioch109) are assumed to be well known, and probably were by anyone capable of 
reading these texts in the first place – they are certainly not dwelt upon.  In no way, 
then, are the introductions primarily inducting the reader into a specialized and 
proprietary technical world.  Rather the movement of the introductions is towards the 
general and well-known.  Canon law is being written into a common code of Greco-
Roman and Christian learning – not out of it, and into its own proprietary world.  To 
understand canon law is to be versed in a wide array of cultural associations and 
allusions, not in a specialized realm of technical doctrine.   
 The single most prominent agenda of the introductions is the location of the 
canons within the Christian "story" of salvation.  As noted, this is most explicitly 
developed in Trullo, but also evident in the οἱ τοῦ μεγάλου θεοῦ and also Gregory of 
Nyssa.  The canons become an instrument in the unfolding the great Paschal drama of 
salvation, of which the main players are God, Christ, the spirit, the devil, and the saints.  
As such, the canons have a cosmic significance, whose horizons easily open up onto the 
next world – as evident, for example, in the Apostolic epilogue, but also in τὰ μὲν 
σώματα, if here in a highly Platonized form.  
In II Nicaea 1 the canons become woven so deeply into the Christian "story" that 
they emerge as quasi-scriptural in themselves: the canons can be cast as the OT law or 
even the NT "law", the Gospel.   II Nicaea 1, however, is only the acme of a much 
broader tendency of locating the canons firmly in a Scriptural literary matrix.  Its 
simplest form is the appropriation of a number of obviously Scriptural images: for 
example, the Good Shepherd, the language of the "royal way", and even the constant 
                                                 
109 The term ἀναφορά is often a translation for suggestio, or relatio  an official report or petition to the 
imperial chancery.  Its use in these canons is somewhat looser. 
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references to the canons/law being about "life", a common OT theme.110  Even very 
early in the tradition canonical material or actions can even be glossed directly by 
Scripture: the image of the canons as the "knife of Spirit" in οἱ τοῦ μεγάλου θεοῦ is an 
excellent example.  Scripture and the canons clearly form a continuous trajectory of 
salvation and ordering, the latter rooted in the former, but nonetheless of very similar 
substance and function. 
Similar in effect is the tendency of casting the canons as first and foremost an 
Apostolic project which is then continued imitatively by the fathers.  The first line of οἱ 
τοῦ μεγάλου θεοῦ is perhaps the most explicit articulation of this idea, but the idea in 
Trullo of "each generation" continuing the battle with the devil, or the tendency of 
speaking about the canons as prototypically "of the Apostles and fathers", coveys the 
same idea: the canons are always an Apostolic-then-patristic endeavour.  From the 6th C 
onwards, this concept is realized in the shape of the corpus itself, when the Apostles 
literally head canonical legislation, and thus becomes part of the physical architecture of 
the system as a whole.  
Not surprisingly, the canons become easily cast as divine.  Although we did not 
remark it closely above, this is most obvious in patterns of sacral epithets.  The canons 
are thus θείοι νόμοι in οἱ τοῦ μεγάλου θεοῦ (4.18), θείοι κανόνες in εἰς δόξαν θεοῦ 
(Heimbach 1838,208.3), ἱεροὶ θεσμοί in τὰ μὲν σώματα (12), ἱεροὶ κανόνες in Trullo 
(52.108.1 and Trullo 2), θείοι κανόνες in II Nicaea 1, and both ἱεροὶ κανόνες and 
ἱερολογίαι in ὁ μὲν παρὼν πρόλογος (27-28). Very characteristic of the civil laws as 
well, these epithets become virtually formulaic by Trullo, whereafter they occur by 
default.111   
Equally evident is the implied deification of the canons in their divine and 
spiritual origin: they are defined directly as a "gift from God" in τὰ μὲν σώματα, the 
Holy Spirit himself has authored, or at least co-authored, them in οἱ τοῦ μεγάλου θεοῦ 
and Antioch (in the former "divine grace" also plays a role), and in II Nicaea 1 they all 
shine straight from "the same Spirit".  Their salvific end, already mentioned, also leaves 
little doubt about their numinous character.  In this too the canons are stepping into a 
very common, and increasingly pronounced late antique and Byzantine pattern of 
                                                 
110 For examples of this last, Deut. 4:1 or 5:33. 
111 For examples from the secular legislation, see Enßlin 1943,73-74; cf. Wenger 1942,98-100 with 
examples from Justinian of both laws and canons as "sacred". In the canons, see for example Trullo 26, 
33; II Nicaea 10, 11; Protodeutera 10, 11.  Earlier, Cyril 1. 
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casting law and legislation as essentially divine and heaven-sent.112  Hess is quite wrong 
to see a diminution in this idea during and after the 5th C; it remains constant and, if 
anything, in the Byzantine tradition, especially in Trullo and II Nicaea, increases.113  
Sohm was well aware of this important first-millennium dynamic.114 
This divine and salvific nature of the canons is nuanced in one important way: a 
consistent pattern emerges of joining and assimilating, yet simultaneously 
subordinating, the canons to faith or Scripture.  This double pattern of 
"faith/Scripture/doctrine and then the canons" is never a clear conceptual doctrine or 
distinction (cf. the later distinction between ius sacrum and ius humanum115), but it 
nevertheless emerges as a recurring theme in the introductions, a fundamental fold in 
the fabric of the tradition.  Important examples include the Nicene prefacing, the 
division of conciliar work in Constantinople, the pairing of Trullo 1 and 2, and the 
assimilation of the canons to Scripture in II Nicaea 1.  Indeed, it represents the canons' 
fundamental self-situation within the tradition: the canons are always together with 
Scripture/faith, with a similar goal and function, and assimilated to them, but 
nevertheless following them, and never totally identified with them.116  The distinction 
and relationship between θεωρητικά and πρακτικά in later Platonic philosophy is likely 
a critical context for this distinction.117 
                                                 
112 On the immense issue of the sacrality of laws and the legislative process in Greco-Roman legal and 
political thinking, and its connection with the idea of a quasi-divine legislator, Dvornik 1966 remains the 
richest and broadest resource; see also Harris and Wood 1993,147-148; Hunger 1964,49-81; Kleinknecht 
and Gutbrod,1967,1025-1035; Ries 1983,120-121, 221-222; Scharf 1959,68-70. On the ever-increasing 
dominance of the divine-origin of law in Byzantium – to the point that the emperor himself seems to 
become eclipsed as a real source of law – see especially Fögen 1987 and Lokin 1994. This may be viewed 
as the legal consequence of the increasing 4th C representation of imperial power as a semi-divine 
institution, mediating between heaven and earth – itself and old Platonic and Hellenistic theme (God, of 
course, being the measure of the political order: Laws 716c); see the references above in the Introduction, 
n. 50.  For ancient near-eastern precedents, see the short summary with further references in Raaflaub 
2000,50-57.  These concepts are, of course, present in the CJC prolegomena; see the famous dedication of 
Tanta  (in nomine domini dei nostri ihesu christi ) or its blunt ascription to heavenly authorship (Tanta 
pr); also Deo auctore 5 in which cumque haec materia [for the Digest] summa numinis liberalitate 
collecta fuerit), and its conclusion, at 14, in which the Digest is deique omnipotentis providentiae 
argumentum.  A classical example of the emperor as divine legislator is CTh Gesta 3 where copies of the 
code are received from the emperor manu divina.  See Enßlin ibid. for further, similar examples.   
113 Hess 2002,76-77, contra Sieben; here too Hess is over-anticipating a much later medieval western 
narrative, in this case the separation of law from theology and morality, and of a clear doctrinal 
distinction in canon law between the ius sacrum and the ius humanum. 
114 Sohm 1923,2.68-77 
115 Sohm 1923,2.85-108, and so Afanasiev 1936,55-57 and Patsavos (Kapsanis) 1999,186, rightly view 
this distinction as a rather odd development; divinity is virtually a constitutive characteristic of ancient 
church law.  
116 For such pairings in the Justinianic legislation, see Wenger 1942,125-129. 
117 See especially O'Meara 2003, particularly with his emphasis on both aspects as part of the ascent to 
θεωρία, and the notion of a constant ascending-descending interplay between the two in this process.  
Neither an absolutely clear distinction between the two, nor a total assimilation, ever seems possible – 
very much as in the relationship between Scripture/faith and the canons in the Byzantine canonical 
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Another omnipresent discourse in the canons is the tendency to view human 
organization and order in overwhelmingly moral terms, and particularly moral-
psychological terms.  With deep roots in the Greek vision of law as a pedagogue to 
virtue, law becomes so overwhelming intertwined with virtue and morality that to  
attempt to separate "law" and "morality" in this tradition is almost ludicrous: the two are 
clearly, and intentionally, held together.118  Thus the practical effect and function of the 
canons is repeatedly expressed primarily in moral and psychological terms of, for 
example, "rectifying the life and manner of each" (οἱ τοῦ μεγάλου θεοῦ 4.18-19), of 
providing a "canon" of a "pious way of living" (τὰ μὲν σώματα 14), of leading the soul 
upwards to true good (ibid. 6), and above all – especially, but not exclusively, in οἱ τοῦ 
μεγάλου θεοῦ, Trullo and Gregory of Nyssa – of curing and aiding the passions: πρὸς 
ψυχῶν θεραπείαν καὶ ἰατρείαν παθῶν (Trullo 2).  This last medical imagery, an 
important subset, culminates in Gregory of Nyssa, whose concern to heal "every 
spiritual sickness" leads him to compose a lengthy treatise on penance as medicine of 
the soul.  This medical theme too has a well established ancient pedigree as a legal 
association.119   
Related to this vision of the canons addressing and healing the moral failings of 
its subjects is also the constant emphasis on the canons as oriented towards "life": the 
canons lead one, for example, "to a greater and higher...life" (Trullo 52.5-7), and are 
able to provide πολλὴν ὠφέλειαν...τῷ βίῳ (τὰ μὲν σώματα 21).  The canons speak to 
human existence in a very broad sense – life itself.120   
                                                                                                                                               
literature. See also Neschke 1995. I strongly suspect that this schema is much more historically useful for 
understanding the interplay of faith/praxis, belief/discipline, or even the divine/human, in the ancient 
canonical tradition than the much more commonly encountered recourses to Christological analogies (the 
church as having a "divine-human" nature) or the interplay of the (medieval!) disciplines of theology and 
canon law.  
118 When Plato asserts that the only aim of the proper legislator is complete virtue (Laws 705d-e, also 
630c), he sums up much of the tradition. On this ubiquitous ancient, and especially Greek, tendency to 
merge law, politics and morality/values – and generally to assimilate the first two to the last – see for 
example Balot 2006,11-14; Barker 1925,352-353; Cohen 1995,35-59; Dagron 1994,30-35; Dvornik 1966; 
Jones 1956,12-16; Schoefield and Rowe 2000 (passim); Gagarin (on Plato, in particular) 2002,216; 
Troianos 1992,331-333.  See also the Introduction, n. 52, 54. We may of course cite also Digest 1.1: ius 
est ars boni et aequi; it is the art of the good and the fair. The tendency of Hess 2002,80-85 to oppose 
morality and legality is not helpful. 
119 Law, government and medicine are closely woven together in Greco-Roman thought. It is a 
particularly strong association in Platonic thought (e.g. Laws 719e; the Republic largely casts law and 
government as therapy of the city/soul); see Dvornik 1966 (especially the references to king as physician 
at 960); Hunger 1964,103-109; 123-130; Lanata 1984,1989a; O'Meara 2003,107-110. 
120 Cf. the idea of obeying the commands of the law "that you may live" in, for example, Deut. 4:1 or 
5:33, or the law as a magisterium vitae in CTh Gesta 4, or laws addressing τὸ πολύτροπον τῆς τοῦ βίου 
καταστάσεως in Leo's Prooimion to his novels (Noailles and Dain 1944,5). 
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Also far reaching is the persistent association of canon law with teaching.  This 
is also a major association for law in Greek literature, and closely related to the idea of 
law as the moral correction of the "life" of the body-politic.121  Law is essentially a 
realization of, and aimed at, the constant (moral) re-education of society. Lawlessness in 
Trullo is thus, for example, about ignorance and "forgetting" of virtue (52.7-15) that 
must be corrected through the luminaries and teachers of the church (49.6-8).  Law itself 
is even defined as a "useful teaching" (χρηστὴ διδασκαλία – τὰ μὲν σώματα 16-17) and 
a number of the Apostolic Epitome sections are titled "teaching of.."; and of course 
Basil presents himself as above all teaching – and so being taught.   
 Numerous other more specific images and concepts also anchor the canons 
firmly within broader late antique legal-political discourses. The canons are thus 
concerned with σοφία, εὐταξία, συμφωνία, ὁμόνοια, and the φρονιμόν. Here we may 
also count the occasional emergence of honour/shame language, as well as the 
Amtsweisungen-like progression of the Apostolic Epitome.  Broadly, in fact, the 
conceptualization of the law in shepherd and "way" imagery, and, as noted, even divine, 
may all be read as recognizable and quite regular elements of the symbolic and 
linguistic world of Greco-Roman legal-political ideology.122  
In short, the canons are deeply embedded in a rich and overlapping network of 
narratives and images from Scripture, Greco-Roman philosophy and ancient law: far 
from emerging as a carefully defined and demarcated, possibly "autonomous" realm of 
normativity, the canons are glossed and assimilated into a huge array of cultural 
referents.  The instinct is in fact to link and to connect to as many relevant contexts as 
possible. 
 
3. One special context: the civil law  
A critical question of much modern scholarship is how Byzantine canon law 
negotiated its identity with Roman civil law.  This question was perhaps not quite so 
pressing for the Byzantines themselves.  Trullo and II Nicaea 1, for example, are 
                                                 
121 The association of law and teaching and gaining (true) knowledge is profound in ancient Greco-
Roman thinking; see (again) CTh Gesta 4 on the law as a magisterium vitae, or Plutarch's Lycurgus 
"attaching the whole task of legislation to education" (Life of Lycurgus 13; ed. Lindskog and Zieler 
1957). For Plato and Aristotle law and politics is virtually an extended program of self- and city 
education: law both is and assumes education. On this immense theme, see the references in n. 118 above; 
also Brown 1992, 35-70; Jones 1956,5-8; Romilly 1971,227-250; Ries 1983,104-126; Too 2001; cf. also 
Dvornik 1966 on mimesis, and especially rulers providing an example for imitation (citations at 963). 
122 For all these images and terms, see broadly Barker 1925, Dvornik 1966, Hunger 1964, Ries 1983, 
Schoefield and Rowe 2000. 
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arguably more interested in establishing the canons' identity vis-à-vis the Scriptural law 
than the civil (a concern, incidentally, shared by contemporary Byzantine secular 
prologues, and not, therefore, a substantive point of contrast with the secular law!).  
Nevertheless, this problem is not altogether ignored in our texts.  Indeed, in the 
earliest extant prologue, οἱ τοῦ μεγάλου θεοῦ, the civil law emerges almost immediately 
as a foil for understanding and defining the nature of church law.  The topic may be read 
as very obliquely broached in τὰ μὲν σώματα as well.  In both cases, however, this 
negotiation is very nuanced and subtle, and does not permit reduction to simple 
doctrines or clear principles.  It is, indeed, a prime illustration of the textures of this 
very conceptually "messy", literary-rhetorical approach to shaping and imagining law. 
 The ambiguities of this negotiation are immediately evident in οἱ τοῦ μεγάλου 
θεοῦ.  On the one hand, the prologue begins with an apparently strong and clear point of 
distinction: penology.  According to Scholastikos, the civil laws seek to harm, while the 
canon law seeks to protect, guide and heal, and in this the church leaders are above 
acting as "good shepherds".   
A little later we also encounter another explicit distinction: the fathers did not 
decree "political" or civil laws but "divine": νόμους τινὰς καὶ κανόνας οὐ πολιτικούς 
ἀλλὰ θείους... ἐξέθεντο.   
 These distinctions, however, within the broader context of Greco-Roman 
political-legal discourse, ring a little hollow.  First, late antique civil law – and at least 
the Greek civil-legal philosophical tradition – may easily speak of itself as protecting, 
guiding and healing: both medical and shepherd imagery are not especially foreign to 
it.123  Scholastikos is thus in a sense distinguishing canon law from civil law with a pool 
of common "secular" legal images.    
 The use of "divine" as, apparently, a point of distinction from the "secular" laws 
is also strangely ambiguous. As noted, referring to laws as divine is an entirely normal 
convention of late antique civil law.124  Indeed, the constant epithetizing of the canons 
as "divine" might elsewhere be understood as precisely a means of assimilating church 
law to civil legislation.  Here too, then, the canons are being distinguished from the civil 
laws, but with common "secular" legal concepts – even if this one does not sound so 
today. 
                                                 
123 See nn. 119, 122. 
124 See n. 111. 
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 It is likewise curious that in the phrase cited above, νόμοι and κανόνες are used 
synonymously.  This is also true later in the prologue (4.21), and in Title 48, where the 
canons are clearly referred to as νόμοι.  Despite the fact that κανών is already a 
reasonably technical term for church rules in the 6th C, and the term itself could be used 
to distinguish the ecclesial and secular laws – and elsewhere often is (see chapter three) 
– the two terms here form a hendiadys.  The two types of laws are distinguished solely 
on the (ambiguous) basis of θεῖος.  
Another level of ambiguity emerges in the fact that this "divine" church law is 
immediately glossed by an allusion to a stock legal definition: νόμους τινὰς καὶ κανόνας 
οὐ πολιτικούς ἀλλὰ θείους περὶ τῶν πρακτέων καὶ μὴ πρακτέων ἐξέθεντο. Although 
applied here to "non-secular" divine laws, this is an absolutely conventional secular-
legal "definition".  Its application to church legislation is thus an important example of 
legal-theoretical appropriation, and clearly locates canonical norms within the normal 
parameters of Greco-Roman legal thought.  Here, however, even another layer of 
ambiguity emerges – for us at least – as this definition is not exactly a proprietary 
technical or juristic legal definition in the modern sense: it is general philosophical 
definition in its original form, and quite moral in tone.  So the "divine" ecclesial laws 
are being defined by a secular-legal definition, but by one much broader than any 
modern secular legal definition.  It is not, therefore, assimilating canon law to any 
secular law as we tend to know it.  
In sum – if one is ready for it – the canonical legislation is being distinguished 
from secular legislation with secular legal images, defined as non-secular by a common 
"non-legal" secular-legal definition, and being identified as non-secular with a common 
secular legal epithet that does not sound secular today – while being referred to with 
secular-legal terminology! 
A similar ambiguity may be found in the appropriation of the Demosthenic 
definition of law in τὰ μὲν σώματα.   Here it is again striking that a common secular-
legal definition of law is immediately and easily applied to the canons.  At the same 
time, however, the definition is rhetorical in origin, and extends far beyond the scope of 
any modern technical-legal, juristic definition of the "legal"; by modern standards, it is 
hardly "legal" at all.  At the very moment of its appropriation it is, in any case, bleached 
of its most secular-legal content, and turned into something more proprietary.  The 
dynamic of this appropriation is thus very similar to that in οἱ τοῦ μεγάλου θεοῦ: one 
easily reaches for commonplace, secular-legal concepts and images to define the 
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canons, but the canons are actively distinguished from the secular law in this very act of 
appropriation – and the definition and images are not particularly "legal" by modern 
standards in any case.  
It is thus very difficult to formulate a clear, coherent legal-doctrinal description 
of the relationship between the civil and ecclesiastical laws from these prologues, and 
particularly one that is meaningful today.  The complex interweaving and stacking of 
philosophical and legal associations simply does not permit it – and obviously reveals 
little interest in such a definition, and even in such a way of thinking.  The best that can 
be said is that both prologues broadly locate church law within the general Greco-
Roman discourse and symbolic world of law.  At the same time, though, both are keen 
to point out particularities in origin, function and ultimate goal vis-à-vis certain aspects 
of secular (Roman) civil law: different penology; a difference, apparently, in the type or 
degree of "divinity"; and perhaps a more eschatological, moral, medical and pastoral 
orientation.  In all of this the church law does not emerge as an entirely different type of 
normativity than secular law: both are properly (ancient, non-positivist, non-juristic) 
"law".  But church law certainly does not emerge as a direct, technical imitation of 
secular Roman law either – and certainly not of any type of secular legality we might 
recognize today.  
 
4. Sources and legislation  
Of the more conventional legal-introductory preoccupations present in the Byzantine 
introductions, assessment and delineation of the canonical sources is the most 
prominent.  This naturally involves reflections, direct and indirect, on the nature of valid 
rule-recognition and of the process of canonical legislation generally.  
 As already noted, some of this reflection approximates the contours of modern 
source theory.  Sources may be weighed in terms of origins and scope (local/universal), 
authenticity, and harmony of content (i.e. of patristic material with conciliar).  A 
tendency to arrange the sources in a hierarchy is also evident: apostles, councils, fathers.  
There is further an obvious concern for listing and delineating the canonical sources – 
i.e. for marking the limits of the valid rule-world.   
Likewise, a process of legislation is clearly presumed that is both ongoing and 
even more or less instrumental (in the sense of laws conceived as a means of addressing 
specific problems that arise), suggesting a modern-like positivism.  Thus in οἱ τοῦ 
μεγάλου θεοῦ legislation is depicted as emerging at many different times, for different 
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reasons, to address different problems: ὡς ἀπῄτει τὰ κατὰ χρόνους ἀναφυόμενα (4.20-
24).  This sentiment is echoed in τὰ μὲν σώματα (15-16), and especially ὁ μὲν παρών: 
many new problems arise "in life" (ἄλλα τε κατὰ τὸν βίον οὐκ ὀλίγα ἐνεωχμωσε) and 
synods are convened to address them (8-9). It is perhaps most strikingly, if a little 
obliquely, expressed in Trullo where Christ is portrayed as raising up "in each 
generation" (καθ᾽ ἑκάστὴν ...γενεάν) champions to wage war against the devil, to 
shepherd the flock, and teach the wayward (104.3-105.12): i.e. Christ constantly raises 
up leaders to guide the church, such as the canon-writing fathers at Trullo.  Conciliar 
legislation is a constant, expected, and normal aspect of church law. 
These similarities are nevertheless deceptive.  The overall picture painted by the 
introductions remains quite foreign to modern legislative sensibilities.  Far from 
constituting simple mundane instruments of a competent formal legislative authority 
and created to enact policy, the canons are ultimately a highly numinous reality, 
authored by the Holy Spirit, and directly following from the Apostles.  Thus the canons 
continue to issue above all from the "the fathers", an important and loaded concept: 
these are the traditional charismatic, spiritual successors of the Apostles, guardians and 
transmitters of the faith, and whose role is highly embedded – quite obviously in Trullo 
– in broader Christian narratives of salvation.  Thus, while the modern positivist-like 
concept of a formally defined legislative organ (the council) regularly meeting to issue 
valid legislation is present, it is not, as it were, the central point: positive legislators 
really only emerges inasmuch as they can be glossed as divine and numinous, which is 
the real emphasis of the introductions.   In effect laws in this world are really become 
laws not through the exercise of formal authority but through their substantive reality 
and recognition as divine and salvific.  "Making law" is thus only quite secondarily a 
mundane, technical process of following valid forms.  It is much more obviously the 
bringing to expression and realization certain metaphysical narratives of healing, 
teaching, saving, guiding, etc. In this respect Sohm quite correctly understood 
legislation in the pre-medieval church as fundamentally a "charismatic" process.125   
This charismatic aspect of lawgiving emerges above all in the casting of the 
legislative processes as a highly traditional task, and it is in this traditionalism that the 
dissonance with modern positivism becomes especially pronounced.  In this world, law 
is "validated" and legislative authority established by locating themselves in relation to 
past authorities.  The introductions are thus oddly deferential and backwards-looking: 
                                                 
125 Sohm 1923,2.63-86 et passim 
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they stress remembering law, receiving it from the past, gathering it, confirming it, and 
pledging one's loyalty to it. As we have already noted in chapter one, there is little 
expression of categorical, absolute sovereign authority over the laws, for one does not 
impute or "grant" authority, validity or "force" to the traditional law as much as 
recognize and affirm the authority, validity and force that they already have – and then 
derive one's own authority therefrom.  The best illustrations of this dynamic are Trullo 2 
and II Nicaea 1: precisely as the moment of the exercise of one's "sovereign legislative 
authority" – in creating new laws – one is most concerned to carefully pledge one's 
adherence and allegiance to the received law as a sacral whole, and to forbid any 
tampering or modification of it.  One must firmly place one's texts in a traditional 
trajectory.  Similarly, ὁ μὲν παρών is very concerned to note that its additions happily 
follow on the work of his predecessors: they are entirely coherent with what has gone 
before.   Even the curious defensiveness of Scholastikos suggests that merely 
rearranging and thematizing the corpus might appear a little risqué: the established 
tradition must never be violated.  
This traditionalism never entails the casting of the text as completely ossified.  
One can clearly always add newer material on top of the older; or clarify, even slightly 
modify the shape of the corpus and slightly clean-up around its edges (e.g. in separating 
out the "local" from the "universal" councils, or in making judgments on Cyprian, or the 
Apostolic constitutions); or express some formal evaluation of new elements (e.g. τὰ 
μὲν σώματα on Carthage); or produce thematic indices.  But all of this is done very 
guardedly, with constant pledges of faithfulness to tradition and affirmations of the 
substantive coherence of the new legislation, and, critically – as we would expect from 
chapter one – with virtually no real expressions of modification of the established 
material. One always seems to come to the conclusion of Chalcedon 1: "we have judged 
it right that the canons of the fathers in each synod until now are in force".      
In short, the law does not emerge in these introductions so much as an abstract 
project for radical positivist construction, as a concrete set of traditional texts for 
reception. This reception is not without any ability to sort or change; the canons 
themselves may directly contradict or modify earlier canons.126  But this movement 
never entails the categorical ejection of earlier material, and is always cast as traditional 
in its fundamental orientation – and as surprisingly humble.  Newer material is thus 
never presented as somehow superceding the old – it is presented as the most recent 
                                                 
126 See chapter 3.E.1.  
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element in a long tradition: exactly as they appears in the manuscripts, tacked on to the 
older core.   
 
C. Summary and analysis: the law introduced 
The picture of law that emerges from the traditional introductions and framing 
structures of the Byzantine canonical tradition is complex and nuanced.  Although in 
places it is very familiar, its overall form is quite foreign, and often not very amenable 
to modern legal sensibilities.  
 In the context of the previous chapter, the most striking aspect of this picture is 
its coherence with the broader physical shape of the tradition.  It is surprisingly easy to 
read the introductions as articulating many of the tradition's basic historical and 
codicological dynamics.  Thus the extreme conservatism and stability of the tradition 
that in chapter one seemed to suggest a quasi-sacral or Scriptural handling of the texts 
finds an easy complement in the introductions' characterization of the canons as 
precisely sacred and quasi-Scriptural.  The curious lack of clear moments of categorical 
official legislative definition is echoed in the introductions' highly traditionalized and 
sacralized treatment of the sources – the Holy Spirit, the divinely inspired "fathers", 
"divine grace" are the real legislators, not any "present" authority.  The problem of the 
"missing jurisprudence" finds a parallel in the surprisingly un-technical and 
commonplace content of the introductions, and their predilection for broader 
contextualizations.  Perhaps most dramatically, the apparent expectation that the 
canonical texts be embedded in broader regulative contexts and narratives finds rousing 
articulation in these introductions.  Even the paralleling of civil and canonical material 
in the manuscripts – separate, yet still part of a larger whole – vaguely invites the 
introductions' negotiation of canon law's identity with the civil law. 
 The "fit" between the physical reality of the tradition and its self-presentations is 
thus surprisingly good.  The introductions can, it seems, be read as "mirrors of the law".  
The reflection in this mirror, however, is only discernible if we allow that this law is 
operating rather differently than we might expect.  In particular, we must allow that the 
modern preoccupation of legal introduction with carefully delineating law as an 
autonomous field of technical endeavour has been replaced by an overriding interest in 
embedding law in very general value narratives.  This world is thus not so much 
concerned with presenting itself as a systematic jurisprudential project as with 
anchoring its jurisprudential elements firmly in the Christian story of salvation, 
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Scripture, divinity, morality, philosophical enlightenment, and Greco-Roman political-
legal ideals.  In effect these introductions are asserting that to "get law right", one has to 
above all get these external narratives right – the essence of a substantive justice system.  
The result is that this world casts law much less as an rather mundane mechanical 
system of consistent definitions, concepts and techniques which govern a set of 
(malleable, human) rules, as a strangely numinous literary endeavour in which the 
central concern is providing the right "glosses" to understanding and applying a semi-
sacralized body of traditional texts.  Formalist legal definitions, concepts and even 
doctrines still exist in this world, but they are not its exclusive or even primary focus.  
In fact, we would only exaggerate a little to suggest that these technical elements appear 
almost decorative or ornamental in these introductions – the real legal content in this 
system is conveyed through the rhetorical inter-weaving of the canons into substantive 
narratives of justice and truth. 
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CHAPTER 3.  THE LANGUAGE(S) OF THE LAW:  READING THE CANONS 
 
In the previous two chapters we have explored a number of the ways in which the 
Byzantine canonical tradition presents and introduces itself as a normative system.  We 
now turn to an analysis of how the canons themselves are written as normative texts – 
i.e. how the canons may be read to describe the beliefs, presuppositions and priorities of 
their own legal world. 
 
A. Nomenclature 
1. Naming the laws: terms for rules 
The question of canonical nomenclature has been the subject of considerable scholarly 
attention, and rightly so.  How the canonical tradition "names itself" potentially reveals 
much about the nature of the system as a whole, and how it relates itself to other 
normative systems.  
Naturally, most discussion has been directed towards the dominant term, κανών.  
Already in the 14th C Blastares considered it worthwhile to provide in his Προθεωρία an 
explanation of this term,1 and short, stereotyped notes on its meaning and significance 
have since become a standard feature of Orthodox canonical introductions.2  Similarly, 
modern histories of canon law rarely fail to discuss the origin and development of the 
term, at least briefly, and a few articles may be found devoted to its significance.3  
Classicists and even one Romanist have also been keen to study the term, and have 
produced two major studies of the term's use in classical and legal texts.4  Recently, 
Heinz Ohme, a church historian, has published a comprehensive monograph on the 
Christian use of the term, particularly the phrase κανὼν ἐκκλησιαστικός, where he treats 
the concept from a highly synthetic viewpoint, taking into account the uses of the term 
in doctrinal, moral, scriptural and canon-legal contexts through to the early 5th C.5 
                                                 
1 RP 6.5-6; Zonaras earlier makes a very short comment in RP 4.81 with reference to the biblical canon.  
There is no definition in the Suda.  In the west, explanations of this strange Greek term are earlier, for 
example in the preface to the 7th C Hispana (Somerville and Brasington 1998,57, trans.) 
2 For example, the Pedalion (Kallivourtsis 1800) xviii; Christophilopoulos 1965,39; Milaš 1902,11-12; 
Rhodopoulos 2005,30; Tsipin 2002,15-16.  
3 For example, Erickson 1991a; Fonti 1.2.494-502; Hess 2002,77-78; van der Wiel 1991,11.  
4 Oppel 1937, Wenger 1942. 
5 Ohme 1998. 
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 The term κανών is, however, only one term used by the canons to refer to church 
rules.  The following is a survey of all substantives used for church norms within the 
traditional Byzantine corpus of canons.6 
Term Distribution (canons with one or more occurances) 
κανών  (singular or 
plural, in sense of a 
specific church rule) 
Ancyra 14*; Nicaea 5, 18*; Antioch 2**, 9*, 19; 
Constantinople 2, 6; Constantinople 394; Carthage 24, 134, 
136, Acta 1; Ephesus 3, 8; Chalcedon 1, 5, 8, 19, 22, 24, 26, 
28; Trullo 2, 3***,4,  6, 13***, 16, 18, 25, 26, 29, 30, 33, 34, 
38, 40, 44, 49, 49, 51, 53, 54, 55, 61, 64, 94*, 96; II Nicaea 1, 
2, 3, 5, 6, 10, 11, 12, 19; Protodeutera 2, 8, 9, 10, 11; Basil 
1***, 3, 4**, 10, 21**, 47, 51, 88, 89; Gregory Nyssa 5, 7; 
Cyril 1; Gennadios; Tarasios 
(*  possibly to be placed in following category) 
(** meaning shades into the quantitative sense of canon as 
"penitential tariff"7) 
(***meaning perhaps generic, as in "rule of prayer") 
κανών (less specific, if 
semi-technical, in 
sense of a synthetic 
concept of general 
Christian practice and 
normativity, verging 
on "tradition" or 
"custom")8
Neocaesarea 15, Nicaea 2, 6*, 9, 10*, 15*,16*, 18*; Antioch 
2; Laodicea 1*; Cyprian; Basil 12; Gregory Nyssa 5 
(* possibly to be placed in above category) 
ὅρος (singular or 
plural, in sense of a 
specific church rule) 9  
Nicaea 15, 17, 18, 19; Antioch 1, 6, 21; Sardica 4, 15, 17; 
Carthage, 5, 18, 25/70, 86, 138; Chalcedon 4, 10, 14, 20, 28; 
Trullo 40, 81  
 
διάταξις  Apostolic 3, 49 (but both referring to commands τοῦ κυριοῦ); 
II Nicaea 1, 4 (but referring to scriptural commands of the 
apostles), 5, 10; Tarasius; Protodeutera 9 
διάταγμα II Nicaea 1 (for "ordinances" of the councils)10  
διαταγή Basil 8811  
                                                 
6  This survey covers all terms for any type of Christian rule, whether the rule is extant and/or in the 
corpus or not.  It does not include very general references to Christian tradition, most references to 
custom (ἔθη, ἔθος, συνηθεία – on these see below nn. 185-187), and most vocabulary that might be 
viewed as common Greco-Roman parliamentary usage (i.e "decision", "judgement" or "sentence" 
language, such as ἀπόφασις, γνώμη, κρίσις, ἀπόκρισις, ψῆφος – all of which occur in the canons.) 
Further, it does not take account of the many verbal nouns used to refer to decisions and norms, such as 
τὰ ὁρισθέντα (frequent; especially in Carthage – also τὰ ὡρισμένα, as Constantinople 2 or Antioch 19), τὰ 
θεσμοθέντα (Trullo 81), τὰ δόξαντα (fairly common, e.g. Athanasius to Rufinianus), τὰ ἐκδοθέντα (e.g. 
Tarasius), τὰ τετυπωμένα (Ephesus 1), or τὰ διατεταγμένα (Trullo 28).  
7 Although this meaning may be considered simply a subset of the "specific" rule meaing, i.e. a specific 
rule of punishment.  See then also Ancyra 24, Gregory Nyss. 4, Basil 1, 30, 79, 80, 81, 83. 
8 This usage is not, of course, to be confused with the sense of κανών as "register of clergy" (e.g. Nicaea 
1, 16, 17, 18; Antioch 1, 2, 6, 11; Chalcedon 2; Trullo 5). 
9 A penitential tariff usage for ὅρος also appears (in Ancyra 6, 19, 21, 23).  Some of the usages noted in 
the chart also have a strong sense of "measure", e.g. Trullo 40. 
10 cf. Trullo 28 διατεταγμένα. 
11 This is the only instance where the term clearly applies to a specific church rule; in II Nicaea 1, 
however, it is applied to canonical regulation more generally (ἐνστερνιζόμεθα καὶ... τὴν αὐτῶν [τοὺς 
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νόμος (referring to 
concrete church 
12rule)
Nicaea 13; Protodeutera 17; Hagia Sophia 3; Basil 24, 50; 
Theophilus 13 
In Basil 24 (ἀνδρὶ δὲ χηρεύσαντι οὐδεὶς ἐπίκειται νόμος) and 
50 (τριγαμίας νόμος οὐκ ἔστιν·ὥστε νόμῳ τρίτος οὐκ ἄγεται) 
the usage is vaguer, shading into "customary penitential tariff".  
This may be true for Nicaea 13 as well; nevertheless, in each 
case a fairly specific church rule seems to be envisaged.  See 
also Basil 20 (mentioning νομοθεσία τοῦ Δεσπότου), 87 and 
Theophilus 14 where νόμος is more obliquely applied to 
church regulation as a whole. 
θέσμος  Antioch 3, 11, 23; Ephesus 8; Chalcedon 12; Trullo 84; Hagia 
Sophia 2, 3; Basil 87; Cyril 3, 5 
This term frequently, if not always, seems to refers to more 
general, unwritten rules13; once, in Antioch 11, it seems to 
approximate the synthetic singular use of κανών. cf. also II 
Nicaea 7 θεσμοθεσία for "written and unwritten" traditions of 
the church. 
(τύπος) (This term is never used as a general designation for church 
rules per se,14 but comes close in its meaning as "formula" or 
pattern for penance or procedure in Nicaea 19; Carthage 49; 
Gregory Thaum. 5;  Basil 3, 7, 76, 78; Theophilus 7, 12.) 
We may also note the usages found in common introductory material.   
Term Distribution (sources) 
κανών (specific usage) Epigraphs and listings in traditional πίνακες: all, without 
exception, where rule terms appear. 
Short historical notices (from Kormchaya): Constantinople 
Introductory structures (prosphonetikoi, letters): 
Constantinople, Trullo, Gangra (epilogue), Antioch, Carthage 
Prologues: οἱ τοῦ μεγάλου θεοῦ, τὰ μὲν σώματα, ὁ μὲν παρών  
κανών (synthetic 
usage) 
Introductory structures: Gangra (letter) 
ὅρος  Historical notices (from Kormchaya): Laodicea 
Introductory structures: Constantinople (possibly only for 
doctrinal decrees); Gangra (letter), Carthage 
Prologues: τὰ μὲν σώματα 
νόμος  Prologues: οἱ τοῦ μεγάλου θεοῦ (also in Title 48) 
θέσμος  Prologues: τὰ μὲν σώματα, ὁ μὲν παρών 
                                                                                                                                               
κανόνας] διαταγὴν), and in II Nicaea 20 to the monastic teaching of Basil; also, in Apostolic 85 it appears 
in the title of the "Apostolic Constitutions" (αἱ διαταγαί). 
12 Most instances of νόμος in the corpus refer to secular laws (e.g. Chalcedon 3, 18; Trullo 34, 71; 
Carthage 56 (acta), 93, 99, 102, 117, 119; Protodeutera 6) or the Old Testament (e.g. Apostles 63, 41; 
Trullo 33, 70, 82; II Nicaea 6; Basil 3, 87).  Gregory Nyss. 4 makes a passing reference to ὁ νόμος τῆς 
φύσεως.   
13 So Zonaras: θεσμοὺς δὲ τοὺς ἀγράφους τύπους λέγει, καὶ τὰς ἀρχαίας παραδόσεις ἐνταῦθα, νόμους δὲ 
τοὺς ἐγγράφους (RP 2.710). 
14 It is, however, probably used twice in a more general sense to designate secular laws: Ephesus 8, 
Chalcedon 17. 
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This data raises four questions : a) which terms are used; b) which terms are not 
used; c) what is the significance of both of these phenomena; d) and what developments 
may be noted.  Three immediate observations may be made.   
First, and most simply, it is clear that a variety of terms can be used to name 
church rules.  Here the common tendency of the tradition to stack and juxtapose 
differing usages, one on top of another, is very evident.  A disinclination to strict 
terminological rationalization is obvious.15    
Second, it is equally clear that the term κανών becomes increasingly, if never 
totally, dominant.  Its only serious competitor, ὅρος, fades almost completely by the 
second wave.16  By the 5th C, as is widely recognized, κανών is clearly emerging as an 
at least semi-technical term for church rules.17   
Third, despite a general congruence with standard Greco-Roman administrative 
and legal rule vocabulary (all of the above terms are attested in some type of Greco-
Roman regulative-normative use), a number of prominent and formal late Roman 
secular terms for laws, most notably νόμος and διάταξις (constitutio), are 
conspicuously, if not totally, absent as terms for church rules.  
These observations lead to one simple but significant conclusion:  the pattern of 
terminological self-designation of the body of Byzantine church law clearly conveys a 
sense of its own self-conscious existence as a special body of rules with (increasingly) a 
proprietary nomenclature – and that it is distinct from civil law.  In other words, the 
canons tend to talk about themselves as "the canons" in a sense close to the modern 
usage: as a coherent and demarcated set of church rules within Byzantine normative 
culture. 
At the same time, this data precludes the idea that the canons cannot think of 
themselves in any other way.  In particular, it challenges any overly-doctrinal reading of 
the significance of κανών for Byzantine church-legal culture.  The impression is rather 
that the canons see themselves as broadly part of large and rich world of normative 
ordering, the terms of which they may freely use.   
                                                 
15 This is true in later Roman secular (and papal) legislation  as well; fairly technical distinctions and 
"official" terms can still emerge, but the overall picture is quite blurry.  See for example Corcoran 
1996,198-203; Maassen 1871,228-229; Mason 1974,126-131; Jolowicz 1952,478-479; Wenger 1953,531; 
Wieacker 1988,19. 
16 Although its corresponding dispositive, ὁρίζω, becomes increasingly regular.  See section C below.  
17 See Ohme 1998 passim; see for example its regular and casual use throughout the acta of Chalcedon. In 
imperial legislation is becomes especially common in the 6th C onwards, but appears occasionaly already 
in the 5th C: Wenger 1942,87-88 et passim. 
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The growing dominance of the term κανών is nevertheless unmistakable, and 
raises the question of the meaning and significance of this term for understanding 
Byzantine church law, and the reason for its preferment.  This problem has exercised the 
scholarly literature for some time.  Very broadly, two theses have become attached to 
the term, both of which make the word bear considerable – probably too much – weight 
in our understanding of the very nature and development of church law.   
The first thesis, which we may term "canonical exceptionalism", is common in 
some modern Orthodox presentations of canon law.  This view tends to read the use of 
term κανών doctrinally, and almost ontologically: it is understood to mark church rules 
as distinct in their very essence from secular "laws" (νόμοι) and as thus signaling – at 
least early on – a fundamental difference between ecclesial and secular legal cultures, or 
even of the lack of an ecclesial legal culture.18  The precise nature of this difference (or 
lack) is often left unclear, but the implication is that canonical legality is not 
characterized by the patterns of legal formalism-positivism detailed in the introduction.  
Canon law functions with its own distinct and special sense of rule, and thus has its own 
distinct and special term: κανών.   In these readings, this term is thus understood to 
denote a more open, informal type of regulation than "laws": "guidelines" is a common 
suggestion.19 
The second thesis, which we may term "from the canon to the canons", has been 
the subject of more sustained scholarly exposition, most recently in the hands of 
Erickson and, above all, Ohme.20   
This thesis suggests that early Christian rule culture is centered around a unified, 
synthetic concept of the canon of the church, the κανὼν ἐκκλησιαστικός which 
encompasses dogmatic, behavioral/moral and church order normativity.  Early synodal 
and patristic rules, it is argued, are self-consciously only specific expressions of this 
basic apostolic κανὼν τῆς ἐκκλησίας, as applied in concrete instances.  They are thus 
prototypically ὅροι that bring to bear the canon, and not κανόνες themselves. When 
κανών is found in more specific and plural uses in earlier texts, it is at the very least 
                                                 
18 Especially strong expressions include Afanasiev 1936 and Deledemos 2002,14-31 but it may be felt as 
a diffuse background assumption or implication of much of the literature noted in the Introduction in n. 9 
above, for example Erickson 1991a,14-20, Yannaras 1970,174-193. See also Archontonis 1970,15-16, 
where this reading is rejected, and L'Huillier 1964,112.  In the most relevant non-Orthodox literature, 
Schwartz may be counted here (1936a,178); the broad trajectory of thought, however, is that of Rudolph 
Sohm, for whom "law" (read: modern conceptual-formalist law) is considered antithetical to the essence 
of the church: "Das Wesen des Kirchenrechtes steht mit dem Wesen der Kirche in Widerspruch." 
(concluding line of Sohm 1923,1.700; emphasis original).  
19 So, for example, Patsavos 1981,108; Schwartz 1936a,178. 
20 Erickson 1991a; Ohme 1998; Hess 200,60-89 adopts and develops Ohme's work.  
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never referring to concrete synodal decisions which themselves have pretensions to the 
authority of "the canon", but to much more customary and traditional rules – which, it is 
argued, are understood as in their very essence rules of the Gospel or the Apostles.21  
The concept of the canon thus precludes the ongoing positivist creation of canons.   
 In the course of the 4th C, according to this theory, a change in usage is 
observed.  First in Antioch (330), and then even more clearly in Constantinople (381), 
and forever afterwards, κανών begins to refer clearly to earlier synodal enactments, and 
even to synods' own enactments.  Councils thus begin to create "canons".  This usage, 
Ohme argues, was encouraged by the late antique legal schools' interest in secular legal 
κανόνες (regula), short summary legal rules or principles, popular in the increasingly 
bureaucratized late antique legal environment.22  This development, a center of which 
was likely the legal school in Berytos, very near Antioch, a center of canonical 
development as well, was a key element in the furtherance of this new canonical usage, 
as it encouraged the conceptualization of church rules as "canons" as precisely such 
short, juridical legal rulings – with which they would share their name.  This 
conceptualization will thus be applied to the "Apostolic canons", and finds echo in the 
very form of the short, summary rules of the late 4th C canonical sources, especially the 
Apostolic canons and Laodicea.23 
The upshot of this shift is that the older idea of the canon of the church became 
submerged, and indeed, the earlier synthetic usage seems to fade.  Church rule culture, it 
is argued, thus re-centers around positively defined conciliar (and patristic) canons, 
instead of the old synthetic Scriptural and Apostolic canon/canons, and the distinction 
between Apostolic ordinances and later synodal ordinances is lost.  This opens the door 
to the onset of legal positivism in which law is conceived as a closed system of 
constructed rules, and suggests a fundamental severance from the old Gospel-Apostolic 
centered tradition of rule ordering.24  By implication, the church's legal system has thus 
become secularized and legalized, and its own more native, proprietary Gospel-centered 
orientation lost: "Lost is the early Church's sense of canon as part of the tradition, 
                                                 
21 So Ohme 1998 reads, for example, the plural disciplinary usage of κανών in Origen (194-195), or the 
plural usage in Gangra (401), or the specific usage of κανών in Neocaesarea 14/15 (335-336), Nicaea 2 
and13 (363-366). 
22 Ohme 1998,497-498, 508, 580. 
23 In Ohme 1998 develops the connection mostly with the Apostolic material (ibid.), but later also 
connects it with other epitomized collections (e.g. Ohme 2001,775) such as Laodicea, and parts of 
Carthage; Hess 2002,70-89 in particular sees this development as encouraging the conceptualization of 
canons of many types by the end of the 4th C as "statutes". 
24 This conclusion is particularly evident in Erickson and Hess. 
 137
absolute and universal, maximalist in its vision of church life.  Instead, canons are 
understood to be laws on ecclesiastical matters duly made and promulgated in written 
form by the competent ecclesiastical authority..."25  Church rules, apparently, have gone 
from being based on broad moral consensus on the apostolic κανών to becoming legally 
binding dictates of sovereign authorities.26 
It is beyond the scope of this work to examine either of these theses, in any of 
their incarnations, in great detail.  The latter, in particular, extends its discussion far 
beyond the parameters of our investigation.  The basic fault of both, however – and they 
share the same weakness – may be quickly noted.  It arises not out of what they do 
argue, but in what they do not: neither carefully investigates the phenomena to which 
their philological investigations are supposed to point.  The first thesis never closely 
examines the actual character or nature of legal discourse in the tradition as a whole, 
secular or ecclesial, and the second never verifies whether the predicated positivism 
ever came to pass.  If one does investigate these phenomena, it is clear both theories are 
quite unfounded – or at least very overstated. 
  The conclusion – or, at least strong implication – of the second thesis, that the 
late 4th C saw the onset of a modern-like canonical legal positivism is particularly 
deceptive, and even anachronistic.  In effect, Ohme and others have stepped from the 4th 
C directly into the 19th C, or at least the 12th C.   As already noted, research in Byzantine 
law for the last forty years has shown that the operation and existence of a modern-like, 
or even medieval-like formalist-positivist legal system is extremely difficult to locate in 
Byzantine society, at any time, even in the secular law.27  In the present work too, the 
picture of 4th and post-4th C Byzantine canon law emerging is already decidedly non-
positivistic/formalistic: the entire system is built around carefully embedding 
normativity in often very vague metaphysical and theological narratives, and most of 
the trappings and presuppositions of modern formalism (conceptualism, developed 
jurisprudence, professionalization, clear legislative authorities, constructivism) are 
strikingly absent.  Indeed, many of the canonical system's central concerns, almost 
obsessions – continuity with Scripture, the Apostles, and broader narratives of Christian 
order and morality – are precisely those that Ohme and others see as having been lost.   
The development of legal positivism that is supposed to have begun in the late 4th C 
simply never materialized. 
                                                 
25 Erickson 1991a,19. 
26 Hess 2002,80-81 for this sense of "moral" vs. "legal" rules. 
27 See the Introduction, and references in nn. 32-45.  
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The first thesis makes the same mistake.  It too carries modern western legal 
positivism-formalism into late antiquity, but now as the unexamined straw-man of all 
secular legality.  Church law, quite correctly perceived to not function in such a 
positivist way, is then radically distinguished from secular law or even all law – and the 
use of κανών instead of νόμος seems to be a convenient indicator of this.  But all law is 
not modern positivist-formalist law, and so any distinction between νόμος and κανών, 
even if a conscious doctrinal distinction is intended, cannot be so easily read as a 
distinction between formalism and non-formalism.  Further, it is very evident that the 
canons do cloak themselves in legal terminology and forms shared with and even 
derivative from the secular law – including the term νόμος.  Conversely, κανών itself 
has a secular-legal valence as regula.  The negotiation of identity between the two types 
of regulations is thus much more complex than a simple doctrinal distinction would 
seem to allow. To read, therefore, the use of κανών for church rules as a radical, 
ontological rejection of legal positivism-formalism – or even any type of secular legality 
– is quite problematic. 
Despite these problems, there is nevertheless much in both theses of great value 
for understanding the significance of the term κανών in Byzantine church law.  In a 
sense, the central instinct of both is correct: we should not properly be thinking about 
church law in terms of modern legal formalism-positivism, and the use of the term 
κανών is in some senses illustrative of this.  
The first thesis, in particular, is broadly correct in seeing κανών as 
distinguishing church regulations from secular.  The distinction, and sometimes pairing, 
between secular νόμοι and ecclesial κανόνες is omnipresent from the 6th C onwards.28  
Further, just as church regulative enactments do not generally call themselves νόμοι or 
other related terms for secular laws, secular legal enactments, with some relatively small 
and technical exceptions, do not tend to self-designate as κανόνες.29  The latter rule is 
stronger than the former; as noted, it is always entirely possible to speak about church 
regulations as "laws", and this is evident even in the corpus.30 But the church laws are 
                                                 
28 For examples of the pairing of the two in Justinian's Novels, see Wenger 1942,123. A TLG search 
reveals 19 examples in the Novels.  See also n. 17.  The first instance of the term κανών as a church rule 
in the secular legislation is CTh 16.2.45 (a. 421). 
29 Aside from technical tax-usages, the major exception are the technical jurisprudential regula which are 
translated as κανόνες; see Wenger 1942,72-81.  But normal imperial leges or ordinances are clearly not 
called κανόνες (the Latin usage of regula is a little broader, Wenger 1942,62-70).  Even imperial 
regulations touching church matters do not call themselves κανόνες; Wenger 1942,123. 
30 Outside of the corpus it is also not difficult to find instances of νόμος language – to say nothing of 
διάταξις or τύπος language –  applied to eccesial rulings.  See, from the TLG, Sozomen Ecclesiastical 
History 1.23.2 (A particularly interesting example – the rules are laws, but are called canons: Ἡ δὲ 
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usually κανόνες, and secular laws usually not κανόνες – and this is almost always true 
when the two are spoken of together.31  There are two Rechtsmassen in Byzantium,32 
and they do each tend to have their own name. 
Ohme is likewise correct to draw attention to the hardening of canonical 
nomenclature around the term κανών in the late 4th C, and its increasingly concrete 
sense as a clear written enactment.  Although one may quibble with details, Ohme is 
correct to perceive a movement from earlier general uses of ὁ κανών to more specific 
and concrete usages.  Although I doubt that this witnesses to a true shift in legal 
mentality any more than the decreasing currency of the old doctrinal vocabulary of 
κανών τῆς ἀληθείας represented a fundamental shift in Christian belief, it undoubtedly 
reflected a movement towards greater definition of a fixed, bounded body of rules.  This 
regular and concrete use of κανόνες for church regulations certainly heightens a sense of 
church normativity as existing as a clearly defined, autonomous body of ecclesial legal 
literature – which physically, as noted in chapter one, was probably finding increasing 
expression in dedicated canonical manuscripts.  Thus, while the onset of a full-fledged 
legal positivism is probably not to be imagined, this formalization and "hardening" of 
terminology is symbolic of a general pattern of the 4th C formalization and 
standardization of earlier, more fluid patterns of customary regulation and belief-
definition.  It is perhaps a step in a more positivist direction.  Certainly it signals the 
church's much more obvious possession of its own proprietary written normative 
system. 
Neither thesis, however, has shed much light on the broader problem of why the 
church settled so definitively on the term κανών for its central written norms.  Indeed, 
no one has yet to discover an absolutely convincing explanation.  Ohme's suggestion 
(followed by Hess), that a central influence were the secular legal κανόνες, is quite 
weak.33  Ohme is probably correct in noting that these secular legal regulae/κανόνες 
were increasingly prominent in late antiquity, particularly in the more academically 
inclined and teaching-oriented jurisprudential climate of 4th and 5th C Berytos – and that 
                                                                                                                                               
σύνοδος [Nicaea] ἐπανορθῶσαι τὸν βίον σπουδάζουσα τῶν περὶ τὰς ἐκκλησίας διατριβόντων ἔθετο 
νόμους οὓς κανόνας ὀνομάζουσιν. Sozomen elsewhere frequently calls church rules "laws"); or 
Athanasius, De decretis Nicaenae synodi, 36.8; or John Chrysostom Ad Innocentium papam (epist. 1), or 
more generally in Chalcedon ACO  2.1.3.104 (see Price and Gaddis 2.174 n. 12). Similarly, later scholia 
to Apostolic 27 and 38 will call the canons  ἱεροὶ νόμοι (Sbornik Prilozh. 7-8).  A thorough examination 
of this question would be valuable. 
31 See Wenger 1942,123.  This is true throughout the Byzantine period.  On the question of νόμοι and 
κανόνες and their relationship, see Beck 1981, Macrides 1990, Stolte 1991, Troianos 1991. 
32 Fögen 1993,68-69. 
33 Ohme 1998,497-498; so Hess 2002,78. 
 140
some Christian canonical writers were undoubtedly in touch with these developments.34 
However, the real connection of these regulae to the ecclesial canons – and certainly the 
implication that the former provided some type of model – is difficult to demonstrate.  
Ohme (and Hess) rely upon a very general point of formal similarity: both the canons of 
the late 4th C and these rules are very short and mostly indicative "summary" statements 
of regulation.35   
However, the differences between the canons and these rules stand out much 
more than these very general similarities.   
First, while there is a brief spurt of short indicative canonical regulation in the 
late 4th C, this is never a particularly typical form for canonical regulations; it is 
something of a passing "phase".36  If this development must be attributed to the 
influence of the secular regulae, it is at the very least a very short-lived phenomenon.  
The canons in fact tend to become longer and longer as time goes on; and even very 
early they can easily tend towards the garrulous.37 
More telling is the difference in the content and nature of the secular regula and 
ecclesial canons – almost entirely ignored by Ohme and Hess.  Most of the regulae are 
maxim-like principles and definitions of a technical jurisprudence.  For example, D. 
50.17.3: "The power of refusal belongs to someone who is in a position to be willing"; 
D. 50.17.9 "In matters that are obscure we always adopt the least difficult view."; 
D.50.17.196 "Some dispensations relate to things, some to persons, and so those which 
relate to things are transmitted to the heir; those which relate to person are not 
transmitted to the heir".  This type of regulation is clearly part of a much larger 
technical legal-doctrinal superstructure – a technical rule-logic discourse.   
But this type of language and content, either as cited from the secular literature 
or as the result of a proprietary ecclesial jurisprudential discourse, is extremely, indeed 
conspicuously, rare in the canons.38  To suggest that the type of summarization evident 
in the secular regulae is akin to that in even the briefest canons is thus a very misleading 
comparison.  The canons represent "summaries" of the church rule-world inasmuch as 
any type of legislation represents "summaries" of general social experience or 
                                                 
34 On the secular regulae generally, Schulz 1943,173-183, 295-296, 307-308; Stein 1966 (109-123 on the 
late classical period); Wenger 1942,53-61.  
35 Ohme 1998,497; Hess 2002,69-89, as part of his "statute" form. 
36 The best examples are the canons of Gangra, Laodicea, the Apostolic canons and some of the shorter 
penitential regulations of Basil (e.g. 55-80).  
37 For example, much of Nicaea and Antioch; even the brief Apostolic canons are filled with decorative 
asides. See below section E. 
38 See below section D.1 
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value/moral beliefs: they are mostly non-technical brief statements of rules of a huge 
variety of types.  The regulae, conversely, are a very technical type of doctrinal 
jurisprudential summary.  They thus have no very few true parallels in either the short 
4th C rules, or almost any other type of eastern canon, before or after.  The emergence of 
real ecclesial regulae – very explicitly on the model of Digest 50.17 – can only be 
identified as a coherent phenomenon in the 13th C west.39  
 In the end, then, neither in form or content do the canons look much like the 
secular regulae.  At most, perhaps, the secular jurisprudential use of the term κανόνες 
may have been a contributing factor in the adoption of this language – but if so, only 
alongside many other usages of κανών.  
 Ohme's research into the church's broader ethical/philosophical discourse of 
κανών provides a better, if less specific, context for the persistence of κανών 
terminology.  In Greco-Roman philosophy, as Oppel has shown, the term κανών clearly 
has a general ethical and epistemological sense as a measure of the good or good 
behavior, or as a fundamental philosophical criterion of truth.40  It is not difficult to see 
how these meanings could easily shade into more concrete meanings of the term as 
epistemological, stylistic, grammatical, or even moral, behavioural and legal rules or 
models – and indeed, they did.41  Likewise, in the Christian usage, as Ohme 
demonstrates, the well-known and well-established "canon of truth" language 
correspondingly encompassed and synthesized not only a broad dogmatic hypothesis of 
the faith, a creedal sense, but also moral and church-order normativity.42  Further, in 
church usage this more synthetic sense could also fade into a plural, specific sense.  
Thus already in Origin, we read of τοῖς κανόσι τοῖς ἐκκλησιαστικοῖς ἑπόμενος – 
κανόνες here clearly used in a disciplinary sense for specific rules.43  In the earliest 
canonical material itself it is likewise clear that, although not yet referring to concrete 
synodal enactments, κανών does refer to fairly specific traditional rules of a variety of 
                                                 
39 Naz 1965; Stein 1999,46-51. 
40 Oppel 1937,23-39, 51-57, 87-94. 
41 Oppel 1937,34-35, 52-53, 64-66, 101-105  A good example of the first are Philo's "canons" for 
allegorical interpretation (see Oppel 1937,64-66). 
42 Ohme 1998,61-239 et passim. 
43 Origen In 1 Cor.Hom., frag. 4, discussed and cited in Ohme 1998,194-195; further references at 217 n. 
156. 
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types.44  The term is thus clearly used for, as Hess puts it, "universally observed 
ecclesiastical standards" broadly of Apostolic origin and character.45   
Ohme thus demonstrates a continuity of normative meaning for κανών from its 
broadest synthetic doctrinal-regulative sense (κανὼν τῆς ἀληθείας)  through to its later 
more specific senses of traditional specific disciplinary rules.  The latter naturally 
follow from the former, as both encompass the idea of transmitting traditional Apostolic 
norms.  However, inexplicably, when concrete synodal enactments begin to be termed 
κανόνες (and particularly when these enactments are placed in the mouths of the 
Apostles in the Apostolic canons), Ohme feels that a major change has taken place, as 
the proper distinction between Apostolic norms and later church decisions has been 
destroyed: and thus this older and acceptable continuity between κανών and κανόνες is 
ruptured.46 
It is, however, possible to read his results in almost the opposite way: the church 
begins to call its conciliar legislation κανόνες precisely as a terminological method for 
asserting the continuity of all legitimate church normativity with apostolic normativity – 
a continuity broadly asserted in the very shape of the tradition and the introductory 
material.  In effect, the κανόνες are simply stating or realizing ὁ κανών, and thus the 
terminological similarity. Calling church rules κανόνες – and thus glossing the rules 
with all of the rich resonances of ὁ κανών in the older usage – is thus an argument that 
such rules are and should be considered "universally observed ecclesiastical standards", 
and that they are entirely coherent with the apostolic tradition.  The term is thus being 
selected not because of any loss of distinction between apostolic ordinances and later 
church ordinances, but because it is inconceivable that any legitimate church ordinances 
would not also be apostolic.  The κανών, the traditional semi-written κανόνες and the 
synodal κανόνες are all being asserted as part of the same continuous reality – and thus 
the preferment of κανών.47  
Another well-known suggestion, that of Schwartz, is that the early use of κανών 
for a penitential tariff – reflecting the quantitative sense of the term underlying its 
employment for taxes or table of values48 – may have, in the context of the pressing 
                                                 
44 For example, in Nicaea 2 or 6, or Gangra (Epilogue) -- and here we might also count all of the early 
uses of the term for a penitential tarrif or ruling in, for example, Peter or Basil (Ohme 1998,296-312, 543-
569). 
45 Hess 2002,77. 
46 See Ohme 1998, esp. 379-407, 485-509, 510-542, 570-582. 
47 See Taylor 1980,43-57 for a similar argument in terms of unwritten/written rules.  
48  On this "table" usage, Oppel 1937,66-68; on the tax, Wenger 1942,24-47 (although the "tax" usage is 
Roman legal documents is attested only from the 4th C). 
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problem of lapsi in the 3rd and early 4th C, provided a critical stimulus for the increased 
use, and ultimate dominance, of the term in the following post-Constantinian 
envrionment.49  This is entirely possible, but, as Ohme points out, the tariff usage of the 
term κανών is rather less extensive than one might expect in the early penitential 
literature, and, in any case, early on the term ὅρος is more prominent than κανών for 
early synodal decisions.50  Further, we might add, many early and later canons do not 
have a particularly penitential focus, or even indicate a tariff – the connection between 
these more general administrative rules and the early quantitative use of the term κανών 
thus becomes tenuous.  Ohme is thus perhaps not wrong to suggest that this "tariff" use 
of κανών thus has little more to do with the later general usage than the use of κανών 
for a table of Easter dates or for the registry of clergy.51 
The search for one or two principal semantic stimuli for the church's adoption of 
κανών has thus yet to reach a satisfying conclusion.  It is worth considering, however, if 
such a narrow search may itself be misguided.  Blastares' presentation of κανών, the 
only Byzantine treatment of the topic, although very late, is instructive in this regard.  
His discussion stresses precisely the plurality of usages: he understands the word as 
fundamentally derived from the use of physical straight-edge by builders, but he knows 
that it is used metaphorically (τροπικῶς) by the fathers for their "ordinances" 
(διατάγματα), as it is also used by "many different sages" (ἐπιστήμoνες) of the "logical 
arts" (λογικαὶ τέχναι), including grammarians, philosophers, doctors, those who 
"reconcile the harmonies of the parts" (musicians), and, "indeed, what is more", by 
those who have gathered (or perhaps "composed", συντάσσω) the civil laws.  All of 
them, he notes, use the term to separate and define, so that nothing incorrect or "base" 
(νόθος) intrudes itself.  But the term is used most suitably of all for the διατάγματα of 
the fathers because of their particular goal (σκόπος), namely correct faith and the 
conduct of a God-loving life.52 
In all of this, Blastares perhaps puts his finger on the single most important – 
and most certain – semantic characteristic of κανών: its polyvalence.  The term κανών is 
notable precisely for the extraordinary number of regulative meanings and connotations 
it could encompass: physical rulers, grammatical rules, musical rules, artistic and 
stylistic models, various types of mathematial tables and lists, types of taxes and tariffs, 
                                                 
49 Schwartz, 1936a,177 et passim; Schwartz points mainly to the uses of κανών in this sense in Basil (cf. 
1911,316-333).  See other examples in n. 7.  
50 Ohme 1998,11-14; 582.  
51 Ohme 1998,582. 
52 RP 6.5-6. 
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philosophical principles and technical jurisprudential regulae.  As such, it is a term that 
can potentially link to, and be glossed by, many different types of rule-realm 
associations.  Although it does undoubtedly become a fairly technical designation for 
church regulation, it is not an inherently technical or narrow term.   
In light of this polyvalence, it is worth considering whether the whole question 
or "problem" of why κανών emerges as the rule term for church legislation has been 
overstated.  We may just as likely ask why would it not have been chosen.  If one were 
to seek a term for church regulations, and for whatever reason a "strong" secular-legal 
term were not desirable, and a more general term were needed, κανών is a reasonably 
obvious choice; in fact, there are not that many other options.53  Here it may be wise to 
consider the extent to which by the Christian period κανών can be read as simply the 
normal Greek substantive for "rule", with something approaching the elasticity – if not 
perhaps quite the banality – of the modern English term.54  The foreignness that attaches 
to the borrowed term "canon" in Latin and in most modern European languages has 
perhaps unduly oriented our research to thinking of this term as somehow exotic, and in 
need of special explanation. 
 
2. Naming the law?  The missing concept of "canon law" 
Scholarship's concern to identify the precise meaning and significance of κανών can 
easily distract from what may be a much more important observation: the Byzantine 
tradition, and especially the central corpus of texts, almost entirely lacks an abstract 
notion of "canon law" or "church law".  When terms such as ὁ κανονικὸς/ 
ἐκκλησιαστικὸς νόμος or τὸ κανονικὸν/ἐκκλησιαστικὸν δίκαιον appear, they almost 
invariably refer to individual, concrete laws, customs, or legal rights.55  The more 
general senses attached to these terms in modern usage, referring to the physical body or 
collection of the canons as a whole or "canon law" as a subject, field, or set of problems, 
or as a jurisprudential project, are almost entirely absent.  To refer to the endeavour of 
canon law as a whole, or in any type of general way, the overwhelming tendency in the 
canonical literature is to resort some sort of plural concrete designator: "the canons", 
"the ecclesial ordinances", and so forth.  This is the usage found in the prefaces, in the 
titles to collections, in manuscript rubrics, and the commentaries.  If the singular ius, 
                                                 
53 Cf. Woodhouse 1932,725. The other major possibility is ὅρος – a term which is also encountered in the 
earlier church legislation, but falls out of favour.  The reasons for this are not entirely clear.  See 
Appendix C (1).   
54 As in modern Greek. 
55 E.g. Nicaea 13, or Chalcedon 12. 
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lex, ὁ νόμος, and τὸ δίκαιον can take on modern-like abstract legal senses in other 
contexts, including the secular Roman law, and certainly in Scripture (ὁ νόμος τοῦ 
θεοῦ), this does not ever seem to have transferred to the canonical realm.56  There is no 
"canon law". 
 The more abstract usage of "canon law", ius canonicum, seems to appear first in 
the west, and only in the 12th C, with the rise of canon law as a distinct field of study in 
the medieval universities, and very much on the pattern of the newly-rediscovered 
Roman law.57  
 The significance of this point of usage is potentially immense, but has rarely 
been noticed or dwelt upon – even though the anthropological literature has long noted 
this phenomenon: "primitive" laws tend to have "laws", not "law".58  But this 
observation accords well with the general shape of the tradition.  As noted in chapter 
one, Byzantine canon law exists primarily as a distinct body of  "the canons", not as a 
distinct and abstract field of "canon law": it is composed of a very conservative and 
stable set of traditional rule-texts and it lacks a sophisticated or elaborate jurisprudence 
or even a significant proprietary academic or professional infrastructure.  Even in the 
later Byzantine period, the entire system will develop more as a huge exegetical 
meditation around "the canons" – as a comparatively concrete and specific body of texts 
– than as a constructive jurisprudential project implied by "canon law".  By not referring 
to itself with an abstract term "law", the tradition is quite accurately reflecting its 
substance.   
 
B. Genre 
By the standards of modern legal codifications, the most prominent genre characteristic 
of the Byzantine corpus is its heterogeneity.  Although from a very broad perspective 
the corpus may be read as mono-generic – i.e. simply a collection of enumerated lists of 
rules either prohibiting or prescribing some type of behaviour or action – the underlying 
                                                 
56 It is interesting that classical Greek legal thinking also does not exactly have a term corresponding to 
ius; τὸ δίκαιον is always an awkward translation. Triantaphyllopoulos 1985,3.  For secular ius in more 
abstract senses, see for example Digest 1.1-5, Institutes 1.1; for ὁ νόμος, Dio Chrysostom Περὶ νόμου 
(Oration 75; ed. von Arnim 1893).  The phrase lex Christiana, encountered in the secular legislation – and 
not used in the Greek canonical tradition itself, as far as I am aware – seems to mean something more 
synthetic, along the lines of "Christian practice" or "way of life"; on this difficult expression, see  
Humfress 2007,196-201; Pieler 1987. 
57 Walter 1840,1; cf. Gaudemet 1958,478.  On the general development of 12th C canonical ius, Brundage 
1995, Ghellinck 1948, Kuttner 1982, Sohm 1923, Southern 1995/2005. 
58 For example, Diamond 1950,27; Donovan 2007,114 (attributed to Gluckman without references); 
Willetts 1967,35 (citing Diamond). 
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media of these rules varies considerably.  Five genres may be identified: the conciliar 
pronouncement or record, the letter, the oration/treatise, the question and answer 
(ἐρωταπόκρισις), and poetry.  Although some, even most, sources of the first genre 
were likely produced as enumerated lists of rules, many of the others clearly underwent 
later processes of division, extraction, and/or compilation to produce their later 
enumerated forms.  Sometimes these works still exist in un-enumerated forms, and in 
many cases, even in the councils, variant enumeration schemes exist for the same 
source, pointing towards gradual and variable process of corpus enumeration.59 
A detailed description of the genres present in the corpus may be found in 
Appendix C (3), but two very general observations about canonical genre may be made 
directly. 
First, the corpus' handling of genre evinces a central instinct: the gathering and 
transmission of traditional rule-texts in their integrity.  A phenomenon already remarked 
in chapter one, sources tend to enter the corpus in their original form, with most of their 
original apparatus, and this form tends to be preserved.  Sustained, invasive processes of 
abbreviation, homogenization, and the extraction of "pure" rule content from the 
sources – processes we might understand as standard in modern codification projects, 
and evident in the ancient secular codes – are very hard to demonstrate.  The most 
intrusive ongoing editing one can detect is the division of all sources into numbered 
canons and perhaps some occasional "trimming" of conciliar subscription lists or 
addressee sections.60  More significant changes that may be detected, or suspected, 
seem to have occurred before, or perhaps at, the source's first introduction to the cor
Thus Carthage is clearly a highly edited compilation of numerous earlier extracted 
sources; Laodicea may be an abbreviation and compilation of earlier, longer texts;
pus.  
                                                
61 and 
numerous patristic texts obviously represent only the answers to questions now lost.62  
But there is no evidence that much editing took place after a source was included in the 
canonical manuscripts.  From the moment these sources definitively enter the corpus the 
rule seems to have been ossification/preservation.  The basic pattern or formula of 
"codification" is agglutination and juxtaposition of traditional texts in their traditional 
form – and the result a kaleidoscopic array of heterogeneous semi-sacred, ossified 
sources.   
 
59  See Appendix C (2) for examples.  
60 On this see chapter 2, n. 98; Appendix B (2). 
61 On the structure and composition of Laodicea, see the overview in Sources Laodicea; also L'Huillier 
1976,59-60 
62 E.g. Theophilus, Basil 
 147
 Second, the genres employed suggest both dissonance and resonance with the 
late Roman civil legal tradition.  The resonance is to be found in the simple 
preponderance of the letter form for legislation.  Late antique and Byzantine secular 
legislation is increasingly (and by modern standards, surprisingly) epistolary.63  The 
basic form of a general law (and even many more specific command-texts) is 
overwhelmingly a dated missive sent to a high official, or sometimes a group of 
addressees.64  Vestiges of this letter-form are even preserved in the abbreviated 
redactions of the constitutiones found in the codices, where the addressees and dates are 
almost always retained.  Canonical legislation is likewise surprisingly permeated, if not 
quite to the same degree, by letters: not only the majority of patristic material but a 
number of councils are framed as letters, or by letters, or as parts of letters (especially 
Gangra, Antioch, Constantinople, and Ephesus).  Curiously enough, in late antiquity 
and Byzantium, law, secular or ecclesial, tends to emerge in letters. 
The dissonances are more striking.  Despite the general preponderance of the 
letter, the absence of any true leges-type law-writing in the corpus is very conspicuous 
(and under-appreciated in the literature).  Virtually no source in the corpus is written in 
clear imitation of a proper late Roman novel: i.e. as a self-standing letter on a fairly 
unitary topic and, above all, with a clear structures of protocol (certainly with inscriptio, 
i.e. addressee, and perhaps invocatio), prooimion, narratio, dispositio, sanctio, and 
eschatocol (including subscription and dating, and publication instructions).65  
Individual canons may contain prooimion, narratio, dispositio, sanctio structures; 
indeed, in the second wave, these structures can become quite pronounced, and may 
well reflect a certain assimilation to imperial law-writing form.66  Even some conciliar 
sources as wholes, such as Antioch, Constantinople, or Trullo, with their addressees, 
and (originally) subscription lists, might be vaguely thought of as novel-like.  The 
letters of Gennadios and Tarasius are even closer: they are self-standing letters written 
on a specific topic, with a specific addressee, and under one name.  But in all cases they 
lack, in particular, of the fairly stereotyped imperial protocols (with at least a generic 
                                                 
63 Millar 2006,7-35 in particular emphasizes this. 
64 As many edicts do in fact possess addressees (albeit general ones – e.g. CJ 1.2.1; 1.23.4), and can be 
understood to gradually blur with imperial law-letters (e.g. Corcoran 198-203), it is safe, with Millar, to 
generally assimilate them to the "letter", at least for our purposes (and more so with the later pragmatic 
sanctions).  For an overview of late antique and Byzantine legislative forms, see Dölger and 
Karayannopulos 1968, Pieler 1978 (passim but esp. 351-361), 1997a; cf. also van der Wal 1981. 
65 See above all Dölger and Karayannopulos 1968 (whence the terminology here), with summary at 48-
49, also 77; also Pieler 1978,355-361; 1997a571-573.  (For some criticism of Dölger and Karayannopulos 
1968, Bochove 1997,159-160).   
66 Much of II Nicaea and Protodeutera read as such. 
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adressee) and eschatochols (at least with a date), strongly distinguishes the canonical 
law-writing from the secular, even as the latter are found in their abbreviated forms in 
the codices.  Further, even the longest canons with prooimion, narratio, dispositio, 
sanctio structures only faintly recall the detail and extent of these structures typical of 
imperial novels.  Some of the most common secular dispositives are also rare.67   
This dissonance is especially glaring because ecclesial law-writing that is much 
more obviously imitative of the secular novels is known in late antiquity and later: the 
papal decretals.68  Further, post-9th C Byzantine canonical legislation, in which 
synodical letters dominate, approximates the secular material much more closely.  The 
canons as a whole thus emerge as a surprisingly different type of legislative form. 
Indeed, it is curious that canons as a whole, particularly the conciliar legislation, 
and despite many resonances, do not look much like any type of contemporary 
legislative texts.69  Broad resonances with parliamentary records and procedures 
(senatorial and perhaps provincial) have frequently been remarked, and there may be 
more parallels to be made with municipal codes.70  If one allows comparison with 
historical texts (the Twelve Tables, in any reconstruction, the Penateuchal material, or 
other extant ancient codes), further points of identity can be made.71  Nevertheless – 
although the point is perhaps a bit fine – compared with the products of the only other 
major source of living, active, public written normativity in most of our period, the 
emperor, the canons as a whole, and particularly the conciliar canons, are a fairly 
proprietary legislative phenomenon.  (Their origin in collective authorities also 
distinguishes them quite dramatically.) The two public, empire-wide legislative 
Rechtsmassen of the late antique and Byzantine worlds thus do in fact look quite 
different. They are not radically "other" from each other, certainly, but clear and direct 
patterns of mirroring are not evident. 
It is also worth noting that, on the level of genre and textual type, the only other 
major type of legal literature with currency in late antiquity and Byzantium, 
jurisprudential writings, also find little real parallel in the canons. A comparison 
                                                 
67 See below section C.  
68 See Jasper 2001,11-22; briefly Gaudemet 1958,222-226. On the general modelling of papal authority 
on imperial administrative patterns, see Humfress 2007,211-212 with further references. 
69 Of course the closest material in genre, tone and style to the canons is the apostolic church order 
materials; but these are "internal" texts of the Christian tradition, not our subject here. 
70 Hess 2002,24-27, 69-75 surveys the recent literature on the senate and/or municipal councils as models 
for Christian conciliar procedure and publication, with a summary of procedure at 27. See also Dvornik 
1966,640-641, Harries 1998.  Here we do not count the secular regula as a properly "legislative" form – 
and, as noted, the canons don't look much like them anyway. 
71 Or the longer edicts; see Johnston et al. 1961. 
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between the patristic canons and the works of Roman jurisprudents is often made, 72 but 
it is applicable only in a very general sense: the patristic letters are "responding" to 
questions or clarifying or communicating certain rules; they are written by individuals; 
Timothy's ἀποκρίσεις represent a genre known to be in use among the jurisprudents; the 
patristic material tends to be treated as secondary to and interpretative of the canons; the 
patristic material is occasionally apt to sound as if it is expressing opinion than issuing 
true authoritative judgments.  However, real genre imitation and sustained textual 
similarities are very few.  The patristic writings do not form themselves as "books" of 
any type like the Roman jurisprudential works listed in the Florentine index (e.g. βιβλία 
digeston, ὅρων, iuris civilion, regularion, ἐγχειριδίου, actionon, ad leges), none emerge 
as formal commentaries on an established corpus structure such as the Edict or the 
Sabinian corpus, and none are written with anything approaching the sustained, closed, 
technical and well-defined conceptual textures for which the Digest is well known.73  
Only one patristic source – Basil – reads with any consistency anything like this 
literature: some of his canons are written in a quasi-commentary style, stating a known 
rule and then subjecting the rule to various processes of quasi-technical rule-
reasoning.74  Other instances of such technical or doctrinal semi-commentary, directed 
towards points of law, may occasionally be found.75  But in all cases, even in Basil, 
such discourse is fairly desultory, ad hoc and hardly beyond a level of techn
sophistication expected of any well-educated rhetor.  This type of writing is also not 
much more characteristic of the patristic material than the conciliar.
ical 
                                                
76  Further, none of 
the authors explicitly, or even allusively, cast their work as comparable to the secular 
σόφοι τοῦ νόμου (the normal Greek term for the Roman jurists);77 their works are more 
those of quasi-magistrates than quasi-assessors.   Broadly, in the Byzantine canonical 
tradition, the first candidates for proper jurisprudential-type literature are the 12th C 
commentaries. 
 
72 This is very widespread; for example, Fonti 2.xiii; Hess 2002,87; Peges 63-64; Schwartz 1936a,178-
179. 
73 Schulz 1953 remains an excellent overview of the types and textures of this material. Pringsheim 1921 
usefully dissects many techniques. 
74 For examples, see below section D.1  
75 Certainly parts of Gregory of Nyssa, Theophilus and Cyril. 
76 Commentary-like texts or technical-interpretative activity may be found, for example, in Trullo or 
Protodeutera – or even Nicaea.  See section D.1. 
77 The Coll14 τὰ μὲν σώματα might be read as suggesting it, RP 1.6, but it is not particularly strong, 
especially considering that the secular σόφοι are mentioned later in the prologue – a comparison would 
have been easy.  See van der Wal and Stolte 1994,xvii on the term σόφος for "jurist"/prudens. 
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Contrary to the common formulation, then, the conciliar canons do not look 
much like imperial laws, and the patristic material does not look much like 
jurisprudential literature.  Such a comparison finds a real referent (perhaps) only in the 
post-12th C western canonical structure of papal decretals (= imperial leges) and the 
commentaries of the decretalists (= jurists).78 
 
C. Normativity I: the canons as rules. Structure and dispositive vocabulary  
The basic structural features of the individual canons as rules invite investigation 
for two reasons: first, to determine the basic character of the rules, particularly their 
level of abstraction and categorical force; second, to determine their relationship with 
other types of normativity. 
We may define the basic structural features of the canons as rules as 1) their 
overall syntactical and compositional structures (e.g. "if...then..." case structure or 
straight apodictic prohibition "Let not....", or formal compositional divisions such as 
narratio, dispositio, sanctio), and 2) key dispositive, or normative, vocabulary employed 
(e.g. δεῖ, προστάσσομεν, κελεύομεν). 
 A survey of both these features reveals that the Byzantine tradition is (again) 
characterized above all by heterogeneity.  This is true across the corpus as a whole, 
which we might expect, but also within individual sources.  There are only two sources 
which show almost complete consistency in both form and vocabulary of rule 
expression: Gangra, which enunciates each of its short rules according to the strict 
schema "Εἴ τις  + optative (sometimes indicative, but optative variant readings may 
often be found)...ἀνάθεμα ἔστω; and Protodeutera, which uses the dispositive formula 
"ἡ ἁγία σύνοδος... ὥρισεν...", or the similar ἡμεῖς...διοριζόμεθα or simply ὁρίζομεν79 in 
every canon but one (9),80 to convey the canon's central rule content and/or punishment.  
In a few other sources, large stretches of texts are often very similar, sometimes as 
vestiges of earlier processes of compilation, but the consistency of expression in these 
parts of the sources ultimately only serves to highlight the discontinuity of form in the 
whole of the sources in their more mature or final forms.81  Broadly speaking, 
                                                 
78 See generally Brundage 1995,59-61, 154-174. 
79 Canons 11, 12, 17. 
80 Where it is suitably replaced with ἡμεῖς οὕτω συμψηφιζόμεθα, as canon 9 is merely repeating and 
strengthening Apostolic 27. 
81 See especially Laodicea 1-19 and 20-59, as well as Constantinople 1-4, and, to a lesser degree, Basil 
56-74 and Carthage 35-47 and 66-85. 
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harmonization and uniformity of rule-structures is simply not a priority in the Byzantine 
corpus. 
Most texts in fact cycle through a variety of structures and dispositives, even if 
one or two may often be particularly common.  Nicaea, for example (considering just 
primary rules, or where this is unclear, the first rule; if supplementary rules are counted, 
the diversity is greater), has εἴ + imperative constructions in canon 1 and 8; ἔι + 
indicative in 9; ἐπειδή + ἔδοξεν in 2 and 20; ἐπειδή + imperative in 7 and 12; ἐπειδή + 
δικαιόω in 17; ; ἦλθεν εἰς τὴν...σύνοδον + imperative in 18;  ἀπαγορεύω μήτε + 
infinitive in 3; προσήκει + infinitive in 4; χρή + infinitive in 16; περί + imperative in 5; 
περί + ἔδοξε in 8, 11, 14 (partially in 5); περί + indicative in 13, 19; διά + ἔδοξε in 15; 
straight imperative in 6, 12; straight indicative in 10. 
Turning to syntactical and compositional structures alone, the forms evident in 
the canons are numerous.  Nevertheless, like much ancient legislation, the canons are 
overwhelmingly casuistic. That is, the majority of canons can be understood to contain 
(and in this order) a functional protasis, in which a problem, behaviour or circumstance 
is stated, and an apodosis which states the consequence of or determination for this 
problem, often including or constituting a sanction, although this last may follow as a 
third element.  The classic form of this type of rule is an explicit "if...then" statement – 
e.g. "If anyone should pray with an excommunicated person, even in a house, let him be 
excommunicated"(Apostolic 10). But many variants are possible.  A common type, 
easily converted to an if...then statement, is a nominative or accusative participial 
subject structure ("He who..."), such as Ancyra 19  "Those who having professed 
virginity disregard their profession, let hem fulfill the penance of digamists" (Ὅσοι 
παρθενίαν ἐπαγγειλάμενοι ἀθετοῦσι τὴν ἐπαγγελίαν τὸν τῶν διγάμων ὅρον 
ἐκπληρούτωσαν). Also very common are ἐπειδή or περί + circumstance clauses,82 or 
casuistic narrationes as simple statements.83   The basic formula of these rules, whatever 
their exact form, is "if in x situation, then y".  This corresponds to a simple narratio-
dispositio structure.   
Not all canons are casuistic.  Some – at least in their primary rule – are straight 
apodictic authorizations or prohibitions. For example, Apostolic 1 "Let a bishop be 
                                                 
82 For example, Trullo 6 Ἐπειδὴ καὶ παρὰ τοῖς ἀποστολικοῖς κανόσιν ηὕρηται τῶν εἰς κλῆρον 
προαγομένων ἀγάμων μόνους ἀναγνώστας καὶ ψάλτας γαμεῖν, καὶ ἡμεῖς... ὁρίζομεν...; or Chalcedon 5 
Περὶ τῶν μεταβαινόντων ἀπὸ πόλεως εἰς πόλιν ἐπισκόπων ἤ κληρικῶν ἔδοξε... 
83 For example, Protodeutera 7 Πολλὰς τῶν ἐπισκοπῶν ὁρῶμεν καταπιπτούσας, καὶ ἀφανισμῷ τελείῳ 
κινδυνευούσας παραδίδοσθαι, ὅτιπερ οἱ τούτων προεστηκότες τῆν περὶ αὐτῶν φροντίδα καὶ ἐπιμέλειαν 
εἰς νεουργίας μοναστηρίων καταναλίσκουσι· καὶ ταύτας διασπῶντες, καὶ τὸν σφετερισμὸν τῶν εἰσόδων 
ἐκμηχανώμενοι, τὴν ἐκείνων ἐπαύξησιν πραγματεύονται. Ὥρισεν οὖν...  
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ordained by two or three bishops".  Many of these apodictic regulations, as essentially 
isolated dispositive phrases, do not specify sanctions. Those that do often must add a 
supplementary sanction in "if...then..." form, and may be viewed as semi-casuistic.  For 
example, Apostolic 5: "A bishop or presbyter or deacon is not to cast out his wife on the 
pretext of piety; if he does cast her out, let him be suspended; persisting, let him be 
deposed."  
Such non-casuistic rules may be found throughout the corpus, but by far the 
greatest concentration of these type of rules are to be found in Laodicea, and to a lesser 
extent Antioch (e.g. 1, 2, 7, 8, 9, 13, 19-25).  They are clearly a subordinate type of 
regulation.84 
The preponderance of casuistic rules in the corpus is important for 
understanding the nature of canonical normativity.  It above all reveals a tendency – yet 
again – to think in terms of specifics and the concrete.  In this respect, it is very much 
like most other ancient laws.85  The law presents itself not so much as concerned with 
juristic abstraction or general principles as with the preserving and presenting of sets of 
traditional answers to specific problems.  As such, the system does not center on 
comprehensive generalities, abstractions, or principles built through hypotheticals and 
deductive reasoning.  Rather, the system is built from the bottom up: from the amassing 
of many concrete details from which, through induction, analogies and abstractions 
might be derived.  But the system is not exactly "built" at all – and it is not really much 
of a "system" either.  Expansion is mostly about the gradual and relatively 
unprogrammatic accumulation of every greater quantities of specific regulations.  
Further processes of induction and abstraction are perhaps assumed, but not particularly 
a focus of the literature itself.  The "law" is primarily the "laws". 
It is important to note, however, that while the majority of the canons are 
formally casuistic, these same canons are very rarely substantively casuistic – i.e. they 
rarely contain explicit narration of specific cases.  Despite a number of important 
exceptions, the canons are not as a whole a collection of real case dossiers or records of 
                                                 
84  Despite the impression given by Ohme 1998 and Hess 2002, who seem to present this type of 
legislation as an evolutionary end-point of the church's "legalization". 
85 On this aspect of ancient near-eastern law, and ancient law generally, see Westbrook 1988,88-102 
(although the contrast with later Roman and Greek law is exaggerated), 2008. On Roman law's oft-
remarked lack of interest in abstraction and deductive system-building, Berman 1983,121-141; Frier 
1985,158-170; Gaudemet 1986; Glenn 2007,127-128; Schulz 1936,41-65; Stolte 2003,85; Weber 
1954,215-216, 276-277; and especially Hezser 1998,586-595, 629-631, where the observation of Roman 
"Gelegenheitsgesetzgebung" is also extended to Talmudic writing, with many further references.  See also 
Tuori 2004 on the exaggeration of the extent and sophistication of early Roman "legal science".  
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decisions in specific cases.86  Most canons are written as generic rules in casuistic form.  
In this sense, the system tends to fairly high level of generalization in terms of potential 
rule-application – the "specificity" of the system is more formal than substantive. 
It is also important to note that this casuistic orientation of the system – the 
seemingly ad hoc nature of the regulations – does not imply a lower level of categorical 
force, or a lowered expectation for general applicability (as if the rules are merely local 
statements of examples, or "suggestions", or "guidelines").  Roman law, Mosaic law and 
indeed most pre-modern laws are built around the conglomeration of specific, casuistic 
rules – Byzantine canon law is no less categorical in intention or force than any of these. 
Dispositive vocabulary and mood in the canons – i.e. the phrases used in the 
dispositive acts of ordering and legislating (e.g. we order, let x happen), and their 
grammatical mood (indicative, infinitive, imperative) – are also chiefly marked by 
variety and irregularity.  Real consistency is the exception, within or across the sources.  
The only lengthy sources in which at least some elements of the dispositive vocabulary 
are almost entirely regular, aside from Gangra and Protodeutera, are Antioch (almost 
entirely "legal infinitives") and Laodicea (mostly δεῖ statements). 
Most sources instead move through a variety of terms and grammatical forms.  
These include third person imperatives or equivalents (i.e. third person subjunctive 
aorists), as Apostles 23 Κληρικὸς ἑαυτὸν ἀκρωτηριάσας καθαιρείσθω; second person 
imperatives or equivalent (very rarely), as Basil 28, ...ὥστε καταξίωσον διδάσκειν 
αὐτους τῶν ἀπαιδεύτων προσευχῶν καὶ ἐπαγγελιῶν ἀπέχεσθαι; command or "legal" 
infinitives, in which the infinitive has no explicit governing auxiliary, as Apostles 35 
Ἐπίσκοπον μὴ τολμᾶν ἔξω τῶν ἑαυτοῦ ὅρων χειροτονίας ποιεῖσθαι...;87 plain indicative 
statements of rules or practices, as Constantinople 7 τοὺς προστιθεμένους τῇ 
ὀρθοδοξίᾳ...ἀπὸ αἱρετικῶν δεχόμεθα κατὰ τὴν ὑποτεταγμένην ἀκολουθίαν καὶ 
συνήθειαν; impersonal modal constructions, of which δεῖ and χρή (and variant 
χρεωστεῖ) phrases are the most frequent, but including also δίκαιόν ἐστιν, προσήκει, 
δύναται, ὀφείλει, ἔξεστι, ἀδεία ἐστίν, εὔλογόν ἐστιν, simple ἐστίν (in the sense of it is 
not right/possible) and a number of more complex phrases such as τὸ ἔθος καὶ τὸ 
πρέπον ἀπαιτεῖ... (Theophilus 1), ἔστω τύπος ὥστε... (Theophilus 7); and, finally, a 
                                                 
86 Naturally most of the acta extracts attached to Constantinople, Ephesus and Chalcedon refer to specific 
problems or cases.  Other notable conciliar exceptions, generally involving actual naming of individuals 
or very specific cases, or very close to it, include Ancyra 25, Constantinople 4 and 5, all of Ephesus, 
Serdica 18 and 19, and a number of Carthaginian canons, most notably the framing Apiarian dossier.  In 
the patristic material, most of Gregory Thaum., Theophilus, Cyril, and many of Basil's supplementary 
letters (after canon 85) read as specific cases; most of the rest, the majority, do not. 
87 On these infinitives, especially prominent in Antioch, see Smyth 1956,448. 
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large number of "meta-dispositives", i.e. indicative statements in which the legislators 
voice their own agency in the legislative process through statements such as "we 
decree", "we decide", "it seems good to us".    
These last are collectively the most common, productive and varied form of 
rule-expression in the corpus.  They are dominated by terms that connote deciding, 
decreeing, judging, or "judging good", such as ὁρίζω (the single most common term 
throughout corpus, very frequent from Chalcedon onwards88), δικαιόω (e.g. Nicaea 17; 
Ephesus 3,4, 5, 9; Chalcedon 1), δοκέω (usually in third-person form ἔδοξε, also very 
frequent89), or ἀρέσκω (regularly in Carthage and Sardica as translation for placere 
forms; also Athanasius to Rufinus).  Other examples of this group be found in Appendix 
C (4).  Closely related are "ordering" or "commanding" terms, such as προστάττω (e.g. 
Apostles 27, 41, 46; Ancyra 17, 21; Basil 34; Trullo 21, 63, 65, 73, 97, 100) and κελεύω 
(e.g. Apostles 15, 26; Ancyra 23, 25; Antioch 36;  Constantinople 6; Ephesus 3; Basil 1, 
24, 34, 51; Sardica 14, 18; Protodeutera 5), as well as permission and forbidding 
language such  as ἐπιτρέπω (Apostolic 82, II Nicaea 14), ἀπαγορεύω (Nicaea 3, Trullo 
51), or ἄδειαν δίδωμι (Protodeutera 6).  Other meta-dispositive expressions are 
confirmatory in character, including ἀνανέομαι (Trullo 3, 8, 25, 36, 49; II Nicaea 6, 7) 
κρατύνω (Trullo 1, II Nicaea 1), ἐπισφραγίζω (Trullo 1, 2), κυρόω and ἐπικυρόω 
(Trullo 1, 2; Protodeutera. 11), συνευδοκέω (Trullo 43) συμψηφίζομαι (Protodeutera 9, 
11), and συμφωνέω (Protodeutera 11).  In a number of sources, especially earlier 
patristic material, a number of "measuring" or "tariff" meta-dispositives are common.  
These are used specifically to indicate the length of particular penances, and include 
ὁρίζω (e.g. Basil 4, Gregory Nyss. 4), οἰκονομέω (Basil 62, 72; Gregory Nyss. 1; 
Theophilus 2), κανονίζω (Basil 77), συμμετρέω (Gregory Nyssa 2), and once even 
δοκιμάζω in this sense (Gregory Nyssa 5).  Similar are a number of "punishment" verbs 
including καθυβάλλω (e.g.Trullo 79), ἐπιτιμάω (e.g. Trullo 67, Theophilus 2), 
κινδυνεύω περὶ τὸν βαθμόν (Chalcedon 2, 22), or ἀναθεματίζω (Trullo 81).  
                                                 
88 I.e. Chalcedon  3, 6, 7, 10,11, 12, 14, 16, 19, 20, 23, 27; Trullo 3, 6, 7, 17, 29, 30, 31, 36, 42, 45, 49, 53, 
54, 56, 61, 62, 72, 79, 82, 84, 85(διορίζω), 86, 92, 94, 99; 2 Nicaea 2, 4, 7, 8 20; all Protodeutera; Hagia 
Sophia 1, 2.  Earlier, it may be found in Apostles 74 (in sense of measuring or apportioning out a tariff), 
Nicaea 6; Ancyra 21 (tariff usage); Serdica 7, 8, 11, 12, 15; Antioch 18; Laodicaea 1; Constantinople 
Prosphonetikos; Ephesus 6, 7, 9; Basil 4 (for past decisions), 27 (tariff usage), 88; Theophilus 12 (for 
synod); and not infrequently in Carthage, esp. after 50 (usually translating statut-/constitut- forms). 
89 E.g. Nicaea 2, 14, 15; Ancyra 1-4, 6, 7, 11, 12, 14; Antioch 10, 20; Ephesus 8; Chalcedon 25, 26; 
Trullo 2, 3, 12, 55, 60; Gregory Thaum. 2; Athanasius to Rufinianus; Basil 1; Gennadius. 
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Although individual sources may evince a higher concentration of one type of 
dispositive form than another,90 only one broad pattern in the corpus may be discerned: 
the general councils are much more given to statements of rules with meta-assertions of 
the legislator's action than the other sources.  There are exceptions.  Ancyra, for 
example, contains numerous examples of meta-dispositives – although they are almost 
all ἔδοξεν, which might be regarded as an archaic form, as it rarely occurs in the second 
wave.91  Both the early western sources, too, often as part of their dialogical structures, 
contain large number of meta-expressions.  It must also be noted that Antioch, Gangra 
do not contain meta-dispositives within their canons per se, but the canons are framed in 
the corpus by introductory structures that serve much the same function.  Conversely, 
Trullo contains numerous imperatives.92 
Nevertheless, on a canon-by-canon basis, the pattern is fairly clear: the 
Apostolic canons, most of the Antiochian corpus, and much of the patristic legislation 
(esp. Basil) are dominated by simple imperatives, impersonal modals, and statements of 
rules, while the ecumenical councils prefer meta-dispositives.  We may consider this 
pattern a quasi-chronological development, as much of the first group of material is 
written in the 4th C, and much of the second in the 5th C or later, although Nicaea and 
Constantinople are exceptions. This development is made all the more striking by the 
fact that it is accompanied by a gradual but unmistakable privileging of one particular 
meta-dispositive: ὁρίζω (and variants).  Already very prominent in Chalcedon, ὁρίζω 
dispositive phrases will emerge as virtually the formula for canonical legislation, far 
more frequent then any other single term in the second wave.  This development is also 
part of yet another, larger development, namely the general movement away from 
indirect dispositives (ἔδοξε, ἤρεσεν), especially common in the 4th C sources and the 
western material, to direct dispositives, usually in the first person plural or the third 
person singular (with subject "the holy synod" or similar).  
 This predilection for meta-dispositives, and especially first-person ones, may 
represent an assimilation to formal imperial law writing.  Imperial novels are almost 
always written with such meta-dispositives, and the solemnity of imperial conciliar 
legislation could call for precisely this type of imitation.  Many of the later canons with 
                                                 
90 Aside from those already mentioned, the Apostles and Theophilus have a very large number of 
imperatives; Ancyra favours ἔδοξε and imperative constructions; the western sources tend to privilege 
ἀρέσκει clauses; Nicaea and Athanasius to Rufinianus contains a large number of ἔδοξε constructions; 
δικαιόω is especially prominent in Ephesus 1-6; straight indicative statements are common in Basil; and 
Timothy is dominated by ὀφείλω. 
91 The exceptions are Trullo 3, 12, 55 and 60. 
92 For example, 5, 11, 13, 14, 15, 20, 21, 24, 27, 35, 40, 46, 47, 48, 52, 58, 59, 69, 70, 72, 83, 88, 98. 
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these dispositives will also contain more prominent prooimion-narratio-dispositio-
sanctio structures, which also heightens this similarity.93  At the very least these shifts 
witness to the gradual regularization – and formalization – of the legislative task.   
In terms of the selection of dispositives, a broad lexical continuity with Greco-
Roman legislative language may be observed.  The lack of systematic studies of secular 
dispositive terminology makes definite and precise conclusions impossible, but 
vocabulary of, for example, ἀπαγορεύω, ἔδοξε, ἔξεστι, δικαιόω, κελεύω, προστάσσω, 
ὁρίζω (διορίζω, προσδιορίζω), ψηφίζομαι, and of course δεῖ and χρή are easily found in 
the Justinianic and Leonine novels.94  Many of the simpler imperatival or indicative 
statement forms also find easy resonance in the secular codices and synopses, as well as 
in the Biblical laws and moral tracts.95   
One or two points of dissonance nevertheless exist.  Most interestingly, two of 
the "strongest" secular legislative verbs are surprisingly rare in the corpus.  The most 
conspicuous absence is θεσπίζω, probably the most common legislative term in the 
Justinianic material, and not uncommon in Leo.96  It can be found in the corpus only 
four times.97  The similarly strong legislative term νομοθετέω (and variants), although 
not especially common in the secular material, also has only a very secondary presence 
in the canonical literature, occurring only six times.98  Curiously, all but three of the 
instances of both words place these verbs in the mouths of past legislators, i.e. they are 
not real dispositive assertions by the source at hand.99  It seems that the strongest 
                                                 
93 Trullo 79, II Nicaea 7 and Protodeutera 10 are particularly "full" examples of this form, but such 
structures, especially without the prooimion, can be discerned in most of the lengthier second wave 
canons. 
94 For Justinian, see the vocabularia of Archi and Colombo 1986 and Mayr 1923 (and both Justinian and 
Leo's Novels are searchable on the TLG). See also the brief comments of Dölger 1968,75. 
95 Aside from the Codices, so in the Ecloga, the Prochiron; or, in Scripture, Exodus 20-23 and 
Deuteronomy 12-26 (where future statements and second-person imperatives or equivalents are 
particularly dominant). 
96 It may be regarded as virtually the standard Justinianic meta-dispositive, occurring approximately 300 
times in the Novels, often in the formula θεσπίζομεν τοίνυν... It is also common in Leo, occurring 45 
times. See Archi and Colombo 1986,1334-1349 and Mayr 1923,199-200. 
97 Serdica 11; Trullo 1, 8; and Hagia Sophia 3 
98 Basil 18, 88 Trullo 12, 26, 36, Protodeutera 1 
99 The exceptions are Basil 88, Trullo 1, and Hagia Sophia 3. Even Basil 88 is in a sentence which is 
emphasizing that Basil was not the first to legislate on his particular topic: οὔτε πρῶτοι οὔτε μόνοι, ὦ 
Γρηγόριε, ἐνομοθετήσαμεν γυναῖκας ἀνδράσι μὴ συνοικεῖν.  In Trullo 1 θεσπίζω is found in the rather 
rare circumstance of asserting a doctrinal confirmation, which may explain its unusual presence; it may 
also be present here merely as variatio, as Trullo 1 conspicuously, and rather elegantly, cycles through a 
number of different dispositives: ὁρίζω, ἐπισφραγίξω, ἐπικυρόω, etc. 
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legislative terms are only put into the mouths of previous legislators.  A third term, 
κελεύω, is also more prominent in the secular material than the ecclesial.100 
Conversely, ὁρίζω vocabulary, used as a general dispositive, is hardly present in 
Justinian at all.  It is more evident in the 9th C Leo, but it is possible that as a regular 
dispositive term it represents something of a semi-technical "church" term; 
alternatively, it may simply represent a general later-Byzantine preference.101   
Broadly, however, there is little truly exceptional about the shape of the 
dispositive vocabulary and forms of the canonical literature: the canons are mostly 
writing rules within the normal parameters of Greco-Roman legal rule-writing.102  The 
general avoidance of a number of "strong" imperial dispositives, particularly θεσπίζω, 
may be read as simply one more example of the canons' delicate and indirect 
negotiation of identity with the civil legislation: the two broadly exist in the same realm 
or rule-language and form, with many resonances, but also with certain subtle patterns 
of distinction.  
Taken as a whole, the normative shape of canonical rules, both in structure and 
dispositive diction, suggests two basic observations.   
First, the canons yet again emerge as above a heterogeneous collection of 
specific rule-traditions.  A strong concern for formal uniformity or rationalization is not 
evident, either in composition or compilation (although such a concern is occasionally 
evident). Indeed, despite a certain gradual standardization in form and diction, a distinct 
lack of concern for formal regularity is everywhere evident.  The casuistic nature of the 
canons heightens this emphasis on the concrete and particular.  This is not law 
conceived as a neat rational construct, a gapless system of regular and coherent norms: 
it is a sprawling collection of authoritative pronouncements, in many different forms, 
made in many different contexts.  This does not make this law any less categorical or 
forceful (or "legal") – it simply anchors legal authority in an engagement with the 
specific and concrete.   
Second, the canons do not emerge, either in their rule-forms or dispositive 
vocabulary, as radically unique or unusual.  Their broad casuistic form of rule-
presentation is coherent with much ancient law, and their dispositive diction does not 
                                                 
100 Over 200 examples of formal first-person forms may be found in Justinian's Novels, and 20 in Leo's. 
See Archi and Colombo 1986,1512-1517 and Mayr 231.  The canonical evidence – the examples above 
are almost exhaustive – are much sparser, and include all forms of the root. 
101 For Justinian, see Archi and Colombo 1986,2390-2939; Mayr 1923,329 From the TLG, twenty six 
instances of dispositive statements with ὁρίζομεν may be found in Leo's novels.  
102 cf. Pieler 1991,606, 616-117 on the secular-like language of Zonaras in paraphrasing the dispositions 
of the canons. 
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seem to be wildly out of line with Greco-Roman traditions.  Only one or two differences 
of emphasis in the selection and use of dispositives suggest some subtle literary 
differentiation with contemporary secular legal literature. 
 
D. Normativity II: the legal language of the canons 
The central methodological imperative of this work is to allow the canonical literature 
to define its own sense of "legality".  Nevertheless, a critical – if often unstated – 
question of the modern literature is the degree to which the canons contain linguistic 
and conceptual phenomena that today, at least, would be considered characteristically 
“legal".  To what extent do the canons read as "legal" texts?  Can we discern a 
specifically "legal discourse" in these texts? 
 From the standpoint of the formalist-positivist legal culture sketched in the 
introduction, "legal discourse" tends to mean "technical legal discourse", which in turn 
means patterns of concepts and language that function as the specialized logical 
grammar of a closed and clearly defined body of formal rules (operated by trained 
professionals).  This discourse manifests itself in particular in the use of specialized and 
proprietary vocabulary and style; a strong interest in terminological, conceptual and 
definitional precision and consistency (and thus the heavy use of formulaic phrases); a 
tendency to schematize and proceed methodically through different aspects of a 
problem, perhaps addressing even hypothetical problems; a strong concern for rule-
detail and comprehensiveness of regulation, including concern for exceptions and a 
tendency towards rule “prophylacticism” in which rules attempt to foresee and forestall 
false interpretations, and make multiple, slightly different provisions for various types 
of circumstances; and finally, a concern to constantly speak within and to "the rules" – 
i.e. to refer to other rules often.103 
In the canons, almost all aspects of this type of technical legal discourse may be 
detected.  It may emerge merely in the passing citation of a noticeable phrase or term 
from secular technical legal discourse, or it may manifest as a stylistic tendency, or it 
may appear as a much more sustained technical legal structuring of the canonical 
material itself.  It occasionally even suggests that the system is beginning to operate as 
an autonomous parallel and proprietary legal discourse: i.e. with its own concepts, 
                                                 
103 The inspriration for these characteristics may be found in the references in the Introduction, n. 59; also, 
Mellinkoff 1963. 
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terminology, and rule "grammar", as distinct from other Greco-Roman technical legal 
discourses 
 
1. The legal parts  
The single most prominent locus of technical-legal discourse in the corpus is the 
canonical penal system.104  Quite aside from the fact that the stipulation of clear, 
specific sanctions itself may be understood by some as a defining characteristic of legal 
discourse itself (versus other types of social and moral rules),105 these provisions in 
many sources evince a formulaic quality that strongly suggests the legal.  This is 
particularly noticeable in sources such as the Apostolic canons (esp. 42-44, 51-72), 
Gangra, Trullo, or Protodeutera, where the repetition of penal formulas can be quite 
prominent (e.g. "ἢ παυσάσθω ἢ καθαιρείσθω", "ἐὰν [one condition or subject] 
ἀφοριζέσθω, ἐὰν [another condition or subject] καθαιρείσθω"; "εἰ...ἀνάθεμα ἔστω". 
Curiously, it is perhaps most prominent in the oldest penitential punishments (e.g. much 
of Basil's letter 217, Ancyra 1-9, most of Gregory of Nyssa) which evince a strong sense 
of technicality in their precisely defined and quite technical penitential steps (e.g. 
mourners, hearers, supplicators, "standers"), and their interest in developing a detailed 
system of specific tariffs (one year excommunication, three years, etc.). 
A legal-like standardization of substantive penalities may also be noted.  Despite 
much variation in both substantive content and terminology across the corpus as a 
whole, three provisions in particular may be distilled as a standard set of penalties: 
excommunication (for laity) or suspension (for clerics), usually called ἀφορισμός;106 
deposition for clergy, generally καθαίρεσις;107 and a stronger and rarer punishment of 
ostracism or permanent public damnation, more varied in content and terminology, but 
often conveyed with ἀνάθεμα, ἀπορίπτω, ἀποκηρύττω or ἀποβάλλω language.108  In 
addition one will also occasionally hear of general, unspecified, ἐπίτιμια.109  In the first 
wave these three (or four) categories are already particularly obvious and standardized 
in the Apostles (e.g. 42-45, 62) and the Coll14 9.10-18, where they are schematized.  By 
                                                 
104 On Byzantine canonical penal law, see especially Panagiotakos 1962 and Rhalles 1907.  For the older 
graded penitential system, Schwartz 1911. 
105 See Donovan 2007,3-15, Freeman 2001,207-219. 
106 Also often some type of paraphrase with ἀκοινώνητος, e.g. Chalcedon 8 ἔστωσαν ακοινώνητοι. See 
Panagiotakos 1962,295-296, 334-335. 
107 Related, if not always identical, with the punishment of being in danger of losing one's βαθμός, rank 
e.g. Chalcedon 2 τοῦ οἰκείου ἐπιπτέτω βαθμοῦ.   See Pangiotakos 1962,4.264-270 for common 
paraphrases and further examples. 
108 See Panagiotakos 1962,321-323. 
109 E.g. Chalcedon 3, 8, 14, 24; II Nicaea 16; Protodeutera 6 
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the second wave they are omnipresent, if not exclusive, and the three of them emerge 
twice in short-hand expressions for canonical penalties generally, first in II Nicaea 1, 
which professes faithfulness to traditional provisions ἀνάθεμα, καθαίρεσις, and 
ἀφορισμός (it also speaks of other types of ἐπιτίμια), and Hagia Sophia 1, which 
confirms the reciprocal observation of Roman and Constantinopolitan canonical 
measures in terms of the same three categories.   Although many other different types of 
penalties will often be specified (loss of rank, loss of honour)110 the relatively regular 
presence of these three defined and distinct concepts strongly suggests a technical, 
methodical conceptualization of sanctions. 
These provisions also constitute one of the very few clear and consistent 
examples of proprietary internal technical concepts or terms in the corpus.  Although the 
ideas of suspension, demotion and ostracism are certainly not unknown in antiquity, the 
collection of these terms as a regular technical set of penal provisions, and for the most 
part the terms themselves, seems without obvious and regular parallel in the Greco-
Roman legal world; certainly the contemporary imperial legislation does not regularly 
express sanctions in this way. In a sense, the Byzantines were themselves aware of this, 
inasmuch as they can speak about the distinction between secular and church law as 
lying precisely in the different character of its sanctions.111  It has its own penal system. 
Penal provisions aside, technical-legal discourse may be found throughout the 
corpus in a variety of different forms.  It may be sought in 1) terminology; 2) stylistic 
tendencies; 3) legal "turns of thought"; 4) legal concepts, definitions and principles; 5) 
sustained or subtle examples of rule logic.   
Technical-legal terminology is perhaps the most obvious and easily discerned 
type of technical legal discourse in the canons.  In principle, it may include technical 
Greco-Roman secular law terminology, technical terms from Scriptural law, or any 
signs of proprietary Christian technical terminology, traditional or novel.  In practice, it 
is mostly evident in borrowings from Roman legal and administrative language; 
certainly these present the most dramatic examples.    
Among the most obvious and prevalent of these last include a large number of 
adoptions of substantive Greco-Roman institutions, offices or legal instruments.  
Among the most prominent include office or position language such as ἀξίωμα, τιμή or 
                                                 
110 See Panagiotakos 1962,4.264-340, Rhalles 1907,43-134. 
111 Especially obvious in οἰ τοῦ μεγάλου θεοῦ; see chapter 2.A.3. 
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ὀφφίκιον;112 terms for legislation or documents such as νόμος, διαταγή, διάταξις, or 
λίβελλος;113 the names of specific offices such as ἔκδικος (defensor);114 administrative 
and legal institutions such as ἐγγύαι (securities),115 ἐνέχυρα (pledges),116 λόγοι (in the 
sense of financial accounts, rationes) and εὔθυναι (reports of administration),117 and 
basic legal procedures such as the διάγνωσις (the standard translation of cognitio)118 or 
more general "hearings", ἐξέτασις or ἀκρόασις119.  These borrowings or modeling have 
often been remarked, and all clearly evince the general receptivity of ecclesial 
administration to secular Roman forms.120 
More intriguingly, and more directly germane to our concerns, are the subtler 
weavings of Roman legal phraseology and processes into the articulation of the rules 
themselves.  Procedural subjects are a particularly fertile area for this type of 
borrowing.121  Some of the language is quite general, common to both native Greek 
legal usage and Roman law texts, and hardly remarkable, including charge words like 
ἔγκλημα/ἐγκαλέω122 or αἰτία/αἰτιάομαι123 (both general Greek legal terms for charges 
or accusations, the former also a formal translation of crimen),  ὑπόθεσις (case),124  δίκ
(penalty, punishmanet), ἀπολογία/ἀπολογέω (defense),
η 
                                                
125 κατηγορία/κατηγορέω 
(accusation),126 ἐλέγχω and διελέγχω (convict and prove)127, ἀποδίδωμι (hand over);128 
ἀποκατάστασις (restoration or reversal),129 φωράω (always in passive, to be caught in a 
 
112 Common; for example Apostles 29; Nicaea 7, 8; Antioch 5; Serdica 20; Chalcedon 2, 4; Trullo 7; 
Hagia Sophia 2. 
113 For λίβελλος, Ephesus 8, Cyril 3; see the table in section A above for others. 
114 Carthage 75, 97; Chalcedon 23. 
115 Chalcedon 30. 
116 Tarasius Fonti 2.326-327. 
117 Antioch 25, Basil 20. 
118 Serdica 14; Trullo 39; Protodeutera 13, 14 (συνοδικὴ διάγνωσις). 
119 E.g. Serdica 3, Cyril 1 (a κανονική ἀκρόασις), Theophilus 6 (ἀκριβοῦς ἐξετάσεως γινομένης). 
120 On Christianity's appropriation of Roman governance and legal forms, see Gaudemet 1958,322-30, 
378-407; Herrmann, 1980, 23-92, 207-231, 290-306; Hunt 1998,240-250;  Humfress 2007,196-211; Jones 
1964,874-894; Millar 2006,133-140. 
121 It has often been remarked that the most obvious Roman law borrowings in church law are in this area;  
e.g. Humfress 2007,208-209. 
122 Very frequent; e.g. Apostles 28 (where they are to be φανερά); Antioch 14, 15; Constantinople 6 
(including in the more technical form ἐκκλησιαστκὸν ἔγκλημα); Ephesus 9; Chalcedon 18 (directly 
appropriating the secular Roman condemnation of the crime of conspiracy, τὸ τῆς συνωμοσίας ἢ 
φρατρίας ἔγκλημα); Peter 12 (in the slightly more technical phrase ἔγκλημα προσάγειν), 13, 15; Basil 9 
(τὸ γὰρ ἔγκλημα ἐνταῦθα τῆς ἀπολυσάσης τὸν ἄνδρα ἅπτεται), 21 (ὑπάγειν ἐγκλήματι), 24, 33, 37, 41, 
53; Theophilus 3, 6, 9; Trullo 21 (ἐγκλήμασι κανονικοῖς), 98; Protodeutera 10, 13, 14.  
123 E.g. Laodicea 40, Cyril 1, Constantinople 6. 
124 Chalcedon 9. 
125 E.g. Antioch 4, 6, 12; Serdica 4, 13, 21. 
126 E.g. Constantinople 6 (esp. ἐκκλησιαστκὴ κατηγορία), Basil 61. 
127 E.g. Neocaeasrea 8, 9 (and here "φανερῶς"); Basil 61; Gregory Thaum. 8, 9; Protdeutera 9; the latter, 
Cyril 1. 
128 E.g. Gregory Thaum 8, 9. 
129 Apostolic Epilogue; Antioch 13; Protodeutera 3. 
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crime),130 ἐκκαλέω/ἔκκλησις (appeal),131; εὔθυνος/ἀνεύθυνος and ἔνοχος or ὑπεύθυνος 
(guilty/innocent and liable)132.  The concentration or repetition of some of these terms 
can nevertheless create a highly technical-legal impression.133   
Other terms are more clearly "legalese", or at least distinctly administration-
speak.  A good example is πρόκρινω, as in Nicaea 10: τοῦτο οὐ προκρίνει τῷ κανόνι τῷ 
ἐκκλησιαστικῷ.  This is a calque of the Latin praeiudicare, which denotes in legal texts 
any type of "prejudice", that is, impairment of, or harm or attribution of liability to 
someone or something, including very often, as here, "harm" to the validity or 
applicability of some rule.134  It is quite common in concilar acta and may be found 
several times throughout the corpus.135   
 Closely related are a number of technical parliamentary turns of phrase.  Thus 
we encounter διαλαλέω/διαλαλιά, an extremely common Greek parliamentary-legal 
calque of the Roman law interlocutio, i.e. an "interlocutory judgment".136  Formal 
decisions, judgments or rulings are of course often rendered with ἀποφαίνω/ἀπόφασις 
or γνώμη, both standard forms for sententia.137  Constantinople 394, a parliamentary 
extract, is full of such language, including as well a rare technical use of ἐμφανίζω 
(insinuare)138; the same texts also begins with a curiously formal (and technical?) 
statement of Nectarius "seeing" before him the two bishops in disagreement. 
 Other borrowings are not directly related to procedure or parliamentary process.  
Among the most prominent and common is δίκαιον/δίκαια, in the sense of legal 
rights/iura.  Thus, for example, in Ephesus 8, each province is to preserve its "inherent 
rights" (τὰ αὐτῇ προσόντα δίκαια); likewise in Chalcedon 12 there is a concern that 
                                                 
130 Very frequent; e.g. Apostles 54, 73; Ephesus 7; Basil 68, 70; Gennadius (Fonti 1.2.296); Trullo 12, 20, 
33, 50, 53, 77, 79, 88; II Nicaea 10, 18; Protodeutera 4, 6, 7. 
131 E.g. Serdica 3, 5;  Carthage 28, 125. 
132 Basil 42, Cyril 1, Theophilus 6 (ἐγλκήματι πορνείας ὑπεύθυνος), Chalcedon 29, Trullo 21. 
133 So, for example, the repetition of ἀπολογία and ἀποκατάστασις as a kind of legal formula in Antioch 4 
and 12; or of ἐὰν μὲν κατηγορηθέντες ἐλεγχθῶσι...ἐὰν δὲ ἑαυτοῖς ἐξείπωσι καὶ ἀποδῶσι in Gregory 
Thaum. 8, 9; or of ἐλεγχθῆναι φανερῶς in Neoceasrea 8, 9; or of εἰ μόνον ἐλεγχθείη in Protodeutera 14, 
15.  Areas of high levels of concentrated procedural terminology include Constantinople 6, Cyril 1, and 
much of Theophilus. 
134  Berger 1953,644; cf. Avotins 1992,181. 
135  Nicaea 10;  Carthage Acta 1 (Fonti 1.2.205); Theophilus 3, 5; Constantinople 394; Trullo 37; 
Protodeutera 7. 
136 Constantinople 394; Ephesus 7; Gennadius (Fonti 1.2.297). Avotins 1992,58; Berger 1953,512-513.   
137 E.g. Nicaea 5; Antioch 6, 14, 15; Serdica 4, 5, 14, 19, 20; Cyril 1; Theophilus 4; Gennadius (Fonti 
1.2.298). 
138 I.e. insinuare apud acta, that is, "enter into the public acts", here in its somewhat broader sense of 
"formally exhibit/demonstrate before a court".  See Avotins 1989,53-54; 1992,79-80; also under 
"ἐμφάνισις". 
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metropolitans preserve their οἰκεῖα δίκαια during imperial divisions of the jurisdictions; 
in Trullo 37 various ἐκκλησιαστικὰ δίκαια are to be unharmed.139   
Further examples of late Roman legalese may be found in Appendix C (5). 
Proprietary technical terminology is much more difficult to identify, aside from 
the penal provisions noted above.  The term κανών itself, as a regular term for an 
ecclesial rule, is among the best candidates. The technical cast of the term is conveyed 
especially strongly by the various adverbial and adjectival uses of the root: κανονικῶς 
or κανονικός.140  The canons constitute a sufficiently specialized and autonomous rule 
discourse to speak "canonically".  Another example may be the usage, twice, in Trullo 
41 and 46, in a monastic context, of the phrase μεθ᾽ εὐλογίας, with what seems to be a 
proprietary technical meaning of "with permission" (a usage retained in the Orthodox 
church today). 
Aside from these, the only proprietary Christian terminology in the corpus 
relates to specific institutions, the best candidate for which is probably the concept of a 
σύνοδος τελεία, which in its repetition in Antioch 16, 17 and 18 sound like a technical 
concept. 
More difficult to pinpoint than technical legal terminology is technical legal 
style or tone.   
One of its more obvious incarnations is perhaps the terse and economic prose 
found in some of the first-wave legislation, peremptory in tone and almost staccato in 
rhythm.  This stylization conveys a strong sense of the canonical rules' force, 
comprehensivity, and generality.  This style is particularly prominent in much of the 
Apostles, most of Gangra and Laodicea, much of Basil's third letter to Amphilochius 
(217), and Theophilus's ὑπομήστικον.  In the last, the highly administrative prose is 
economic and dense to the point of obscurity.     
 Other stylistic tropes also convey a sense of authority, precision and rule-
comprehensivity.  One of the most distinctive is what we may term "legal pleonasm".  
This involves the rapid successive restating of certain concepts in which the sense is 
shifted slightly, either through the use of different aspects or forms of an action (to 
condemn any common possible variant) or different tenses.  This type of writing is quite 
common in the secular leges.  It is never overwhelming in the canons, but does emerge 
occasionally.  Thus, for example, in Ephesus 7 "no one is permitted bring forward or 
                                                 
139 Other examples may be found in Constantinople 394, Ephesus 8, Trullo 39. 
140 E.g. Ephesus 9; Cyril 1; Trullo 21, 33; cf. Wenger 1942,119-125. 
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compose or construct another faith..."; in Constantinople 4 "...Maximus did not become 
and is not a bishop....and everything that that has beendone concerning him and by him 
[τῶν περὶ αὐτὸν καὶ τῶν παρ᾽ αὐτου] is declared invalid."; in Chalcedon 17 "...and if a 
city has been erected or aftewards will be erected by imperial authority....".  Sometimes, 
with pairs of near-synonyms, it is difficult to tell if one is encountering mere (and 
typical) Byzantine hendiadys, or if a real conceptual distinction is intended.141   
 Other typically "legal" stylistic tropes include the repetition of formulae, the use 
of "aforesaid" phrases, or the use of officious-sounding hyperbole.  See Appendix C (6) 
for examples.   
 Overlapping with legal stylizations are what we may term "legal turns of 
thought".  These are conceptual tendencies or patterns which convey a sense of legal 
technicality.   
The simplest and most obvious of such patterns is the tendency to write with 
frequent reference to other, usually older rules.142  Although not always strikingly 
"legal" if examined in isolated examples, the cumulative effect of repeated rule-
referencing strongly conveys the idea that one is writing with a closed system of formal 
norms.  Rule referencing may be found throughout the corpus – as the table in section A 
indicates – but is especially strong and noticeable in Gennadios, Basil, and virtually all 
of the second wave, where canons can be entirely given over to conveying or 
interpreting older rules.143   
A much broader and multi-faceted conceptual phenomenon is the pattern of 
speaking and thinking in exceptional detail, with attention to precision and the striving 
for comprehensiveness.  In effect, the texts read as if the rule-world is struggling to 
encompass as much of reality as possible and as carefully as possible.  Its most obvious 
manifestation are rules or questions which evince almost pedantic attention to very 
narrow issues or provisions.  Ancyra 14's concern to stipulate a very specific minimal 
rule requirement is a good example of the former type: fasters must at least taste meat, 
and then they may abstain (to prove they are not reviling meat-eating per se).  Similarly, 
Timothy 8 addresses the very specific problem of whether a woman at the verge of 
childbirth must fast during Holy Week (no); Timothy 13 is concerned with a minimal 
                                                 
141 See the instances of this type of stylization in Ephesus 1, 2, 3, 5, 9; Chalcedon 4, 27; Hagia Sophia 2; 
and Protodeutera 1, 5, 6, and 13. 
142 See generally the table in section A, above; also below, section E.1. 
143 For examples of this last, see Basil 1, 3, 8, 9, 12, 24, 47, 50, 51, 80; Trullo 6, 8, 14, 16, 36, 90 (among 
many others; see Historike 294-295); II Nicaea 5, 6, 11; Protodeutera 8, 9; Tarasios is essentially a 
canonical florilegium on simony.   
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requirement for sexual abstinence (couples must abstain from intercourse at least 
Saturday and Sunday); Basil 37 rules that a man who has married again after his first 
marriage to another man's wife will be punished for adultery for the first marriage – but 
not for the second; Theophilus 5 turns on whether the deacon Panuph married his niece 
before or after baptism.   
A particularly noticeable subset of this type of technical rule-detail work may be 
found in the frequent positing of exceptions to broader rules, often as asides.  For 
example, Apostles 54 forbids clerics from eating in taverns, unless they must stay at an 
inn while on a journey.  Laodicea 1 permits digamy, but only if there is no clandestine 
marriage.  Chalcedon forbids clerics from engaging in business affairs, but lists two 
exceptions: guardianship of minors or ecclesiastical adminstration.  Protodeutera 5 is 
quick to insert two specific exceptions to its three-year novitiate rule: those who are sick 
or who are already living a monastic-like life.  Many other instances of such provisos 
may be found.144  
Another subset of this type of thinking emerges when considerable pains are 
taken to work through a variety of different, detailed aspects of the same general rule or 
problem, either within one canon, or across a series of canons.  This tendency leaves the 
impression of very careful, almost finicky, concern for comprehensiveness and 
thoroughness, and often suggests an agonistic rule environment.  Many of the instances 
of legal pleonasm above may be counted here, but a good general example is Gangra 7 
which is careful to specify as problematic both the taking or giving of offerings against 
the will of the bishop or anyone entrusted with these things.  Ephesus 2 makes separate 
mention of both bishops who never condemned Nestorius, as well as those who did 
condemn him but then back-slided.  Ephesus 4 specifies that both private and public 
adherence to Nestorianism is forbidden.  II Nicaea 10 is careful to stipulate that clerics 
may only come to Constantinople and serve in nobles' houses with the permission of 
both their bishop and the patriarch of Constantinople.  For further examples, see 
Appendix C (7). 
Even more revealing of a technical concern for detail – and conveying a strong 
sense of operating within a well-defined rule system – are the various instances when a 
later rule fills in, or corrects, small details or gaps is earlier legislation.  Basil 24, for 
example, addresses a narrow rule-gap in Pauline legislation: if widows who marry are to 
be overlooked in the distributions, what about widowers?  Timothy 5 is a response to a 
                                                 
144 For example, in Basil 13; Ancyra 11; Antioch 11; Chalcedon  4, 25; Trullo 68; Protodeutera 4. 
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question on the details of Paul's rules about couples' mutual sexual abstentions (the 
night before liturgy?). Trullo contains a very large number of such examples.  Canon 5 
repeats prohibitions against clergy living with women (particularly Nicaea 3, but also 
Ancyra 19, Basil 88, and more vaguely Carthage 38), but now adds a clear punishment, 
and extends the rule to eunuchs as well.  Canon 6 cites Apostolic 26, that only readers 
and singers may marry, and reaffirms it by stating that presbyters, deacons and sub-
deacons may not marry after ordination; the intention must be to counter attempts to 
assimilate subdeacons to the lesser clergy named in Apostolic 26.  Canon 15 supplies a 
minimum age for ordination of subdeacons, which had been overlooked in the earlier 
legislation (which is summarized in canon 14).  Further examples may be found in 
Appendix C (8) 
 These general conceptual-legal tendencies are sometimes accompanied by – or 
develop into – manifestations of what we today might consider real "legal scientific" 
discourse.  These include the development of formal schematizations and 
categorizations, the regular use of formal distinctions, concepts, and definitions, and the 
employment of rule principles.  All evince the strongly "jurisprudential" concern to 
explore or determine how rules can be applied systematically to a variety of fact 
situations. 
Among the best examples of sustained technical schematization and 
categorization are the lapsi categorizations of Ancyra 1-9 and Peter. Both show a 
concern for the methodical drawing of careful distinctions and an interest in rational 
systematization in the (more or less) descending pattern from higher ranking to lower 
ranking and less problematic to more problematic.145  Also important are the graded 
schemata of heretics, primarily in Basil 1, Constantinople 7, and Trullo 95, but also 
Nicaea 8 and 19, Laodicea 7 and 8 and Basil 54.  The most extreme example is Gregory 
of Nyssa's division of penitential rules into the Platonic schema of the faculties of the 
soul.146  A more localized example would be the careful distinctions on the age and 
status of perpetrators of bestiality in Ancyra 16.  Although only Gregory of Nyssa 
engages in building a multi-layer branching set of divisions (sin is divided into three 
categories, each category is divided into further types of sins, and so on – a conceptual 
"pyramid" as Fuhrmann calls it)147, these schemata all evince a concern for both rule-
comprehensiveness, definition and careful distinction.  The categorization of lapsi and 
                                                 
145 Something similar may be found in Ephesus 1-6 and Protodeutera 13-15. 
146 These will be discussed more fully in chapter four.   
147 Fuhrman 1960; see further chapter 4.F. 
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heretics may also be considered one of the very few important proprietary legal-like 
distinctions of the canonical tradition. 
 Formal concepts, distinctions and definitions may also be found.  Most may be 
regarded as commonplaces. Particularly striking is the very stock distinction between 
voluntary and involuntary actions.148 Basil 8 explores the difference with reference to 
murder in great detail, considering a number of different possible scenarios. One may 
also find the distinctions of unwritten/written,149 knowledge/ignorance,150 or a crime 
confessed/un-confessed151.  Many of these distinctions emerge in the context of 
determining a penitential tariff, as potential mitigating or exacerbating factors.  Related 
are a number of formal concepts concerning the circumstances of an act, such as a 
person's "intention" or "disposition" (προαίρεσις, διάθεσις, πρόθεσις)152, or "need" or 
"force" (ἀνάγκη, βία)153.  Basil also speaks of custom having "the force of law"154. 
More specific distinction and definition-making may also be found.  This is 
particularly obvious in Gregory of Nyssa where distinctions are explicitly named as 
διαιρέσεις and διαφοραί, and include extended discussion of the difference between 
adultery and fornication (canon 4) or stealing and robbery (canon 6). Elsewhere in the 
corpus other fairly specific distinctions can become important topics of discussion, 
including those between self-castration and non-self-castration,155 formed and unformed 
fetuses,156 different degrees of sexual contact,157 or widows and virgins158.    
Some canons are specially focused on whether a certain case may be subsumed 
under a set definition.  Basil 2, for example, treats the scope of application of the 
technical definition of murder: does it include abortion? (yes)  Basil 31 deals with the 
problem of whether a woman whose husband has gone away and marries before 
assurance of his death is indeed an adulterer (yes).  In a similar way, Protodeutera 9 
mostly revolves around the meaning of the verb "to strike". 
Very occasionally, principles and maxims – regula-like material – are voiced.  
The biblical prohibition of double jeopardy, for example, is employed in such a way 
                                                 
148 Ancyra 22, 23; Gregory Nyss. 2, 5; Basil 8 (also called a διαφορά here). 
149 Basil 91, 92; II Nicaea 7.  
150 E.g. Basil 7, 27, 46; Trullo 79. 
151 Gregory of Nyss. 4, 6; Gregory Thaum. 8,9; Basil 61. 
152 Nicaea 12; Basil 8, 10, 11, 53; Gregory Nyss. 8; Neoceasarea 6, 12; Carthage 47 (although these last 
three are with specific reference to baptismal theology). 
153 E.g.Gregory Thaum. 1; Gregory Nyss. 3; Ancyra 3; Chalcedon 25; Trullo 41. 
154 Basil 87 
155 Nicaea 1; Protodeutera 8. 
156 Basil 2 
157 Basil 70 
158 Basil 18 
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three times.159  Likewise Basil 40 should probably be read as appropriating a Roman 
legal principle when he notes that a slave who has married without her master's consent 
is a fornicator since "the contracts of those who are subject to another have no force".160  
Protodeutera 17 likewise contains a quite explicit citation of a Roman regula: τό γε 
σπάνιον οὐδαμοῦ νόμον τῆς ἐκκλησίας τιθέμενοι ["...not making the exception in any 
way the law of the church"].  This is a paraphrase of Digest 1.3.4 = Basilica 2.1.5.161 
 A few principles may be considered proprietary.  Although highly theological in 
content, Basil's formulation in canon 27 that a presbyter who has sinned sexually cannot 
serve liturgically as "it is illogical for one to bless another who ought to heal his own 
sins" seems to have become accepted as a kind of canonical principle in Trullo, cited as 
such in canon 3.162  In Basil 26 we also may not be wrong to hear a proprietary 
canonical principle in "Fornication is not marriage, nor the beginning of marriage". 
Finally, to complete our survey, a number of places in the canons are notable for 
simply involving particularly subtle, ingenious, complex or sustained jurisprudential 
logic of one type or another – their "legal" texture is unmistakable.  Frequently these 
combine many of the foregoing elements.    
Some of the most impressive are those which contradict some overly-subtle rule-
interpretation, or attempt to close loopholes.  Protodeutera 9 for example is written to 
counter narrow rule-agonistic interpretation of an older canon: it confronts those who 
attempt to evade Apostolic canon 27 by ordering people struck, instead of striking them 
themselves.  It disallows this distinction and – in a fairly technical way – directly 
isolates and addresses the problem of the definition of "strike" in the canons, opting for 
a simple comprehensive definition ("the canon chastens simply 'striking'"...).  Similarly, 
II Nicaea 12, probably the most "legalistic" canon in its source, directly addresses a very 
narrow and technical and ingenious rule loophole: seculars may not acquire church 
property directly, nor through an intermediary clerical possessor.  It also contains 
considerable secular-legal diction, and build its regulation around an older fixed rule 
(Apostolic 38). 
Sometimes the ingenuity and subtlety is more on the canons' own part than any 
targeted interpretation. Trullo 13, for example, seems to read Carthage 3 and 25, on 
                                                 
159 Apostolic 25; Basil 3, 32. The principle is from Nahum 1.9.  Basil 20 also cites ὅσα γὰρ ὁ νόμος λέγει, 
τοῖς ἐν τῷ νόμῳ λαλεῖ (Rom. 3:19) to void the professions of virginity of heretics. 
160 See Buckland 1963,419-420; Kaser 1955,1.314. 
161 Τοὺς νόμους ἀπὸ τῶν ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πλεῖστον συμβαινόντων, οὐ μὴν τῶν σπανίως εἰσάγεσθαι δεῖ.  The text 
in Protodeutera could, of course, be an exact citation of another paraphrase.  See also Basil 87, 91 92; 
Constantinople 394; Protodeutera 7 for other possible examples of secular legal rules or concepts. 
162 And again in Trullo 26 as part of a fuller citation of Basil 27. 
 169
clerical continence, as properly only referring to sexual continence before the service of 
the liturgy – a distinction not entirely evident in the canons in question.  Trullo 16, 
interpreting Neocaesarea 15, draws a fairly fine distinction between deacons who serve 
liturgically, and the deacons of Acts who were specially appointed to address the needs 
of the community.   
Many of the most sustained instances of such reasoning may be found in Basil, 
whose work often reads as a virtual rule-commentary.  Basil 1 is representative of many 
of Basil's techniques and concerns.163  The canon is above all about finding specific 
rules about reception of different types of heretics: thus he begins by talking about 
customs that prevail, then noting that no canon on the Pepouzeni exists, then working 
through how a rule for them might be found, then noting different rules on the Cathari, 
and Encratites, and finally, most strikingly, worrying about how certain actions imply 
broader rule consequences for others (namely, that the acceptance of certain Encratite 
bishops implies acceptance of those in communion with them οἷον κανόνα τινα).  In the 
course of all this, Basil makes a technical distinction between three types of heretics, 
defines each type, weighs different traditional rules – one of which, Cyprian's, he 
exposits in full, going step by step through its rather fine, multi-step logic – worries 
about objections and complications (e.g. what it means that the Encratites accept 
orthodox baptism), and offers his own reasoned opinions.   
We thus have very many classical "jurisprudential" concerns, in considerable 
concentration and all very near the surface of conscious concern: rule finding and 
precedents, distinctions, definitions, systematic classification, problems with authority 
of rules, problems with setting precedents, and ways of harmonizing conflicting rules.  
Even one of the most important characteristics of real jurisprudential thought, the 
logical generation of new rules from old ones, i.e. making the rule system itself create 
rules, is present, if vaguely. 
Another good Basilian example – and one of the greatest examples of technical 
rule discourse in the corpus – is Basil 87, the letter to Diodorus.  Here Basil's explicit 
target is a very fine interpretation of the Mosaic law which justifies taking one's dead 
wife's sister in marriage on the grounds of Leviticus 18:18: "You will not take your 
wife's sister, to uncover her nakedness, to rival her, while your wife still lives".  The 
argument was made that one could take one's wife's sister once one's wife was dead.  
Basil, extremely annoyed at this "σόφισμα", responds angrily that everyone should 
                                                 
163 Other good "jurisprudential" examples include Basil 8, 9, 10, 18, 21, and 63.  
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know better than this, even without detailed reasoning, but that he will provide 
arguments "from reason" (ἐκ τῶν λογισμῶν) anyway.  He then goes on to analyze, for 
example, how "syllogizing from logical inference from the silence of a law is to make 
one a lawgiver, and not to let the laws speak" (τὸ δὲ ἐκ τῆς τοῦ ἀκολούθου ἐπιφορᾶς τὸ 
σιωπηθὲν συλλογίζεσθαι νομοθετοῦντός ἐστιν, οὐ τὰ τοῦ νόμου λέγοντος), and 
produces several pages of similar logical and exegetical arguments showing the 
absurdity of such reasoning, and the likelihood of his own interpretation.   
Further examples of similar extended "legal" discussions, from throughout the 
corpus, may be found in Appendix C (9). 
 
2. The legal whole? 
When the above instance of technical-legal language and thought are considered 
together, en masse, it becomes difficult to avoid a simple conclusion: technical legal 
discourse does exist in the canons.  The canons are entirely capable of speaking and 
thinking in a manner consistent with modern expectations of a fairly closed, formalist 
and agonistic rule system.  The large number of parallels, borrowings and cross-overs 
with secular Greco-Roman legal technical discourse also demonstrate that the canons 
can move very comfortably in the world of their contemporary secular jurisprudential 
culture: they can, and do, engage in the same type of "rule-think" as the Roman law. 
 This first-blush consonance with modern expectations – and even Roman law – 
is, however, deceptive.  Despite the impression that may be given by amassing a 
number of technical legal characteristics in one place, as above, the corpus does not in 
fact read as a primarily or convincingly technical-legal text – certainly not by modern 
standards, and not even, I think, in comparison with the Digest or other contemporary 
Roman legal works (although here the difference may be more quantitative than 
qualitative).  Two factors work against such a reading. 
 First, technical legal discourse is present only very unevenly in the corpus.  
Whereas modern technical discourse, virtually by definition, is programmatic, 
systematic, and above all consistent, this is not so in the canons.  Technical legal 
stylizations and characteristics – formulas, technical diction, high levels of details, use 
of principles, arguments from definition, etc. –  tend to fade in and out throughout the 
corpus.  Some parts of the corpus are thus very legal sounding, such as Antioch, Basil, 
some of Carthage, Gangra, Protodeutera, and many of the acta extracts.  Elsewhere 
sources evince hardly any technical-legal content at all – the two canonical poems of 
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Gregory Nazianzen and Amphilochius, and most of the very general letters of Dionysius 
and Gregory Thaumatourgos, are obvious examples.  Most often sources are simply 
collections of straight rules, embellished in various ways, but with hardly enough 
technical legal stylization or content to distinguish them markedly from any other types 
of rules.  Individual canons may thus be exceptionally "legal": for example, 
Protodeutera 9 on "striking" or the property-focused II Nicaea 12; or Basil 1 on heretic 
baptism.  Others, not mentioned above, would include Constantinople 6, a huge 
meditation on procedure; or Constantinople 394, a technical discussion of the number of 
bishops needed to ordain and depose another bishop; or Chalcedon 28, a detailed canon, 
filled with legal stylizations.  But such rules must be placed alongside the distinctly un-
legal Carthaginian doctrinal canons (109-116), or the Basilian exegetical canons (15-
16), or canons such as Neocaesarea's bizarre "canon" 4 ("If anyone, desiring a woman, 
intends to lie with her, but his desire does not come to fruition, it is evident that he has 
been saved by grace") or the homily-like regulations of Ephesus 9 or Trullo 96 – or 
simply the huge range of rules that are little more than simple statements and 
prohibitions.  It is also noteworthy that certain topics tend to attract more technical-legal 
discourse than others.  If one were to follow carefully the topics covered by many of the 
examples listed above, one would find that topics which are closely akin to matters 
treated in Roman law, secular or ecclesiastic, tend to attract the most technical attention: 
marriage, procedure, heretics, jurisdiction, finances, interactions with the secular 
administration.164 
Even the sources that are more technically-inclined are rarely technical or 
"legal" in the same way.  Gangra, for example, is precise, formulaic and detailed, but 
quite simple and clear; Theophilus is very dense and technical, an example of work-a-
day administrative prose; Antioch is garrulous but officious and refers to a number of 
secular administrative institutions;  Athanasius is rhetorically highly wrought but very 
methodical; Constantinople 6 is very dry, but Roman in content and diction, and highly 
comprehensive; Basil 1 or 87 are highly theological in content, but work through 
specific rule and classification problems in great detail; Protodeutera is often novel-like 
in its structures and legal stylizations, but quite ornate; and so on.  All of these texts in 
some way feel distinctly "legalistic", but consistent patterns of technical rule writing are 
hard to identify.  Even individual sources evince considerable variation.  Trullo 3 or 16 
show a certain degree of jurisprudential subtlety, but other rules, such as Trullo 96 are 
                                                 
164 This is a point that merits further study. 
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virtually moral-rhetorical homilies, and most are little more than straight prohibition.  
And often it is difficult to determine if a source, while technical in some respect, is 
legally so: Athanasius' distinction of "canonical" books and books that can be "read" 
(κανονιζόμενα vs. ἀναγινωσκόμενα) in Athanasius 2 is perhaps a good example; but 
even Gregory of Nyssa's programme of divisio is not for the most part particularly 
"legal" in texture – it is medical, psychological, and philosophical, and fairly typical of 
elementary textbooks of many varieties.165  
 The second mitigating factor, and the more important one, is the huge quantity 
of not-so-technical discourse in the canons – discourse that suggests that the canons are 
not primarily meant to be read as a closed rule system in an agonistic environment, or as 
a systematic whole, or as an exercise in rule-logic.  These "un-technical" characteristics 
take a variety of forms, and operate on a variety of levels, but even the more technical 
moments in the canons are often revealed upon closer inspection to be not quite so 
technical at all.   
The penal system, for example, while showing considerable regularity relatively 
speaking, is in fact mostly notable – from a modern perspective, at least – for its variety 
of terminology, its lack of standardization, and its numerous gaps and ambiguities.166  
Thus the difference between ἀνάθεμα and ἀποκήρυξις, for example, is hardly obvious.   
Further, many canons simply don't specify punishments, or they are simply quite 
vague.167 
Many more specific examples might be cited. Basil 87, for instance, the Letter to 
Diodore, is one of the most jurisprudential-sounding texts of the corpus, but closer 
suggests it turns more on simple moral outrage than real jurisprudential logic: its critical 
argument is that one should not be acting passionately. Likewise the rule against 
double-jeopardy may be articulated more than once, but contradictions are not difficult 
to find.168  Gangra seems to evince many formulae and a concern for detail, but its 
overall structure is chaotic, and shows little rational progression or concern for logical 
topic coverage –five canons, for example, scattered throughout the source, touch on 
virtually the same topic.169  
                                                 
165 Fuhrmann 1960. 
166 See the references in nn. 106-108. 
167 Much of Laodicea and Serdica are example for the former; for the latter, see for example Chalcedon 3, 
9, 14. 
168 E.g. Apostolic 29, Neocaesarea 1, Serdica 1. 
169 Abhorring marriage: 1, 4, 9, 10, 14. 
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Also glaring are the many small elements of the canonical texts that can best be 
described – by modern standards – as instances of "legal clumsiness".  In these texts 
considerable ambiguity is created through unclear drafting, or rules are asserted that 
seem inappropriate, irrelevant or hopelessly vague for a system of logical rule 
application.  For example, Apostolic 60 rules that pseudepigraphal books cannot be read 
publicly "as holy works" "to the harm of the people".  Does this mean they could be 
read if not considered holy and/or not read to harm the people?  In Laodicea 10 children 
are not to be married to heretics "indiscriminately" (ἀδιαφόρως); could they be married 
to heretics with care? Gangra 1 condemns any ascetic who "reviles" a married woman 
"as if she we not able to enter the kingdom [of heaven]".  Does this mean that reviling 
with another type of ideological intention might be permitted?  Antioch 19 notes that it 
is "better" that a full synod elect a bishop, but not necessary – why do we need to know 
what is "better"? The minimal rule should suffice.  Neocaesarea 2 simply notes that 
penance for the spouse of a fraternal digamist will be "difficult"(!).  In Basil 53 a widow 
slave has "perhaps" (?) not fallen too greatly if she gives herself over to an abduction 
marriage. Many other examples of this type might be cited.  Clearly these texts are not 
meant to be read as precise technical rule-cogs in a smoothly-running formalist rule-
machine. 
 Finally, many canons are full of material that would simply be considered 
"extraneous" from a modern technical-legal perspective: moral or theological asides, 
scriptural exhortations, rhetorical decoration, or small harangues.  These elements can 
often submerge the more technical elements of rule articulation – and if read as part of 
technical rule articulation they can create considerable ambiguity.  They are the topic of 
the next section. 
The overall complexion of technical legal discourse in the canons is thus quite 
disconcerting, and particularly when the corpus is considered as a whole.170  On the one 
hand, technical-legal handling of the rules is clearly possible, and can even appear in 
quite serious and sustained ways.  It would be a mistake to suggest that this is a legal 
world that is unconcerned with comparatively narrow problems of rule interpretation 
and application, or logical consistency, or even the development and use of a technical 
"grammar" of terms, principles and definitions.  This is a world that is capable of and 
values detailed "rule-think".   
                                                 
170 And, note, we have for the most part not even been considering the many points of apparent 
contradiction within the substantive provisions of the law – on which see the references in the 
Introduction, nn. 3, 8. 
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On the other hand, this technical legal discourse is clearly not a primary or 
default mode of church-rule exposition; it is not the "controlling" discourse of the 
system.  There is no sense that the system as a whole is trying particularly hard to 
constitute itself as a convincing technical legal mechanism, or that the canons are 
primarily being written for such a discourse.  (Indeed, in this respect, this section has 
been arguing the obvious: even a quick reading of the canons will disabuse one of the 
notion that this material is written or edited to look anything close to the technical 
products of modern formalist legislators – and thus the reason modern Orthodox 
canonical manuals read very differently than the canons themselves!)  Instead, technical 
legal discourse tends to appear occasionally, almost opportunistically, if sometimes 
dramatically.  It is thus present, but it does not dominate, and it does not constitute 
fundamental framework of the system.  As odd as it may seem, then, it is apparently 
only a part of a much broader, irregular, and variegated legal discourse – not an 
unimportant part, but only a part.  
 
E. Normativity III: the non-legal legal language of the canons   
The fact that technical-legal discourse is only a part of canonical discourse raises 
the question of what the other parts might be. 
Functionally, the canonical texts may be understood to "do" a number of things.  
Their first and most obvious function is to convey rules, and in this function their 
technical-legal aspects become most evident.  This has been the subject of the previous 
two sections.  But in order to engage in the above analyses of the canons as rules, we 
have had to artificially distill their "pure" rule content from the canonical texts 
themselves as compositional wholes.  In so doing, we have had to ignore much other 
"extraneous" matter that is present.  This is a process that modern readers engage in 
almost unconsciously when examining such texts: ancient laws are read as a quarry 
from which legal rules and doctrine might be, with care, and often some frustration, 
extracted.  In this it is very easy to overlook what else might be going on in these texts – 
and to ask why they seem to be so full of "extraneous" matter in the first place.   
Recently, in Byzantine law studies, and elsewhere, a growing recognition has 
developed that laws can have not only a pragmatic rule-function but also a symbolic 
function.171  This realization has emerged from the need to explain the function of rules 
                                                 
171 In Byzantine law, see especially Fögen 1987; Haldon 1990,258-264; cf. Harries 1991,56-59 or also 
Nelson 2008,309 on early medieval western collections as "totemic and inspiration as well as practical".  
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that otherwise seem to contain completely obsolete or impossible provisions – like 
much of later Byzantine law, essentially recycled 6th C material.  In this view, it is 
recognized that laws provide not only – and maybe not even primarily – a set of real-life 
rules, but an interpretative framework for a society's self-understanding, a template for a 
culture's identity and social functioning: they "enunciate a more or less consistent world 
view, a moral system...regardless of its practical relevance in day-to-day terms..."172  
Such laws still provide a kind of normativity and regulation, but it is much more geared 
towards internalizing broad narratives of social order and socio-cultural behaviorial 
expectations than developing and maintaining a workable rule-system. 
In such a view, the presence of many "extraneous" ideological elements in the 
laws suddenly becomes less surprising, particularly if we extend this idea of the 
"symbolic" nature of law to accept that laws are not simply used in a symbolic way – a 
kind of subsidiary usage in moments of cultural decline – but are actually written and 
idealized in such a way.  These extraneous elements, as in the prologues, are suddenly 
not so extraneous – they are not simply "rhetorischer Schmuck"173. They are instead 
speaking to other normative dimensions of the text, aside from the rule's straight rule-
content, but not necessarily any less essential or unimportant.  Indeed, in this case, it 
would be a mistake to consider these elements as extraneous to the nature of the texts as 
laws at all – a proper law qua law speaks "symbolically": it speaks to broader narratives 
of normativity.  Incidentally, this is precisely how Plato says laws are supposed to be 
composed.174 
 In late antique and Byzantine law it is, I think, quite possible to understand law-
writing in this way: proper laws are padded, symbolic-rhetorical version of law filled 
with moral admonition, elegant turns of phrases, and imperial ideology. The Romans 
and Byzantines were perfectly capable, of course, of extracting and abstracting (more or 
less) pure rule content.  The civil codifications (quite explicitly), the synopses, the 
systematic rubrics, the later Byzantine handbooks, even the Institutes – all are witnesses 
to such rule-extraction.  Nevertheless, it is always quite clear that these texts are in a 
                                                                                                                                               
The question is common in ancient near-eastern law, where the matter is often contested between those 
who wish to see the ancient codes as "real" law (i.e. of practical rule-force of a formalist type) and those 
who see them as only symbolic/propogandistic, or perhaps academic, in orientation; see Westbrook 1985, 
Roth 2000.  
172 Haldon 1990,258. 
173 As Fögen 1987,147 puts it, making this very point. 
174 See Laws 721b-e, an extraordinary passage, where Plato gives an example of a law in a short, "pure" 
rule form (the wrong way of legislating), and a longer, pedagogically and philosophically "padded" 
version (the correct way). 
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sense the secondary forms of the law: they are the practical handbooks and the aids for 
day-to-day operations.  When one writes a real law in late antiquity and Byzantium – 
i.e. a proper, full imperial novel – all of the padded and extraneous bits tend to 
resurface. Voss's work is in many ways the ideal illustration of this phenomenon.  If he 
is correct that the late Roman imperial chancery tended to produce two types of texts for 
laws – properly coherent and regular rule texts for internal use, and rhetorically ornate 
versions embellished by the quaestors for publication – it is clear that the real, i.e. 
published law is the rhetorical version.  This version of the law is the version marked as 
culturally important, high-status and valued. Anything else is for quiet technical in-
house consumption.175  Although we might still wish to idealize and study this (murky) 
bureaucratic underworld of technical legal coherence and pure rule expression as law's 
"real" life,176 it is quite clear that late Romans and Byzantines would tend to do the 
opposite.  Law in its most ideal form, its most proper form, does not simply confine 
itself to pure rule content.  It is supposed to be filled with broader cultural padding.   
The "extraneous" elements in the canons may be analyzed as a variety of 
compositional features, themes, emphases, and strategies around the pure and technical 
rule content.  For convenience, this material may be analyzed in two stages.  First, three 
fundamental discourses or framework strategies may be identified that convey, present 
and colour the rule material.  These represent the basic functions, agendas, and modes 
of presentation of the "extraneous" material.  Second, the most prominent assemblages 
of ideas, motifs, images, references, and inter-textual connections may be examined 
individually. These represent the fundamental contextual referents of the canons as a 
whole.   
 
1. Three Principal Discourses: Tradition, Pedagogy Persuasion 
Aside from conveying rules, the canons "do" three other principal things. First, the 
canons tend to look backwards: they speak to and from tradition.  The canons are thus 
constantly positioning themselves in relation to older rule material, and speaking to the 
present from the past.  Second, the canons teach.  The canons are constantly explaining, 
re-enforcing, or drawing out the broader consequences of the rule material.  Third, and 
closely related to the second, the canons persuade and dissuade.  The canons exhort and 
                                                 
175 Voss 1982. 
176 See for example Honoré 2004,119, concerned to noe that contemporaries in late antiquity could "read 
between the lines" of their rhetoric legal texts to understand the real (legal) meaning.  This is a good 
example of wanting to read through the rhetoric to law, instead of reading the rhetoric as law. 
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chastise, honour and dishonour, and generally employ numerous rhetorical devices to 
encourage or discourage certain types of behaviour. 
The discourse of tradition is extremely pervasive.177  It entails the constant 
positioning of the rule-writing against a broader background of regulative tradition.  
This positioning may entail a number of different relations.  The dominant relation is 
that of coherence and adherence: one writes rules "according to" past authorities, or as 
simply renewing older authorities.  It may often, however, also involve some type of 
clarification, interpretation, modification (often a relaxation) or extension. Thus, for 
example, Ancyra 21 relaxes a "earlier rule" (πρότερος ὅρος) on women who engage in 
abortion from life-long excommunication to ten years;  Chalcedon 28 brings out further 
consequences for patriarchal rights of Constantinople 2; Trullo 6 clarifies that only 
readers and cantors may marry after ordination, slightly modifying an clarifying earlier 
rulings (Apostolic 26; Ancyra 10); and so on.  At times this interpretative relationship 
may become so pronounced as to transform canons into virtual commentaries on older 
rules, especially when the traditional rule is listed very near the head of the canon.  This 
is true of many of Basil's longer rules, but may also be found elsewhere.178  Sometimes 
older traditions are also more or less simply rejected – although usually on the basis of 
yet other traditions. Basil 1, with extensive traditional argumentation, explicitly contests 
Dionysius of Alexandria and Cyprian's views on re-baptism; or Trullo 12, with 
reference to Scripture, essentially overturns Apostolic 5, which permitted episcopal 
marriages.179  
 There are three primary traditional referents: 1) Scripture; 2) specific canonical 
rulings; 3) vaguer "customs" or "traditions" "of the fathers".  The last group, the most 
nebulous, includes references to ἔθη, παραδόσεις, ὁ κανών (in its older, more generic 
sense), and similar concepts.  Occasionally, especially in the second-wave sources, 
other specific patristic and liturgical sources are also cited as traditional authorities.180 
Scriptural referencing – referencing to the ultimate source of traditional 
authority –  is the most common and persistent in the corpus as a whole.  Its distribution 
is nevertheless irregular.  Its presence may be felt most intensely in the earliest material, 
                                                 
177 For some discussion of similar tendencies in the secular legal literature, see Honig 1960,127-144.  
Humfress 2005,171 is right, I think, to see even Justinian's legislation as presenting itself as 
fundamentally rooted in the past.  
178 For example, Nicaea 2, 5, 13; Basil: 2, 4, 7, 8, 9, 13, 18, 26; Gregory of Nyssa; Chalcedon 28; Trullo 
6;  II Nicaea 3, 6, perhaps 12; Protodeutera 8-11. 
179 Trullo is particularly notable for its confrontation, to various degrees, of earlier rules.  See 3, 12, 13, 
28, 30, 32, 33, 40, 55, 65.  
180 See Appendix C (10). 
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especially the patristic writings of Dionysius, Peter, and Gregory Thaumatourgos, 
Athanasius 1, and in the latest material, i.e. the second-wave material.181   It is at its 
least intense, not surprisingly, in the very laconic legislation of Neocaesarea, Gangra, 
and Laodicea, and in narrowly administrative types of documents, such as Theophilus' 
ὑπομνηστικόν.  Even in these canons, however, it can emerge quite prominently (e.g., 
Neocaesearea 15).  In the Apostles, it presence is especially pronounced.  In this, it is 
very interesting that even the Apostolic Canons "look backwards" and ground their 
decisions in even earlier tradition:  Jesus' teaching, the Old Testament, and the Apostles' 
own actions and writings in the New Testament.182   
The second type of references, to earlier more or less specific canonical rulings, 
is also very common.  It too can become rare in some of the shortest 4th C canons, but it 
is, overall, surprisingly consistent across the entire corpus. From virtually its inception 
to its end the canonical material is thus being written – very consciously – against the 
background of a quite substantial and concrete rule-world.183 The table above in section 
A is a good guide to its distribution.  For more details, and examples, see Appendix C 
(11).  
The third, less specific type of expression of traditional adherence (sometimes 
rejection)184 is no less frequent.  The canons are littered with expressions such as 
"according to the ecclesiastical canon" (in a general sense; Laodicea 1); "the majority 
said that..." (Neocaesarea 9); "it has been judged by the fathers that..." (Gregory Nyss. 
2); "the ancients judged that...it seems good to those from the beginning that...it seemed 
good to the ancients that...our fathers considered that.... (Basil 1, 18); according to the 
prevailing usage (συνήθεια) (Constantinople 2);185 "following everywhere the decrees 
of the holy fathers... according to custom (ἔθος) (Chalcedon 28);186 or "according to a 
most ancient tradition..." (παράδοσις)(Trullo 69)187.  Sometimes whole sources are 
                                                 
181 In Trullo, for example, see the use of Scripture in 7, 12, 13, 16, 54, 60, 61, 64, 65, 67, 70, 72, 76, 83, 
85, 88, 89, (somewhat less so) 100, and 101; or in II Nicaea 2, 4, 5, 7, 12, 13, 15, 16, 18, 22. 
182 See for example Apostles 3, 25, 27, 29, 41. 
183 This has often been remarked for the early tradition in particular; see, for example, Fonti  2.500-501; 
Hess 2002,77-79; Schwartz 1936a,179-181, 186-187.  Broadly relevant to this phenomenon is the 
discussion of the interrelationship and dependence of norms in early canonical sources; see Sources 
Apostles; Ohme 1998 passim;; cf. too the notes in the Deferrari  translation (1926) of Basil's canonical 
epistles. 
184 E.g. Nicaea 15; Basil 21; Gregory Nyss. 8; Trullo 28, 65. 
185 For further συνήθεια references, see Nicaea 7, 15, 18 (cf. 6 σύνηθες);  Constantinople 2, 7; Carthage 
70; Trullo 39; II Nicaea 15; Basil 3, 4, 21, 89, 91, 92; Gregory Nyss. 8. 
186 For further ἔθος references, see Nicaea 6; Ephesus 8; Chalcedon 30; Trullo 28, 37, 39, 62, 65, 90; II 
Nicaea 7, 14; Basil 87, 91, 92; Theophilus 1, 2, 3. 
187 For further παράδοσις references, see Nicaea 7; Gangra Epilogue; Carthage 3, 24; Chalcedon 8; Trullo 
29, 69; II Nicaea 7; Basil 91-92; Peter 15; Gregory Nyss. 6. 
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framed by such general professions of traditional loyalty, most notably Gangra, 
Carthage, Trullo and II Nicaea, as already noted in chapter two. 
The full force of all of these types of expressions is best illustrated by examples 
which combine all types of traditional texturing.  Nicaea, for example, despite its own 
sense of authority as a "holy and great council" (canon 8, 14, 15, 18), is particularly full 
of such references, constantly articulating its legislation with reference to past 
authorities.  Thus canon 2 begins by condemning ordinations "against the ecclesiastical 
canon"; canon 5 introduces its topic very clearly with the citing and affirmation of "the 
opinion/decision according to the canon..." (ἡ γνώμη κατὰ τὸν κανόνα); canons 6 and 7 
famously start "Let the ancient customs prevail..." and then later "Since a usage and 
ancient tradition has prevailed..."; canon 13, very much like 5, treats its topic 
commentary-style with the citation of "the ancient and canonical law" (ὁ παλαιὸς καὶ 
κανονικὸς νόμος), which is to be preserved "even now"; canon 15 treats the transfer of 
clergy as entirely a traditional problem, namely that of a bad συνήθεια that is "against 
the canon"; canon 16 starts by chastising those who neither fear God nor know "the 
ecclesiastical canon"; canon 17 takes as its starting point the fact that some have 
"forgotten" the scriptural rule against lending at interest (Prov. 26:11); and finally canon 
18 begins with condemning a practice by asserting that "neither the canon or usage has 
handed down that...", a combination of three common tradition-vocabulary words 
(κανών, συνήθεια and παραδιδ-) .  In other canons traditional references are present, if 
not in the lead position.  Thus canon 9 mentions those "acting against the canon" and 
canon 10 does not permit ignorance to prejudice the canon: "this does not prejudice 
[προκρίνει] the canon".188 
Other examples may be found in Appendix C (12). 
The second major discourse in the canons is that of pedagogy.  We have already 
noted that pedagogy is hard-wired into the ancient conceptualization of law: law is 
pedagogy of the social soul, and it presumes patterns of social, spiritual, and moral 
education.189  For a modern reader, however, pedagogical stylization is one the strangest 
aspects of ancient law, and one of the most important factors in creating a sense of 
canonical rule-discourse as distinctly foreign and archaic. 
Its most obvious manifestation are those sources which, by their very genre, 
topic and composition, are primarily didactic or argumentative treatises.  The 
                                                 
188 In both these cases, however, it is just possible these usages of "canon" should be read in these sense 
of "register of clergy". 
189 See chapter 2.B.2.   
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pedagogical aspects and strategies of these texts are so obvious as to require no 
comment: by their very act of providing an argument, they are teaching.  Broadly, 
virtually all of the material in the form of a non-conciliar letter or actual treatise – i.e. 
much of the patristic material – could be counted in this category.190  
 Pedagogical stylization is more surprising in the conciliar material, and in the 
patristic material that more closely approximates the conciliar style of legislation.  In 
this material, pedagogical discourse may be defined as any type of construction that, not 
strictly necessary for the articulation of the rule at hand (as a rule, pedagogical 
constructions can be removed from a canon without any change in the canon's basic 
content, or even grammar), but that provides some type of additional background, 
explanation or rationale for the rule at hand.  These thus "unpack" some further 
consequence, context, motive, or principle of the rule-content at hand.  This unpacking 
may be moral, psychological, theological, philosophical, scriptural (here overlapping 
with traditional discourse), or even broadly legal-doctrinal in tone. In all cases, it makes 
the canons speak to some type of reality beyond their mere rule-content.   
In practice, instances of pedagogical styling often takes the form of short 
epexegetical asides set off by ὡς, γάρ, ἵνα, ὅπως, ὥστε or the like.  A typical example is 
Apostles 22: someone who castrates himself cannot become a cleric, "for he has become 
a murder of himself and any enemy of the creation of God".  We thus learn both the 
rationale and the full implications of such behaviour.  In Nicaea 5 we learn the reason 
for the prescription of a pre-Lenten synod: "so that a pure gift might be offered to God 
with all small-mindedness taken away" (μικροψυχίας ἀναιρουμένης).  Another, more 
extended example, can be found in Ephesus 8, where the consequences of the 
Antiochian usurpation of Cypriot rights are drawn out at great length and scope: "[the 
Antiochians are to give up the usurped province] lest the canons of the fathers be 
transgressed, or the vanities of worldly authority be brought in under pretext of sacred 
work, or we lose, without knowing it, little by little the liberty which our Lord Jesus 
Christ, the deliver of all men, has given us by his own blood." (trans. NPNF  235, 
altered).  Such transgressions apparently imply a breaking of custom, worldliness, and a 
violation of the very salvific freedom given in the blood of Christ.  Very frequently a 
Scriptural passage is offered as the explanation or "lesson". Thus in Basil 41 a widow 
                                                 
190 The most obviously didactic texts are Dionysius 1, Athanasius 1, Basil 87, 90, 91, 92, Gennadius, and 
Tarasios.  They all contain definite rule content, but it is deeply buried within didactic scaffolding.  Lesser 
examples include Gregory Thaum., Peter, the rest of Athanasius, Gregory of Nyssa, and much of Cyril; 
much less so Basil's remaining canonical letters (although, as noted, they are introduced as highly didactic 
in tone and goal), Timothy and Theophilus. 
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with authority over herself is allowed to live with a man "since the Apostles says: 'if her 
husband dies, she is free to marry whom she wishes; only in the Lord' [1 Cor 7:39]". 
Apostles 52 employs considerable pathos when it deposes clergy who reject repentant 
sinners "because it grieves Christ who said 'there is joy in heaven when one sinner 
repents'".  Gangra 17 can't resist the scriptural gloss, and rather ponderous deduction, 
for why a woman must not cut her hair: "If a woman...should cut her hair, which God 
gave to her as a reminder of her subordination, so that she would be setting aside the 
commandment of subordination, let her be anathema".  Such short pedagogical glosses 
are very common, and may be found throughout the corpus. 191   
In the second wave, when some of the canons begin to approximate mini 
didactic-treatises, pedagogical styling can become quite pronounced and sustained.192  
II Nicaea 2, for example, begins with a framing scriptural exhortation to "meditate upo
thy statutes", as well as the reminder that to do so is "saving" for all Christians, and 
especially the hierarchy.  It later moves on to a patristic gloss on the necessity of 
learning Scripture – "for the God-given oracles, that is the true knowledge of the divine 
scripture, is the essence of our hierarchy" (οὐσία γὰρ τῆς καθ᾽ ἡμᾶς ἱεραρχίας ἐστὶ τὰ 
θεοπαράδοτα λόγια εἰτοῦν ἡ τῶν θείων γραφῶν ἀληθινὴ ἐπιστήμη) – and closes with 
another Scriptural passage warning of God's rejection of those that reject knowledge.    
n 
                                                
This pattern of opening and/or closing with small pedagogical 
contextualizations, often scriptural, may be found a number of times in Trullo and II 
Nicaea, but especially in Protodeutera, where it is virtually the norm.193  Protodeutera 1 
is a good example.  It begins with a moralizing traditional commentary (a faux narratio) 
on the restoration of monasteries: "The restoration of monasteries has of old always 
been considered a sacred and honorable thing by our blessed and holy fathers, but today 
is seen to be practiced badly."  Other pedagogical styling continues as it gives an 
unflattering description of the motivations of its target, private owners of monasteries, 
as "contriving to consecrate to God only in name", before eventually concluding with a 
 
191 Ancyra, Gangra and Theophilus are the only sources to contain only a few each.  Most contain many 
more.  They are especially prominent in the Apostolic canons, where over half contain some type of 
similar explanatory aside or Scriptural example/ampflication: 8, 9, 13, 16, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 29, 31, 
33, 34, 36, 38, 39, 40, 41, 46, 47, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 55, 59, 60, 63, 64, 68, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 80, 81, 
82, 83. 
192 In addition to the examples cited below, see esp. Trullo 7, 64, 73, 82, 88, 101, 102; II Nicaea 1, 4, 6 
15, 22; and all of Protodeutera, aside from 16. 
193 See Trullo 40, 60,  3, 96; II Nicaea 1, 2, 4, 5, 7, 16, 18, 22; in Protodeutera, all canons but 9 and 14 
contain some form of it.  It may also be found occasionally in the first wave, for example in Serdica 1, 
which begins and ends with short moral harangues, or Ephesus 8 which begins with a lengthy meditation 
on the vagaries of pastoral leadership.  For a similar phenomenon in Byzantine secular laws, see Hunger 
1964,191-203. 
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final condemnation-via-rhetorical-question: "for if one does not remain owner of those 
things which one gives to a man, how will one be permitted to seize ownership of those 
things which one consecrates and dedicates to God?"  
A much more extensive example is found in II Nicaea 5, which begins with this 
immense preface:  
It is a "sin unto death" [1 John 5:16] when men incorrigibly continue in 
their sin; but they sin more and deeply who proudly lifting themselves up 
oppose piety and sincerity, accounting mammon of more worth than 
obedience to God, and caring nothing for his canonical precepts.  The Lord 
God is not found among such, unless perchance having been humbled by 
their own fall, they return to a sober mind.  It behooves them the rather to 
turn to God with a contrite heart and to pray for forgiveness and pardon of 
so grave a sin and no longer to boast in an unholy gift, for the Lord is near 
to them who are of a contrite heart.  With regard, therefore...[the rule 
content begins]. (Translation from NPNF 558-559, altered) 
Usually such "theological" introductions are shorter.  Trullo 40, for example, opens 
"Since it is a very salutary thing to cleave to God on account of withdrawal from the 
tumults of life..." or Trullo 73 with "The life-giving cross has shown us salvation, and 
we ought thus with all assiduousness to render worth honour to it, through which we 
have been saved from the ancient fall. Whence..." 
Finally, Trullo 96 is one of the best examples in the corpus of this type of 
pedagogical ornamentation.  It contains perhaps two lines of rule-content (highlighted) 
embedded in a mini-homily on the evils of extravagant hair-dos:  
Those who through baptism have put on Christ have promised to imitate 
his life in the flesh.  In the case of those men, therefore, who to the 
detriment of those who see them arrange the hair on their head in elaborate 
plaits, offering allurement to unstable souls, we shall treat them paternally, 
with an appropriate penalty, educating them and teaching them to live 
prudently; so that once they have given up the error and vanity of material 
things they may direct their mind constantly toward the blessed and 
imperishable life, may preserve chaste behaviour in fear of God, may draw 
near to God, in so far as possible, through pureness of life, and may adorn 
the inner rather than the outer man with virtues and honest and blameless 
manners; and thus they will bear in themselves no trace of the enemy's 
perversity.  If anyone behaves contrary to the present canon, he shall be 
excommunicated. (Translation from NPNF 406, altered) 
A relatively simple rule is turned into an extensive moral, philosophical and theological 
lesson. 
The final mode of canonical discourse, the discourse of persuasion, is the least 
common in terms of direct, citable instances, but is nevertheless a very prominent aspect 
of the corpus' language.  It is particularly difficult to extract and analyze because many 
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of its instances overlap with those of the discourses of tradition and pedagogy: most 
appeals to tradition are broadly intended to persuade the reader to obedience, and the 
pedagogical highlighting of motives, consequence, or dispositions function to persuade 
to or dissuade from various types of action. 
 Specific elements of the discourse of persuasion/dissuasion may nevertheless be 
discerned.  Unlike the other two discourses, it is mostly a function of tone and style, 
created by patterns of hyperbole, amplification, deprecation, laudation and, generally, 
the rhetorical "charging" of language.  Its effect is usually to induce a strong, often 
emotional complicity of the reader with a rule's intention and content.  It is perhaps best 
termed the "discourse of moral outrage", after its most normal mode, but it also exists in 
other more irenic and dialogical forms.194  
 One of its most dramatic incarnations is the tendency to stylize infractions with 
language implying insolence and impudence.   Thus Antioch 1, for example, 
wrongdoers are constantly "daring" (τολμέω) to commit infractions: "All those who 
dare to set aside the decree... and if one of those who preside in the church...dare to act 
on his own... and those who dare to communicate with them...".  Similarly, in Antioch 5 
priests and deacons who separated themselves from their bishop are "despising" 
(καταφρονέω) him.  Likewise at the opposite end of the corpus Hagia Sophia 3 speaks 
similarly about laity "puffed up with authority" and "despising"(αὐθεντήσας καὶ 
καταφρονήσας) commands, and "deriding" (καταγελάσας) the laws of the church, 
"daring" (τολμήσειεν) to striking a bishop.  Other examples are not difficult to find.195 
Another type of hyperbolic and dramatic phrasing may also be noted.  In 
Antioch 16 a bishop "hurls" (ἐπιῤῥίψας) himself at a vacant church, and "snatches" 
(ὑφαρπάζοι) its throne.  Likewise in Laodicea 36 one "hurls" (ῥίπτεσθαι; instead of 
employing the usual βαλ- root) out of the church clergy wearing phylacteries.  In canon 
35 of the same council one dramatically "forsakes" (ἐγκαταλείπω) Christ and the church 
by engaging in angel invocation.  In Chalcedon 22 a cleric wrongfully "snatches" 
(διαρπάζειν) the goods of a bishop. Protodeutera 1, just cited, also speaks of "snatching" 
ownership over monasteries (ὑφαρπάζειν). Sardica, which contains a number of very 
highly charged canons, begins its first canon with wonderful hyperbole, noting of the 
transfer of bishop that "there is no more awful custom in need of being uprooted from 
                                                 
194 See Lanata 1989 for examples of similar patterns in Justinian's Novels. 
195 E.g. Apostolic 28, 31, 74; Nicea 1, 16; Gangra 3, 6, 11; Serdica 7, 11, 13, 21; Antioch 1, 4,  10, 11, 12, 
13, and 22; Constantinople 6; Ephesus 4, 7; Chalcedon 7, 8, 10, 12; Protodeutera 7, 10. 
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its foundation than the most harmful, corrupt practice...[of transferring bishops]" – there 
is no worse!  
Very frequently the behaviour of wrong-doers is stylized in highly contemptuous 
terms.  In Nicaea 2, for example, one who disobeys the council does so "audaciously" 
(θρασυνόμενος).  In Antioch 1 those opposing the decree of Nicaea do so "for love of 
strife" (φιλονεικότερον).  Gangra 20 cannot help but note that those who disparage 
assemblies of the faithful do so "in a disposition of arrogance" (ὑπερηφάνῳ διαθέσει), 
and in 12, 14, 17, 18 it places the asceticism and piety of its targets in distinct quotation 
marks – the supposed "ascesis" or the supposed "piety" (νομιζομένη ἄσκησις, 
νομιζομένη θεοσέβεια). Constantinople 6, especially in its introduction and conclusion, 
goes out of its way to paint decidedly negative pictures of those it wishes to condemn: 
they act, for example, "with love of enmity and as false-accusers" (φιλέχθρως καὶ 
συκοφαντικῶς), wishing to do nothing other than ruin the reputation of priests and whip 
up "troubles" among the laity.  Ultimately, they are simply "outraging [καθυβρίσαντα] 
the canons and ruining good ecclesiastical order".  Similarly in Chalcedon wrongdoers 
often act "on account of" or "according to" all sorts of bad dispositions: love of gain (δι᾽ 
αἰσχροκερδίαν), love of money (διὰ φιλαργυρίαν), "arrogantly" (κατ᾽ αὐθάδειαν), "on 
account of the desire of empty glory" (διὰ δόξης κενῆς ἐπιθυμίαν) – or once, in the case 
of good behaviour, "on account of the fear of the lord" (διὰ τὸν φόβον τοῦ κυρίου).196  
Further examples may be found in Appendix C (13). 
At times this type of emotional and dramatic "charging" can be sustained across 
almost an entire source.  This is particularly true in some of the longer patristic letters 
and treatises.  A good example may be found in one of the very earliest sources.  
Gregory Thaumatourgos' letter begins with a very calm and moderate consideration of 
an initial problem (canon 1), but in canon 2 the tension begins to mount when Gregory 
notes that there is not enough room in one letter to convey all of the scriptural passages 
that denounce greed and robbery, and then proceeds to focus on a Scriptural exposé of 
how the wrath of God will fall upon the church if the sinners are not expelled.  He then 
begins to ask rhetorical questions of the reader – will not the wrath of God fall on his 
interlocutor as well?  Did not the wrath of God fall on Achar? (Canon 3) Did the wrath 
of God not only on Achar, but others around him as well?  And as to those who have 
stolen things on the pretext of "finding" them (now in canon 4) – "let no one deceive 
himself!" In scripture, he continues, one is not allowed to benefit from an enemy's 
                                                 
196 Chalcedon 2, 3, 8, 10. 
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misfortune in peace time – how much less then now are Christians not to benefit from 
the misfortune of their brothers during war?  In canon 6 the tension comes to a 
crescendo as a report is received that is "unbelievable" (ἀπηγγέλη δέ τι ἡμῖν καὶ 
ἄπιστον): Christians are keeping Christian captives, escaped from barbarians, as slaves.  
An emissary is to be sent to address the problem, μὴ καὶ σκηπτοὶ πέσωσιν ἐπὶ τοὺς τὰ 
τοιαῦτα πράσσοντας!  Lightning can strike in the canons.   
More moderate but similar examples of the sustained building of annoyance or 
tension may be felt in Cyril 1-3 or Basil 87, 90. 
Gentler forms of persuasion may also be found.  In Ephesus 9, for example, the 
reader is drawn along with the council's decision through a deft weaving of images of 
the grief and troubles suffered by Eustathius, and particularly of his inexperience and 
isolation, and the pathetic topos of the weeping and injured old man ("we all felt for this 
old man and considered his tears to be our own") who had made mistakes "far away 
from his home city and dwellings of his fathers for such a long time".   Similar in effect 
are the lengthy and affective descriptions of the sufferings of noble lapsi (e.g. Ancyra 3, 
5, "shouting that they are Christians", "crying", "prostrating") to garner support for 
relaxed punishments.    
Other similar examples may be found in Neocaesarea, a source that has the 
curious habit of speaking directly to the reader, subtly inviting the reader into 
complicity with its conclusions.  The most obvious instance is canon 7, forbidding 
priests to attend banquets of digamists, where a rhetorical question invites the reader to 
come to the same "obvious" conclusion: "for if the digamist must do penance, what type 
of priest will he be who through his attendance approves the marriage?" Canon 14, 
likewise, directly tells the reader to search in Acts.  Much more subtly, canons 2 (its last 
clause) and 4, perhaps originally answering specific questions, now lack real rule 
content but seem to invite the reader to join them in thinking out loud: "But if the 
woman or man in such a marriage should die, penance for the survivor will be very 
difficult"; "If a man, desiring a woman, should intend to sleep with her, and his desire 
comes to nothing, it seems that he has been saved by grace."  Rhetorical questions, as 
already noted, are also evident elsewhere in the corpus.197   
  
                                                 
197 E.g. Apostles 46 ; Gregory Thaum. 2,3,4;  Basil 27, 29, 48; Gennadius; Protodeutera 1, 3, 10.  Related 
are the occasional use of "it is clear" or "obviously" (δῆλον, πρόδηλον), such as in Nicaea 1, 6, to assume 
complicity, or the a minori ad maius trope (if "x" is true then "y" must be all the more true), as in 
Apostolic 41 or Chalcedon 18.  Both enforce a sense of the "obviousness" of the ruling to the reader. 
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2.  Principal "Assemblages": the basic contexts 
All three modes of "extraneous" canonical discourse are fundamentally inter-textual: 
they link the canons into a broader network of texts and the value narratives they 
contain.  A number of texts and "assemblages" of subject, ideas, motifs, and images 
may be discerned as forming particularly prominent and regular nodes along this 
network.198 
 
a. Scripture 
The single most prominent text cited within the canons – by far – is Scripture, both Old 
and New Testaments.  Over 180 canons199 contain at least one reasonably clear 
Scriptural reference, and often citation.  This exceeds even the number of canons (~120) 
with more or less clear references to other canonical rules, the second most common 
referents.  (Even if one includes broader references to tradition, "the fathers", and 
custom, I estimate the total does not much exceed 150 canons).  Non-canonical patristic 
references and other legal references/allusions are a very distant third (~ 15)200.  
Scripture may thus – not surprisingly – be considered the preeminent textual referent of 
the canons.  It forms the basic contextual backdrop against which the canons are set, just 
as the traditional introductions suggest. 
 Scripture's presence is nevertheless highly variable in content, form and 
function.  Across the corpus as a whole, there is little systematic or rationalized about its 
employment.  It suggests itself instead as a pool of highly flexible, infinitely relevant 
contextual referents that can be adapted and adopted for virtually any compositional 
need.  In effect, a broad literary coherence of the canons and Scripture is implied: the 
canons naturally and easily speak out of Scripture, and with Scripture.  In this sense too, 
then, the canons become a broadly "scriptural" text. 
                                                 
198 Many of the following may also be found in the secular legal literature, frequently discussed in 
scholarship as elements of the narratives of the "rhetoricization", "ethicization" or "Christianization" of 
law; see especially the studies of Biondi 1952, Honig 1960, Hunger 1964. 
199 By my own count; see also the index in Fonti 4 which counts approximately 380 scriptural citations in 
total (although this list is not complete).  Akanthopoulos 1992,26 counts 349 canons which contain 
Scriptural references, a number I can account for only if every possible resonance and allusion is 
included. (However, Akanthopoulos' broader treatment of Scripture in the canons, Ἱεροὶ Κανόι Κανόνες 
καὶ μετάφραση τῆς Ἁγίας Γραφῆς in Εἰσηγήσεις Δ´ Συνάξεως Ὁρθοδόξων Βιβλικῶν Θεολόγων 
Thessaloniki 1986:189-190, was unfortnately not available for consulation.) 
200 I.e. the aforementioned patristic citations and regulae type material.   
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No thorough study of Scripture in the canonical tradition has ever been 
undertaken, east or west,201 but three types of Scriptural references may be tentatively 
identified.  The first and most productive group encompasses those which provide some 
type of further confirmation, explanation, or rationale for a given rule; frequently the 
rule is cast as naturally following from the Scriptural citation, as from a general 
principle or rule.  A good example is Apostolic 46, where the acceptance of heretical 
baptism is rejected "for what agreement does Christ have with Belial, or a believer with 
an unbeliever?" (2 Cor 6:15); or Ephesus 8's citation of "Christ's freedom" (Gal 5:1) in 
reference to jurisdictional independence; or Trullo100, which takes its starting point 
against pornography from Proverbs 4:23, 25, "Let your eyes see straight... keep your 
heart under secure guard" 
Sometimes such references or allusions can become even more vague, and are 
best described as "Scriptural texturing" or ornamentation, the second type.  These lend 
the canonical texts a Scriptural tonality, and are very broadly supportive of the given 
regulation, but tend not to relate directly to the given rule content.  Thus in Nicaea 12, 
for example, those who have returned to military/secular pursuits after having become 
Christians are glossed as "dogs returning to their vomit" (Prov 26:11; 2 Pet 2:22); 
Neocaesarea 5, speaking about fallen catechumens becoming "hearers", adds "sinning 
no more" (John 5:14; 8:11); Trullo 96 speaks about virtuous Christians in terms of them 
adorning "the inner man rather than the outer" (Gal 3:27); or much of the preface of II 
Nicaea 5, cited above, might be counted here.   
The rarest type, the third, sometimes blurring with the first, is encountered when 
a Scriptural passage functions as a bearer of some element of specific rule content 
which is simply repeated and applied.  Thus, for example, Nicaea 2 forbids the 
ordination of newly baptized Christians with a citation of 1 Tim 3:6-7 ("not a 
neophyte..."); Basil 11 explicitly follows Exodus 21:18-19 in determining criteria for 
voluntary and involuntary murders; Trullo 67 forbids eating blood with direct reference 
to Acts 15:29; Carthage 59 refers to 1 Cor 6:1 as the basis for the "apostolic right" 
(ἀποστολικὸν δίκαιον) of Christians to appear before an ecclesial tribunal; Gennadius 
cites Act 8 against simony.  Sometimes this explicit Scriptural rule-sourcing may be 
rather odd by modern standards, as when Peter derives penitential tariffs from various 
Scriptural numbers (e.g. canon 1 with 40 days on the model of Christ's period of 
                                                 
201 See Helmholz 1995,1557-1558 on the poor state of literature for even high medieval canon law, but 
see generally Gaudemet 1984 and Pieler 1997, and the references in the following note. 
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struggle in the wilderness after his baptism; or canon 3 with four years of penance 
because of their likeness to the four years' fruit that was expected from the sterile fig 
tree (Luke 13:6-9)).   
 One approach to Scriptural rules is, however, conspicuously absent: at no point 
are the Scriptures systematically "mined" for rules, which are then added to the 
corpus.202  The citing or referencing of concrete, substantive Scriptural rules is in fact 
surprisingly rare and desultory – and exceptionally so when the Scriptural rule is mostly 
constitutive of a canon.203  In general, a concrete Scriptural rule is cited as a principle, 
parallel or confirmation of a canonical rule – which are usually slightly different from, 
or in addition to, Scriptural rules. 
 This curious neglect is significant, and conveys an obvious but very important 
assumption of the canonical texts: Scriptural rules stand on their own.  They are not to 
be repeated, or extracted, as the canons already assume their presence.  The canons are 
thus a different, and in fact lower, form of rule-text, continuous with Scripture, and 
rooted in it, but ultimately a kind of companion and supplement to the real rule-book.204  
In one place, the tradition comes very close to saying this. Carthage 5, considering the 
problem of priests taking interest on loans, states: "those things which divine scripture 
has clearly ordained, it is not for us to vote upon, but rather to follow" – in this case, the 
Scriptural rules on interest for laity are to apply to clerics as well.  Gregory of Nyssa 
likewise speaks clearly in canons 5 and 6 of Scripture covering many rules not treated 
by the penitential traditions.  Once again, then, the pairing, and yet hierarchical 
ordering, of Scripture and canons emerges.  Both constitute essential and "in force" 
pools of regulative texts, and both are inter-related, but the latter is clearly dependant 
upon, and subordinate to the former.205  The canons do not replace Scripture as the 
regulative texts, nor do they develop isolated from Scripture – but they are to be broadly 
"scriptural". 
 
                                                 
202 The only major exception in the Byzantine legal tradition seems to be the 8th C νόμος Μωσαϊκός, a 
small collection of rules from the Penateuch.  See Appendix C (14) for details. In the west, however, 
"mining" Scripture for rules in the canonical collections seems to have been more common, principally, 
and first, in early 8th C Ireland and then more broadly. See Fournier 1931,64-68; Gaudemet 1984; Kottje 
1970; Sheehy 1987; Wasserchleben 1885,xiv-xvi. 
203 The best candidate is probably Apostolic 63, conveying the dietary laws of Gen 9:4, Ex 22:30, Lev 5:2 
and Acts 15:29 (surprisingly not exclusively Acts 15:29, as Trullo 67). But even it does not simply cite 
one Scriptural rule as its exclusive content.   
204 Cf. Pieler 1991,21 on the primary importance of Scripture in Zonaras' commentary – equivalent, Pieler 
feels, to the position of imperial laws in secular juristic writings. 
205 The statement in Beck 1981,7 that the bible has only a "subsidiary" role in Byzantine law is thus in a 
sense misleading; the tradition more obviously sees the canons as the subsidiary rules of Scripture! 
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b. Morality and metaphysics 
If Scripture is the preeminent textual referent for the canons, morality and metaphysics 
are the preeminent topical preoccupations.  The canons constantly speak to moral and 
metaphysical realities beyond basic legal rule-logical realities, regularly unpacking the 
substantive moral values, beliefs, and standards of behaviour within and around the 
specific rules themselves.   
One of the most striking and common emphases in this regard, echoing the 
traditional prologues, is the tendency to speak to internal dispositions, attitudes, 
emotions and motives.  The canons are very often – and very strangely by modern 
standards – prescriptive and proscriptive of both the what of behaviour and the how of 
behaviour.  Indeed, the two are seen as closely linked.  Negative behaviour is frequently 
seen as connected to some negative disposition, attitude, intention or motive, and 
positive to positive.  Most often, wrong-doing is cast as a function of vice.   
 Many examples of such tendencies have already been offered, including much of 
the language of "moral outrage" (wrong-doers as "despising", "daring" and so forth), or 
the glossing of motivations as "on account of" various vices and evil dispositions.  The 
effect of these is to suggest that to commit canonical wrongs is to act in a morally 
defective manner.  Sometimes "passions", as in the prologues, are explicitly targeted.  
Protodeutera 2, for example, condemns those who take up the monastic habit with 
vainglorious intentions ("so that by the reverence of the habit they might receive the 
glory of piety") as those who will "give their own passions abundant pleasure". Vices 
and dispositions are even to be directly taken into account in investigations of 
wrongdoing.  Thus in Nicaea 5, in cases of the excommunication of priests, the bishop 
is to be examined lest "meanness of spirit or love of strife or any such unpleasantness" 
is involved; Sardica 14 is very similar, directing that any behaviour of anger of the 
bishop be investigated. 
Positive behaviour, however, is also sometimes described and prescribed in 
terms of correct internal attitudes, motivations and dispositions.  Thus in Antioch 24 and 
25 episcopal property management is to take place "with good conscience and faith" 
and "with all piety and fear of God". Gangra 3 is concerned that slaves are not to run 
away, but to continue to serve their masters "with a good attitude" (μετ᾽ εὐνοίας).  
Dionysius 2 justifies its prohibition on menstruating women's communion by reference 
to what "faithful" (πίσται) and pious (εὐλαβεῖς) women would do.  II Nicaea 1 has 
clergy depicted as law-abiding "gladly" (ἀσμένως), and who, through the words of 
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Scripture, "delight" (τέρπω) in the law and "rejoice" (ἀγαλλιάω) in it, and "hug [the 
canons] to their chests" (ἐνστερνίζομαι). 
At times references to internal dispositions and vice/virtues can become quite 
sophisticated and involved, adopting the theoretical vocabulary of ancient spiritual 
psychology. The preeminent example is Gregory of Nyssa's canonical letter, which, as 
an intentional attempt to classify penitential material according to the standard 
psychological schema of λόγος, ἐπιθυμία, and θυμός, stands in a class of its own. 
Canonical regulation become a psychological-therapeutic practice.  Other examples of 
analysis of internal dispositions and even emotions are easily found – see Appendix C 
(15).   
Aside from dispositions, motives and virtues, the canons also sometimes speak 
directly to specific metaphysical ideas or concepts, Christian or Greco-Roman, either as 
a point of support or source, or as a ramification.  In these instances, the canons speak 
"theologically" or "philosophically" (here, of course, not including those canons whose 
primary topic is a doctrinal matter)206. 
Many – even most – of the short Scriptural citations and short pedagogical 
epexegeseis cited above are doctrinal/theological in orientation, and needn't be repeated 
here; see Appendix C (16) for further examples.  This "theological" discourse becomes 
most notable, however, when drawn out at length.  Trullo 96, cited above, along with 
many of the longer, more elaborate examples of pedagogical styling evident in the 
second wave, and especially the many short "theological" introductions, are all 
especially good examples (e.g. II Nicea 14).  A broad set of metaphysical narrative are 
being both assumed and inculcated.   
Especially interesting are the few occasions when relatively technical Greco-
Roman philosophical language (aside from the technical psychological language already 
noted, as for example in Gregory of Nyssa) makes appearance.  This is particularly 
characteristic of Trullo, where, as observed, it is already evident in the 
Προσφωνητικός.207  Thus in Trullo 41 monastics seek solitude not for "empty glory" 
but δι᾽ αὐτὸ τὸ ὄντως καλὸν, the "true Good"; also in Trullo 45 nuns are not to be again 
led to remember the things of her former life through the putting on of adornments of 
"this perishable and transient world" (φθαρτοῦ τε καὶ ῥέοντος κόσμου).  Languag
"materiality", hyle (ὕλη) also emerges briefly in Trullo 96 ("giving up the deception and 
e of 
                                                 
206 That is, on Christological or Trinitarian heresies (Constantinople 1, 5; Ephesus 7; Trullo 1), Donatist 
beliefs about original sin (Carthage 110-116), or certain exegetical matters (e.g. Basil 15, 16). 
207 Chapter 2.A.5. 
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vanity of material things": ἀφέντας τὴν ἐκ τῆς ὕλης ἀπάτην καὶ ματαιότητα) and canon 
101 (those receiving communion with metal receptacles are chastised as preferring 
"inanimate and lower matter",τὴν ἄψυχον ὕλην καὶ ὑποχείριον, to the icon of God). Of 
course most of these concepts are still quite generic, and long domesticated for Christian 
use 
   
c.  Honour and appearances 
Another major theme in the corpus is an assemblage of ideas and terms relating to 
honour and appearances.   These may be considered subsets of both moral disposition 
and theology discourse, prescribing and proscribing certain types of attitudes, moral 
standards and certain ways of thinking about the nature and implication of infractions.  
It embraces ideas of reputation, insult, mockery, respect, shame, suspicion and 
generally, "how things look".  It is often a key component of the language of moral 
outrage: infractions are not simply infractions of an impersonal rule, but personal 
insults; wrongdoing is not simply "mistake", but insolence, and everything is happening 
in the public eye.  Considering the well-known importance of these concepts in Greco-
Roman political discourse, and literary culture, its presence in the canons is not 
surprising.208   
 It is perhaps most immediately noticeable as a subject of substantive regulation.  
(Our analysis is not as a rule concerned with the substantive content of the canonical 
rules, but here an exception must be made in order to convey the full force of this broad 
tendency.)  Thus Apostolic 8 suspends clergy who do not reveal the reason for their not 
receiving communion precisely because this may create suspicion, ὑπόνοια, among the 
laity as to the purity of the offering.  The entire canon is centered upon the mere 
suspicion of cultic inefficacy; i.e. it is meant to combat a mere perception or appearance 
of wrong – and not necessarily even a wrong itself – and particularly that which might 
affect cultic practice.   Even more directly, in Apostolic 53, 54, 84 people are 
condemned who "insult", ὑβρίζω, bishops, presbyters, deacons, and the emperor or 
magistrates.  (These rules should, of course, be read in the context of civil legal 
regulation of hubris, or libel, a very serious charge.209)  In Basil 45 a complementary 
rule is issued that forbids "insulting" Christ.210  In Laodicea 20, a provision is explicitly 
                                                 
208 E.g. Brown 1992; Lendon 1997.    
209 E.g. Digest 47.10; CJ  9.35-36; Institutes 4.4 
210 Cf. Constantinople 6, which concludes with a condemnation of certain plaintiffs ὡς καθυβρισάντα 
τοὺς κανόνας καὶ τὴν ἐκκλησιαστικὴν λυμηνάμενον εὐταξιαν.  Even the canons can be "insulted".  
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made for diaconal "honour": "similarly, the deacons are also to receive honour from the 
servers and all the clergy." Many other regulations may be found which treat the 
"honourable" appearance of Christians, various types of insults, and the problem of 
reputation and "suspicions" thereabout (especially regarding the good standing of 
plaintiffs). See Appendix C (17).   
Similarly, honour language is embedded into the very language of institutional 
processes, offices and relationships (entirely coherent with general late antique use)211.  
In Nicaea 7 Jerusalem is "honoured", τιμᾶσθαι, and to have the "honour that follows" 
(ἀκολουθίαν τῆς τιμῆς), and Caesarea is to retain its ἀξίωμα, or dignitas, its office or 
rank, i.e. its "worthiness".  Constantinople 3 raises the famous "prerogatives of honour", 
πρεσβεῖα τῆς τιμῆς, of Constantinople.  Earlier it may be found used to describe the 
distinction of the metropolitan from his bishops in Antioch 9: "...when it seems good 
that he will also exceed them in honour" (καὶ τῇ τιμῇ προηγεῖσθαι αὐτον).  Offices, 
ranks and functions are frequently referred to throughout the canons, as per normal late 
antique usage, as "honours" (with a variety of shades of meaning).212   
On a more supplementary, epexegetical level, behaving honourably and 
avoiding shameful actions is a very common theme.  Nicaea 17, for example, strongly 
textures its condemnation of clerical interest-taking with αἰσχρο- (shame) vocabulary: 
αισχροκέρδεια, αἰσχρου κέρδους ἕνεκα.  Such activity brings "shame" to the clergy.  
Chalcedon 2 likewise speaks of αἰσχρὰ λήμματα, and Chalcedon 3 of αἰσχροκερδία.  
Chalcedon 4, conversely, begins its condemnation of busy-body monastics by noting 
how the honour of the monastic schema does properly accrues to monks who are 
"worthy" of it: "let those who come truly and purely to the monastic life be deemed 
worthy of the appropriate honour". The presence of this line as the formal introduction 
to the canon is significant: honour constitutes a basic conceptualization for 
characterizing, rewarding and promoting proper behaviour.   
A sharp casting of canonical relations as honour/shame relations may also be 
found in Trullo 17 where a cleric who is registered in another church without release 
letters is described as "bringing shame [καταισχύνων] upon the one who ordained him". 
Carthage 138 also casts Aparius' activities as his αἰσχρότηται, his denial as ἀναισχυντία.  
In Sardica 20, the bishops are concerned that "the divine and most reverend name of the 
                                                 
211 Cf. for example Jones 1964,377-390 on the dignitates and honores of the late imperial administration.   
212 Other examples include Apostolic 76; Nicaea 8; Ancyra 18; Antioch 5, 10; Serdica 10; Carthage 57 
(probably).  See Ancyra 1, 2; Antioch 18; Chalcedon 12 for the punishment of losing only the τιμή of 
one's office. 
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priesthood" is being brought into disrepute by the "shamelessness" of a few.  Elsewhere 
similar concerns about shame, scandal, and "name" emerge with some frequency.  See 
Appendix C (18) for further examples. 
A particularly interesting sub-type of honour/appearance language, more subtle, 
but very effective, involves texturing infractions or their results as insults or acts of 
dishonour or mockery, often with ὑβρισ- vocabulary. Sardica 13 is perhaps the earliest 
example.  The canon treats the problem of other bishops communing with clerics 
excommunicated by their bishop, but describes such infractions in terms of hubris: "[a 
bishop] ought not to inflict hybris upon his brother by offering him [the 
excommunicate] communion".  Laodicea 27 likewise forbids a (somewhat obscure) 
disruption of church order "on account of the hybris that this inflicts upon the 
ecclesiastical order".  Similarly, Carthage 138 speaks about the hybris inflicted upon the 
synod by Faustinus' attempts to appeal to Rome.  Similar concepts are also to be found 
in Constantinople 6 (wrongdoers "insulting" the canons), Chalcedon 6 (at-large 
ordinations are to the "hybris" of the one who ordains), Chalcedon 15 (a fallen 
deaconess "insults" God's grace), Trullo 13 (the Roman practice of clerical celibacy 
"insults" marriage), Trullo 42 (false hermits "insult" their profession), and Basil 1 
(Montanists "insult" the Holy Spirit).  
Another important subset of honour/shame styling are explicit expressions of 
concern about the public appearance of actions.  Thus Laodicea 27 condemns mixed-
gendered bathing in terms of the response it might invoke from pagans: "for this is the 
first reproach among the pagans". Cyril 1, as already noted, casts canonical order as 
essentially concerned with the avoidance of "slander" (τῆς παρὰ τινων δυσφημίας) and 
the acquisition of "praise" from "right-thinking people" (τὰς παρὰ τῶν εὖ φρονούντων 
ευφημίας).  A very striking and self-conscious audience reference may also be found in 
Protodeutera 1, where it is noted that sales of consecrated property "provides 
astonishment and an abominable scandal to those who see it" (θάμβος ὁμοῦ καὶ μύσος 
τοῖς ὁρῶσι παραεχόμενα)    
Elsewhere the public audience is a little less explicit, yet still tangible.   
Apostolic 40 on the need to keep personal episcopal and ecclesial finances separate, 
phrases its rule in terms of keeping everything "evident" (φανερὰ) for all to see: "Let the 
bishop's own property be visible...and that of the church" (Ἔστω φανερὰ τὰ ἴδια τοῦ 
ἐπισκόπου πράγματα... καὶ φανερὰ τὰ τοῦ κυριακοῦ).  Here the audience is even divine: 
"for this is just before God and men" (δίκαιον γὰρ τοῦτο παρὰ θεῷ καὶ ἀνθρώποις).  The 
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same canon concludes with an unmistakable and typical concern for public scandal: its 
regulations are to avoid that "the death [of the bishop] be surrounded with slander" (τὸν 
αὐτοῦ θάνατον δυσφημίᾳ περιβάλλεσθαι).  Sardica 20, on punishments for bishops, 
likewise includes a reference to human and divine "public": regulations are made 
"pleasing to God and to men" (καὶ θεῷ ἀρέσαντα καὶ ἀνθρώποις).  
  
d. Purity, cleanliness and defilement 
Rarer than honour/appearance language, although sometimes connected with it, is the 
discourse of purity, cleansing and defilement.  It is nevertheless a striking and recurring 
feature of Byzantine canonical thought and expression.  It is closely related to language 
of disease and contagion. 
 Its most obvious presence is (again) in the numerous substantive regulations that 
may be considered to somehow touch on purity: restrictions on Eucharistic participation 
because of blood or semen (e.g. Dionysius 2, Athanasius to Ammoun, Timothy 7); 
regulations on sexual purity relating to the reception of the Eucharist after licit sexual 
activity (Timothy 5, 13); restrictions on ordination and liturgical service because of both 
licit and illicit sexual activity (e.g. Neoceasarea 8; Laodicea 55; Theophilus 4; Carthage; 
Basil 27; Trullo 3, 13); problems of consanguinity (Basil 23, 67-68, 75, 76, 78, 79, 87; 
Trullo 53, 54); sexual defilement of women (e.g. Ancyra 11,  Gregory Thaum. 1, Basil 
22, 30, 38); other inappropriate types of sexual activities (homosexuality, bestiality, 
pornography – e.g. Ancyra 16; Basil 7, 63; Trullo 100 - more broadly, almost all the 
canons on fornication, adultery and polygamy may be included in this category); 
regulations on the defilement of sacred property and goods (Apostolic 73;  Trullo 68, 
97, 99;  Protodeutera 10); regulations on food purity (usually condemning over-zealous 
ascetics showing βδελυρία, loathing or disgust, as in Apostolic 51, 53, 63; Ancyra 14; 
Basil 86; Gangra 2; Trullo 67); and purification from demon possession (Apostolic 
79).213   
The language of purity in these canons is usually pronounced, and need no 
extensive exposition. One aspect of this discourse is, however, noteworthy: sexual 
purity is treated very much like a physical contagion or wound.  In this sense, purity 
                                                 
213 Interestingly, one type of purity-thinking is explicitly rejected: lack of physical wholeness.  In 
Apostolic 77 and 78 physical defects that do not "impede the affairs of the church" do not disqualify from 
ordination, "for the defect of the body does not defile a man, but defilement of the soul" (οὐ γὰρ λώβη 
σώματος αὐτὸν μιαίνει, ἀλλὰ ψυχῆς μολυσμός). It is important to note, however, that this is not a 
rejection of the concept of purity per se.  In fact, it affirms the concept of spiritual impurity.  It simply 
notes that physical "impurity" is not a true μιασμά.   
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language blends into medical language.  For example, even ignorant engagement in 
illicit sexual activity by a clergyman is understood to impair completely his ability to 
serve.  Basil 27, on clergy involved in unlawful marriages through ignorance, is the 
locus classicus: "it is illogical that one who should heal his own wounds can bless 
another; for blessing is the communication of holiness, but he who does not have 
holiness through a transgression of ignorance, how can he share it with another?" 
(εὐλογεῖν δὲ ἕτερον, τὸν τὰ οἰκεῖα τημελεῖν ὀφείλοντα τραύματα, ἀνακόλουθον. 
εὐλογία γὰρ ἁγιασμοῦ μετάδοσίς ἐστι, ὁ δὲ τοῦτο μὴ ἔχων, διὰ τὸ ἐκ τῆς ἀγνοίας 
παράπτωμα πῶς ἑτέρῳ μεταδώσει.)   This logic – and even the phrases – will be 
repeated in Trullo 3 and 26.  Impurity impairs the very capacity for sacral activity; one 
is virtually physically damaged.   
Outside of these areas of substantive legislation, purity language emerges more 
occasionally, usually quite briefly, but enough to signal its presence as an accepted and 
expected background language of canonical ordering.  In Antioch 1, celebrating Easter 
with the Jews becomes "the cause of much corruption for many" (πολλοῖς 
διαφθορᾶς...αἴτιον).   Apostolic 8 speaks of the suspicion of clergy not offering the 
Eucharist sacrifice ὑγιῶς, "healthily" or "soundly".  (It is not entirely clear what this 
means, but we may suspect a purity issue, cf. Apostolic Constitutions 2:20, 6:18).  
Ephesus 7, a doctrinal canon, condemns Nestorius' doctrines as precisely μιαρά, stained 
or defiled.  In the next Ephesian canon, the rights (δίκαια) of every province are to be 
preserved "pure and inviolate", καθαρὰ καὶ ἀβιάστα.  In Sardica 1 a botanical metaphor 
of a rotting plant is perhaps implied when the custom of episcopal transfer is described 
as a "corruption that must be uprooted from the foundations" (διαφθορὰ ἐξ αὐτῶν τῶν 
θεμελίων ἐστὶν ἐκριζωτεά).  In the next canon, people are portrayed as "corrupted by 
rewards and honours" (μισθῷ καὶ τιμήματι διαφθαρέντας).  In Carthage 138 Apparius 
needs to "cleanse" himself from the charges (ἐγκλημάτων καθαρθῆναι), and later in his 
confession is spoken of "cleansing" his shameful stains (ἐκ τῶν οὕτως ἐπαισχυνταίων 
σπίλων...καθαρθῆναι) (both times purgari in Latin; Fonti 2.429-431).  In Trullo 1 
Macedonius is a βδελυρός, "abhorrent", and the fathers of the fifth council themselves 
ἐβδελύξαντο, "abhorred", "abominated" the three chapters.  The afore-cited Trullo 45 
also contains corruption terminology: φθαρτοῦ τε καὶ ῥέοντος κόσμου.  Trullo 96 
directly commends ornamentation of the self not through cosmetic adornments but 
"through [moral] cleansing in life" (διὰ τῆς ἐν βίῳ καθάρσεως). In II Nicaea 16 
iconoclasm is referred to as a μίασμα, "stain", "defilement" and uses the verb βδελύσσω 
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to describe the iconoclasts' attitude towards the icons.  Similarly, part of the elaborate 
build-up for canon 22 includes the exhortation for us to purify our minds: λογισμοὺς 
ὀφείλομεν καθαίρειν.214 
 
e. Medicine 
The language of medicine, of healing and disease, is most prominent in Gregory of 
Nyssa's canonical letter and Trullo 102.  Both are elaborate treatments of canonical 
penances as medicines for the soul, a connection already noted in οἱ τοῦ μεγάλου θεοῦ.    
Together these canons represent the single most elaborate theoretical development of 
any metaphor in the canons, and may reasonably be regarded as coming as close as 
anything to providing the canons with a basic framing "theory" of canonical sanctions. 
 Aside from these canons, however, medical references are never exceptionally 
common.  They occur occasionally.  Basil is unusually rich.  In canon 1 his definition of 
"schismatics", as opposed to heretics, involves their having certain ecclesiastical 
differences that are "healable", ἰάσιμα. In canon 3, a phrase in a general discussion of 
suitable penalties for clergy reveals that Basil thinks very much in terms of healing: "but 
in general the truer healing is departing from sin" (καθόλου δὲ ἀληθέστερόν ἐστιν ἴαμα 
ἡ τῆς ἁμαρτίας ἀναχώρησις).  The same term appears in his introduction to canon 90, 
his letter to his bishops on simony: his letter is to be received by the guilty "as a cure", 
ὡς ἴαμα.  The introductory line of Basil 29 is dominated by θεραπεία language: rulers 
who swear to harm their subjects πάνυ θεραπεύεσθαι προσῆκε.  θεραπεία δὲ τούτων 
διττή... The same language appears in canon 38, as Basil asserts that, if a girl who has 
gone after a man without her parents' permission, is reconciled to them, as so "it seems 
that what happened has received healing" (δοκεῖ θεραπείαν λαμβάνειν τὸ γεγονός). A 
little differently, in Basil 27, as we have seen, his rational for his prescribed suspension 
of clerical functions is articulated with a medical metaphor: their τραύματα, wounds, 
prevent the priests in question from exercising their function.  They must rather attend, 
τημελεῖν, to their own wounds.  
Such language may also be found elsewhere.  Antioch 5, unlike its doublet, 
Apostolic 31, contains a brief phrase in which it notes that a recalcitrant priest, having 
being summoned numerous times, is now to be deposed completely as having "no 
further remedy" (καὶ μηκέτι θεραπείας τυγχάνειν).  Ephesus 8 contains a more extended 
(psychological) medical metaphor, speaking of passions, healing, harm: "the common 
                                                 
214 Reading with Fonti, against Kormchaya and RP, καθαίρειν instead of καθαιρεῖν.  
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passions require greater healing as causing greater harm" (τὰ κοινὰ παθὴ μείζονος 
δεῖται τῆς θεραπείας ὡς καὶ μείζονα τὴν βλάβην φέροντα).  In Trullo 1 the faith is to 
remain ἀπαράτρωτον, without "wound".  In Trullo 2, as already noted, the canons are 
written πρὸς ψυχῶν θεραπείαν καὶ ἰατρείαν παθῶν.  The same canon ends by casting its 
own penalties as "healing: "...being healed by that in which he fell." (δι᾽ αὐτοῦ ἐν ᾧπερ 
πταίει θεραπευόμενος).  Later, in Trullo 41, it is necessary that eremites who leave their 
cells without permission must be "healed" with fasts and other hardships (νηστείαις καὶ 
ἑτέραις σκληραγωγίαις...θεραπεύειν).  In canon 96 the authors again cast their own 
penal activity with healing language: "we paternally heal with a fitting 
penalty"(ἐπιτιμίῳ προσφόρῳ πατρικῶς θεραπεύομεν).  Protodeutera 3, one of the last in 
the corpus, contains a strong example: it condemns heads of monasteries that do not 
pursue run-away monks and apply the appropriate medical treatments to the sickness 
(τῇ προσκούσῃ καὶ καταλλήλῳ τοῦ πταίσματος ἰατρείᾳ τὸ νενοσκηὸς ἀνακτᾶσθαι καὶ 
ἐπιρρωννύειν).  
 
f. The divine presence and the sacred 
"The sacred" is present in the canons in a variety of ways.  The most profound are the 
least explicit, and have already been treated: the general scripturalization and 
traditionalization of canonical discourse.  These serve to root canonical legislation, both 
directly and indirectly, in Christianity's most fundamental referents for sacrality and 
holiness: Scripture, the Apostles, "the fathers" and the "sacred tradition".  The canons 
thus emerge as a quasi-sacred text – which, as we have seen, is how they seem to be 
treated in their transmission.  Also important are the canons' many theological and 
metaphysical pedagogical glosses, especially those which indicate the canons' salvific 
function or their capacity to effect spiritual healing – to say nothing of the number of 
obviously sacral matters, namely doctrine and cult, explicitly treated by the canons.   
The canons are also occasionally directly , or almost directly, named as sacred.  
This is mostly confined to the second-wave, and mostly accomplished with the epithets 
θείος, ἱερός, ἅγιος, already mentioned.  Sometimes it is conveyed in other ways.  In 
Theophilus 14, for example, obeying canonical order is presented as equivalent to 
drawing near to "the law of God".215  Similarly, II Nicaea 5 refers to the canonical 
precepts as God's  canonical precepts: "...considering mammon of more honour than 
                                                 
215 Something similar occurs in Basil 20, where church order regulations are assimilated to the "laws of 
the Lord". 
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obedience to God and not holding to his canonical precepts" (καὶ τῶν κανονικῶν αὐτοῦ 
διαταξεων μὴ ἀντεχόμενοι").  In II Nicaea 2, the canons are also rolled into the concept 
of "holy Scripture": "[bishops must diligently read] the sacred canons, the holy Gospel, 
and the book of the divine Apostle, and all other divine Scripture..."  
The most striking presence of the sacred in the canons, however, entails the 
number of ways in which God himself is seen to intrude into the canonical realm.  This 
is usually subtle, but not always.  It often involves invocations of (final) divine 
judgment as an essential context of penance, or appeals to God as an "audience", as 
already noted above, or references to God as a participant in church justice and church 
administration.  Often this type of texturing seems very brief and formulaic, but even in 
such cases its effect is palpable: God is always part of ordering and ruling.  We may 
term this the "eschatological" or "theophanic" discourse of the canons.216   
Gregory Thaumtourgos' letter, explored above, is the oldest representative, and 
one of the most dramatic: the wrath of God may itself fall upon the community and the 
sinners as a result of disciplinary disorder.  Canon 7 is particularly interesting, as here a 
decision on penitential practice is referred to the Holy Spirit.  Gregory decides that the 
wrong-doers in question are to remain outside of even the hearing of the Scriptures 
"until such time as a common opinion about them is reached by a congregation of the 
holy and, before them, to the Holy Spirit." (μέχρις ἂν κοινῇ περὶ αὐτῶν τι δόξῃ 
συνελθοῦσι τοῖς ἁγίοις καὶ πρὸ αὐτῶν τῷ ἁγίῳ πνεύματι). The Holy Spirit – God – is 
the primary agent in deciding difficult penitential cases.  A similar instance may be 
found in Theophilus 13, which also calls upon God to assist in a decision, although in a 
more passing manner: Theophilus instructs his bishop, Agathon, to "do what God 
suggests" (ὅπερ ὁ θεὸς ὑποβάλλοι σοι, τοῦτο ποίησον) in regards to whether or not he 
should treat a certain case with greater severity.  More obliquely, in Laodicea 2, God's 
beneficent will is to be taken into account when considering the reconciliation of 
repentant sinners to Eucharistic communion: they are to be received "on account of the 
pities and goodness of God".  Likewise in Carthage 66 a decision has been reached to 
treat the Donatists leniently after not only considerable conciliar examination of the 
matter, but also with  the Holy Spirit himself "nodding assent" to and "becoming 
resonant" with the decision (ἐπινεύσαντος καὶ ἐνηχήσαντος τοῦ πνεύματος τοῦ θεοῦ). A 
                                                 
216 Similar patterns may be found in the secular laws, with God's presence or punishments assumed. See 
for example N. 5.9.ep.; N. 7.5.pr., N. 137.1.  A particularly good example is Justinian's demand that the 
gospels be placed in courtrooms, with the very explicit assertion that this brings to bear the presence of 
God into the courtroom, which places the judge himself under judgement – CJ 3.1.13.4 and 3.1.14.2. Cf. 
also the tradition of antique judicial cursing tablets, Humfress 2009,387-390. 
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revealing reference to eternal punishment may also be found in Carthage 93.  In the 
context of a request to the imperial government that the civil laws against the Donatists 
be activated, the authors give as a rationale for the request: "...so that at least in this fear 
[of imperial force] they will cease from creating schisms and the foolishness of heresy – 
they who have not suffered to be purified and corrected by awareness of eternal 
chastisement"(Fonti 1.2.350.16-20). Schismatics and heretics are expected to be 
deterred and corrected by the prospect of eschatological punishment; a secular law is 
required in this case because of the lack of this expected behaviour. 
Carthage 138, the final element of the Apiarian dossier, is a small tour de force 
of theophanic judicial stylization.  Here God "the just judge" intervenes quite directly 
and decisively in the Apiarian process.  The narration begins by noting that three days 
into the process "God, the just judge" himself "cut off" (ἔτεμε) the delays of Faustinus 
and the prevarications of Apiarius.  We learn that God himself had revealed, even to the 
eyes of men, Apiarius' wrongdoing (τοῦ γὰρ θεοῦ ἡμῶν τὴν συνείδησιν αὐτοῦ 
στενοχωρήσαντος καὶ τὰ ἐν τῇ καρδίᾳ κρυπτά...πᾶσιν ἔτι μὴν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις 
δημοσιεύσαντος...) Later in the same text, and in a similar vein, in the rebuke to Pope 
Celestine, the council's position is articulated very much in terms of the Holy Spirit's 
active participation in church affairs.  The Nicene fathers, it is noted, decreed that all 
matters are to be decided in the place they arise, "for [the canons of Nicaea] did not 
think that the grace of the Holy Spirit was lacking to each and every area of pastoral 
care [πρόνοια]" (οὔτε γὰρ μιᾷ καὶ ἑκάστῃ προνοίᾳ ἐλογίσαντο ἐλλείπειν τὴν χάριν τοῦ 
ἁγίου πνεύματος).  Later they express a similar disbelief that anyone could think that 
God would inspire one man with justice, and yet deny this to a whole synod: "...unless 
there is someone who will believe that our God is able to inspire any one man or other 
with the justice of judgment, but deny it to an innumerable number of bishops gathered 
in synod?" God himself "inspires" church administration and judgments.  
Sometimes God can even be involved in quite detailed and even mundane 
administrative matters.  In Apostles 38, for example, the bishop is exhorted to manage 
financial affairs "as if God is overseeing" (ὡς θεοῦ ἐφορῶντος).  Clear guidelines are 
then given of what God expects, particularly that no appropriation for relatives or 
personal use are to occur of his things: μὴ ἐξεῖναι...ἢ συγγενέσιν ἢ ἰδίοις τὰ τοῦ θεοῦ 
χαρίζεσθαι.  In the canon's Antiochian doublet, Antioch 24, God is again similarly τὸν 
πάντων ἔφορον καὶ κριτὴν θεόν.  In Antioch 21 God appears briefly as an 
administrative agent, placing clergy in their appropriate churches: clergy are "to remain 
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in the church which they were allotted by God in the beginning".  Similarly in Carthage 
26, a bishop who has not taken the required steps of consultation before selling church 
goods is to be held accountable not just to the synod, but also to God: ὑπεύθυνος τῷ θεῷ 
καὶ τῇ συνόδῳ.   
God is particularly concerned about questions of hierarchical order.  In Carthage 
86 the order of precedence among bishops is formally put in effect with the permission 
of God: "this order...will be maintained by us by the permission of God" (κατὰ 
συγχώρησιν θεοῦ).  Similarly, in Trullo 64, the clerical order of the church is strongly 
defended in terms of its origin from God: lay people are to "yield to the order handed 
down by the Lord" (εἴκειν τῇ παραδοθείσῃ παρὰ τοῦ κυρίου τάξει) for, as we learn, God 
himself has made the "parts" or orders (διάφορα μέλη πεποίηκεν ὁ θεὸς).  Again in II 
Nicaea 14, which states that only ordained readers should read in church, the scrupulous 
observance of church hierarchy is asserted to be "well-pleasing to God" (θεῷ εὐάρεστόν 
ἐστιν).   
 Further examples of such "theophanic" stylizations may be found in Appendix C 
(19) 
 
3. The legal whole revisited 
With these examples of the "extraneous" elements of canonical discourse reintroduced 
into the legal equation – the flesh put back on the bones – the overall complexion of the 
canonical rules changes considerably, and a much more satisfying picture of the "legal 
whole" begins to emerge. The rules no longer appear as merely a set of technical and 
pure regulations, but now are manifest as a much richer legal phenomenon, still 
conveying basic rule content, but in a manner that is revealing of a concept of law and 
legality that is quite complex – and once again rather foreign to modern sensibilities. 
Each of the discourses noted above is perhaps best understood as conveying a 
"message" about the nature of canonical law and legality.   
The message of the discourse of tradition is simple: canonical legislation is very 
much about relaying and engaging with tradition, and the chief referents for this 
tradition are Scripture, other canons and other traditional ecclesial customs and usages.  
Legislative work is very much a respectful, ongoing conversation with the past, mostly 
derivative and confirmatory in character.   
The message of the discourse of pedagogy is also simple: law must speak 
directly to moral and metaphysical realities, and it must be kept embedded in these 
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realities. The law is thus both pedagogical in its own action, and it presume pedagogy: 
the law itself teaches, and it requires that its subjects be formed in specific cultural value 
narratives.  These last include specific concepts of morality, theology, honour, law-as-
medicine, purity, and a strong conviction in the ongoing action of God in the 
disciplinary world of the community.  This discourse is perhaps particularly 
disconcerting for modern legal sensibilities – it seems especially "extraneous" to the 
"real" rule content – precisely because this intentional embedding blatantly contradicts 
the fundamental instinct of much modern positivism-formalism, the strict autonomy of 
legal discourse from "outside" value systems.  In this regard, some of the most extreme 
examples of this type of canonical styling, such as Trullo 96 cited above, are 
exceptionally instructive.  The degree to which they strike us as odd – even ridiculous – 
is the measure of how distant our own legal presuppositions are from those of these 
texts, and of this entire world.  
 The message of the dramatic discourse of persuading and dissuading is similar to 
that of the discourse of pedagogy: canonical normativity is to be embedded solidly in 
the realm of moral imperative.  Obeying or disobeying the canons is not simply a 
neutral question of following or not following a set of minimal rules.  It instead involves 
questions of one's very character and thus demands conformance to a very broad set of 
narratives of correct behaviour and dispositions.  In effect, the canons co-opt broader 
forms of social control (morality, shame, fear) for their own uses, both instilling certain 
dispositions, and demanding certain dispositions. Yet again the instinct is almost 
opposite that of modern positivism/formalism, which seeks to distinguish the moral and 
legal, or the "internal forum" and the "external forum": the canons quite intentionally 
weave them together.  In effect, the law makes constant claims on conscience, and is not 
at all shy about addressing – and making demands on – the hearts and emotions of its 
subjects. 
 The bottom line of all these discourses is that to "get" canon law, and to "do" 
canon law, you must "get" and "do" broader narratives of the just and the right.  These 
include knowing the right traditional referents or fundamental con-texts, learning the 
right ideas, and cultivating the right behaviours and dispositions.  Critically, however, 
this now emerges not simply as a theory or idea articulated about the tradition, as in the 
prologues.  Now it emerges as part of the very fabric of the laws themselves.  The 
canons are written almost as expressions or manifestations of these other narratives, and 
are quite inseparable from them, because to be a "legal" text they must be connected 
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with the past, with justice, morality, the Holy Spirit, Scripture etc.  Normativity is 
essentially, primarily and actively about remaining embedded in these narratives.  The 
overall picture – the legal whole – is thus not one of a bare system of instrumental rules 
dominated by a technical proprietary discourse of rule-logic, and closed-off from other 
narratives of theology, values and morals, only touching them now and then, and in a 
controlled manner.   Instead, the rules are clearly written for a conceptualization of legal 
process in which the rules are always being read and applied in a much more free-form 
and constant negotiation with many other external narratives.  The more technical legal 
discourse discussed above, with its logical rule-finding and conceptual formalism, still 
exists in this world, but as part of this world.  It is only one aspect of legal practice that 
one must get right.  It is thus not so much the controlling framework for the laws' 
operation – as we would expect – as much as one tool among others in the realization of 
justice. 
 
F. Summary and analysis: the language of the canons  
A survey of canonical nomenclature reveals one vital fact: the Byzantine canonical 
tradition does consciously conceive of itself as a collection of rules which possess their 
own name.  The presence of this proprietary and even technical nomenclature strongly 
suggests a self-conscious sense of the canons' own autonomy as a rule-world.  There can 
be little doubt that the canons were thus consciously conceived as a particular and 
proprietary body of rules: Fögen is quite correct to note that Byzantium knew two basic 
Rechtsmassen, the νόμοι and the κανόνες.  This corresponds to the reality of the 
manuscripts, and aspects of the prologues. 
Even vis-à-vis the νόμοι, however, this autonomy is never particularly doctrinal 
in character, or absolute.  The distinction in nomenclature, for example, is susceptible to 
exceptions, which should caution us from assigning it too much ontological significance 
in revealing the essence of Byzantine canonical normativity.  Closer examinations of the 
broader textures of the canons – genre, patterns of dispositives, rule-structures, technical 
language – also reveal shifting patterns of assimilation and distinction that elude any 
overly-neat conceptual distinction between νόμοι and κανόνες.  The canons never 
emerge as radically different or discontinuous from the norms of secular legal-writing, 
nor do they emerge as truly imitative.  A constant pattern of similar-yet-different 
emerges in a negotiation of identity that seems primarily literary, not legal-doctrinal, in 
character.  The result, not surprising, is very similar to what we have seen in the 
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manuscripts and implied in the prologues: the two types of norms seem to share the 
same general normative "space", and to participate in the same general world of 
normative expression, but neither is exactly a mirror of the other.  
 The self-conscious terminological autonomy of the Byzantine canonical tradition 
also does not translate directly into a broader modern-like legal positivism-formalism, 
either as something the canons are seeking to avoid by calling themselves κανόνες or as 
something the canons are beginning to manifest by calling themselves κανόνες.  (The 
term κανών is in any case exceedingly broad in scope, fairly generic and with many 
uses, and probably should not be read as having any deep doctrinal significance in 
itself.)  Indeed, an examination of the broader textures of the canonical texts makes it 
clear that one of the core concepts of modern positivism-formalism – namely the 
conceptualization of the legal system as a body of internally coherent rules that operates 
as autonomously as possible from external narratives of morality and values – is 
precisely and directly negated.  As we might now expect from the broader shape of the 
tradition and the prologues, the canons are instead constantly reaching outside of 
themselves in a very messy process of embedding themselves into broader value 
narratives.  Whereas the shape of the tradition and the prologues only suggest this 
activity, however, the canons can now be seen to be realizing it.  The prologues thus, for 
example, say the canons should teach and tap into broader metaphysical narratives, and 
the canons do teach and tap into broader narratives; they canons are supposed to be 
about "life", morality and spiritual psychological, and they do speak directly to life, 
morality and spiritual psychology; canonical activity is supposed to be traditional in 
orientation, and indeed the canons are; and so on.  The canons are thus only in part 
written as constituting a technical-doctrinal framework.  Equally important are these 
other tasks which by turns instill and assume a huge network of scriptural, moral, and 
metaphysical values as integral parts of Byzantine canon-legal reality. Thus while even 
the most positivist-formalist legal theory (e.g. Kelsen's "pure law") must ultimately 
assume some type of contact with a value network, in the canons this network is very 
near the surface, and is regularly, and apparently quite happily, "breaking into" the rule 
world.  The canons are very directly and consciously being written into, and held into, 
this network.  Consequently, the textual and terminlogical autonomy of the canonical 
rules does not translate into a doctrinal-theoretical rule autonomy.  Byzantine canon law 
is a formal and distinct rule-world, but it is not a closed rule-world. 
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 This self-understanding is also signaled by the lack of any consistent sense of 
the Byzantine canonical tradition as "canon law".  The Byzantine canonical tradition 
seems to think of itself as a distinct rule-world, and yet not abstractly.  One aspect of 
this is the casuistic and surprisingly "concrete" nature of the canons, with their lack of 
systematic interest in juridical abstraction, as well as the general formation of the 
tradition as an agglutinating accumulation of very heterogeneous traditions which tend 
to be preserved in their original form.  The tradition thus does not tend to think of itself 
primarily as an ongoing and autonomous discipline or field, or an abstract aggregate of 
principles, techniques and "sources" constituting a constructive jurisprudence, or even 
as a present legislator's project, but as a set of heterogeneous rules, "law sayings", 
deeply embedded in broader sets of principles and narratives, and thoroughly traditional 
in character.  This last is particularly critical: legal authority is always vested in older 
semi-sacred traditions, and therefore the legal system per se is never a present abstract 
reality constructed out of the past, but always a collection of the past authorities 
themselves.  If it is a real law, it is a concrete, traditional text.  As such, "canon law" is 
"the canons".  Inasmuch as there is a broader concept of "the church's law", it must be 
nothing other than the aggregate of the broad Christian regulative "stories" of justice, 
moral progress, divine instructions, repentance and eternal judgment – of which the 
canons are a part. 
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CHAPTER 4.  SYSTEMATIZING THE LAW: THE 6th C THEMATIC 
COLLECTIONS 
 
In the previous chapter we explored how the canons themselves read as legal texts.  In 
this chapter we turn to the thematic indices of the Coll50 and Coll14 as two critical 
moments in which these same canons are being read, shaped and generally "digested" 
by and within the early tradition itself.  In particular, these indices represent the first  – 
and ultimately definitive1 – attempts at classifying the Byzantine corpus material and 
organizing it into a shape and structure beyond that of the straight corpus collection.  
They therefore provide an invaluable window onto a range of issues associated with the 
nature of Byzantine canonical "systematization":  how and to what extent the texts 
could be shaped into a new whole, what shape this whole could assume, how the 
canonical "parts" could be related to one and other in this whole, and how the individual 
texts could be manipulated, interpreted and transformed in these processes.  They are 
thus primary witnesses to how canonical texts could be handled by jurisprudential 
processes and the extent to which Byzantine canon law could be consciously conceived 
as a legal "system" at all.2   
 
A. Origin and dating 
 Thematic or systematic collections (I use the two terms synonymously) may be 
defined as any canonical collection which contains a set of topical titles or headings 
under which relevant canons are subsumed, either cited in full, in part, or as simple 
canonical references (e.g. "Nicaea 10", "Ancyra 4").  These type of texts emerge with 
any clarity in both Greek east and Latin west only in the 6th C.  The first such 
collection, however, mostly unrecognized in the survey literature, seems to be Syrian: 
                                                 
1 In our period the Coll50 and Coll14 thematic schemata have no competition whatsoever.  See Appendix 
D (1) for further details. 
2 This last is a critical question in light of the almost automatic assumption in much modern, especially 
civilian, legal thinking that legal phenomena should constitute internally coherent juristic and legislative 
wholes. See Berman 1983,7-10; Glenn 2007; Merryman 1969,65-70; 13-15; Weber 1925. For broader 
historical context, see Kelly 1970, and any narrative of post-16th C European legal history (Kelly 1992, 
Robinson et al. 2000, Wieacker 1952). The methods, techniques and, especially, implications of canonical 
systematization in our period have not, however, been investigated in much depth.  The most useful study 
is Pinedo 1963, but see also Gaudemet 1991 and Mordek 1975.  Sohm's (in)famous study of Gratian's 
order (Sohm 1918,19-61, 1923,79-85) may also be mentioned, as he saw it as a last gasp of the 
altkatholische mentality; see Chodorow 1972,10-16 (and Congar 1973) for further references on its later 
reception (mostly rejection).  Secular legal systematization and codification in our period, and earlier 
antiquity, is better treated, including Burgmann 2002; Diamond 1950; Frier 1985,158-171; Gagarin 2000 
(and Lévy 2000); Gaudemet 1986; Harries 1998; Heszer 1998; Honoré 1978; Jones 1956,292-294; 
Matthews 2000; Schulz 1953; Stolte 2003; and, in part, Weber 1925.  Works on general Byzantine 
processes of compilation and collection are also useful, including Lemerle 1971 and Odorico 1990.  
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the Collection in 51 Titloi.3   Although only first attested in a 7th C manuscript (London 
BL syr. 14526), its titles contain only references to the canons through to 
Constantinople, despite being found in manuscripts that contain later material. As such, 
as Schwartz suggests, it may well be pre-Chalcedonian (451).4  According to Schwartz 
it is a translation of a Greek original, but is unrelated to the Coll50.5  Possible 
relationships with other later systematic collections have not been explored.  
In the west, the first thematic collection is usually recognized as the handbook-
like Breviatio canonum of Fulgentius Ferrandus, dated c. 535-546.6  It is followed by 
the equally handbook-like Capitula of Martin of Braga, c. 563-580, as well as the much 
more complete Concordia canonum of Cresconius, perhaps dating to the mid-6th C.7  
Other prominent early Latin thematic collections include the 7th C systematic recensions 
of the Hispana, the 7th C Vetus Gallica, and the early 8th C Hibernensis.  This genre will 
slowly gain ground in the west, becoming virtually the norm for collections after the 9th 
C, ultimately culminating in the very sophisticated Concordia of Gratian. 
 The Byzantine canonical tradition of the first millennium will only ever know 
three systematic collections, all of which are thought to have originated in the 6th C.  
Only the Coll50 and Coll14 are extant.  One other collection, the Coll60, is known from 
a brief description in the forward to the collections in 50 titles.8  The Coll50 and Coll14 
traditions, particularly the latter, each undergo numerous expansions and re-workings in 
the following centuries, but later recensions do not seem to have significantly modified 
the original thematic titles themselves; their number and content remain fairly stable 
throughout the tradition, with or without nomocanonical insertions.9 
                                                 
3 Ed. Schulthess 1908,17-27.  Unfortunately, no translation of this collection has been made, and I rely 
upon descriptions by Schwartz 1910,200-201, 218 n.2 and a few notes of Schulthess 1908,viii-xi and Selb 
1989,95, 100-101, 133, 143. It is to be distinguished from the capitulatio of London BL Syr. 15428, 
which seems to be similar in form (and content?) to that proceeding Dionysius II. 
4 Schwartz 1910,200-201.  
5 Schwartz 1910,200 n.2; cf. Sin 10-12 
6 On the following collections generally see Maassen 1871 and, more briefly, but up to date, Zechiel-
Eckes 1992, Fransen 1973, Gaudemet 1985 and Mordek 1975.  Occasionally another small collection, the 
so-called Statuta ecclesiae antiqua (5th C; ed. Munier 1963), is treated as the first western "systematic" 
collection (e.g. Gaudemet 1991,167; Mordek 1991,901; Zechiel-Eckes 1992,1.31).  However, this 
collection lacks a title-rubric structure, and is best regarded as a rather ordinary example of Apostolic 
Church order material that has implicit topical themes – and as such is no more "systematic" than most 
other examples of Apostolic Church order literature (e.g. the Didache). On this collection, see Munier 
1960, Gaudemet 1985,84-86. 
7 The date and place of origin of Cresconius' Concordia is controversial; see Gaudemet 1985,138-139; 
Reynolds 1986,400; Zechiel-Eckes 1992,1.66-118.  
8 Syn 5. From the very general criticisms of Scholastikos it does not seem possible to reconstruct the 
precise form of the Coll60; see Beneshevich's comments, Sin 219.   
9 The matter has not yet been thoroughly examined, but in the editions of Kormchaya and Meliara 1905-
1906 (both pre-Photian recensions) no chapter clearly owes its existence to a post-6th C addition. Pitra and 
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 Only two dates are reasonably secure for the Greek collections.  First, the first 
version of the Coll50, fairly consistently ascribed to John Scholastikos in the 
manuscripts, must have been composed sometime during his lifetime, i.e from c. 525-
530 to 577.10  Second, the first nomocanonical reworking of the Coll14 is very likely to 
be located between 612-629, perhaps 612-619, as all manuscripts contain a law of 
Heraclius of 612, but an important law of 629 is quite obviously a later addition in some 
manuscripts, and another law of 619 is missing altogether.11   
Aside from these ranges, dating is more speculative, and tends to become quite 
dependent upon the (somewhat hypothetical) connection of the various collections to 
civil law appendices.  Scholars tend to assume, however, with Zachariä von Lingenthal, 
that the Coll60 titles was unlikely to have been written before the completion of 
Justinian's civil codification in 534, and thus place it around 535.12 If this is correct, it 
may vie with Fulgentius as the first thematic collection in the Greco-Latin world.  This 
dating can be lent precision if the Coll60 included the Coll25 as an appendix, as the 
original form of the Coll25 seems to have lacked any legislation post-534.13  
John Scholastikos' collection is often placed after his ordination as a presbyter c. 
550, at any rate before his tenure as patriarch of Constantinople (from 565-577), and 
possibly while still in Antioch.14  In support of these assertions one manuscript, now 
lost, may be cited which attributes the collection to "the presbyter John".15  Further, the 
Coll87, if originally the appendix to the Coll50, and composed at very near the same 
time, seems to lack any material after 546 – in particular, Novel 129, of 551, which 
touches on church matters.16  Finally, the Coll87 omits various regulations relating only 
to Constantinople – thus supporting an Antiochian provenance.17 
                                                                                                                                               
RP, however, both include a latter addition 13.41, a chapter derived exclusively from a post-6th C addition 
(Trullo 64).  Title 14 also tends to gain some extra miscellaneous chapters in the manuscripts, as reported 
by Pitra 2.636, and evident in MSS of the 11th C recensions (e.g. in Jerusalem Pan Taph. 24 and Athos 
Pant. 234; cf. Schminck 1998); so also in the older Paris gr supp. 614, 10th C.  The Nachleben  of these 
chapters is, however, unclear; apparently they are not regular in the commentator recensions.  In at least 
one instance Title 14 also seems to disappear (Vienna hist. gr. 70); this too is not well studied. 
10 On Scholastikos' birth date, see Sin 273-274 
11 The likely authorship of "Enantiophanes" also confirms this general period; for more detail on both 
matters see Delineatio  66-67. 
12 So, especially, Delineatio 52; cf. Zachariä von Lingenthal 1877,615-616. Peges 132 places it at 535-
545.  
13 Thus Delineatio 52. 
14 For example, Beck 1977,144; Delineatio 52-53; Historike  44-45; Hongmann 1961,53; L'Huillier 
1976,55; Peges 132-133; Schwartz 1933,4; Zachariä von Lingenthal 1877,618.  To my knowledge, 
however, the matter has not been thoroughly re-examined in the 20th C. 
15 The so-called "Claromontensis", known now only through Voellus and Justel 1661 and two early 
catalogue descriptions. See Sin 196-198; cf. Zachariä von Lingenthal 1877,618. 
16 Sin 288-289. 
17 Sbornik 205 n. 2. 
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 Ernst Honigmann's ingenious proposal – the details of which we cannot repeat 
in full – that the first Coll14 was produced by Patriarch Eutychius and the monk John 
(later John IV "The Faster" of Constantinople) is widely regarded as reasonable, if not 
provable, and has tended to fix a date of this collection at c. 580.18  Suffice to say that if 
the references in τὰ μὲν σώματα to a predecessor do refer to the Coll50, then at least it 
was produced after the Coll50, and presumably after the death of Scholastikos (the then-
standing patriarch).  Further, if the Tripartita is the secular collection referred to in τὰ 
μὲν σώματα – which seems very likely, as no other such collection comes even close to 
fitting its description – then the date of 580 is certainly possible, as the latest piece of 
legislation in the Tripartita dates to 572. 
 The relatively synchronous appearance of many of these collections in both east 
and west in or around the 6th C suggests a certain coherence, and even connection, 
between these collections – a kind of systematic "movement".  There is no concrete 
evidence to suggest an official or even conscious project per se, but if one maps the pre-
7th C collections they do read as a surprisingly coherent imperial Mediterranean 
phenomenon, as all but one of these collections, the Capitula of Martin, are written in 
imperial territories (Ferrandus and Cresconius, of course, writing in the newly re-
conquered African provinces – or for the latter, perhaps Italy).  Even Martin of Braga 
spent time in the eastern empire, and became a monk in the Holy Land; he is very much 
of the empire, and his work is directed towards making better known the imperial 
(Greek) corpus to a western audience.19 The Syrian Titloi, although earlier, are also 
almost certainly from the empire.  The systematic indices are thus best thought of as, at 
first, a general imperial phenomenon, stretching west-east across the Mediterranean 
region. Only later do they extend beyond the imperial borders. 
 These collections are also all very similar in both form and content.  All are built 
around the same core (Greek) corpus of canons, and all are more or less the same "type" 
of thematic index: simple rubrical headings that summarize canonical content.  More 
specifically, although Ferrandus and Braga are clearly meant to be small practical 
handbooks, and in their size and level of selection, have no 6th C eastern counterparts, 
Cresconius' Concordia, the most advanced and complete of the early western thematic 
collections, is – as we will see – an almost exact morphological twin of the Coll50.  
Further, its treats its source (the Dionysian II corpus) in almost exactly the same way as 
                                                 
18 Honigmann 1961,55-64; so Delineatio  60-61; Historike  68-71; Peges 134-135; Stolte 1998a; van der 
Wal and Stolte 1994,xx-xxi. 
19 Preface in Somerville and Brasington 1998,53-54 (trans.).  
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the Coll50 treats its corpus: absolutely comprehensively – it only omits some canons 
from Carthage, as often the case at this period.20  If the mid-6th C date for this 
collection is correct, it is also approximately contemporary with the Coll50.  The 
systematic elements of the 7th C Hispana (in their various forms) are likewise 
morphologically very similar to the Coll14: a thematic index comprised of a series of 
books divided into chapters, and the whole tending to preface a straight corpus 
collection – and apparently including most of the material of the Hispana.21 
 Despite, then, the tendency to treat the emergence of the thematic collections in 
east and west as two isolated if parallel events, the collections instead suggest a certain 
legal-cultural unity, and are another indication of a common imperial canon-legal world 
running east-west across the Mediterranean through at least the 6th C: it is centered on 
the same corpus, and tends towards the same forms. 
 The reasons for the appearance of these thematic versions of the corpus are not 
entirely clear.  The usual explanation is two-fold: an internal pressure was generated 
within the tradition itself by the increasing unwieldiness of the growing canonical 
corpus, and the Justinianic codification (528-534) provided an impetus for a parallel 
ecclesial development.22  Neither explanation is entirely satisfying.   
Leaping to the idea that the corpus naturally evolves into a thematic form 
because of the latter's natural convenience and sophistication is perhaps a retrojection of 
the later trajectory of the western medieval experience.23  The growing size of the 
material, in particular, cannot be understood as a certain cause.  It is true that the 
addition of Basil in the Coll50, and of Carthage and the patristic material in the Col14, 
or Carthage and papal material in Dionysius, did considerably increase the size of the 
various corpora.   It is also true that the prefaces do imply that the variety and quantity 
of the material corpus was a primary motivation for their work (see below). But this last 
may be more of a topos of authorial justification, and as for the former, the additions to 
the 6th C corpora are hardly overwhelming – not enough to credibly strain a pre-modern 
memory. Certainly the full corpus of the 6th C Coll14 is minuscule in comparison to the 
quantities of secular legal material that are much more convincingly put forward as 
factors in the initiation of Justinian's (and earlier) secular codification project.  Further, 
the Syrian Titloi were clearly formulated before considerable corpus expansions. In this 
                                                 
20 On its contents and sources, Zechiel-Eckes 1992,1.5-28; the decretals may also be considered as 
somewhat selected. 
21 See Díez 1982,2.1 and 2.2; this parallel is especially close with the Tabulae. 
22 For example, Peges 131; Pieler 1997a,579-580; van der Wiel 1991,42. 
23 See chapter 1.C.1. 
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light, a systematic indexing of the corpus suggests more convenience than necessity, 
and even suggests a certain artificiality. A more ideological explanation may be 
preferable. 
 The idea that Justinian's codification may have inspired the ecclesial 
development is an obvious one, and most scholars take it for granted.24  It is especially 
compelling if the Syrian collection is ignored, and the terminus post quem of the Coll60  
(and perhaps Ferrandus) is set at 534.  Certainly the form of the systematic collections – 
divided into books and/or titloi and chapters – is highly reminiscent of the CJ and the 
Digest.    
 Here too, however, we should be cautious.  There is no direct evidence that 
Justinian's codificatory work provoked the systematic recensions.  The authors of the 
new collections do not explicitly cast themselves as working on the model of this 
emperor's work, or secular legal works at all, and as far as I am aware, there are no 
references in the 6th C literature to such an ecclesial "program".25  In fact, there are 
almost no references in our period to the collections as "systematic" collections at all, or 
even as "the canons in [x] titles"; overwhelmingly the canonical collections are always 
simply "books of canons" or "the canons".26  There is very little explicit consciousness 
of systematization at all.27 
 Further, strictly speaking, there is no hard and fast reason why the systematic 
canonical collections could not have emerged before Justinian.  Here we must be careful 
about a potential circularity in dating the collections in Coll60 and Ferrandus to after 
534 on the grounds that they "must" have been inspired by Justinian – and then bringing 
them forth as evidence of a sudden post-Justinianc boom in thematic collections.  The 
Syrian Titloi are apparently pre-Justinianic, and the Coll60 and the Breviatio could be 
too.  In this connection one disturbing aspect of the transmission of the Coll50 is worth 
noting: the collection is not uniformly ascribed to John Scholastikos.   In a few 
                                                 
24 For example, Historike 38; L'Huillier 1976,55; 1997,141; Peges 131; Pieler 1991,604 n. 18; Schwartz 
1910,195, 1936a,160. 
25 A possible, and indirect, exception is the occasionally remarked (e.g. Historike 46) parallel of the fifty 
titles of the Coll50 and the fifty books of the Digest.  However, fifty, half a century, is also simply a very 
convenient and round number. 
26 An exception may be a 9th C letter of Pope Nicholas to Photius (Mansi XV 176.263) which mentions 
the "quinquaginta titulos"; Sin 326. See chapter 1.B. 
27 This finds a certain parallel in the oft-remarked lack of interest of contemporary sources in the 
Justinianic codification; see Pieler 1978,402-403, nn. 13, 14, with further references, and Laiou 1994b for 
similar patterns in later Byzantine sources. 
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manuscripts the collection is ascribed to Theodoret of Cyrus (393-457).28  The text's 
editor, Beneshevich, dismissed this tradition on the basis of the much broader tendency 
of ascribing the text to John, including in the oldest manuscripts, and the lack of 
awareness of this "collection of Theodoret" in the Oriental churches.29   But even 
Beneshevich admits that it is difficult to determine why Theodoret's name would ever 
have entered the tradition.30  It does seem odd that anyone in the 6th C or later would 
have mistakenly or intentionally ascribed anything to Theodoret following the Three 
Chapters – much less something that was intended to have authority.31  However, it 
would be very easy to imagine that Theodoret – in the vicinity of Antioch, which was 
already associated with church-legal activity, and also near Berytos – may have 
composed such a collection well before 534.  Could not John Scholastikos, who was 
from Antioch, have brought this text with him to Constantinople, perhaps modifying it, 
or perhaps just attaching his name to it or a later recension (perhaps when the Coll87 
was added)? 
 Perhaps more importantly, there is nothing in the basic technique of the ecclesial 
systematic collections that demands Justinian's codification as a precedent. The very 
basic type of topical organization of the canonical collections is easily evident in the 5th 
CTh (books and titles), for example, and elsewhere in even earlier legal literature.32  
Further, it is not entirely clear that a legal precedent of any sort is necessary.  Although 
it is probably correct to view the systematic "movement" as one way in which the 
canonical tradition broadly assimilated itself to Roman legal literature, other types of 
literature also evince basic rubric-reference organizing structures.  Schwartz, for 
example, saw Basil's Moralia as the most obvious model for the Syrian Titloi, and τίτλοι 
listings may be found in 5th C biblical manuscripts (the term is not exclusively legal).33  
If anyone had cared to thematize the canonical material before the 6th C, ample models, 
from a variety of different sources, were available. 
 It is probably unnecessary therefore to imagine any particularly pressing need, 
cause or inspiration for the thematic indices.  They are best thought of as what they 
                                                 
28 London BL Add. 28822; Venice Nan. 226; Paris gr. 1370; Torino BN 170 (see Sin 269).  Cf. Historike  
38, n.5 for the theory of Jean Doujat (d. 1688) regarding Theodoret's authorship of the Coll60.   
29 Sin 269-270, 322. 
30 Sin 269. 
31 Clavis notes only three works that seem spuriously attributed to Theodoret: 6286-6288. 
32 Almost all the source surveys discuss this material; see e.g. Pieler 1997a,566-567, 573-579; Schulz 
1953; Wenger 1953,530-561; cf. also Honoré 1978,139. 
33 Schwartz 1910,200 n.2; Goswell 2009; see Pinedo 1963,289. n. 18 for parallels in various other 
patristic and even Masoretic practices. 
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most obviously present to be: works of convenience, bringing greater order to the 
church's canonical tradition, and broadly resonant with a variety of contemporary late 
antique organizing and structuring techniques, legal and otherwise. 
 
B. Self-presentation 
How do the collections talk about their own systematizing work?  All three authors of 
the prefaces to the Coll50 and the Coll14 provide some description of their method of 
systematization and organization.  These technical descriptions, inevitably in the latter 
part of the prefaces, seem to constitute a conventional part of Byzantine canonical 
introduction, and may also be found in a number of the secular prefaces.34 These 
passages are exceptionally valuable as they are the only texts in which Byzantine 
systematizers directly reflect on the technical aspects of their task.  In effect, they are 
the only sources for how the Byzantines themselves may be found defining and talking 
about their own canonical τεχνή. 
 The texts are above all characterized by brevity and simplicity.   Indeed, they 
verge on statements of the obvious, and their most striking feature is not what is present 
but what is not: they engage in virtually no sophisticated jurisprudential analysis, 
neither discussing contradictions, repetitions, or obscurities, or means or principles for 
treating these matters.  Instead, they convey a simple method of compilation and 
organization oriented above all at the facilitation of convenient and thorough 
engagement with the canonical sources.  
 The main notes are sounded by John Scholastikos.  The canonical legislation of 
the church, he explains, has been issued in a variety of different places, for different 
reasons, at different times.  As such, it lacks "organization by subject matter" (τάξις 
πραγμάτων), and it is thus difficult to discover all that the canons say on any given 
topic.35  His task, therefore, is to gather the material into one and divide it into titles in 
which the similar are placed next to the similar36.  His goal is thus explicitly quite 
simple: to make the "finding" (εὕρεσις) of that which is sought easy (ῥᾳδία) and toil-
free (ἄπονος).  These points are enforced by criticism of the previous Coll60, which 
made it difficult to find all that has been set forth on any one topic – in his collection, he 
                                                 
34 For example, De Auctore 6-9; Tanta 2-8; Prooimion to the Eisagoge 84-113; Prooimion to the 
Prochiron 42-83. 
35 Syn 4-5. 
36 Syn 5. 
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notes, each title will clearly indicates the content of that which it encompasses.37  His 
table of contents, he notes, also makes it easy to identify the taxis of the canons: λίαν 
εὐσύνοπτος.38 
 The first prologue to the Coll14, τὰ μὲν σώματα, likewise speaks of gathering 
the canons of the synods which took places at "various" (διάφορος) times into one place 
– but in so doing being careful to preserve the name of each council.39 Having gathered 
"everything", the author continues, one "brings together" the δύναμις of the material 
into titles, and divides them into chapters under which one places the references to the 
appropriate canons.40  These references include source name and number.  The whole 
produces – "as I think"  – a "σύνταγμα εὐσύνοπτον".41   Criticism of predecessors is 
also engaged in; in particular, as already noted, the author criticizes the tendency of 
placing the full text under the titles as producing an unwieldy collection, and, in 
particular, of leading to the undesirable division of canons – accusation of which he 
wishes to avoid.  
 He concludes by briefly describing how and from which sources he includes 
political legislation, "in short and summary".  His exposition of this material is "brief", 
in a collection, as both an aide-memoire and for the "perfect research" of the readers: 
σύντομον ἐν συναγωγῇ ποιησάμενος ἔκθεσιν, ἅμα μὲν εἰς ἀνάμνησιν, ἅμα δὲ πρὸς 
τελείαν αὐτῶν τοῖς ἐντυγχάνουσιν ἔρευναν. 
 The second prologue to the Coll14, generally attributed to Photius, or at least to 
the redaction of the 14 Title tradition made during his patriarchal tenure, follows a 
similar pattern.  The author notes that during the interval since the appearance of the 
first version, new synods of arisen to address "not a few" new issues, of various 
(διάφορος) causes.42  He has thus added new material, but has been careful to preserve 
the "chain" (εἱρμός) and order of composition of the older collection.  This last he 
describes as "that which our predecessors ἐφιλοτεχνήσαντο" – a rare use of "techne". 
 The overall picture is thus quite simple, and quite coherent.  Taken together, the 
three prologues may be understood to constitute the basic Byzantine self-conception of 
canon-legal systematic techne.  It is composed of four conventional elements, each 
conveyed with similar terminology. A 1) varied source material (διαφορ-) is 2) gathered 
                                                 
37 Exactly what was wrong with the Coll60 is, however, difficult to discern from Scholastikos' 
description.    
38 Syn 5. 
39 Pitra 2.445.16-17 
40 Pitra 2.447.41-44 
41 Pitra 2.447.44 
42 Pitra 2.448.8-9. 
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into one (συναγογ-; συλλογ-; συνταγ-; αἰθρο-; συναιρ-; [συν][προσ]αρμοζ-; συμφλεκ-) 
and 3) divided (διαιρ-) into titles or chapters (or both) which allows for 4) a clearer and 
more convenient "discovery"  of what one is seeking: not δυσευρετ-, δυσποριστ- or 
δυσαλωτ- to find (εὕρ-) but ῥᾳδ- and ἀπον-, ἀκοπ-, and always with the result of σαφ- 
and εὐσυνοπτ-. The Coll14 preface supplements these terms with memory (μνημ-) 
vocabulary: the fathers and secular legal legislation are provided as aide-mémoires. 
 The extreme simplicity of this "systematic" prescription is important.  The 
Byzantine self-presentation of canonical systematization is one of a very simple, literal 
model of "law finding".  Systematization facilitates quite literally the "finding" of and 
engagement with traditional legal texts.  To systematize law is to engage in a 
straightforward categorization of traditional material by which one is brought into closer 
contact with the original texts.  Issues of contradictions, distinctions, underlying 
concepts, or material coherence are not prominent: the notion of the law being "varied" 
does not seem to imply an idea of contradiction, nor does the ἁρμοζ- or εὐσυνοπτ-  
vocabulary implies any type of interpretative reconciliation.  It instead seems directed 
towards coherence of topical classification.  There is, indeed, no sense that  
systematization in any way implies material reshaping of the corpus itself.  The real 
concern of the systematizer is simply 1) to identify the correct traditional material, and 
then 2) to place it in thematic categories.  It is a process of topical indexing.  
 
C. Morphology  
The self-presentation of the systematic elements of these collections as simple topical 
indices is true to form. The thematic index, essentially a preface to the corpus, may be 
regarded as little other than a glorified table of contents to the corpus.  Indeed, in terms 
of genre, tables of contents are probably the most obvious predecessor for these 
collections.  Both are constituted by a brief set of rubrics, summarizing the contents of 
their referent, and are often in the form (Περὶ... Ὁτὶ... De..).  The difference is simply 
that the rubrics of the thematic indices subsume a number of specific referents, and that 
the rubrics do not (generally) follow the work's order of chapters, but instead follow 
their own thematic ordering.  
 The basic morphology of all early systematic collections, Latin and Greek, may 
thus be schematized as follows: 
 PROLOGUE + LIST OF SOURCES (perhaps as part of the prologue) + SYSTEMATIC 
INDEX + CORPUS 
 215
 There are a few main variations among the collections.  First, the systematic 
indices may be either one-tiered or two-(or more)tiered.  In the former, there is only one 
level of rubrics in the index (as Cresconius, or, superficially, the Coll50); in the latter, 
there are two, with sets of primary rubrics gathered under larger thematic groups by 
secondary rubrics (as in the Coll14 or the systematic Hispana, where the chapters are 
subsumed under broader "books" or titles).  Second, as already noted, the corpus portion 
of the collections may be arranged either systematically or non-systematically.  In the 
former, the systematic index is simply repeated with the subsumed canons under each 
rubric written out in full.  In the latter, the index is left as an index.   
 We may thus indicate a more comprehensive schema: 
 PROLOGUE + LIST OF SOURCES + SYSTEMATIC INDEX (one or two-tiered) + 
CORPUS (systematically arranged or non-systematically arranged) 
 The Coll50 is formally a one-tiered systematic collection, and generally found 
with a systematic corpus: 
 PROLOGUE + LIST OF SOURCES + ONE-TIERED SYSTEMATIC INDEX + ONE-TIERED 
SYSTEMATIC CORPUS. 
 It sometimes, understandably, lacks the initial systematic index.43  Its corpus, as 
noted in chapter one, while originally systematic in form, also often has appended to it 
later sources listed chronologically. Cresconius, which has a very similar corpus, is very 
similar in form.  It too has a prologue, a one-tiered index, and a one-tiered corpus in 
systematic in form.  Cresconius may however be regarded as more conservative or 
"primitive" in that his system of rubrics is one step closer to a simple table of contents: 
his rubrics, mostly derived from Dionysius, actually follow the Dionysian corpus 
successively (e.g. Titles 1-50 start each with canons from the Apostles; 76-80 from 
Nicaea; 81-106 from Ancyra; 108-120 from Neoceasarea, and so on).44  As a result, 
very few titles actually function as real thematic groupings.45  Further, Cresconius' 
rubrics are true one-tier rubrics.  The Coll50 titles in fact usually contain more than one 
rubric, and are thus functionally two-tier. 
 The Coll14 is a two-tiered collection comprising fourteen secondary grouping of 
primary rubrics, called respectively τίτλοι and κεφάλαια.  Its corpus is intentionally and 
                                                 
43 Syn 10 n. (a).  
44 Zechiel-Eckes 1992,1.29-48; cf. Fiery 2008 on Dionysius' own attempts to provide a proto-systematic 
index in his title-listing. 
45 Zechiel-Eckes 1992,1.49 counts only about 20 titles (of 300!) with substantial groupings.  
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explicitly left in normal unsystematic corpus form, and this is the usual state of affairs in 
the manuscripts.46  Its form is thus prototypically the following: 
 PROLOGUE (as many as three in the MSS) + LIST OF SOURCES + TWO-TIERED 
SYSTEMATIC INDEX + NON-SYSTEMATIC CORPUS. 
As noted, certain versions of the systematic Hispana may be regarded as the 
morphological twin of the Coll14, containing a similar two-tiered initial index, and a 
non-systematic corpus. 
 In the Byzantine collections, when the secular laws are added, they are always 
added as a second discrete section under the rubrics after the canonical references, often 
beginning with "ὁ νόμος".  In both cases, the secular laws are never actually mixed in 
with the canons themselves, and are easily extractable.    
  
D. Source selection 
As the Byzantine systematic collections present themselves as little other than glorified 
indices to their material, we might expect them, like any table of contents, to be 
comprehensive – i.e. to cover all of the corpus material.  In this, as already noted, they 
do not fail.  In fact, the single most striking – and important – aspect of the two 
principal Byzantine systematic collections is the almost total absence of any sustained 
process of selection vis-à-vis their stated sources.  The reality of Byzantine systematic 
collections as simple re-arrangements and indexings of the corpus – and not as 
substantively creative new collections – is in no way better illustrated.  The systematic 
indices are working around and from the corpus: the corpus is not being shaped to suit 
the indices. 
 This aspect of the collections has already been broached several times.47  To 
summarize, this feature is particularly pronounced in the collection in the Coll50.  The 
Coll50 is nearly a literal re-arrangement of the corpus, inasmuch as very few canons are 
even repeated.  One could write out each canon on a separate piece of paper and then 
simply re-arrange the pieces under topical themes to arrive at something like the 50 
titles.  It omits nothing.  Even the repetitions are few.48 Cresconius is very similar.49 
 The original Coll14, on the other hand, does seem to have omitted some canons 
in its systematic rubrics.  However, as already noted, these are only from material that 
                                                 
46 Although variations in the manuscripts for the Coll14 (and Coll50) are not unknown. See Appendix D 
(2) for details.   
47 Chapter 1.C.1; Appendix A (7).   This is also broadly true of Blastares. 
48 See Appendix B (7) for repetitions in the Coll50. 
49 Cresconius also has few repetitions; Zechiel-Eckes 1992,2.801-807. 
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the Coll14 itself just added to the corpus; the material that was already established as 
"core" seems to have been faithfully represented.  Indeed, the concern to full represent 
the corpus is in one sense more pronounced than in the Coll50, as the Coll14 include 
many one-canon rubrics which seem to have been invented precisely to ensure topical 
representation for all canons.  Some of these, in their very specificity, verge almost on 
the bizarre: for example 13.38, "On those who attempt to set at nought the enactments 
of Ephesus: Ephesus 6".  Further, as noted, later recensions of the Coll14 seem to have 
re-added the missing canons, at least in a catch-all chapter in Title 14.  The basic 
imperative of the Coll14 tradition is thus very similar: faithfully represent the canonical 
corpus. 
  
E. The nature and constitution of the rubrics 
The essence of the Byzantine systematic method is the subsumption of canons under 
thematic rubrics.  These are then arranged in a (more or less) logical manner. Although 
seemingly simple, this process presupposes a) a careful reading of the canons to 
identify, distinguish and choose significant content; b) the creation of suitable categories 
to subsume that content; c) the association of similar canons with each other; and d) the 
provision of some type of overall structure.  Each one of these steps provides 
opportunities for the interpretation and reshaping of the material.50   
 In this section our concern is with the first three steps, i.e. the formation and 
design of the rubrics themselves, and how they relate to their subsumed canons.   
 The hermeneutic relationship of rubric and canons is potentially complex.  
Rubrics may be introduced from elsewhere, for example, and the traditional material 
made to fit under them, thus subtly modifying their content; or the rubrics may subsume 
and group certain material in unusual ways; or the language of the rubric may imply 
specific readings of the canons; or the rubrics may show evidence of abstracting 
jurisprudential principles or concepts – or at least general topics – from the traditional 
material.  The methodical creation of general categories might also highlight gaps in the 
legislation.  For example, if one finds enough material to stimulate the creation of a 
topic on "episcopal marriage" one might wonder about finding (or inventing) material 
on "presbyteral marriage" and then "diaconal marriage" or "subdiaconal marriage".    
 In fact, as we might already suspect, relatively little of any of these activities are 
present in the Byzantine thematic rubrics.  The hallmark of the Byzantine rubricization 
                                                 
50 cf. Pinedo 1963,293-294, and the brief comments of Mordek 1975,4-6. 
 218
is instead deep conservatism and traditionalism.  This conservatism is manifested in two 
interrelated ways.   
 First, the thematic rubrics are overwhelmingly derived from the canons 
themselves; with only one significant exception they are not imported from any outside 
source.  This again demonstrates the close affinity of the thematic indices to table of 
contents: the content of the canonical titles is broadly inductive or exegetical, in the 
sense of being pulled "up" and "out" of the canonical material.  In the Coll14 this 
process is in fact two-fold: the κεφάλαια tend to be summaries of the canons, and the 
τίτλοι of the κεφάλαια.  More advanced forms of rubricization, identified by Pinedo in 
later western collections, where a rubric is created as a thesis to be endorsed (e.g. 
rubrics on papal primacy in the Gregorian collections) or as a problem to be solved 
(Gratian), are hardly evident.51 Likewise there is almost nothing parallel to Bernard of 
Pavia's direct borrowing of titles from the Digest for his decretal collection.52 
 Second, the thematic rubrics show very little evidence of jurisprudential 
abstraction of any sort.  There is thus little independent distillation of legal principles or 
general legal concepts; little attempt to extrapolate from specific regulations to more 
general norms; no attempt to discern or establish distinctions not already present in the 
canons; little introduction of new terminology; almost no attempt, even indirectly, to 
address contradictions; no provision of tools for extended rules to cover gaps; no 
attempt to organize canons according to internal principles; and, finally, even the degree 
of generalization, the (ostensibly) basic concern of the whole system, in not uniformly 
pursued across the rubrics.  Instead, to a point that at times verges on the bizarre, the 
rubrics adhere very closely to the surface contours of the canons themselves, deeply 
transparent to, and bound by, the canons themselves.  The majority of titles are thus 
either very close paraphrases, or even literal composites, of specific canons' contents, or 
very innocuous summaries focusing on one or two key words from the canons  – what 
Pinedo has aptly called "resume rubrics".53 
 To examine these tendencies in greater detail, we may begin with an example of 
a typical "resume" rubric: 
                                                 
51 Pinedo 1963,291-292; cf. Fournier 1931,1.77.  The best example of the former may be the Dictatus 
Papae, if, as now often suggested, they were originally the headings for a planned canonical collection.  
See Ferme 1998,166-169; Kuttner 1947,400-401. 
52 See Pennington 2008,297-298, and the table in Friedberg 1879,2.xx-xxviii. 
53 Pinedo 1963,289, 292-293. 
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Coll14 8.16 
Περὶ τοῦ μὴ ὀφείλειν κληρικοὺς συνεστιᾶσθαι τῷ δευτερογαμοῦντι ἤ 
παρανόμως γαμοῦντι.  Συνόδου Νεοκαισαρείας κανὼν ζ´.Τιμοθέου κανὼν 
ια´. (Regarding that clerics ought not to feast with those getting married 
for the second time or those married illicitly. Neocaesarea 7 and Timothy 
11.)   
These canons are as follows:  
Neoceasarea 7: Πρεσβύτερον εἰς γάμον διγαμοῦντος μὴ ἑστιᾶσθαι, ἐπεῖ 
μετάνοιαν αἰτοῦντος τοῦ διγαμοῦντος τί ἔσται ὁ πρεσβύτερος, ὁ διὰ τῆς 
ἑστιάσεως συγκατατιθέμενὸς;  (A presbyter is not to feast at the marriage 
of one getting married for the second time, for if the digamist must do 
penance, what type of priest will he be who through his attendance 
approves the marriage?) 
 
Timothy 11:  [Question posed: Can a cleric attend various types of dubious 
marriages?] 
Ἀπόκρισις.  Ἅπαξ εἴπατε· ἐὰν ἀκούσῃ ὁ κληρικὸς τὸν γάμον παράνομον.  
εἰ οὖν ὁ γάμος παράνομός ἐστιν, οὐκ ὀφείλει ὁ κληρικὸς  κοινωνεῖν 
ἁμαρτίαις ἀλλοτρίαις. (Answer:  You have just said 'if the cleric hears that 
a marriage is illicit'; if the marriage is illicit, the cleric ought not to 
participate in the sins of others.) 
In this example, it is evident that the rubric is a fairly simple summary of the content of 
the two canons, and that even much of the basic language of the rubric is derived 
directly from the subsumed canons: ἑστιᾶσθαι, ὀφείλει, γάμος παράνομoς, κληρικός.   
Sometimes the rubric is virtually a straight citation of a canon.  Thus Coll14 
1.10, for example, reads Περὶ του μὴ χειροτονεῖσθαι τινὰ ἐπίσκοπον ἢ πρεσβύτερον ἢ 
διάκονον πρὶν ἢ πάντας τοὺς ἐν τῷ οἴκῳ αὐτοῦ χριστιανοὺς ὀρθοδόξους.  The one 
subsumed canon, Carthage 36, differs only slightly in structure: ὥστε ἐπικόπους καὶ 
πρεσβυτέρους καὶ διακόνους μὴ χειροτονεῖσθαι, πρὶν ἢ πάντας τοὺς ἐν τῷ οἴκῳ αὐτῶν 
χριστιανοὺς οῤθοδοξους ποιήσωσιν.   
This literal, surface correspondence of the rubric to canons is often so close that 
when there are multiple elements in a rubric, one can generally trace each element to 
specific canons under the rubric.  For example, in Coll14 1.12, Πῶς ὁ ἐθνικὸς ἢ ὁ ἐν 
νόσῳ ἢ ὁ νεωστὶ βαπτισθεὶς καὶ ὁ ἐκ φαύλης διαγωγῆς χειροτονεῖται ἐπίσκοπος ἢ 
κληρικός, four canons are subsumed, each treating some aspect of ordination.  From 
Apostolic 80 comes the reference to ἔθνος and φαύλη διαγωγή, from Nicaea 2 ἐθνικός 
and the problem of recent ordination (νεωστὶ βαπτισθεὶς paraphrasing ἅμα τῷ 
βαπτισθῆναι), from Neocaesarea the reference to νόσος, and in Laodicea again the 
problem of rapid ordination. 
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The same tends to be true for the Coll14 title rubrics: each element of the rubric 
can often be fitted to sections of chapters, and often in a similar order.  For example, 
Title 3, "On prayers, psalmody and readings and anaphora and communion and apparel 
and services of readers, singers and servers" may be divided into four rubrical fragments 
each of which corresponds to a distinct section of chapters: on prayers (= κεφάλαιον 1), 
psalmody and reading (= κεφάλαια 2 and 3), anaphora and communion (=κεφάλαιον 4 
to the conclusion of the title, with the terms from κεφάλαιον 4).  The last rubrical 
fragment, on apparel and services of readers, singers and servers, corresponds only to 
chapter 10, perhaps singled out because its specific content. 
 This summary-literalism is particularly pronounced in the Coll50 where it 
provides the key to unraveling one of the text's most curious mysteries.  Beneshevich 
long ago noted that there exists in the manuscripts two traditions of arranging the 
canons under each rubric: a normal arrangement according to the corpus order (citing 
first the Apostles, then Nicaea, then Ancyra, etc) and a "systematic" arrangement, which 
is highly irregular.  Beneshevich was very careful to detail and schematize this 
systematic arrangement in both his 1914 study, and again in his 1937 edition of the 
Coll50 (published a year before the great scholar was murdered by Stalin).54  To my 
knowledge, he never changed his assessment in his first study: "To establish the 
grounds on which this [systematic] order of rules was constructed is extremely difficult, 
and even impossible."55  Because of this obscurity, and especially because this 
"systematic" order only occurs in 33 of the titles, he decided that the corpus-order form 
was likely original.56 
 Once we realize, however, that these collections are constructed by deriving 
rubrics from a specific canon or canons, with other canons then grouped with these 
source canons, the nature of this systematic order becomes quite clear.  In the systematic 
titles, the canons are simply being placed in the order that corresponds to the order of 
the compound rubrics in each title.  For example, Title 14 reads as follows: Περὶ τοῦ μὴ 
δεῖν ἐπίσκοπον ἢ ὅλως ἐν κλήρῳ καταλεγόμενον κοσμικὰς ἀναδέχεσθαι καὶ δημοσίας 
φροντίδας, πλὴν εἰ μὴ κατὰ νόμους ἀναγκασθείη, μήτε δὲ δανείζειν ἐπὶ τόκῳ ποτὲ ἢ 
ἐγγύαις ἑαυτὸν ἐκδιδόναι, μήτε στρατείαν ἑαυτῷ περίνοιεῖν καὶ ἀξίωμα. This title 
subsumes nine canons.  In corpus order they are Apostolic 6, 20, 44, 81, 83; Nicaea 17; 
Laodicea 4; Chalcedon 3, 7 – and so they are listed (more or less) in most manuscripts 
                                                 
54 Sin 224-247; Syn xvii-xx, 261-265. 
55 Sin 244 
56 Sin 224-225. 
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of the non-systematic type.   In the systematic manuscripts, however, they are in this 
order: Apostolic 6, 81; Chalcedon 3; Apostolic 44; Nicaea 17; Laodicea 4; Apostolic 20; 
Chalcedon 7; Apostolic 83.   If we repeat the title rubric and place the canons in the 
systematic order alongside of it, the correspondence is perfect (close literal 
correspondences in parentheses): 
Περὶ τοῦ μὴ δεῖν ἐπίσκοπον ἢ ὅλως ἐν κλήρῳ καταλεγόμενον κοσμικὰς 
ἀναδέχεσθαι καὶ δημοσίας φροντίδας = Apostolic 6 (κοσμικὰς φροντίδας), 
81 (δημοσίας διοικήσεις) 
 
πλὴν εἰ μὴ κατὰ νόμους ἀναγκασθείη = Chalcedon 3 (πλὴν εἰ μήπου ἐκ 
νόμων καλοῖτο) 
 
μήτε δὲ δανείζειν ἐπὶ τόκῳ = Apostolic 44 (τόκους...δανειζομένους), 
Nicaea 17 (ἐπὶ τόκῳ...δανείζοντες), Laodicea 4 (δανείζειν καὶ τόκους)  
 
ποτὲ ἢ ἐγγύαις ἑαυτὸν ἐκδιδόναι = Apostolic 20 (ἐγγύας διδοὺς)  
 
μήτε στρατείαν ἑαυτῷ περίνοιεῖν καὶ ἀξίωμα = Chalcedon 7 (ἐπὶ 
στρατείαν...ἐπὶ ἀξίαν...), Apostolic 83 (στρατείᾳ σχολάζων)   
Not all of the 33 titles with this type of ordering work quite so neatly – there is a certain 
amount of "messiness" across the manuscripts.  But most are very close.57  
 With the logic of the systematic order revealed, Beneshevich's argument that the 
corpus-order arrangement is original becomes much weaker.  The systematic order 
would seem to be much more in keeping with an original process of composition in 
which like canons were grouped together, rubrics formed for them, and then these 
groups combined together to form the extant titles.58  The collection is also certainly 
much easier to use, and more logical, in the systematic order; without it, one has to 
search about for the canons pertaining to each rubric.  Further, it seems much easier to 
imagine later copyists transforming the odd-looking systematic order into a much more 
normal corpus-order, than the opposite; the latter would have taken considerable 
analysis and work.  It is also interesting that two of the four oldest manuscripts for the 
Coll50 are in this order.59  Finally, the curious fact that only 33 of the titles seem to 
evince a systematic order is deceptive.  In most of the 17 remaining titles, the order of 
                                                 
57 The correspondences in titles 12, 20, 24, and 36 are rather uneven. 
58 It is also possible that some of the otherwise somewhat obscure details of Scholastikos' description of 
his work in the prologue make more sense in this reading.  In particular, the repeated assertions of 
attaching "like to like"(Syn 5.11,14; cf. 5.6-7) and thus making the "division of the canons" clearer "by a 
juxtaposition of the material" (σαφεστέραν...τῇ παραθέσει τῶν ὁμοίων ποιῆσαι τῶν κανόνων τὴν 
διαίρεσιν) (5.13-14) – unlike, apparently, the Coll60 –  may imply this process.  Is the lack of this type of 
internal canonical grouping precisely what he finds objectionable in the Coll60?   
59 Paris Cois. 209 and Venice Nan.22 (both 9th-10th C). 
 222
the rubrical fragments in the titles is in the "normal" corpus order – in other words, in 
these titles the "systematic" order is the corpus order.60   
 The basic compositional imperative of both collections – to "pull" the rubrical 
topics overwhelming out of the canons themselves – means that, as we have already 
noted, the systematic indices read much more as summary statements of the content of 
the corpus than as significantly rationalized jurisprudential interpretations or 
abstractions.  Creative shaping of the material is still possible, and evident, but as a rule 
it is uneven, occasional, and rarely deeply significant.  Instances are often so subtle that 
it is often not clear how conscious they are.   
We may here provide a short survey of some of the most important ways in 
which the rubrics interpret or otherwise modify canonical content. 
 The introduction of new terminology represents one of the simplest ways in 
which the rubrics can "filter" and direct the reading of the canons. However, if one 
isolates all instances in which the language of the rubrics diverges from a very close and 
literal representation of the subsumed canons, most are revealed to be quite 
insignificant.  Many instances can be dismissed as paraphrases of the most innocuous 
and banal type, modified for entirely pragmatic or stylistic reasons.  For example, in 
Coll50 28 the strange Laodicean θεωρίας θεωρεῖν becomes θεωρίας ὁρᾶν; in title 6 the 
term ἀποδημοῦντα is used to convey the bulkier πρὸς τῇ τελευτῇ τοῦ βίου τυγχάνῃ in 
Antioch 23; in Title 10 εἰς ἣν καθιερώθησαν replaces εἰς ἐχειροτονήθη in Antioch 18, 
probably for reasons of variatio, to avoid repeating χειροτον- roots excessively in the 
rubric; Coll14 1.38 changes Neocaesarea's ἀφιέναι to λύεσθαι; Coll14 3.22 changes 
Timothy 14 ἑαυτὸν χειρώσηται to the somewhat more standard ἑαυτὸν ἀνελόντος.  
Most paraphrases, in fact, are of this type. 
Sometimes paraphrases appear to be a little more significant.  Nevertheless, in 
many of theses cases, the "intruding" term may be found already present elsewhere in 
the corpus, often in a similar context. As such, these do not represent the ingress of 
"external" concepts.  Thus, for example, Coll50 14 cited above contains the interesting 
phrase μήτε στρατείαν ἑαυτῷ περινοιεῖν καὶ ἀξίωμα ("devising" a office or dignity) 
Although in its context this phrase is clearly intended to be a summary paraphrase of 
Chalcedon 7 and Apostolic 83, the term περινοιεῖν does not appear in either canon.  
However, this apparently interesting phrase finds its direct origin in Serdica 7, a canon 
                                                 
60 Although here too not all titles work perfectly; there is still considerable "messiness" in titles 5, 6, and 
11, for example. 
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from the previous title, which speaks of κοσμικὰ ἀξιώματα καὶ πράξεις περινοιεῖν τισιν.  
It seems this phrase has been unconsciously transferred. Many examples of this type can 
be found.61   
 Only very occasionally are significant terminological innovations to be found.  
Indeed, they are so rare that they are quite conspicuous.  The external idea or term is 
invariably from either secular legal or Scriptural sources (or both).  Thus, for example, 
the term and concept of πατριάρχης – a biblical term, originally, and present as a 
technical ecclesial office term in the secular legislation from the 6th C onwards, but 
nowhere present in the canons62 – enters the Byzantine canonical tradition first in 
Coll50 1, and again in Coll14 1.5. In the last, it is also joined by the term πρίματες (καὶ 
τῶν ἐν Ἀφρικῇ λεγομένων πριμάτων), a Latin loan word found nowhere in the canons.63  
The introduction of both these terms is potentially significant in that they lend a degree 
of conceptual precision to a very fuzzy area in the canons: supra-metropolitan 
jurisdiction.  
 Another good example is θεολογία in Coll14 1.1: Περὶ θεολογίας καὶ ὀρθοδόξου 
πίστεως.  This term appears nowhere in the canons upon which the Coll14 was built. In 
this particular chapter, most the canons mention πίστις, which accounts for the second 
part of this rubric.  On the rule of summary-literal rubric formation, however, Apostolic 
49, 50 (on baptism) and Constantinople 5 (on Trinitarian belief) are not accounted for – 
they do not mention πίστις.  They do, however, each use the phrase "Father, Son, and 
Holy Spirit".  It is thus very likely that θεολογία here is meant to paraphrase "Father, 
Son and Holy Spirit" in these canons (and not mean "theology" in is more modern 
sense).  This is confirmed by the fact that this rubric – very unusually – is probably 
modeled on a rubric of the imperial codices: De summa trinitate et de fide catholica (CJ 
1.1) = Περὶ τῆς ἀνωτάτω τριάδος καὶ πίστεως καθολικῆς (Basilica 1.1) or Περὶ τῆς 
ἀνωτάτω τριάδος καὶ πίστεως καθολικῆς ἤτοι ὀρθοδόξου (Tripartita 1).  In the Coll14, 
θεολογία has simply been substituted for τῆς ἀνωτάτω τριάδος. 
 Coll14 1.1 is part of the only significant example of external rubrical 
"borrowing" evident in either Byzantine collection.  Broadly, Coll14 1.1-6, and the rest 
of the title, can be read as modeled on the first book of the CJ.  Although close linguistic 
                                                 
61 See, for example, Coll50 20 (ἐφοδιάζεσθαι, from Antioch 11), 25 (καὶ περὶ τῶν ἐκ συναρπαγῆς 
χειροτονουμένων, from Apostolic 33), 26 (ἐν κυρίῳ γαμεῖν, from Basil 41), 39 (εἰδολοθύτου, from 
Gangra 2). 
62 See Liddell-Scott 1348; Lampe 1051-1052. In the civil legislation, see N. 3.2. 
63 This seems to be the first Greek attestation of the term; I can find no earlier reference in any lexical 
resource, or the TLG.  The source is obviously meant to be Carthage, but in the extant translation 
primates is rendered by its normal Greek translation πρωτεύων (e.g. Carthage 17).  
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parallels are mostly not evident, we may note the following correspondences: Coll14 
1.1(on faith) = CJ 1.1, but by extension 1-13, the whole "sacred" section; Coll14 1.2-4 
(on types of valid sources) = CJ 1.14-25; Coll14 1.5ff (on offices) = CJ 1.26ff.   Coll14 
1 is thus a kind of mini-ecclesial version of CJ 1. This undoubtedly accounts for the 
comparatively organized and "rational" nature of the organization of Coll14 1.1-5, 
particularly the exceptionally "legal" concern about sources in Coll14 1.3, 4 ("Which 
canons must be obeyed" and "That ecclesiastical custom must be kept as law, and that 
we do not need to keep the law of Moses").  As a point of interest, the similarity with 
the later Basilica titles is even more defined: Coll14 1.1 = Basilica 1; Coll14 1.2-4 = 
Basilica 2; Coll14 1.5ff = Basilica 3 (only on clergy, with the added emphasis in the 
rubric, like Coll14 1, on "ordination").  More broadly, the resonance is present with any 
other legal collections that begin with "faith" or general doctrinal matters and then 
"source" matters.  We may also note that just as the beginning of Coll14 1.1, "On 
Theology, and Orthodox Faith...", seems to be a paraphrase of CJ 1.1, so likewise, the 
second title, "On the making of churches, and on sacred vessels and offerings...etc." is 
reminiscent of CJ 1.2: "On the most holy churches and the things and privileges of 
them". 
The influence of the codex might also be felt in one other place: the strange 
inclusion in Coll14 12.5 of the name of Porphyry in a list of heretics.  This name is no 
where present in the canons.  It is presumably referring to the (pagan) Porphyry 
condemned in CJ 1.1.3. 
A number of Greco-Roman legal-administrative terms without any precedent in 
the canons also appear in the indices, notably ἀντίδικος in Coll50 15 (for various terms 
for "accuser" in Chalcedon 9); or ὀφφίκια in Coll14 1.24 for various offices listed in 
Chalcedon 2; or most strikingly, in Coll14 9.6 ἀναψηλάφησις in its technical Justinianic 
sense as a calque for retractio, re-trial/re-examination.64  Their presence effects a further 
stylistic legalization of canonical discourse.   
The principal example of biblical language "invading" canonical discourse may 
be found in Coll14 3.18 and 4:16.  Chapter 3.18 reads "That a woman ought not to take 
communion in the days of her impurity [ἐν ταῖς ἡμέραις τῆς καθάρσεως αὐτῆς]"  
Chapter 4.16 is identical, but on baptism.  The two canons subsumed by both, Dionysius 
2 and Timothy 7, refer respectively to "women in their menses" (αἱ ἐν ἀφέδρῳ γυναίκες) 
                                                 
64 See Liddell and Scott 127, Roussos 1949,1.46  Although ψηλαφάω in the sense of tractio, examine, 
may be found as translationese in Carthage (e.g Fonti 1.2.206.20-21, 208.11). 
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and "the custom of women" (τὸ κατ᾽ ἔθος τῶν γυναικείων).   The rubric's phrasing of 
"in the days of her impurity" is drawn directly from Leviticus 12:4, 6, and/or its New 
Testament parallel, Luke 2:22.  The reason for this change is probably stylistic, but it 
does pose a subtle problem of interpretation.  In Leviticus and Luke it is quite clear that, 
strictly, this phrase refers to the period of purification following childbirth.  The canons, 
however, refer to menstrual periods.  This distinction is not, in the long run, significant 
–  the two types of blood impurity are clearly assimilated to each other in Scripture (Lev 
12:2), and in later church tradition.  However, the rubric does perhaps contribute to, or 
at least reflect, the blurring of the distinction. 
Turning from terminology to broader conceptual issues, we may return to our 
observation above that even the most basic "digestive" operation of the rubrics – the 
provision of general topical categories – is surprisingly limited and feeble in its 
application and implications.  Very rarely does the formulation of the general topics 
demonstrate any particular creativity, extending much beyond a fairly basic and literal 
summary of the canons concerned – certainly not to the formulation of internal 
principles or concepts.  In the Coll50, in fact, relatively few truly general rubrics are to 
be found at all.  The majority of its rubrics are not so much topical rubrics ("On x", "on 
y") per se as summary rules, and as such quite specific.  For example Title 3 reads "That 
a bishop must not go beyond his diocese without being asked unless to attend to his 
property; and he must not ordain beyond his borders".  This is a summary rule, complete 
with an exception.  Even the more properly "topical" rubrics tend to be quite long and 
complex.  For example, Title 10: "Regarding bishop or presbyters who are ordained and 
whose service is not accepted or received by the city into which they were consecrated, 
not because of their own doing but because of others, or those who after ordination 
neglect the people and the clergy". The Coll50 thus reads almost as a summary 
statement of corpus rules, virtually an organized canonical synopsis.65 
Occasionally more general rubrics do seem to emerge in the Coll50, but they 
often prove to be less impressive than they first appear.  In several titles, for example, 
the very first rubric fragment seem to be the most general, and comes close to 
functioning as a general rubric for the title.66  For example Title 33 begins with the 
rather general injunction that ascetics must obey their bishops (Περὶ τοῦ δεῖν τοὺς 
ἀσκητὰς ὑποτετάχθαι τοῖς ἐπισκόποις), but three of the following four rubrics have 
                                                 
65 Is the Coll50 – or the Coll14 – an organized canonical synopsis? See Appendix D (3).  
66 E.g. 18, 24, 25, 37, 48, 50. 
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nothing to do with obedience to bishops per se (monks not leaving the place in which 
they are assigned, monastic properties not again becoming secular, and slaves not 
becoming monastics without the permission of their masters).  The real topic of the 
rubric is something more general, perhaps "On monastic discipline" – but this is 
precisely the kind of abstraction these titles do not engage in.  In this particular example 
the first rubric is in fact created by a normal surface resume process from Chalcedon 3 
(including the line τοὺς...μονάζοντας ὑποτεταχθαι τῷ ἐπισκόπῳ). 
This tendency to leave even topical generalization and distillation comparatively 
implicit is curious.  It is a pattern, however, that has been remarked of ancient thought 
generally, and especially of ancient Roman jurisprudence.67  In distinction to modern 
tendencies, general rules or principles are not usually explicitly distilled out of specific 
regulations; instead, one tends merely to juxtapose traditional texts, and allow the reader 
to make the inductions.  This very curious and, for moderns, unintuitive tendency is an 
important aspect of the traditionalism of many ancient legal systems: the law is the 
traditional texts, and thus extrapolating from the laws to create more abstract principles 
is left implicit.  Such extrapolation is done, but its results are in a sense secondary, 
ephemeral, and subordinate to the traditional texts themselves.  The movement from the 
laws to law is fairly quiet, and leaves little trace. 
 The Coll14 contains many more general and more sophisticated topical rubrics.  
Examples of basic general rubrics include "On the holy anaphora and communion" 
(3.4), "How one must baptize" (4.3), "On offerings" (6.1), "On lawsuits of bishops and 
clerics" (9.5), "For what reasons one is deposed" (9.14); "On those who divorce" (13.4) 
and even "On greed" (14.1).  The Coll14 also sees the fairly extensive use of another 
type of generalizing rubric: the multiple-aspect rubric.  In these rubrics, various aspects 
of one or more provisions are indicated through the use of multiple relative 
interrogatives: e.g.  "Regarding whom and where one ordains bishops..." (1.6), or 
"Regarding who, and how, and what type of things, one must sing.." (3.2).68   
Upon closer inspection, however, the texture of generalization of the work as a 
whole is very inconsistent, and at times downright odd.  Sometimes, for example, such 
topics only sound general, but in fact encompass only a few canons.  Thus 6.1 reads "On 
offerings" – sounding quite broad – but subsumes only three canons; 10.2 purports to 
gather all canons on "the administration of ecclesiastical affairs", but only contains 7 
                                                 
67 See the references in chapter 3, n. 85. 
68 The Coll50 contains only one such rubric, in Title 49. 
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canons, mostly those which actually use the words "management" and "affairs"; Coll14 
14.1 "On greed" is purpose built for one canon.  
On the other hand, such chapters can be truly general in their representation. 
Chapter 1.6, cited above, encompasses 24 canons that all in one way or another relate to 
the whom and where of ordaining clergy; Chapter 9.14, also cited above, contains 53. 
These rubrics, however, are more than counterbalanced by one of the most 
curious aspects of the Coll14 (already noted): the presence of many (92) single-canon 
chapters, almost 39% of the total.  These can become bizarrely specific, as already 
noted. More typical examples include Coll14 14.1, just cited. 
A pattern may also be observed in the Coll14 in which general chapters are 
followed by a series of much more specific chapters on the same basic topic, and often 
repeating the same canons as the general rubric.  The best example are the very general 
"punishment" rubrics in 9.10, 9.11, 9.14, 9.15, 9.16, 9.18, and 9.19 – each listing the 
canons for deposition, excommunication, anathema, etc.  These are followed in 9.21-
9.39 by rubrics that subsume many of the same canons again, but now in much greater 
detail, listing specific canonical infractions.  Similarly, chapter 1.6 a very general 
multiple-aspect rubric on who, where and how clergy are ordained, effectively heads the 
rest of the title's chapters, each of which deal with some specific aspect of ordination – 
these "unpack" the detail of the first general chapter.  Similar patterns are evident 
especially in Titles 3, and 10, and more sporadically elsewhere.69  The presence of these 
sub-groupings in fact occasionally transforms the Coll14 into a functionally three-tier 
collection: title topics, subgrouping topics, chapter topics.  The effect of this technique, 
however, is that the Coll14 has not so much produced an even, general account of the 
corpus content as it has provided both a general and specific account.  It makes the 
Coll14 read as virtually as specific and detail-oriented as the Coll50.  The imperative in 
both collections is clearly still to convey as much of the surface content of the corpus as 
possible.  
The unevenness and comparative irrationality of generalization in the Coll14 is 
finally very marked in the wildly varying scope of the fourteen titles themselves.  Titles 
such as 1 (On theology, and orthodox faith, and canons, and ordinations), or 9 (On sins 
and cases of bishops and clerics and suspension and deposition and repentance and 
                                                 
69 Titles 6, 7, 8, 13.  
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which sins ordination looses70), or 13 (On laity) sound very broad, and in fact do 
encompass a large and varied number of canons.  However, these titles sit alongside the 
much more specific and detailed title 2 (On the making of churches, and on holy vessels 
and dedications and clerics establishing sanctuaries against the will of their bishop), and 
5 (On those who despise churches and synaxeis and memorials and those eating in 
church and on agapae), and 6 (On offerings), which each encompass only a very few 
and much more specific set of topics and canons.  The unevenness of canonical 
representation, in particular, is well illustrated in the distribution of chapters and canons 
throughout the collection: 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
Chapters Canons
Distribution of Chapters and Canons in the Collection in 14 Titles
 
 If topical generalization as basic summary is timid and desultory in the 
Byzantine collections we should not be sanguine about the presence of other types of 
interpretation, rationalization or legal innovation.  Indeed, they are rare.  Even those that 
are present often appear more creative and innovative than they actually are; as a rule, 
they only highlight or follow – and convey – a thread of thought already present in the 
corpus. 
 In almost no case do topical generalizations fade into true doctrinal distillation 
or even rule abstraction – i.e. very rarely does a rubric seems to name an abstract quality 
or underlying concept of a group of canons. Instead, as we have already seen, the 
instinct is to simply relate surface content or at most stack different, if related, surface 
topics one after the other.  Thus, for example, Coll14 3 "On prayers, psalmody and 
                                                 
70 This bizarrely specific final rubric, which refers only to 9.38, is an excellent example of the tendency to 
juxtapose very general and very specific rubrics. 
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readings and anaphora and communion and apparel and services of readers, singers and 
servers" which addresses numerous specific matters relating to "holy" matters and 
services does not become "On holy matters" or "On services in the church" or "On 
sacraments". Certainly no where do we find attempts to analyze the canons in terms of 
different types of powers or authority (teaching, administrative, sacramental), or 
different types of rights or obligations. There is not even a branching categorization of 
the material into more abstract γένος-εἶδος "pyramidal" categories as may be found in 
the Institutes tradition, and which Fuhrmann has demonstrated to be an absolutely 
common and standard method of classical systematic presentation in rhetorical, 
philosophical, and grammatical manuals.71  Even Gregory of Nyssa's categorization of 
canonical regulations into the three faculties of the soul has no impact on later 
structures. In general, one can almost feel a resistance to the formation of rubrical topics 
that stray too far from the literal content of the canons themselves.  
Two exceptions seem to be present in the Coll50.  In Title 1 and 2 we read of 
"honour" being "defined" for patriarchs and then metropolitans: Περὶ τῆς ὁρισθείσης 
τοῖς πατριάρχεις ἐκ τῶν κανόνων τιμῆς... Περὶ τῆς ὁρισθείσης τοῖς μητροπολίταις ἐκ 
τῶν κανόνων τιμῆς...  The repetition of virtually the same expressions enhances a sense 
that τιμή is being turned into an abstract category to convey "powers" or "rights" 
granted by the canons.  Likewise, in Title 36 the final rubric καὶ περὶ πίστεως ὀρθόδξου 
ἣν ἐκμανθάνειν ἀνάγκη τὸν φωτιζόμενον ("regarding the Orthodox faith which one 
being enlightened must learn thoroughly") might seem to suggest an abstract sense of 
"Orthodox faith" in the sense of "collection of beliefs and doctrines" – especially as 
some of the subsumed canons treat matters of baptismal faith, and the Trinity.  When 
the subsumed canons are inspected more closely, however, the level of abstraction in 
the rubrics is shown to be at least partially illusory – almost accidental.  Certainly the 
much more normal, literal process of surface paraphrasis is still operative.  Thus the 
relevant canons in Title 1 and 2 (Nicaea 7, Constantinople 4, Antioch 9, Chalcedon 3, 
12) all mention the term τιμή more than once, and do often focus on honour matters – 
the title is thus talking about "honour" in a more literal form than seems immediately 
obvious.  A more abstract "loading" of this word is still perhaps implied, but it is not as 
dramatic as it first appears.  It is only associatively connected to a concept already 
present in the corpus.  Similarly, in Title 36 the corresponding canons are clearly 
referring to learning the creed itself (thus ἐκμανθάνειν here almost certainly means 
                                                 
71 Fuhrmann 1960. 
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"learn by heart"), and the rubric is in fact drawn directly from Laodicea 11 and 12, on 
learning the creed.  Other canons relating to the content of the faith are then also 
associatively added (although the selection is a little odd, including the canons treating 
valid baptisms; having the words "Father, Son and Holy Spirit" seems especially 
important), but the process of abstraction is again fairly limited: a rule is pulled literally 
from the canons, and then other material associated with it.  This is a type of 
abstraction, but it is not truly the provision or even distillation of an abstract conceptual 
category in the way that it may first seem. 
Even the creative subsumption of a canon under a rubric to which it does not 
have an immediate surface-topical relation – i.e. that does not strictly seem to 
correspond to the canon's rule content, and, more strikingly, does not demonstrate any 
obvious linguistic correspondences between rubrics and canons – is rare.  In these cases, 
a process of interpretive extrapolation might seem to be present.  However, the few 
instances that can be found can often be explained by rather more mundane reasons.  
For example, Laodicea 42 reads "That a hieratic or cleric must not travel without the 
command of the bishop."  This is placed, logically, under Coll14 8.2, "That a bishop or 
cleric must not travel at will from home to live in another diocese".  Yet it is also placed 
under 8.5: "Regarding the reception of foreigners, and regarding letters pacific and 
commendatory".  The collector may seem to be making an interpretative jump, 
extrapolating, perhaps, that the "command" implies a letter, and that therefore it is 
appropriate under 8.5 as well, or that a traveling cleric must be a "foreign" cleric.  
However, its placement in 8.5 is almost certainly due to the fact that is drawn into this 
chapter as part of a series with the canon that immediately proceeds it: Laodicea 41  
"That a hieratic or cleric must not travel without letters of communion."  The motivation 
for the placement of Laodicea 42 in 8.5 is thus the rather accidental existence of pre-
made text-link with Laodicea 41 in the corpus – and not a process of independent 
jurisprudential abstraction of possible rule-applications.  The author is recognizing and 
following a textual link already present in the canons.  
 Some parts of the collections do show a typically systematic and rationalistic 
concern for methodical progression and presentation.  The best example is the penal 
rubrics of Coll14 9.10, 9.11, 9.14, 9.15, 9.16, 9.18, and 9.19, most asking "from which 
reasons..." different types of penalties are imposed, and broadly progressing from least 
to most severe.  A few encompass a huge number of canons (e.g. all canons for which 
one can be deposed).  Similar are the very many double (or even triple) rubrics in the 
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Coll14 which repeat certain canons under different titles to highlight different 
applications of the same canons.  For example, Laodicea 30, which forbids the bathing 
with women of "higher clergy, clerics, ascetics...or any Christian or lay person", is 
subsumed under three rubrics under three different titles: "Regarding higher clergy who 
bathe with women" (9.31 – under the title on clergy); "That ascetics may not bath with a 
woman" (11.07 – under the title on monastics);  "That men may not bath with women." 
(13.25 – under the title on laity).  Very often, as in these last examples, only the subject 
of the rubric changes.  At other times different material aspects of the same topic will be 
explored.  For example, in 3.18 and 4.16 cited above, the first rubric conveys the rules 
in regard to the eucharist, and in the second, baptism.   
All of these examples, made possible by the Coll14's willingness to repeat 
canonical references, show a certain level of analytical sophistication, and, more so, the 
sense that similar analogous topics should be explored thoroughly for different 
circumstances.  Almost never, however, do they push the canonical material beyond its 
own content, or evince any real creativity.  The penal categories in Title 9 are thus all 
quite obviously present as categories in the canons, and the divisions of multiple subject 
or object applicability are all very simple, following basic surface divisions in the 
canonical material itself.   
In the Coll50 a slightly more sophisticated type of methodical progression may 
be found in the first two titles of the Coll50, already mentioned. Although not sharing 
any canons, each poses a similar rubrical "question" to a descending series of subjects:  
Coll50 1 
Regarding the honour defined for the 
patriarchs by the canons 
 
 
and that none of them are to seize a 
province belonging to another... 
Coll50 2 
Regarding the honour defined for the 
metropolitans by the canons  
and metropolitan areas formed by imperial 
letters 
and regarding that they must not seize a 
diocese belonging to another... 
This is a small but significant attempt to apply systematically a common doctrinal 
framework to disparate material, especially as the second highlighted rubric is not a 
literal extraction from any canon in either title (although it recalls Nicaea 16 and 
Antioch 16).  One would almost expect a similar set of rubrics for bishops, and perhaps 
other clergy.  However, this attempt at methodical rubrical application goes no further. 
 Another sign of the advanced, analytical digestion of rules may be observed 
when more than one rule is extracted from the same canon.  This represents a proper 
analysis of rule content, and can suggest a very subtle step in the direction of thinking of 
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the canons more as containing or expressing the rules, instead of simply being the rules.  
However, most of these examples follow obvious breaks within the canons themselves: 
in effect, the collector assigns different "parts" of the canons to different rubrics.  The 
most obvious example is the dissection of the compound canon Carthage 16, which 
contains five entirely disparate rules.  In this case, they are marked by clear literary 
markers: three ἤρεσεν ἵνα/ὥστε phrases, one straight ἵνα phrase, and one καί+third 
person subjunctive phrase.  The rules are that clergy cannot be procurators; that readers 
at puberty much decide about marriage; that clerics cannot take interest; that deacons 
may not be ordained before they are 25 years old; that readers may not bow to the 
people. The canon is naturally thus cited under five appropriate rubrics (Coll14 1.28, 
8.11, 8.13, 9.27, 9.29). 
 Sometimes the dissection of a canon is slightly more sophisticated.  Chalcedon 
25, for example, is concerned primarily with the prompt filling of vacant dioceses by 
metropolitans. It is thus assigned its very own rubric on this very topic, Coll14 1.9.  At 
the conclusion, however, it also adds the following supplementary regulation: "The 
revenue, however, of the widowed church will be kept secure with the steward of that 
church". As a result, the canon is also subsumed under 10.3: "Regarding the affairs and 
revenue of churches without bishops."  Another good example is the extraction from 
Nicaea 8 (a canon on the reception of Cathari) of its final clause ("...that in one city 
there be not two bishops) by the canon's citation under Coll14 1.20 ("Regarding that 
there are not in one city two bishops").  A relatively passing epexegetical comment is 
thus almost elevated to a general principle – or at least strongly emphasized. 
 A closely related – and classically jurisprudential – tendency is the distillation of 
distinctions, definitions and principles.  The Coll14 is, on the surface, seems quite 
notable for this.   Definitions or distinctions can be found in at least five chapters: "Who 
are clerics or of the ecclesiastical order?" (1.31); "Regarding the difference between 
letters pacific and letters commendatory" (8.6); "What is heresy, what is schism, and 
what is parasunagoge? (12.1); "What is a heretic"? (12.2); and the last element of 
"Regarding corruption, and marriage of a widow, and who is called a widow" (13.7).72 
The best example of the articulation of a principle of law is 9.17: "That one must not 
prosecute twice for the same case." The first rubric of 1.3, although a little less general, 
can also be considered a general rule: "That unwritten ecclesiastical custom should be 
                                                 
72 See also 1.4, 8.17, 12.14. 
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kept as law...", as can 1.4 "That canons are issued not by one bishop but by the 
commonality of bishops". 
It is clear, however, that these few definitions and principles do not constitute a 
serious systematic attempt to derive a coherent set of definitions and principles from the 
material.  First, they are far too desultory. Second, and more importantly, only a few 
represent real jurisprudential analysis on the part of the collector. Most are easily and 
directly derivative from the subsumed canonical texts and thus represent little more 
sophistication than any other derivative rubrical topic – although they are, of course, 
being highlighted. Critically, however, they do not entail original distillation of a 
general rule from a wide selection of canons – they are instead relatively simple 
extractions or paraphrases of one or two canons.  Thus, for example, the principle 
present in 9.17 is derived virtually word for word from Nahum 1:9 (...οὐκ ἐκδικήσεις 
δὶς ἐπὶ τὸ αὐτό), which, as noted, is one of the few principles stated as a principle in the 
canons themselves – three times, in fact (Apostolic 25, Basil 3, Basil 32). Likewise, the 
definition in 12.1 is nothing more than a surface summary of the topic of Basil 1, and 
8.6 is a simple summary of Chalcedon 11.  Sometimes a little more abstraction is 
required – but barely.  For example 12.2 is not exactly a question posed by the corpus, 
but it is easily prompted by the unusually schematic nature of Constantinople 7; 
likewise 1.4 is not the central topic of the canons at hand, but is nevertheless clearly 
stated therein.  In all cases, the collection is more following the lead of the collected 
canons, than posing genuine jurisprudential "questions" to the material. 
 Substantive interpretation of the canons is not difficult to find, although rarely is 
it unquestionably significant.  Most commonly a rubric might be read to restrict or 
expand the scope of a canon's application. For example, in Coll50 8 it is affirmed that 
the "laity" must be promoted through all the ranks before becoming bishop.  The canon, 
however, Serdica 10, only refers to "someone wealthy or a lawyer from the agora". 
Coll50 46 likewise refers to the illicit removal of "anything ecclesiastical" from the 
churches.  However, the canons refer to only wax, oil, silver, gold or textiles.  Coll14 
11.1 states "..that [monasteries] may not become private possessions[ἰδιωτικά]".  The 
subsumed canon (Chalcedon 24), however, only refers to monasteries becoming 
"worldly inns" (κοσμικὰ καταγώγια).   
Limitations or expansions of applicable subject are especially common, often a 
result of pasting together multiple canons with different subject applications.  Thus 
Coll50 5, mostly on episcopal duties, commands that bishops care for clergy in need; 
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but Apostles 59, the relevant canon, had considered this a duty of presbyters too.   
Coll14 8.7, however, on the same issue, seems to extend the duty to deacons.  Coll50 30 
asserts that not only clergy but also lay people are forbidden from entering taverns; the 
relevant canons, Apostles 54 and Laodicea 24, refer only to clergy and lay monks (but 
many other canons of the same rubric do apply to both clergy and the general laity).  
Coll14 8.16 cited above perhaps extends the Neocaesarean rule from "presbyters" to 
"clerics". 
 Sometimes interpretations are hardly more than clarifications.  For example, in 
Coll50 22 the very odd κατασκευὰς τυρεύοντες ("curdling schemes", "conspiring") of 
Chalcedon 18 is regularized as κατασκευὰς ἀπεργάζεσθαι ("effect schemes"). In Coll14 
9.25 φυλακτήρια ("phylacteries"?) in Laodicea 36 is changed into the more generic, and 
probably more understandable, περιάπτοι ("amulets").   
Occasionally more complex and definitive interpretative statements are made.   
Under Coll50 27 is found Basil 32: "Clerics who sin the sin unto death are demoted 
from their rank..."  By placing this canon under a title treating clerical marriage 
regulations, and implicitly sexual morality, the collector has made a judgment on the 
meaning of this otherwise rather ambiguous Johannine concept of "sin unto death".73  
Likewise in the Coll14 8.1 the "τύποι" of Chalcedon 17, which are sometimes read in 
modern translations as "forms",74 is clearly understood as "imperial enactments" 
(βασιλικοί τύποι).   Extractions of asides (as in 1.4 cited above, or 1.20 cited below) in 
canons can also have an interpretative effect, emphasizing a rule not otherwise so 
prominent.  One of the most dramatic examples, however, is in Coll14 1.3: "...that we 
do not have need to keep the precepts of the Mosaic law." The source canon is almost 
certainly intended to be Basil's letter to Diodoros (canon 87). However, this letter does 
not make such a categorical statement.  Basil does repeat Romans 3:19, that the law 
speaks to those who are under the law, but his argument is subtler than the rubric 
suggests: a passionate reading of the OT law is inapplicable for Christians.  The rubric 
is not an impossible interpretation of the letter, but it is an interpretation – possibly the 
boldest of its type in the collection.   
 Another, rather elementary, type of systematic rationalization may be sought in 
patterns of standardization.  The "flattening" of terminology by regularizing, for 
example, dispositive language, is the simplest form.  More complex is the 
                                                 
73 Cf. the different tacks taken by the commentators, RP 4.173-175. 
74 For example, NPNF 14.280; similarly Fonti 1.1.83. 
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standardization of the form of rubrics and/or of the categories employed. The evidence 
for all of these is quite mixed.  As to the first, in the Coll50, with only two exceptions,75 
all rule rubrics do use either δεῖν or simple infinitives.  The subsumed canons, however, 
show a much greater variety, employing χρή, ἔξεστιν, ὀφείλει, ἀναγκαίον ἐστι, or third 
person imperatives.  This is a comparatively remarkable rationalization.  More often, 
elsewhere, the author does not standardize terms, even when it would seem easy to do 
so.76  In the Coll14 dispositives are usually omitted or left as-is in the rubrics, i.e. very 
diverse.   
In terms of formal rubrical standardization, only the first two rubrics in the 
Coll50, cited above, evince any type of serious formulaic regularity. The many 
repetitions of similar rubrics between different titles in the Coll14, however, lend a 
sense of methodical rubric formation, even if still rather irregular and unpredictable. 
Generally the awkward conclusion must be reached that standardization occurs 
in the collections somewhat, and sometimes. 
 A final and subtle, but potentially more far-reaching, set of interpretative 
problems are raised by the issue of representativeness: the extent to which the rubrics 
individually reflect the content of their subsumed canons, and, as a whole, convey the 
content of the corpus.  Are certain rules marginalized? Emphasized?  Caution is 
advisable: the history of interpreting patterns of canonical selection, compilation or 
emphasis according to putative ideological agendas has not met with striking success.77 
Nevertheless, a few instances of interpretative canonical selectivity may be suspected.  
The best example is perhaps Coll50 16.  The title contains three rubrics: on bishop who 
are accused and those who may be accepted as accusers; that one who is unjustly 
deposed may travel to other cities; and that another bishop may not be appointed to a 
deposed bishop's see if the latter is still seeking an appeal.  From these rubrics, one may 
be surprised to find that this title contains all of the Serdican and Antiochian appeal 
canons (3, 4, 5; 14, 15).  Certainly they are not out of place here – the first rubric is so 
                                                 
75 In Title 1 and 18. 
76 See for example the Coll50's using both ἀσκ- roots or μοναχ- roots for monastics in titles 32-34, or the 
retention of many different paraphrases for ordination aside from χειροτον- roots (esp. titles 7, 8, 10, 19, 
36, 39).   
77 See, for example, the attempts to argue that the Apostolic canons after 50 were not included because 
they were "anti-Roman" (rejected in Sources Apostles); or the attempts to see the Slavonic  translation of 
the Coll50 as anti-papal (see the summary refutation in Gallagher 2002,95-100, and esp. Zuzek 1967); 
or the lack of Chalcedon 28 in Dionysius as a statement of its rejection by the west (early eastern 
collections don't contain it either, as noted in Fonti 1.10; L'Huillier 1997,135-136); or Dionysius' 
supposed church-politically motivated selection in his collections (see Firey 2008,n. 34).  Even western 
selection of Trullan canons (see Landau 1995) seems almost random, including "anti-Roman" ones, 13, 
30 and 36!  
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general as to associatively subsume them with ease, and the third rubric is derived from 
the language of the Serdican canons, both in language and content.  (The second rubric 
corresponds to another included Serdican rule, canon 18). The idea of "appeal" is also 
certainly present.  Further, the systematic order of canonical disposition in some 
manuscripts makes clear that the Serdican and Antiochian canons are considered 
subsumed by the last two rubrics.  It is surprising, however, that these canons are 
represented by only one very minor element of their provisions: the overly-rapid 
appointment of replacement bishops!  Nothing is said about the Roman see, 
neighbouring bishops or other major procedural provisions. 
Another example is in Coll50 23, which subsumes a number of specific 
regulations relating to deacons: giving communion to presbyters, sitting with presbyters, 
and receiving honour from lower clergy.  One may also find, however, the awkward 
Neocaesarea 14, which limits the number of deacons in any city to seven, tucked in 
among the subsumed canons – it is nowhere present in the rubric.  Is it being "hidden", 
or is this just part of a much broader phenomenon of associatively grouping various 
canons together without exceptional concern for exact content? 
Detecting patterns of emphasis is even more difficult. The many single-canon 
rubrics in the Coll14, and the sometimes very specific rule-rubrics in the Coll50, may 
sometimes seem to suggest that special emphasis is being placed on specific canons, but 
the phenomenon is too varied and random to suggest real ideological patterns.  Likewise 
it is difficult to identify any particular category of organization or type of regulation that 
the rubrics themselves highlight or "add" to the tradition.  One exception, already 
mentions, is types of valid sources, in Coll14 1.2-4, highlighted through paralleling with 
the civil codices.  Issues of valid sources are occasionally raised in the tradition, but 
they are certain highlighted here.  If one wishes to read the systematic collections as a 
further "legalization" of canon law, this is the best example.  Coll14 9.1-9, by clustering 
procedural rules together, with considerable amounts of quasi-technical legal 
vocabulary,78 has a similar effect.  Even these examples, however, are neither dramatic 
or sustained. 
Much more broadly, Coll14 2-7, and especially titles 2, 5, 6, 7, might also be an 
example. These titles all treat more or less "sacral" matters: construction of sanctuaries, 
prayers, sacraments, liturgical offerings.  However, as the graph above demonstrates, 
                                                 
78 κατηγόρεω (9.1), καταμαρτυρέω (9.2), ἔγκλημα (9.3), δίκαι (9.5), ἀναψηλάφησις (9.6), δικάζω (9.7), 
κινέω παρά (9.8) 
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they represent very few canons.  In effect, the Coll14 is emphasizing their content by 
granting them more physical "title space" than they properly deserve: the Coll14 is 
privileging sacral matters.  
The topic of "monastics" as a separate and distinct group (Coll50 32-34 and 
Coll14 11) also perhaps emerges more strongly as a distinct class of persons in the 
systematic collections than in the source material – although "ascetics" are certainly 
already present as an explicit topic of legislation in Gangra and Chalcedon.  In any 
event, in all these cases the emphases are fairly slight.  Taken as a whole, there can be 
little doubt that the primary intention of both collections is to simply convey the 
traditional canonical content 
 To conclude, the overall impression left by the formation and constitution of the 
thematic rubrics, and their various relationship with the subsumed canons, is one of 
marked conservatism.  The central "agenda" of their formation seems to be the 
facilitative revealing of the content of the canons themselves.  The collections thus 
amount to little more than a basic unfolding of the traditional texts in more organized 
forms.  More analytical and creative jurisprudential processes of thinking are not 
entirely absent, but their presence is tentative and desultory, almost hidden, and their 
function more that of amplifying, emphasizing, or suggesting: not reshaping, developing 
or for the most part "advancing".  In this, what is not happening is more striking than 
what is: there is little real distillation of general principles or doctrinal concepts; there 
are no sustained attempts to fill in gaps; and there are no hints of harmonization.  There 
is in short little "scientific" juristic activity of any type.  The tradition is once more 
being treated in a very careful, almost leery way, as a highly sacred body of rules which 
exist to be transmitted and communicated – not modified or re-worked.  The result is a 
very uneven, and by modern standards, unwieldy composition.     
  
F. Order and structure in the systematic indices 
The relationship between the individual thematic rubrics and the contents of the 
subsumed canons is only one aspect of how the thematic indices shape and digest the 
canonical tradition.  Equally important are the larger structures and orders into which 
the collections shape the canonical material by the creation, selection and ordering of 
larger groupings of related rubrics.  This type of structuring represents one of the most 
dramatic and obvious ways in which the collections "shape" the law.   
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 Scholarship has not traditionally been terribly interested in these matters.  As a 
rule, order and structure tend to excite imaginations only when they assist in textual 
archeology or historical reconstruction of codificatory events: for example, in 
recovering the original form of constituent texts, establishing the historical relationship 
of texts to one another, or in determining how a collection was composed.79 Interest is 
much less marked in what the patterns of ordering themselves may tell us about 
attitudes towards law and legal thinking.80   
 The very "fuzziness" of ancient ordering is undoubtedly the main reason for this 
lack of scholarly interest.   In much of the canonical material we may well sympathize 
with Mommsen's observation – made with reference to the Praetorian Edict – that what 
order is to be found is more of a disorder.81   But order may be found, of a sort.  We 
tend to seek order in neat hierarchies of comprehensive categories of internal legal 
concepts, with strict logical coherence among parts, completeness of presentation, and 
the avoidance of gaps, repetitions, or contradictions.  But in Byzantine canon law, like 
in most ancient sources, ordering is much more superficial, oriented towards simple 
grouping and arrangement of surface topics.  Its instincts are best captured by epithets 
such as loose, digressive, associative, agglutinative, irregular, and understated.  Patterns 
and strategies of ordering are not absent, but they are subtle. 
  In analyzing the structures of the indices, and indeed the structures of the 
canonical sources which underlie them, one fact emerges quickly: almost no where can 
one detect the direct, sustained influence of any other specific schema, Greco-Roman or 
otherwise.  As noted, Bernard of Pavia in the 12th C will directly import Digest rubrics 
and structures into his Decretal collection – creating an order that will thenceforth 
become standard.82  But almost nowhere in the Byzantine corpus do we see a 
comparable imposition of a pre-made, external schema onto the canonical material.  The 
one exception, already mentioned, is Coll14 1.1-5, but even this is not very precise, and 
certainly it is not sustained.  It is also just possible there is a connection between the 
                                                 
79 So for example, Bluhme's "masses" hypothesis, and, more recently, the wonderfully detailed 
reconstruction of the creation of the Digest in Honoré 1978,139-186.  Broadly all of the structural 
analyses – which are most of them – emerging from and around "palingenesia" projects could be counted 
here.  This is part of a broader legal-historical trend of being more interested in what the Roman codes 
preserved, and perhaps how they preserved it, than in what they are. 
80 However Sohm 1918, 1923 wished to see in Gratian's order a last remnant of a mentality of 
"sacramental" law of the first millennium.  But even Zechiel-Eckes 1992, who does consider Cresconius' 
ordering system in depth, is too struck by its "weakness" and "inadequacy" to consider its broader legal-
theoretical implications (see esp. 1.51, 61-62).  
81 Cited Schulz 1953,151 (Gesammelte Schriften 1.164). 
82 See the references above, n. 52.  On this order's long Nachleben, Gaudemet 1991,171-174; in the 
middle ages, Fransen 1972,21; Somerville and Brasington 1998,218. 
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strange Coll14 14.1 and the equally strange opening title of Apostolic Constitutions 
Book 1: both are Περὶ πλεονεξίας.83  Otherwise, when one places the structures of the 
canonical sources and the systematic collections against similar patterns in the 
Apostolic church orders, the most prominent civil material, and literary/philosophical 
expositions of law, direct, sustained correspondences in the grouping and ordering of 
material are very hard to find.84  This is true even where patterning might be easily 
accomplished and/or suggested, for example in the ordering of criminal-like wrongs 
treated by the canons.85  
 Curiously, this lack of direct structural modeling is also evident within the 
canonical tradition. The thematic indices do not show any clear evidence of trying to 
follow the order of topics found in, for example, Laodicea, or the Apostles, or of each 
other.  Even the second-wave material (generally much more tightly structured than the 
first wave), does not show any strict or sustained dependence on the structures of the 
thematic collections.  This is true even where we might expect it, most notably in the 
structuring of the very large and code-like Trullo – a council which seems to be 
following the Coll14 in its selection of sources, but, it seems, in no other way.86 
 Nevertheless, if specific and sustained instances of modeling are difficult to find, 
general resonances and broad parallels are everywhere.  This is first and foremost true 
within the tradition itself.  Indeed, the single most important aspect of the 6th C 
systematic indices is that in the subject-groups formed, and the general ways of ordering 
and relating these groups, almost everything in the systematic indices has some 
precedent somehow, somewhere, within the earlier canonical sources themselves. The 
two cannot be treated separately.  The pattern of deriving content from the corpus, 
instead of imposing it upon it, is thus evident also in the provision of structure and 
order.  The systematic indices do not represent any radical innovations in ordering or 
shaping the material: they mostly emphasize and amplify patterns already present.   
                                                 
83 Text at Metzger 1985,1.100. 
84 The text structures and orders taken into account for this comparison include samples from a wide, if 
not exhaustive, survey of the relevant literature. For details, see Appendix D (4). 
85 For example, the progression through criminal-like material in Coll50 40-46 and Coll14 9.25-27; 13.20, 
23 does not follow the progression of the exposition of crimes in CTh 9 or CJ 9, Digest 48, Institutes 4.8 
or Plato Laws  853d-910d (i.e. books 9[-10]). 
86 I.e. the order of topics addressed, or the order of older source canons, in no way follows the order of 
any of the topics or sources in the Coll50 or Coll14 indices.  To give an example, if the Trullan canons 
were to follow the order of the infractions in the "clerical code" of Coll14 9.20-39, they would be in the 
following order: 67, 12-13, 61, 50, 24-25, 66, 10, 3-5, 92, 77, 9, 34, 102.  Only the last canon (102) and 
chapter (9.39), on repentance, correspond. 
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Thus, to look just at groupings, the systematic collections tend to create a group 
for ordination material (Coll50 1-12; Coll14 1.6-28) – so already Apostolic 1-2, 76-83, 
Ancyra 10-13, Neocaesarea 8-12; likewise they create groups for heretics, Jews and 
pagans (Coll50 37-39; Coll14 12), as already in Laodicea 29-39; or for procedure and 
penalties (Coll50 15-19; Coll14 9), as in Serdica 3-9 (with 3-5 specifically treating 
appeal), as also numerous times in Carthage (8-15, 27-30, 104-107, and 128-133), 
Antioch 11-15, and even Apostolic 74-75; or for liturgical, sacramental and ritual 
matters (Coll50 46-47, 50; Coll14 2-7), as Apostolic 7-11 (paralleled in Antioch 1 and 
2) or 69-73, Laodicea 43-52 (indeed, much of 20-52) or Carthage 3-7; or for marriage, 
women, family and/or sexual matters (Coll50 41-44; parts of Coll14 13), as in Ancyra 
19-21 (maybe from 16), Gangra 13-17, Basil 3-7, Chalcedon 14-16  and much of Basil's 
second letter, especially 21-27, 30-42, 48-50; or for murder, sorcery, augury, violence, 
and theft (all broadly "criminal" matters", as Coll50 40-46 and parts of Coll14 9 and 
13), as in Apostolic 21-27, Ancyra 22-25 or Basil 54-66 (perhaps 54 to 83).   
 Resonances and parallels for these groupings, if not direct derivations, may also, 
however, be felt in material outside of the canonical sources. "Criminal" sections, for 
example, are frequent; 87 procedural sections are not unusual;88 marriage and family 
topics likewise often form common groups;89 and cultic and "sacred" matters often 
cluster together.90  More immediately, works addressing specifically Christian matters 
can group, for example, heretics, pagans and/or Jews together.91 Others could easily be 
found. 
The patterns of ordering within the systematic indices are also not in any way 
exceptional.  Both within and outside of the corpus many resonances may be found.  
 Three ordering strategies may be remarked as particularly prominent – although 
all are sporadic, uneven, and often broken by digression. 
The most obvious, and the dominate pattern, is the tendency to build structure 
around a hierarchy of personal subjects and/or personal statuses or offices.  This 
                                                 
87 See above n. 85.  We may also the second half of the Ten Commandments, Josephus Antiquities 4.266-
291, and the second half of Philo's Special Laws 3-4 (as following the order of the second half of the Ten 
Commandments; esp. those laws attached to 7, 8, 9). 
88 E.g. Institutes 4; CTh 2; CJ 2-3 (broadly); Digest 2-3 (or to 5); Athanasius Syntagma  4-5 (ed. Simon 
and Troianos 1989); Josephus Antiquities; 4.214-222. 
89 E.g. Plato's Laws 772d-785b; CTh 3; Athanasius Syntagma  10-11;Philo Special Laws 2-3 (i.e. Ten 
commandments 5, 6); Josephus Antiquities 4.244-265. 
90 E.g., the Ten Commandments 1-4; Deut. 12-13; Didache 7-10; Canons of Hippolytus 19-38; Plato's 
Laws CTh 16; CJ 1.1-13; Philo On Special Laws 1-2; Josephus Antiquities 4.199-213 (and broadly book 
3). 
91 Apostolic Constitutions 6; CTh 16.5-10 and CJ 1.5-11; Athanasius Syntagma  3. 
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structure, usually near to the beginning of a collections, finds easy resonance in the 
many Amtsweisungen of the secular literature, and is also very prominent in some 
Apostolic church order material.92  In the canonical material, the most obvious example 
is the Coll50, especially Titles 1-39 where the topics proceed down the scale of clergy, 
laity, monastics, catechumens, schismatics and heretics.  The descending hierarchical 
progression within these titles is made all the more noticeable by a tendency to place the 
subject very early in the rubric (in emphasis below), which makes the sense of slowly 
stepping down the hierarchy quite palpable.    The following table of rubrical initia 
demonstrates this sequence. 
Titles Rubrical initia 
1 Περὶ τῆς ὁρισθείσης τοῖς πατριάρχαις ἐκ τῶν κανόνων... 
2 Περὶ τῆς ὁρισθείσης τοῖς μητροπολίταις ἐκ τῶν κανόνων... 
3, 5, 6, 7, 12, 14, 
15 [16], 19 
Περὶ τοῦ δεῖν [or μὴ δεῖν] τὸν ἐπίσκοπον... 
20 Περὶ τοῦ μὴ δεῖν κληρικοὺς... 
21 Περὶ χωρεπισκόπων καὶ πρεσβυτέρων... 
22 Περὶ τοῦ δεῖν τοὺς πρεσβυτέρους καὶ πάντας τοὺς ἐν τῷ κλήρῳ 
23 Περὶ τοῦ διακόνους μὴ δεῖν... 
24 Περὶ χειροτονίας γυναικῶν... 
26  Περὶ τοῦ ψάλτας καὶ ἀναγνώστας καὶ ὑπηρέτας καὶ ἐπορκισάς ... 
27, 28 Περὶ τοῦ μὴ δεῖν ἱερέα... 
29-31 Περὶ τοῦ μὴ δεῖν ἐπίσκοπον ἢ κληρικὸν ὅλως ἢ λαϊκόν... 
32-34 Περὶ τῶν ἀσκούντων... ἀσκητὰς ... μοναχῶν καὶ μοναστριῶν... 
35, 36   Περὶ κατηχουμένων... Περὶ τοῦ μὴ δεῖν τοὺς ἄρτι φωτισθέντας... 
The progression is not, as ever, exact or mechanistic. Thus we might have expected 20 
to follow 22; but the topic of 20 is a close continuation of 19.  Similarly, 27 and 28 
should seem to have been placed after 22, but the introduction of clerical marriage at the 
end of 26 (and the transitional function marriage plays into 29 and onwards) seems to 
have attracted both of these titles to their current place.  The deviations may thus be 
explained through processes of digression.    
In a more disjointed way, a similar pattern is evident in the Coll14, first in Title 
1, which roughly proceeds down the scale of clerical offices, and then after a long 
                                                 
92 Such structures are well known, and very common, in early codes and code-like literature. Solon – or at 
least the  BC403 Athenian "code" – is sometimes suspected of it (see the discussion, and doubts, in 
Ruschenbusch 1966,27-31); Plato assumes it (Laws 734e; cf. Gagarin 2000,218), Cicero does it (Laws 
Book 3), and it is broadly true of Dionysius of Halicarnassus' account of Romulus' legislation (Roman 
Antiquities 1-29, ed. Jacoby 1885; part of a broader tendency, I think, of treating "constitutional" matters 
first).  It is very evident in the first parts of CTh, CJ; Digest; Eisagoge; Basilica, and strongly present in 
many examples of the Apostolic church order material, for example the Apostolic Tradition texts, the 
Constitutiones ecclesiasticae apostolorum, or the Didascalia (and thus the Apostolic Constitutions).  The 
introduction to the Eisagoge even includes an elegant rationale for this structure: see lines 91-94 (ed. 
Schminck 1986,4-11).  It is also quite evident in NN. 123 and 131. 
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liturgical/sacral interlude (Title 2-7), with titles treating (mostly) disciplinary matters 
related to bishops and clerics (8, 9 and 10), then monastics (11), heretics and other 
marginals (12), the laity (after heretics!), (13) and "all men" (14).   
Many corpus sources show some traces of this type of ordering.  In the first 
wave it can sometimes emerge rreasonably clearly, as in the Serdican canons, which are 
neatly divided between regulations treating bishops (1-12) and those treating clerics in 
general (13-19), or in Ephesus 1-4, where one "steps down" through metropolitans, 
bishops and then clergy more generally.  Similarly Laodicea 20-28 are fairly obviously 
focused on the clergy while 29-39 are notably more general in scope (with no subject or 
addressed to "Christians").  Elsewhere such an order may be perceived more dimly, or 
more briefly.  Apostolic 1-59, for example, are mostly focused on the clergy, while 
much of the rest might be seen as a little more general in scope (although 76-83 
represents a clerical reprise); Nicaea broadly works from clerical ordination and 
episcopal matters (1-8) down to more general or varied questions, and clerical, lay and 
catechumen lapsi treated in that order (10, 11, 14). Neocaesarea 1-4 treats the marriages 
of clergy (1), then lay people (2-4).93   
In the second-wave sources such patterns become more regular and obvious. II 
Nicaea moves (with some digressions) through emphases on bishops (2-7), clergy 
generally (10-16), and then monastics (17-22).  Protodeutera, curiously, is reversed, 
moving from monastics and monasteries (1 to 6, or perhaps 7), up to clergy in general (7 
or perhaps 8 to 12 or perhaps 13), and then on to bishops (13, or perhaps 14, to 17).  
Even the brief Hagia Sophia proceeds distinctly through primates (1), bishops (2), and 
then laity (3).  Trullo is exceptional in the corpus for containing actual topical rubrics 
within its own canons, which are in a hierarchical series: περὶ ἱερέων καὶ κληρικῶν 
before canon 3, περὶ μοναχῶν καὶ μοναστριῶν before 40, and περὶ λαϊκῶν before 50.94   
 The second, and often vaguer, major structuring pattern is a hierarchy of 
substantive topics.   Also evident in non-canonical material, this manifests most 
regularly in a tendency to place higher status matters of faith, general legal "doctrine", 
clergy, and anything sacral near the beginning, and material that might be considered 
lower status material near the end (although the very end will sometimes "recover" with 
                                                 
93 Similar patterns may be discerned in Ancyra, Neocaesarea, Antioch, Chalcedon, Serdica, parts of 
Carthage and Basil, and Peter.     
94 These rubrics represent something of a textual mystery, and it is not entirely certain that they are 
original.  See Appendix D (5).   
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higher status material again).95  Thus in the Coll14 faith, clergy and sacral matters 
clearly dominate the first half of the collection (Titles 1-7), while the more mundane 
management, finances and “criminal” matters all emerge in the latter half, along with 
more neutral topics on lower-status persons.  Within the Coll14 titles, a diffuse tendency 
in the same direction may also occasionally be noted.96  In the Coll50 matters likewise 
get palpably more distasteful after about Title 36, where one starts to discuss, 
schismatics, heretics, lapsi astrologers/diviners, murder, fornication, marriage(!), 
aberrant sexual practices, thieves perjurers, and sacrilege.     
 In the corpus sources, this pattern is most evident in the tendency to place faith, 
faith-like and general questions about the canons very early, as in Constantinople 1, 
Chalcedon 1, Carthage 1-2, Trullo 1-2, II Nicaea 1 (and 2).  Sacral and liturgical matters 
also tend towards first-position, as Apostles 1-9 (roughly); Antioch 1-9; Dionysius 1; 
Timothy 1-10, Theophilus 1 and 2; and II Nicaea 2-6.   Likewise, matters treating more 
"criminal" matters, sexual matters, administrative and financial matters, or 
heretics/pagans, tend to come later, as Ancyra 16-25, Laodicea 29-39, much of Antioch 
10-25, Timothy 11-15, II Nicaea 8-16.   
Another important material hierarchy can also be found in the growing or 
diminishing seriousness of offences, as for example in Coll14 9.10-18; Coll50 39 
onwards; the corpus' two main treatments of lapsi, Ancyra 1-7 and Peter 1-14; and 
Gregory Thaumatourgos 1-8, which moves from less culpable actions to more culpable 
actions (especially if canons 3-5 are read as an appendix to canon 2). 
Interestingly, some of the most common exceptions to the substantive 
hierarchies seem to follow patterns – almost traditions in themselves.  One of the most 
prominent is a tendency to return to certain types of liturgical or sacral material – "high 
status" matters – at the very end of a source.  Thus, various liturgical matters appear in 
the last title of the Coll50, as they do in Nicaea (18-)20; Gangra 18-20; Laodicea 14-19 
(the end of what is often thought of as "first" Laodicea, from 1-19), and also the very 
end of Laodicea, 58-59; and Peter 15.  The canon of Scripture is also mentioned last in 
the Coll50, just as two listing of the content of Scripture, Apostolic 85, and Laodicea 
59, occur at the very end of their sources. Finally, a general canon/rubric on repentance 
                                                 
95 There is a great deal of variation in the patterns of substantive ordering in the non-canonical literature 
consulted, but it is fairly common to find, for example, more sacral and general theoretical matters, or 
matters pertaining to the offices of the great, first, and then more distasteful criminal, sexual or mundane 
financial administrative matters later.  See Appendix D (6). 
96 For example in Title 3 matters pertaining to demoniacs (13), heretics and Jews (14-15, 20), 
menstruation, nocturnal emissions and sexual impurity (18-19, 21), and suicides (22) are clustered near 
the end.  Similar patterns are perhaps evident in Titles 4, 6 8, 12. 
 244
may be found at the end of Basil's third letter (canon 84), at the end of title 9 of the 
Coll14 (chapter 39), and at the end of Trullo (canon 102).    
One other exception also follows a pattern: marriage-related canons begin many 
of the oldest sources.  So, very directly, Neocasarea (1-3), Gangra (1), and Laodicea (1).  
Similarly, if we except Ancyra 1-9 as a "special" section on lapsi, Ancyra's "general" 
portion also begins with marriage canons (10-11).  Likewise, after two general canons 
on the faith, Carthage begins with marriage (3-4). The Apostolic canons, after their 
initial ordination pair (1-2), and liturgical-altar pair (3-4), also move directly to the 
matter of clergy and their wives (5).  This may be related to the next tendency. 
 The third tendency, and the most subtle, is to proceed through a "life order", i.e. 
to move through material in the order in which the topics would arise chronologically.  
Fairly well known in the later Byzantine legal sources,97 it is very sporadic in the 
canonical literature.  It may be dimly felt in the beginning of the Coll50, where in title 
six (possibly this should be extended back to four, with five as an associative 
digression) one begins with matters relating to the death of a bishop, and thus a 
vacancy.  Then one moves to the manner in which a new bishop is to be elected (7), the 
time limit for the election and qualifications of new candidates (8-9), and finally a set of 
typical problems of ordination itself (10-12). The remaining titles all treat matters to be 
encountered once ordained.  In Coll14 4 the chapters move through accepting one to the 
catechumenate (1); questions of catechesis/ἐφορκήσις once one is in the catechumenate 
(2); how one actually performs the ritual of baptism and how the candidate must confess 
the faith at the baptism (3-4); and then problems with particular types of candidates (5-
10).  In effect, one has moved from pre-baptismal to baptismal problems.  Chapters 11-
14 then passes to logically post-baptismal issues: chrismation, rebaptisms, and reception 
of heretical baptisms. (Chapters 15-16 returns to problems with candidates and 
catechumens, breaking the order – however, this section, entirely derived from Timothy, 
may be reasonably understood as an appendix, tacked on.)   
Such orders may be occasionally suspected in the canonical sources.  Such a 
progression can be felt dimly underlying Antioch 17-25, a series of rules governing 
                                                 
97 So Burgmann 1983,7-8 on the order of the Ecloga.  It is never terribly well defined, but the Prochiron 
and Eisagoge likewise broadly move through matters of the beginning of (civil) life, i.e. marriage, then to 
things during life (buying, selling, partnerships), then to matters relating to the end of life (inheritances, 
legacies).  The Eisagoge is even quite self-conscious about this structuring – see its Prooimion 95-107 
(Schminck 1986,4-11).  It may also be perceived dimly in some Apostolic church order matter, for 
example in the Constitutiones ecclesiasticae apostolorum material, with the progression through 
catachesis, baptism, eucharist, general prayer, and finally funeral matters (the Basilica and Plato's Laws  
also ends with funeral matters).  See also Laws  721a on codes following the "order of nature". 
 245
clerical, mostly episcopal behaviours, and that otherwise seems to have little structure at 
all.  Thus we begin with matters relating to the ordination of new bishops (17-19), then 
move to behaviour of bishops as bishops, especially with regards to other bishops and 
sees (20-22), and then finally end with matters of succession and finance that pertain to 
the end of a bishop's life (23-24, with 25 as an extension of 24).  Even more vaguely, 
this pattern might underlie the peculiar opening structure of Nicaea: canons 1-2 treat 
problems relating to candidates for ordination, canon 3 on the συνείσακτοι intrudes as 
an exception (possibly associatively aimed at potential candidates), 4 treats the actual 
ordination of bishops, and 5-7 the consequent relations of bishops with each other.  
More clearly, in Protodeutera 1-4, one moves from the construction of new monasteries, 
(1) to the reception of postulants to monasteries (2), to problems encountered with those 
who have become monks (3-4). 
Aside from these three major tendencies, one last pattern – or almost non-pattern 
– must also be noted.  We may call it the "miscellanizing" pattern.  It reveals itself in the 
surprisingly common pattern, evident in the secular literature as well,  of proceeding 
from greater order to less order – with order sometimes recovering at the very end of a 
source.98 What "order" means may vary: perhaps clearer and more distinct hierarchies, 
more coherent and larger topical groupings, more methodical categories, or more 
precise rubricization.  Often it emerges across a source as simply the gradual descent 
into more random and ill-ordered matters.  This is evident across the entirely of both the 
Coll50 and Coll14, both of which begin quite distinctly, with organized and distinct 
rubric-groupings, but then gradually become more and more vague.  In the Coll14, for 
example, faith and sacral matters are divided into seven fairly precise titles which only 
subsume about a quarter of the collections references, and quite accurately and in great 
detail relay the canons' contents.  But clerical disciplinary problems then get divided 
into only three titles; monastics, heretics, and, especially, laity, into only one each; and 
finally, the last title, Title 14 Περὶ κοινῶν πάντων ἀνθρώπων seems to function as 
something of a miscellaneous catch-all. In effect, the author seems to have become less 
ambitious and detailed in his rubricization and categorization as he continued.  Within 
the Coll14 titles this pattern is also often evident. Thus, for example, 1.1-15 exhibits 
considerable structure, even imitating the Codex; but 1.16-38 much less so, often 
without any sense of structure, or even coherent subject sub-groupings. So 8.1-8 is 
                                                 
98 Broadly almost every external legal source examined, for varying reasons, is more ordered, logical, and 
structured in its very beginning than its later sections. See Appendix D (7). 
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loosely centered on clerical travel, but 8.9-19 feels almost random.  Likewise title 12 
begins with a fairly clear introductory section treating initial definitions and "heretical 
books" (but here a kind of "faith" matters it seems); this is then followed by a fairly 
clear sacral section (6-12), treating chiefly ἀναφοραί, entering churches, and praying 
together; the rest of the title is then much more miscellaneous. The Coll50 is likewise 
most organized and regular in the first 40 titles or so, with regular hierarchical 
progression, and fairly large groupings of related items.  Then titles become much more 
specific and progress with less logic (40 murder; 41-44 fornication, marriage, aberrant 
sexual practices; 45 thieves and perjurers; 46 removing items from church; appropriate 
offerings; 47 liturgical matters; 48 canons and repentance; 49 synods; 50 prayers, times 
and calendar).   
In the corpus such "miscellanizing" is also often evident. Thus one can detect 
more structure and logic in Apostolic 1-15, with its movement through ordination, altar 
service, communion, association with excommunicates, and letters for excommunicates 
than the rest of the text, with its movement through marriage, surety, self-mutilation, 
criminal activities, marriage again, physical violence, liturgical actions of deposed 
clerics, and simony, clergy rebelling, episcopal and synodal rules, dice, usury, baptism, 
eating in tavern, and so on.  Ancyra begins with two comparatively developed and 
defined sections on lapsi and ordination, 1-9 and 10-13, and then moves quickly through 
a kaleidoscope of other topics: abstention from meat, property of widowed churches, 
bestiality, reception of bishops, women and sex, murder, sorcery, and rape. The first 
section of Carthage, 1-33, likewise begins, despite some digressions, with relatively 
coherent groups of canons on faith (1-2), sacramental matters (3-7), and then dispute 
resolution (8-15); from 16 onwards, however, the canons become much more mixed, 
running through clergy and guardianship, reader marriage, clergy lending money, 
readers saluting the people, a primate for Mauretania, ignorance of the law, and so forth.  
Trullo starts with its very organized introductory canons and then a fairly coherent 
group on marriage and sex, but then loses almost any sense of order.  II Nicaea also 
loses much coherence after about 16 (aside from the general monastic theme).  Many 
other examples could be offered.   
Aside from these structures and patterns, more sophisticated, but isolated, 
structural schema can very occasionally be found.  The most extraordinary example is 
Gregory of Nyssa's canonical letter, the only truly systematic aperçu of church law in 
the Byzantine corpus – and indeed, perhaps in the entire Byzantine canonical tradition.  
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Using systematic medical τεχνή as his explicit model (ὡς δ᾽ ἂν γένοιτό τις τεχνικὴ 
μέθοδος)99, and proceeding through a branching processes of divisio and distinction, 
and with considerable concern for definition, Gregory creates a scheme based upon the 
common tripartite division of the soul's faculties: intellectual, desirous, and appetitive.  
Various different types of canonical infractions are carefully classified into each group, 
and sometimes further subdivided through analysis of their intention or other 
circumstance.  Distinctions drawn include that between involuntary and voluntary 
actions, the level of coercion, whether one has turns oneself in or not, weaponry 
involved or not, and the degree of harm done.  At least one set of definitions is also 
established through an abstract analysis of effect: fornication and adultery are defined 
as, respectively, sexual acts which do not harm another, and those that do. 
 Gregory thus provides an abstract of categories and distinctions – largely 
external to the canons – for comprehending and inter-relating the entire system.  
Further, the classification into these categories requires the analysis of different 
infractions according to a set of underlying concepts (i.e. not surface topics), in this case 
primarily types of psychological error.   
Even more remarkably, but very characteristically of truly "systematic" 
approaches to law, the system serves to reveal gaps in the existing legislation, as well as 
to challenge the consistency of existing concepts.  Both occur because of the internal 
comparisons implied by the system-building.  The first appears when Gregory notes (in 
canon 5) that, to his surprise, only one appetitive sin, murder, has been addressed at 
length by the fathers – despite the fact that other actions could be also considered 
appetitive (hitting, blasphemy).  His categories have revealed/created an inconsistency 
in the received penitential tradition.  The second occurs when Gregory observes (canon 
8) that the traditional punishment for sacrilege – a crime punishable by death in the Old 
Testament, he notes – is lighter than even the punishment for adultery.  His systematic 
treatment has forced a comparison of penalties.  In both cases the systematic shaping of 
the material is thus encouraging substantive critique – and thus pointing to the 
"advancement" of canonical regulation. 
 Despite its sophistication, however, in the perspective of the entire tradition, and 
the thematic indices in particular, the most remarkable aspect of Gregory's system is its 
almost total lack of influence on the later tradition.  It is no where taken up as a model 
to be followed: it is simply one more item in the traditional pool of rules. 
                                                 
99 Fonti 2.205.13-14 
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 Another, less dramatic example may be found in Coll14 9, on clerical 
infractions, which, despite the relative disorder of the material after chapter 20, may 
nevertheless be regarded as among the most sophisticated structures in the Byzantine 
canonical traditional.  In effect, a very disparate set of material has been organized into 
a quasi-procedural order – a kind of specialized "life-order".  The first eight chapters 
thus move through the steps of ecclesial actions, beginning with accusations against 
bishops (1-3), then trials themselves (5), and then retrials (6, and perhaps 8).  (The 
technical ring of these chapters is amplified by the high concentration of typical legal 
terminology.100)  The title then moves to a set of unusually general rubrics on the types 
of punishments that might be imposed during such trials, broadly proceeding from least 
severe to most (10-19).  The last half of the title (20-38) then treats all of the particular 
crimes treated by the canons, thus forming a type of substantive complement to the 
procedural beginning.  Finally, the whole concludes with a very general reflection on 
repentance, chapter 39, that is, what one is to do once one has committed any of the 
foregoing crimes and been assigned a punishment.  The overall structure suggests a kind 
of mini criminal code for the clergy. 
 Even this structure, however, is implicit. Ultimately this title is still doing little 
more than manipulating fairly simple summary rubrics into a vaguely more structured 
whole.   
The basic mechanism – the "how" – of Byzantine structural ordering thus 
remains highly limiting: one can build structures only by clustering topics of similar 
external content, and then placing these groups, almost always roughly, into a slightly 
more logical schema.   Moreover, this method is often strangely associative, with 
connections made through similar, sometimes only vaguely similar, surface topics or 
simply similar phrases,101 and with a strong tendency towards digression.  It often seem 
almost opportunistic: connections are made mostly when easily made. It seems to resist 
deeper internal analysis. 
It is interesting, however, that when allowance is made for the associative nature 
of this structuring, a very tenuous pseudo-structure can emerge for parts of the material 
that otherwise seem to have very little obvious progression, and odd breaks or 
                                                 
100 See above n. 78. 
101 This is very often remarked in the literature on ancient law.  Tigay 1996,449-459 is one of the best 
treatments, with discussion of other ancient near eastern sources, and many further references; see also 
Diamond 1950,23-31 on Hammurabi; Honoré 1978,174 on the Digest, the Edict and Ulpian; Mordek 
1975,23 on the Vetus Gallica; Schulz 1953,151 esp. n. 6, on the Edict, with further references; and 
Willetts 1967,34 on Gortyn. 
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transitions are sometimes explained.  An example of this last may be found in Ancyra 
10, 12, and 13, a loose grouping of canons treating aspects of ordination.  Canon 11, 
however, treats betrothed girls who have been seized by others for marriage, and seems 
to break the grouping.  However, this break should almost certainly be understood as an 
associative digression from Ancyra 10, which treats the status of ordination of deacons 
who have or have not made clear their intention to marry at the time of their ordination.  
The general matter of ordination is simply resumed in canon 12.    
Sometimes association can be even vaguer, perhaps unconscious.  An excellent 
example is an associative "chain" threading through Apostolic 69-73, a cluster of 
canons vaguely centered around feasting/holy places/behaviors interior to holy places.  
(The “chaining” concepts are in boldface.)  Canon 69 opens with the topic of fasting 
during Lent; the next canon then moves to fasting and feasting with Jews; the next, 
taking oil into Jewish synagogues during their feasts; the next, taking oil or wax out of 
the “holy church”; the next using any sanctified thing (i.e. out of a church) for one's 
own use.  The progression develops through the associative chain fasting – feasting – 
Jews/oil – "holy" item.   
More often transitional or "hinge" associative canons (or rubrics) may be noted, 
in which a canon contains some type of topical association with both preceding and 
succeeding groups of canons.102  For example, in Laodicea 49-54 four Lenten 
regulations (49-51) merge smoothly into two marriage regulations (53-54) through a 
regulation (52) that treating marriages during Lent.  Or in II Nicaea, canon 7 functions 
to connect the "episcopal" section of 2-7 and the false belief/religion section of 7-9 by 
stating a rule that overlaps with both: the consecration of churches (an episcopal task) 
must be accomplished with relics, contrary to the heretical iconoclastic view.  In some 
sources, such associative transitions can be quite pronounced, running almost the entire 
length of a source.103 
Such loose, semi-conscious associative structuring does not, however, provide 
much "order" or structure by modern standards of rational systematization, and they are 
difficult even to detect.  They in fact point to what is perhaps one of the most important 
characteristics of Byzantine structural ordering: its absence. Very frequently in 
Byzantine sources, and even in the systematic indices, there is simply not much order at 
all, and what does occur tends to be sporadic, localized and elusive.  Order tends to 
                                                 
102 A phenomenon remarked in Tigay 1996,449-450. 
103 Most notably in Neocaesarea, much of Antioch, II Nicaea, and much of the Coll50  (perhaps also 
through Coll14 2-7).  
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emerge occasionally, and somewhat gingerly, and roughly, and it can be difficult to 
determine how conscious a structure really is.  Rarely is ordering highly sustained 
across the entirety of a source, or in exactly the same way.  Indeed, lest the above 
examples mislead, in the canonical sources themselves, but also in the indices, large 
stretches can exhibit virtually no order at all.  Both Chalcedon and Trullo, for example, 
but also much of Basil and Carthage, show very little internal order; Nicaea is also very 
vague.  Only with difficult can one tease much structure out of Coll14 12 and 13 
(despite some coherent subject groupings), and large parts of titles 1, 8 and 9 seem 
almost random; even the Coll50 hardly constitutes a uniformly organized whole, with 
predictable and consistent categories and forms.  Its last half is particularly jumbled.  
One of the key "methods" of canonical ordering is thus a non-method: you don't 
structure and order much. 
  To conclude, the overall shape of order and structure in the systematic 
collections, as in the canonical sources themselves, is mostly sporadic, "thin" or just 
plain simple.  Like so many other aspects of Byzantine canon law, it is highly 
"exegetical", strongly attached to and reflecting the surface content and contours of the 
canons themselves, and showing little interest in sustained rationalization or abstract 
conceptual analysis – despite the occasional exceptions that demonstrate that such 
analysis was indeed possible. 
 
G. Summary and analysis: systematizing the law? 
The first, and in many ways definitive, attempts of the Byzantines to "systematize" their 
canonical corpus do not much impress.  They are ultimately little more than topical 
indices whose principal goal is to aid in the finding of canonical texts on particular 
matters: tools of "law-finding" in its simplest sense.  In their self-presentation, selection 
among their sources, creation of rubrics, and structuring of topics they show little 
inclination towards juridical abstraction, systematic creativity or interpretative courage: 
they rarely "advance" the law in any obvious or dramatic way. Even creative topical 
formation or distillation is surprisingly rare.  The creativity and abstraction they do 
evince is more on the level of emphasis, an occasional nudging of the tradition – but it is 
revealing that such instances need to be searched for, often with some difficulty, and it 
is not always clear how intentional they are.  Even imitation of the secular codices is no 
where overwhelming, if not completely absent.  The real point of these works seems to 
be encapsulated best in a phrase such as "surface summary": the collections provide a 
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helpfully organized summary of the surface contours of the canons.  Juristic abstraction 
and systematic rationalization are not priorities. 
 Such a method clashes directly with modern expectations for legal 
systematization.  Legal systems are supposed to be internally consistent gapless wholes: 
all rules, neatly defined and conceptually clear, are to relate seamlessly to one another in 
a clear and predictable mechanism of internal logical coherence, and when a rule does 
not exist to address a certain situation, then the system is supposed to itself aid in 
creating one.  The Byzantine systematic indices, however, do not engage in even the 
precursor tasks to such systematization: casting canon law as a series of problems to be 
solved (gaps to be filled, contradictions to be resolved, obscurities to be removed – as in 
Gratian, or even the late antique secular codification projects) or the distillation of 
common concepts and principles.  They do not even present the law as a synthetic and 
digested whole as the Institutes do, nor do they evince the sustained doctrinal thinking 
of the Digest fragments.104  More disturbingly, all of this is true despite the fact that 
they are created in a society, and during a period, with many resources and models for
far more penetrating systematic and analytical thinking (again, the Institutes and Dig
themselves are good examples, but the works of the Aristotelian commentators and 
Neoplatonic and rhetorical pedagogical manuals also come to mind).  Indeed, in texts 
such as Gregory of Nyssa, the tradition reveals its own ability to think in an abstract 
systematic manner.  Yet, as a whole, the tradition never moves in this direction.  This 
curious disregard for more sophisticated and technical jurisprudential systematization 
mirrors the odd place of technical formalist discourse in the canon themselves: it is 
present, known, and even possible, yet somehow not central.  It is not the controlling 
concern. 
 
est 
                                                
 If we are not too quick to condemn these texts to the narrative of "primitivism",  
it is possible to discern a certain legal logic and coherence behind the observed 
phenomena.  The key may be in realizing that, from a phenomenological perspective, 
the central action of these texts – what they are "doing" – is bringing one into closer and 
easier contact with the canonical texts themselves, and in a fairly physical way, i.e. they 
are always bringing one as close to the actual textual contours of the canons as possible.  
 
104 Neither of which, of course, do either task particularly well by modern standards.  On the inner "flow" 
of the Digest titles, Stolte 2003,89; Pieler 1997a,581; cf. also Pringsheim 1921,441 on the secular Greek 
scholiasts' concern for ἀκολουθία.  But on the general lack of internal systematic coherence in even the 
ancient secular codes – something of a commonplace – see especially Hezser 1998,629-631; also Bretone 
1999,397-398; Gaudemet 1986; Schulz 1936,53-66; Westbrook 1988.  We do well to remember that it 
took the medieval glossators and commentators centuries to pull an internally coherent usus out of the 
CJC! 
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Thus these collections do not select much among their sources; their rubrics do not stray 
far from the texts themselves; and the arrangement of the texts hardly pushes beyond 
very simple and conventional patterns evident in the structural shape of the canonical 
sources themselves.  The texts are, in short, not trying to lead one "beyond" the canons 
themselves, or to construct a doctrinal world into which the canons might be fit.  They 
are not creating "canon law".  They are instead directed towards facilitating engagement 
with the original texts themselves, "the canons", whatever their state or content might 
be.  To borrow a turn from Zechiel-Eckes, they are deeply, and intentionally, 
transparent to the canonical corpus.105 
This priority makes very good sense if we recall that the "law" truly is first and 
foremost conceived as a quasi-sacred body of traditional material that has its basic locus 
in the physical texts of the laws, in the concrete plural.  Any movement away from, or 
any jurisprudential violation of, these laws is naturally avoided, and almost nonsensical.  
Certainly any aspect of systematization that might suggest radical structural change of 
this material is mostly avoided.  As a result, juridical rationalization, and other types of 
systematic development, if not entirely absent, take on a rather different cast.  They 
appear as occasional and tentative suggestions, mostly around the margins, and very 
much trying to shape themselves to the shape of this sacred body of material.  In overall 
structure, in particular, the level of organization evident in the collections is only a very 
slight step up from leaving things as they fall: the priority remains the adherence to the 
surface contours of the legislation. Order and system thus seem to be striving to appear 
only on the terms of the canons themselves.  At best a general coherence with the 
broader world of legal ordering is found, perhaps occasionally verging on imitation. But 
strong, reconstructive juristic manifestations of systematic rationalization are neither 
much evident nor to be expected.   
The assertions of "system" that are present are therefore mostly very diffuse and 
symbolic in character.  Thus, for example, the shaping of the material into various 
hierarchies of offices and topics does assert a symbolic sense of systematic 
comprehensiveness: the rules stretch from one end of the cosmic world-order to another, 
and are a natural part of this quasi-sacred order – and must be read in this way.  In this, 
there is even an implicit assertion of the canons' internal coherence, but it is not an 
internal juristic one: the canons are instead "internally coherent" with the whole cosmic 
order!   
                                                 
105 Zechiel-Eckes 1992,1.37. 
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More specific "messages" may also be read from these structures.  For example, 
canonical order must emerge from rightly-ordered hierarchical officials; disciplinary 
measures are subordinate to faith issues; and some matters are more shameful than 
others.  But these messages are not juridical-doctrinal in form or intent.  Instead of 
trying to create or refine a proprietary (and autonomous) set of legal doctrines, the 
intention of this type of symbolic systematization is – once again – to inscribe or embed 
the canons into a broader metaphysical narratives or "systems" of order.  And once 
again, even in the area of systematization, law and legal practice is thus oriented less 
towards "getting right" a thorough and consistent application of rules to facts in a 
specialized and self-perpetuating technical discourse, as "getting right" a much broader 
and general world of traditional social and ideological ordering into which the canons 
are meant to be read and applied.   
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CONCLUSION 
 
We may now return to the question of what a close reading of the central texts of the 
Byzantine canonical tradition 381-883 reveals about the "the fundamental perceptions, 
categories, values, expectations, assumptions and structures that constituted the 
intellectual and cultural framework of Byzantine canon law " – in other words, what 
they reveal about the nature of law and legality in the Byzantine canonical collections. 
Out of the many details and observations made in the above analyses, a coherent 
picture has slowly begun to coalesce. 
In chapter one, the broadest "shape" of the law – its physical structures and 
patterns of growth over time – revealed a legal world built around a surprisingly unitary 
and stable body of traditional texts.  Byzantine canon law is above all the story of the 
development of one more or less unified collection of texts that slowly grows through 
the accumulation of sources in a succession of corpus "cores".  In this world, patterns of 
real diversity and radical system-wide re-hauling are nowhere in evidence.  Instead, the 
leitmotifs of the system's growth are conservation and accretion as newer traditions are 
piled on top of older ones, and gradually themselves accepted as part of the core corpus.  
Nothing is ever lost or permanently ejected from the tradition: once "in", texts are quite 
eternal.  
The process of definition or demarcation of valid sources emerges as quite 
curious.  On the one hand, "the canons" always have a fairly concrete referent.  The type 
of uncertainty that will apparently prevail in the western tradition before the 12th C will 
never occur in the east: everyone always knows what at least the "core" corpus of 
canons is, and if anything this certainty increases over time.  At the same time, however, 
the precise definition of the corpus is always elusive.  The "edges" of the core are 
ragged and permeable.   
This uncertainty is related to an apparent lack of any clear expressions of 
"sovereign" authority over the tradition.  Such authority is never something that any one 
(living) agent ever manages to exercise in order to construct or reconstruct, or even 
definitively define, the tradition.  Instead (as also evident in chapter two), authorities at 
best add material, index material, confirm material or clear up some particular problems 
"around the edges".  Those that seem to come close to "officially" defining the tradition, 
like Trullo 2, do not seem to have the effect they should, at least not until they 
themselves are well established as part of the tradition. Their function is prototypically 
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more to confirm the existing tradition than definitively define it. The result is that the 
tradition never achieves an absolutely clear definition of itself. 
This curious leeriness about expressions of positive authority over the tradition 
has a counterpart in the surprising absence of any type of sustained jurisprudential 
literature – and a class of legal professionals to produce it. Although it is clear that such 
jurisprudential handling of the rules is taking place, this never develops into a 
substantial literature in our period, or an important focus of the system as a whole. 
Byzantine canon law thus does not develop itself primarily as a jurisprudential 
"project": no attempt seems to be made to develop a coherent doctrinal architecture of 
"secondary rules" to govern the interpretation and application of the canons, and 
jurisprudential principles are never given definitive leave to govern the shape of the 
tradition as a whole.  The tradition instead presents itself as first and foremost a huge, 
extended "project" of preserving and faithfully transmitting a series of traditional 
"primary" rules.  Even the jurisprudential literature that does exist – and will 
increasingly exist – is always self-consciously subordinate to the traditional texts, 
mostly facilitative or exegetical in nature, and always built around the traditional texts 
as around a stable core structure. This handling of the texts strongly suggests a sense of 
the tradition as above all constituted by a body of traditional rules of a quasi-sacral 
nature. 
In chapter two, the central point of the traditional introductory texts emerges as 
the desire to anchor the canonical texts in as many extra-legal narratives as possible.  
The prologues thus seek to cast the canons as part of broader scriptural and 
metaphysical narratives of salvation, and as intimately speaking to and intertwined with 
questions of morality, virtue and "life".  Further, the canons are to be understood as a 
mode of teaching, as fundamentally paired with (but subordinate to) Scripture/faith, as 
easily glossable by some of the most commonplace philosophical and rhetorical 
definitions of law, and, as always, as grounded in tradition.  The canons are also 
affirmed as indeed quasi-sacral texts. 
The overall legal "message" of these prologues is thus hard to miss: Byzantine 
canon law is a legal tradition that intentionally, happily and probably necessarily 
embeds itself in a wide array of "extra-legal" value narratives.  Although in chapter one 
the tradition emerges as existing as an autonomous physical textual reality, any other 
type of "autonomy" seems to be neither a value nor a goal. 
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In chapter three the canons themselves seem to enact or embody the tasks set for 
them in the prologues.  These correspondences can be striking: the canons are cast as 
rooted in tradition, and the canons are indeed written as constantly speaking from and to 
earlier traditions; the canons are supposed to be about teaching and persuading towards 
virtue, higher morality, and a proper way of life, and the canons are frequently 
concerned with teaching and persuading towards precisely these themes; the canons are 
cast as quasi-scriptural and sacred, and the canons are, sure enough, littered with 
Scripture and frequently speak and act in surprisingly sacred registers. Like the 
prologues, then, the very textures of the canons seem to be oriented towards "linking" 
the rules into innumerable extra-legal narratives.  The canons read as assuming that they 
are functioning alongside of and as part of broader systems of normative moral control.   
In chapter three we also noted one small but highly significant terminological 
peculiarity: the lack of the phrase "canon law".  This absence gives convenient 
expression to the physical shape of the tradition noted in chapter one.  Instead of 
"naming itself" as an abstract project or field of endeavour, the tradition 
overwhelmingly thinks of itself in the plural and the concrete.  Canon law is the canons.  
This is strongly emphasized by the tendency noted in the same chapter to stack a variety 
of genres and forms one after another in the corpus, with the original forms of the 
sources left more or less as-is.  The traditional texts are apparently invulnerable to 
formal rationalization via homogenization or standardization: the concrete specificity of 
the traditions, as plural traditions, trumps any homogenizing tendencies of a systematic 
jurisprudence. 
 In chapter four, the deep conservatism of the tradition, and its attachment to the 
traditional texts, makes a final and dramatic appearance.  The central point of the 
Byzantine "systematizations" seems to be the very simple task of assisting one in 
coming into contact with the appropriate laws – law "finding" in its most basic sense.  
Instead of representing complex processes of systematic interpretation or digestion of 
the tradition, the Byzantine systematic collections are deeply "transparent" to, and 
derivative from, the traditional texts, often to a surprisingly literal degree.  Instances of 
interpretation and creative shaping of the material are not entirely absent – occasionally 
they are even significant – but overall their absence is more notable than their presence.   
Even the patterns of ordering imposed upon the material hardly represent dramatic re-
shapings of the tradition, as most are already present in the canonical sources, and are in 
any case quite conventional. The patterns of ordering and "systematization" that do 
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emerge tend instead (at best) towards the symbolical.  These thus function once again to 
embed the canons into broader narratives of (cosmic) hierarchal order – certainly they 
do not represent any profound rationalized arrangement by internal concepts. 
 One thread that runs throughout all of the chapters is the relationship of the 
canons to the civil law.  Here a surprising consistency may be noted.  On the one hand,  
the canons frequently cast themselves as comfortably part of the same general world of 
formal normativity as the civil law.  They can share similar physical spaces, similar 
images, similar definitions, similar dispositive expressions, similar technical 
vocabulary, and similar forms of ordering and structure.  At the same time, however, 
very rarely do the canons directly imitate the civil legal material: the two laws are 
usually, if not rigorously, distinguished in nomenclature; their genres and forms are not 
exactly equivalent; their selection of dispositives is slightly different; their precise 
systematic structures are generally proprietary; and they are distinct masses in the 
manuscripts – and the canons do sometimes explicitly distinguish themselves from the 
civil laws.   
Both radical dissociation, and radical assimilation are thus avoided.  The canons 
do not emerge as either a particularly "other" type of legal reality, nor do they emerge as 
a kind of parallel "ecclesial Roman law", a mirror of the civil system (as will develop 
more obviously in the west during the high middle ages).  The relationship between the 
two is always one of "similar, but not quite the same".  This relationship is, however, 
elusive of clear doctrinal articulation, and seems to be mostly negotiated through 
indirect, literary means. 
 From all of these observations, a basic legal architecture of Byzantine canon law 
can now be sketched.   
As a whole, the "system" is above all centered around the preservation, 
transmission, and exegesis of one core corpus of quasi-sacral traditional texts.  To an 
extent that is difficult for us to wrap our modern minds around, these traditional texts 
are the law.  They are not exactly sources of canon law, nor expressions of canon law.  
Likewise canon law is not (or at least not primarily) an abstract project or doctrinal 
construct.  Canon law is instead a concrete set of specific traditional texts gathered in a 
reasonably well-defined corpus structure.   
This emphasis on law in the plural, as a gathering of concrete semi-sacral 
traditions, is accompanied by a surprising lack of interest in the development of a 
proprietary and sustained jurisprudential/doctrinal architecture – the secondary rules of 
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a legal system.  This lack of a complex legal-doctrinal architecture points towards the 
theorization of Byzantine canon law as a "substantive justice system".  In other words, 
the system is written for a conceptualization of law that is oriented above all towards 
finding the truly just and correct answer to every problem – and not simply a formally 
correct "legal" solution.  In such a system, as A. Diamond has succinctly put it, "[t]he 
ruling internal principle (if it can be called such) is that justice should be done."1  As a 
result, the system is not particularly concerned about its own operation as a coherent 
and predictable mechanism of legal concepts and techniques, safely isolated from 
"values" and any other unpleasant external variables that might disturb its equilibrium, 
i.e. its ability to produce a correct "legal" answer.  Instead, the orientation of the system 
is precisely the opposite: it is deeply invested in constantly embedding itself into 
broader narratives according to which just decisions might be measured.  The 
"message" of the system in this regard is thus simple: to get law right, you need to get 
Scripture right, doctrine right, morality right, your psychological disposition right, 
Greco-Roman concepts of justice, right, etc. – and in every case, every time.  In a sense, 
then, the secondary rules of the system, the jurisprudential rules, principles and 
definitions, which seem to be so lacking, are furnished – and quite intentionally so – by 
a huge, if relatively stable, set of broader cultural images and narratives of "the just" 
(including, incidentally, but obviously not restricted to, Roman law).   
This aspect of the system explains the lack of professional canon lawyers.  The 
system is written not for a professional rule-expert proficient at operating proprietary 
legal techniques and definitions, but for a professional "culture expert", an educated 
amateur who is able to negotiate correctly among the mass of cultural narratives, along 
with the canons, relevant to any particular issue. Legal experts, if they still have a place 
in this world, are off to the side: assessors advising the judge/bishop. 
 Finally, the entire system is dominated by the notion of tradition.2  Although not 
explicitly so, this is, I propose, the controlling concept of the entire system: tradition 
legislates, tradition adjudicates, and tradition interprets. Indeed, as we have already 
noted, tradition, in the form of the traditional texts themselves, is the law itself.   
                                                 
1 Diamond 1950,30. 
2 The idea of the centrality of "tradition" in first-millenium canon law is a major theme of Sohm's; see 
especially his idea of tradition, and not the church, as "infallible" (Sohm 1923,2.65-67).  See also Glenn 
2000 for his fascinating account of the role of tradition in "chthonic" ("primitive") legal systems, and 
Kuttner 1950,357 on the "dialectical rationalization" of the 12th C versus the "linear traditionalism" of the 
previous period (the former understood, of course, as an advance on the latter). 
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This aspect of the law is perhaps most obvious in legislation: as Sohm long ago 
noted, real law in this world always emerges from the past, and more recent material, 
however exalted its origin, always seems secondary.  Changing and even adding to the 
law likewise seem somehow awkward: only time lends real confidence.  Certainly 
categorical assertions in the present of authority over the tradition are quite difficult to 
find.  In particular, the two most common form of leveraging authority against the 
tradition – a doctrine of sovereign positive legislative authority or the assertion of 
rationalized jurisprudential authority (i.e. through the application of rational juristic 
principles that can modify the tradition itself) – never seem particularly evident or 
prominent, unable on their own to modify the tradition or settle any matter.  Additions, 
changes and interpretations by such authorities tend instead to emerge warily, fleetingly, 
and inconspicuously, mostly around the edges of the tradition, almost as if downplaying 
their own prominence.  They await acceptance. 
The embedded nature of the canons also conveys a traditional message: real 
normativity must always be linking itself into broader traditions of the just and right.     
Curiously, however, this idea of "tradition" does not radically exclude 
contemporary addition, modification and even confrontation of the tradition. 
Throughout our period, the canons themselves make this clear, frequently modifying 
older canons, and likewise the prologues assume quite explicitly the slow, continuous 
growth of the system.  Tradition is not, therefore, a doctrinal principle with 
systematically stifling consequences.  It is instead more of a cultural-legal predilection 
towards systematically downplaying the importance and status of anything one is doing 
"now".  It is more of a legal instinct than a legal principle. 
 Emphasis on laws-not-law, an orientation towards substantive justice, and the 
overwhelming dominance of the idea of "tradition" – these are thus the three pillars of 
Byzantine canon-legal theory that emerge from this study.   
Two general observations may be made about the structure these pillars seem to 
support.   
First, this system may be read as extraordinarily dissonant with the formalist 
legal world sketched in the introduction.  It is possible to read Byzantine canon law as 
almost that system's opposite number, its eastern "shadow": whereas clear definition of 
the nature and domain of law as an autonomous type of social practice is critical to the 
one system, the emphasis in the other is on a "fuzzy" process of self-embedding in 
broader value narratives; the one prefers clear, logical, "clean" rules, the other "messy", 
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padded, rhetorical ones; the one places high value on precision, internal consistency, 
and gaplessness, the other is quite happy to tolerate high degrees of inconsistency, 
ambiguity and legislative lacunae; the one is very cautious about discretion and equity, 
the other seems to systematically prefer and assume it; the one is deeply invested in 
professional infrastructure, the other is not; the one tends to be highly malleable, 
instrumental and "secular", the other static, sacral and inviolable; the one is centered 
around deriving legality and justice from the logical application of rules, the other is 
centered around deriving legality and justice from a polyvalent engagement with 
tradition; the one assume a high degree of value-plurality, the other assumes – and 
instills – a high degree of value-uniformity; very broadly, the one is mechanical in 
operation and orientation, the other literary. 
 It is important, however, not to exaggerate these differences.  Our own 
investigation of canonical language and style has shown that the Byzantines were at 
times quite capable of engaging in formalist-like legal discourse not so different from 
our own.  Indeed, simply as a collection of formal written rules, Byzantine canon law 
does present itself as a "formalist" system in the most basic sense: it presumes that 
certain factual situations can be addressed by a series of more or less general rules.  I 
quite suspect, in fact, that the vast majority of Byzantine canonical disputes were solved 
by reasonably straightforward application of rules in this matter.  Further, one only 
needs quickly peruse the extant conciliar acta to become convinced of the ability of the 
Byzantine church to transact its affairs in quite technical, formalist-like ways. 
 Nevertheless the system as a whole is clearly not written for pure formalist legal 
operations.  The structures and paraphernalia of legal formalism never obviously 
constitute what we most expect them to: the basic framework of the law's operation and 
conceptualization.  Certainly formalism and its values do not emerge as the clear ideals 
of the system, nor do they suggest themselves as in any way the locus of the system's 
central instincts, habits or beliefs.  In this sense, then, Byzantine canon law does 
represent a real inverse of modern legal expectations: modern systems are conceived 
more or less as fundamentally structured along formalist lines, and as containing some 
substantive-justice elements.  Byzantine law (at least church law) is the opposite.  It is 
fundamentally a substantive-justice system containing some formalist elements.   
 Finding a precise formula to describe the role and place of the technical-
formalist elements in this system is, however, exceptionally difficult.  I cannot claim to 
have found a definitive answer.  Yet it is an important question to pose.  Dieter Simon 
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recognized this problem when he noted that Eustathios does engage in very rational, 
even technically coherent arguments – but only sometimes.  Particular arguments will 
often be very well-argued and internally coherent, but across the work as a whole there 
seems to be very little consistency: certain technical terms and arguments will be 
employed in one place, but not later in a very similar context.3  Others scholars have 
noted similar phenomena where technical legal principles will be employed 
occasionally, but not always, and not necessarily as a definitive argument.4  Modern-
like formalist rule-reasoning is possible, but not regular and sustained. Similar dynamics 
have been noted throughout our study.  Technical formalist-like discourse does emerge 
occasionally, but it is strangely desultory, and it certainly never appears as the 
controlling discourse of the system as a whole.  It comes and goes. 
 The conclusion, however, that the Byzantines did understand and were capable 
of technical-legal discourse, and yet did not systematically employ it, is extremely 
upsetting from a modern formalist perspective. The point (supposedly) of this type of 
discourse is that it is meant to be employed regularly and consistently.  In Byzantine 
hands, however, it often appears, ironically, as almost decorative, or perhaps 
opportunistic and supplementary.  It is only one argument among others.  Here Simon's 
suggestion that laws emerge as a variety of rhetorical topos is fascinating, and 
undoubtedly close to the truth.  It would be interesting, however, to engage in a broader 
study to see if these formalist elements tend to emerge more in certain decisions, or 
topics, or with reference to certain classes of people, or certain types of cases (harder 
cases? easier cases?), than in others. 
 The second observation we must make about this legal world is that, from a 
certain perspective, it also seems strangely familiar and even expected.  That it 
resembles many "primitive" systems, for example, can hardly be doubted; the 
description above is very much indebted to literature on such legal systems, as noted in 
the Introduction.  Similarly, many of its dynamics seem very similar to those noted for 
early Greek law, also as noted in the Introduction.  
But there is much here recognizable to any student of Byzantine culture.  The 
image Byzantine canon law presents of itself is one of extraordinary stability and 
continuity: sacral, unchangeable (certainly change is ponderously slow), florilegic, 
                                                 
3 Simon 1973,27-29. 
4 See the Introduction, nn. 43-44. 
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traditional, and hieratic. These are all stereotypes of Byzantine cultural expression.5  
Indeed, like much Byzantine art and literature, Byzantine canon law seems strangely 
numinous and "unrealistic", suffused with symbolism, dogmatic meanings and stock 
figurae.  However, whereas in iconography or hagiography – and even historiography – 
we might easily accept such characteristics, in law they are jarring.  Modern legal theory 
is accustomed to thinking of law in exceptionally mundane and practical terms, as part 
of a very human, perhaps amoral, nitty-gritty negotiation of competing interests.  But 
the Byzantines seemed to have been trying very hard not to see it in this way.  They 
tend instead to cast it as a very high-status, sacral matter, aesthetically significant and 
deeply rooted in, and constantly read against, the master narratives of Christian 
salvation and Greco-Roman philosophical advancement.  In this respect, it is perhaps 
not unhelpful to consider that Byzantine law is to modern law what Byzantine 
hagiography is to modern biography or a Byzantine icon to a modern realistic painting 
or a Byzantine declamation to a modern political speech.  They may share many 
important characteristics – sometimes perhaps very many – and yet their overall 
complexion is very different. 
 We may now return to the four disciplinary problematics raised in the 
introduction, and consider what my results might mean for each. 
 Despite my caricatured presentation of the two major streams of modern 
Orthodox canon-legal thinking in the introduction, my results in fact largely confirm the 
central instincts of much Orthodox legal thinking to date.  The central instinct of the 
manual tradition – that Orthodoxy possesses a real law that deserves careful analysis 
and treatment as a real law – cannot, I think be doubted.  One may endlessly argue 
about what precisely constitutes a "legal" system, but I believe it is safe to say now that 
the Byzantines themselves broadly did consider canon law as within the realm of "the 
legal".  The Orthodox Church does have a law, and it is in fact a very high-status 
element of the tradition. 
At the same time, however, canon law does not emerge as a mirror image of 
secular Byzantine law, as sometimes assumed by representatives of the manual 
tradition, and it is not safe to assume that whatever might apply to the secular Byzantine 
law could also apply to the canonical.  (Much less, of course, can we assume that any of 
                                                 
5 The cultural historian need only partially heed Lemerle's famous warning that "to represent Byzantium 
as immutable over a period of eleven centuries is to fall into a trap set by Byzantium itself." (Cinq études 
sur le XIe siècle byzantine, Paris 1977 p. 251, cited in Magdalino 1999,115). If we are interested in 
understanding how the Byzantines themselves perceived their own society, and shaped its expression, this 
trap needs to be fallen into, at least occasionally. 
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the categories, ideals, presuppositions, principles or theories of modern law – also 
sometimes assumed by the manual tradition – can be directly and uncritically applied to 
the canonical tradition.) 
 As to the much more diverse "ecclesiological" streams of thinking, my results 
also largely confirm many of the recurring assertions of this tradition.6  We cannot 
explore the correspondences here in depth, but they include the ideas that Orthodox 
church law cannot be separated from broader dogmatic narratives; modern formalist 
juristic categories do not fit the traditional texts well; change in the system does not 
happen as it does in modern legal systems; the laws are surprisingly sacral in 
orientation; the canons are very much concerned about morality, broader questions of 
life and virtue and are highly pedagogical in orientation; the texts are strangely allergic 
to formalism; and tradition is a central concept.  In short, my results confirm the basic 
instinct that Orthodox canon law is a very different legal phenomenon from what we 
expect, and that it is not appropriately treated as simply another branch of continental 
civil law.  The only substantial improvement I hope that my work represents is the 
provision of a more detailed and developed language for identifying and theorizing the 
legal dynamics present, and as legal dynamics.  In this I hope to assist in the 
transformation of many of these ideas from rather vague philosophical and 
ecclesiological speculations to a more developed theory of Orthodox legal method and 
practice.  I also wish to challenge the more radical assertions that Orthodoxy does not in 
fact possess a legal life. 
 With reference to both schools of thought, however, this work has above all 
sought to make a methodological point: it is extremely desirable, and indeed possible, to 
develop Orthodox legal theory through a close quasi-exegetical reading of the primary 
texts.  In this process it is perfectly valid to bring modern legal categories and 
ecclesiological theories into the conversation with the texts – or modern theoretical and 
anthropological observations, as I have done.  What should be avoided, however, is the 
tendency to formulate legal theory with hardly any direct or sustained consultation with 
the traditional texts at all, instead beginning, and mostly ending the conversation, with 
reference only to modern legal theory or modern ecclesiology.  Like everything else in 
Orthodox theology, Orthodox legal theory must at least begin with the traditional texts 
themselves. 
                                                 
6 They are in fact very close to the presentations of those scholars who tend to straddle the divide between 
the manual and ecclesiological traditions: Erickson 1991, L'Huillier 1964, Meyendorff 1978a, Patsavos 
(Kapsanis) 1999, Pheidas 1998. 
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 The contribution of this work to the second discipline, general historical 
theology/patristics, is perhaps more potential than realized. Nevertheless, the picture 
that has emerged in chapter one of a surprisingly unified, stable and universal canonical 
corpus will hopefully encourage further study of this material, as a corpus, as a 
significant and very prominent monument of the patristic legacy.  As noted earlier, 
canonical texts tend to emerge in patristic studies as sources to be occasionally "mined" 
for specific pieces of data, and considered only in light of various local circumstances.  
Here, however, I have suggested that these texts may also be usefully studied as a 
prominent, coherent cultural whole that, precisely as a corpus of legal texts, 
encapsulates a rich set of beliefs and assumptions pertaining to ecclesiology, church 
order, and the definition and conceptualization of power in the church – and, of course, 
the nature of law itself.  More specifically, my argument that the canonical tradition is 
overwhelmingly oriented towards substantive-justice solutions, and that it tends to 
present law as a numinous and quasi-sacred reality, may also serve as a caution against 
any precipitous assumptions about the formalist and positivist nature of early Christian 
canon law.  The legal "texture" of patristic culture is in fact rather different from what 
we might expect: modern legal mores cannot be assumed as a historical constant.  
 The third set of problematics relevant to this study is those of the general history 
of canon law.  Here I have sought to address two major narratives.  The first is that of 
the supposed legalization/secularization of canon law after the 3rd century.  This 
narrative is easily confronted, inasmuch as it tends to involve the retrojection into the 4th 
C of a full-blown modern legal formalism and positivism on the evidence of relatively 
minor patterns of formalization and regularization of terminology and perhaps canonical 
forms.  As we have argued, however, the Byzantine tradition never sees real positivist-
formalist legal-theoretical development – it doesn't even comes close.  Even the 
assimilation of the canonical literature to contemporary secular legal literature will 
always remain ambiguous and occasional.  Thus while a certain formalization and 
regularization of the tradition from, for example, the 2nd C to the 9th C, is undoubtedly to 
be observed, its true legal-theoretical significance is minimal.  In effect, during this 
time, church law moves from being a loosely defined body of quasi-sacred charismatic 
traditional regulations deeply embedded in Christian metaphysical narratives to a 
slightly less loosely defined body of quasi-sacred charismatic traditional regulations 
deeply embedded in Christian metaphysical narratives.  
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 The second narrative is that of the gradual evolution of canon law towards the 
12th C western developments, when canon law finally emerge as an autonomous legal 
discipline parallel to the secular legal system, complete with jurists, faculties, 
professional lawyers, and a strong positivist legislator – and a completely reconfigured 
textual tradition (Gratian's Decretum).  In the western tradition of canonical 
historiography, this development is usually considered natural, a movement from the 
primitive and chaotic to the ordered and advanced.  The Byzantine experience, however, 
as sketched above, offers a very different perspective on these developments.  No aspect 
of this transformation appears particularly likely, natural, or even desirable: one is never 
supposed permanently to select or sort among "the canons" (as Gratian does); the 
system is never autonomous and "dis-embedded" from theology, nor (thus) 
professionalized, and it is not supposed to be; clear assertions of (present) positive 
legislative authority tend to be avoided; dramatic imitation or internalization of the 
secular patterns is very rare; and jurisprudence is generally highly exegetical in 
character, not constructive (or destructive) of the tradition. 
More broadly, the eastern experience also challenges the ubiquitous reading of 
these western developments as the introduction of uniformity and stability, and the end 
of canonical "localism".  Although this reading is undoubtedly valid within the Latin 
experience, from a broader, more global canonical perspective the western 12th C 
developments may be read as precisely the moment of the definitive shattering of an 
older pan-Christian "imperial" canonical tradition.  In the 9th C the Dionysius-Hadriana, 
the Coll14 and the Syrian Synodika contained much very different material, but their 
core Nicene corpus was the same (and identifiably a core), and they are clearly the same 
type of collection: they witness to the same idea of a highly traditional, accumulative 
canonical source collection built around the old Nicene corpus.  At least on a textual 
level, they represent a common canonical world.  By the end of the 13th C, the 
Byzantine collections, and many of the oriental collections, will look much the same; 
but the western textual world is completely changed, and hardly recognizable.  An older 
common Christian canonical world – with its center of gravity surprisingly in the east – 
is gone. 
 If we replace a western set of prejudices with an eastern set, then, it is entirely 
possible to view the western 12th C development not as an evolutionary movement from 
the primitive to the advanced, but as the endpoint of a strange unraveling of a well-
established imperial tradition of church law – and, perhaps, with Sohm, as a very real 
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devolution into legal formalism.  Certainly it is perfectly possible to look at the 
Byzantine experience as a "normal" progression, perfectly consistent on its own terms 
(increasingly fossilized, overwhelmingly exegetical), and continuous with the older 
imperial tradition, while the western one (massive reconfiguration, jurisprudential 
creativity, increased formalism, secular-like re-formation) seems the odd-system-out.     
 Less polemically, however, the Byzantine experience simply throws into higher 
relief the problem of explaining the extraordinarily different development of the western 
and eastern systems. Both traditions start with very similar traditions, and similar legal 
resources and backgrounds – but both end in very different places.  Why?  Whatever the 
answer may be, recourse to "natural evolution" on the western side is not sufficient. 
 The final set of problematics in the background of this study is those of late 
antique and Byzantine law, and particular the issue of the eternal defectivity of late 
Roman and Byzantine legal phenomena.  Here my work has very much followed in the 
footsteps of the Byzantinists who have sought to read the many odd and "defective" 
characteristics of Byzantine law not as evidence for decline or corruption but as an 
opportunity for re-thinking the cultural-legal paradigm that has produced these 
narratives of decline and defectivity in the first place.  My work has, I think, largely 
confirmed this approach inasmuch as I have shown that Byzantine canon law does not 
read convincingly as one long, failed attempt to try to form itself into a formalist-
positivist legal system.  Quite the opposite, it reads as a surprisingly coherent and 
internally consistent legal world that is simply operating according to a very different 
set of priorities and ideals than those expected by much modern legal historiography.  If 
taken "on its own terms", the Byzantine legal world does not need to be explained by 
narratives of decline, primitivism, or corruption. One does not even need to explain the 
phenomena with reference to socio-political change (although one could).  Byzantine 
canon law can be read as a theoretically coherent and "satisfying" legal structure quite 
by itself. 
My results may be one more indication that even in late antiquity we should be 
cautious about taking for granted the traditional formalist-positivist vision of law of 
many of the older generations of Romanists.  Although late antique law is very 
complex, my suspicion is that already in this period many of the dynamics noted for 
Byzantine canon law are more operative as legal-cultural ideals than is commonly 
acknowledged, including the tendency to think of law as a set of sacred traditions, a 
disinclination to value or honour narrow and technical rule-logic and rule-manipulation, 
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an emphasis on substantive solutions, and a preference for "amateur" dispute resolution.  
Indeed, if this is true, it may ultimately even be possible to "turn the tables" on much 
modern legal historiography of this period, and, read (in part with Biondi) the 
theoretical developments of late antique and later Byzantine law not as a decline but – 
from the perspective of its contemporaries, at least – as an advance, a kind of 
"correcting" of the somewhat odd and peculiarly formalist orientations of the old 
Roman law.  Certainly from the perspective of a system like Byzantine canon law it is 
precisely the more formalist and technical-conceptualist elements of classical Roman 
law that suggest a certain deviance – and even, perhaps, a certain vulgarity?  In any 
case, further cultural-historical investigation of the late antique legal imagination would 
be welcome. 
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APPENDIX A 
Appendix to Chapter 1 
(The following are supplementary notes, supplying further details, texts and examples 
for various points in the main text.  These notes are referred to in the main text and/or 
footnotes by appendix and note number.) 
 
1) [from p. 28, n. 11] The central corpus of RP, volumes 1-4, although drawing heavily 
on a 17th C humanist edition (Beveridge 1672) took as its model a very complete 14th C 
MS, Istanbul Topkapı 115 (via Athens EB 1372, an 18th C copy; see Menebisoglou 
1982,193-206).  RP nevertheless omits the scholia, places certain texts in footnotes, and 
following Beveridge includes all three commentators in the corpus section, a 
combination never found in any manuscript.  The appendix material in volume 5 – even 
excluding, obviously, the modern Greek material – does not seem to reproduce any 
particularly example of the Byzantine canonical appendix tradition per se.  (On George 
Rhalles and Michael Potles, and the historical circumstances of their edition, see further 
Deledemos 2002,3-10.) 
 
2) [from p. 28, n. 13]  For example, early Greek positive lawgiving, and even the 
concept of law, may be connected with the emergence of writing (Kelly 1992,9; 
Gagarin 2005,91-92, now Gagarin 2008; cf. Thomas 2005,50).  The 3rd-5th C shift from 
roll to codex has also been connected with patterns of canonization, selection and 
compilation in late antique law (Wieacker 1960,93-119), and it is not difficult to 
suppose a connection between the rise of the codex and the emergence of both the great 
Roman and Jewish legal codifications of the 5th and 6th C (see broadly Heszer 1998). 
The more schematic and systematic presentations of canon law known from the 16th C, 
rather different from the older corpus-centered exegetical teaching method (see 
Gaudement 1991; Naz 1949,1480-1483; Schulte 1875,3.3.279-281; Plöchl 1959,3.352-
353), are also notably post-printing developments, as are almost all modern rationalized, 
constructivist and systematic presentations of the law (e.g. the Insitutionalist systems, 
the natural law systems, the Enlightenment codification projects). See generally Ong 
1982. 
 
3) [from p. 30, n. 18] A full and thorough survey of the form and content of the 
Byzantine canonical tradition as found in the manuscripts is neither available nor – 
outside of the work being undertaken at the Max-Planck-Institut für europäische 
Rechtsgeschichte (MPIfeR) in Frankfurt – even possible given the state of the 
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manuscript catalogues and indices.  Nevertheless, a general overview, adequate to the 
needs of this work, is possible utilizing all of the resources now available. 
From an examination of the principal editions and text-critical works (Fonti, 
Pitra, Sin, Syn, Sbornik and Kormchaya), the catalogue indices,1 and pre-17th C 
canonical material indexed (loosely and often inadequately) in the Greek Index Project 
Series (now continued by l'Institut de recherche et d’histoire des textes online as the 
project Pinakes: Textes et manuscrits grecs, http://pinakes.irht.cnrs.fr), it is possible to 
amass a list of approximately 500 reasonably complete Byzantine canonical 
manuscripts.  This figure that does not include mostly penitential, liturgical or monastic 
regulative works (e.g. Typika).  This total tallies approximately with a provisional 
working list (as of April 2009) of the manuscript holdings of the MPIfeR, pared down 
with the same restrictions, for which I am deeply indebted to the MPIfeR for sharing 
with me.2   
Of these approximately 500 canonical manuscripts, a quick survey of their 
contents through Pinakes and the catalogues reveals that about a quarter (~130) are 
irrelevant for discerning the shape of the tradition during our period. The majority of 
these contain the collections of Blastares (14th C) and Malaxos (16th C), as well as 
Nikon of the Black Mountain's quasi-canonical Pandects and Taktikon, the juridical 
works of Chomatianos and Apokaukos, the 14th C patriarchal registers, and a few other 
fragmentary or late miscellaneous manuscripts.  These works do not directly witness to 
any earlier structures per se (although some of the versions of Blastares contain 
appended 883 corpus structures, in very normal and unremarkable forms, for example. 
Paris gr. 1337). 
Approximately half (~240) of these manuscripts contain earlier collections in 
their 12th C commentary recensions.  These include most commonly Zonaras and 
Balsamon writing (more or less) on the 9th C "Photian" (883) canonical corpus, but also 
Aristenos, writing on a more restricted selection of material, and attaching his 
commentary to an epitomized version of the corpus (Aristenos, however, is a small 
work often tacked-on to larger structures).  Because these commentaries are written on 
                                                 
1 In addition to individual library catalogues (as per Richard and Olivier 1995, now also updated on 
Pinakes), the first volume of the Repertorium der Handschriften des byzantinischen Rechts (Burgmann et 
al. 1995), the first product of the MPIfeR manuscript description project, provides up-to-date and accurate 
descriptions of over 300 secular legal manuscripts, many of which also contain canonical content. 
2 Burgmann et al. 1995,x, however, provisionally placed the number of canonical manuscripts at 
approximately 600.  It seems that this discrepancy arises because this latter number includes a larger 
number of manuscripts which contain either relatively fragmentary extracts of canonical manuscripts, or 
are of monastic or liturgical regulatory content, or are fairly late.  
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pre-10th C collections, which they preserve more or less in their integrity, these 
manuscripts are important for discerning the earlier shape of the tradition.  At the same 
time, however, because they are exceptionally uniform, at least as far as the underlying 
corpus is concerned, our survey of them has been comparatively cursory.  The follow 
manuscripts have been examined in microform: Athens EB 1372 (18th C copy of 
Istanbul Top. 115); EB 1429; Venak. 20;  Florence Laurent. 5.2; Istanbul Topkapı 115 
[= Codex Trapezuntius, underlying Rhalles-Potles]; Vatican gr. 844; Vienna iur. gr. 10 
(Aristenos).  In addition, virtually all of the descriptions of the pre-16th C manuscripts 
(and many later) found in the following excellent and usually very detailed catalogues 
have been quickly consulted: Florence (Laurent.); Milan (Ambros.), Moscow (Synod., 
now GIM), Naples (Bib. Naz.); Paris (Bib. Nat.: Coislin, gr., supp gr.); Rome (Vallic.); 
Vatican (Bib. Ap. Vat., Barb., Palat.); Venice (Marcian); Vienna.  Further, I have 
quickly examined all of the relevant Pinakes entries for Zonaras, Balsamon and 
Aristenos.  
In basic structure, the commentary-manuscripts of Zonaras and Balsamon are 
very predictable.  Manuscripts typically begin with an introductory section containing 
one or more prologues, and perhaps some other introductory-type articles; then the 
systematic index and other various accoutrement of the Coll14 is sometimes provided; 
then the Photian corpus follows in the "systematic" or Tarasian form (see chapter 1.C.5) 
with one or perhaps both commentaries of Zonaras and Balsamon attached 
lemmatically, i.e. following each canon, in the main text of the manuscript.  Later parts 
of the manuscripts are taken up with much more variable sets of articles, i.e. "appendix" 
sections.   
The underlying collection in these manuscripts, in both structure and content, 
generally appears to be a completely normal Coll14 883 corpus, more or less as found in 
RP or Pitra, and more or less as found in non-commentary recensions, despite small 
variations in layout.  In effect, the commentaries are simply built around or "hung off 
of" the older structure of the 883 corpus.  Patterns of extraction, addition, re-ordering, 
omissions and interpolations, as least as relate to this corpus structure itself, seem to be 
very few: the text of the canons seems fossilized and regular (although it is possible that 
future work will reveal more variation).   
The collections of Aristenos suggest a similar structure, but in miniature: a brief 
prologue is followed by a slightly smaller corpus of material, usually in a pre-Tarasian 
order (see chapter 1.C.5), with Aristenos' commentary following each canon. 
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The remaining ~130 manuscripts have been the focus of this overview.  These 
contain more or less "pure" pre-commentary recensions of the canonical texts, and have 
been the traditional focus for historians and editors of the first millennium Byzantine 
texts.  These manuscripts typically contain straight corpora of canons or the Coll50 or 
Coll14 in various recensions.  All these texts have their origin in our period, but no 
manuscript contains works completely untouched by later post-9th C expansion – i.e. all 
pre-9th C collections must be reconstructed.  Nevertheless, the work of Beneshevich and 
others has shown that the basic shape of earlier forms of these collections are 
recoverable: expansions are usually quite easily identifiable as such, tacked-on to or 
placed around older structures.   
Of these manuscripts, the following have been examined in microform: Athos 
Meg. Lav. B.93; Koult. 42; Pant. 234; Vatop. 555; Dublin Trin. 199; Florence Laur. gr. 
10.10; Jerusalem Pan. Taph. 24; Milan Ambros. M.68 supp; Moscow Syn. 398; Naples 
II.C.7 (=gr 75); Oxford Barroc 26, 86; Laud. 39; Paris Coislin 36, 209, 211; gr. 1319, 
1320, 1331, 1370, 1371; gr. supp 614, 1085, 1086; Patmos 205; Rome Vallic. F.10; 
Vallic. F. 47; Sinai 1112,1113; Turin Bib. Naz. B.II.26;  Vatican Barb. 578; gr. 640, 
843, 1980, 1981; Venice. Marc. app. gr. I.29 [= Nanian 22]; Vienna hist. gr. 7; iur. gr. 5.  
Of the remaining manuscripts, reasonable (sometimes excellent) descriptions 
exist and were consulted for the following:  Andros Pant. 6-7; Athens Eth. Bib. 1370; 
Athos Iver. 302; Meg. Lav. B.93; Pant. 141, 234; Phil. 42; Camb. Univ. Ee. iv. 29; 
Escorial X.III.2;  Florence Laurent. gr 5.22; 9.8 ; Istanbul Panagias (Chalk.) 175; 
Jerusalem Cruc. 2; Metoch. 635; London BL Add. 28822, 34060; Milan Amb. E. 94 
sup; B. 107 sup; D. 317 inf.; F. 48 sup; G. 57 sup. Moscow Arch. 3; Syn 397, 432, 467; 
Munich Bay. Staat. Bib.gr. 122, 397; Naples: Bib. Naz. II.C.4; II.C.7; Oxford. Baroc. 
185, 194, 196; Gr. misc. 4, 206; Rawl. G 158; Rawl. Misc 170; Seld B.55; Paris Coislin 
34, 35, 364, 1263; gr. 1324, 1325, 1326, 1334, 1369; Paris supp. gr. 483; Patmos 172-
173; Rome Vallic. F 47; St. Petersburg GPB 66; Vatican gr. 640, 827, 829, 840, 1142, 
2060, 2184, 2198; Palat. 376; Venice Marc. 169, 170, 171; app.III.2, III.17; Vienna iur. 
gr. 9; 11; hist gr. 56, 70. 
In total, 108 manuscripts or manuscript descriptions were examined.  These 
include virtually all of the manuscripts consulted by Beneshevich and Joannou, and 
many of those listed (if not used!) by Pitra.  Further, they include all of the manuscripts 
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that may pre-date the second millennium:3 Athens 1370 (10th C); Jerusalem Hier. Cruc 
2 (a. 928-931); Jerusalem Pan. Taph 24 (10th-11thC); Moscow Syn. 398 (9th-10th C); 
Paris Coislin 209 (9th-10th C); Paris gr. 1334 (10th C); Paris gr supp. 614 (10th C); Pari
gr. supp. 1085 (10th C);  Patmos 172-173 (9th C, perhaps first half); Rome Vallic. F 10 
(10th C); St. Petersburg GPB 66 (10th C); Turin Bib. Naz. B.II.26 (10th C); Vatican gr. 
843 (9th – 10th C); Vatican gr. 1980 (10th-11th C); Vatican gr. 1981 (10th-11th C); Vati
Palat. 376 (10th C); Sinai 1112 (10th-11th C); Sinai 1112 (10th-11th C); Venice. app. gr. 
I.29 (10th C).  They also include representatives from all of Beneshevich's Coll14 and 
Coll50 recensions, as well as of the three known 11th C recensions (see Schminck 
1998).  Further, they include numerous instances of the synopsis, in various forms. 
s 
can 
                                                
 The Pinakes  project does not at present adequately index many of these 
canonical manuscripts.  Nevertheless, as a supplemental exercise, the relevant entries 
under IOHANNES SCHOLASTICVS CPL PTR III and PHOTIVS were investigated, 
as were the very varied entries under IVS CANONICVM,.  
The results of the overview of these manuscripts form the basis of the 
observations in chapter 1, and are discussed, in particular, in section C.1. 
 
4) [from p. 38, n. 58]Athanasius (particularly his letter to Rufinianus), Gregory 
Nazianzen, and Amphilochius are not always listed in the traditional tables of contents 
of the Coll14, nor in the thematic index references.  Gregory Nazianzen and 
Amphilochius, in particular, seem to have had particularly variable fates in the 
manuscripts, sometimes missing even in the corpus sections; see Fonti 2.xix-xx; also 
Delineatio 69, 129, 131; Sbornik 89-91;142-148; Sources Fathers.  It is therefore 
suspected that all are later additions. Gregory Nazianzen and Amphilochius, in fact, are 
not securely attested in any canonical witness until Trullo canon 2 – although a 
manuscript that may contain a pre-Trullan recension, Patmos 172, does contain them 
(Sbornik 236). In the later expanded Coll50 recensions described by Beneshevich, 
Gregory Nazianzen and Amphilochius are also often missing (e.g. "Group A", "Group 
B", Paris Cois. 211). Stolte 1998a,190 notes the possibility of an even smaller selection 
of fathers in the original Coll14.  Unquestionably the fathers always constitute one of 
the "softest" spots in the corpus. 
 
 
3 Dating of these manuscripts can vary considerably among catalogues, editions and surveys; I have 
tended to privilege Beneshevich. 
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5) [from p. 41, n. 82]  The early Byzantine and Slavic usage of νομοκάνων for 
collections with civil and canonical material is so consistently inconsistent that we must 
wonder if the term did not originally mean "canons-and-laws", but only had this 
meaning attached to it later, perhaps with a degree of artistic license (the first certain 
reference is, of course, in a poem).  While it is true that copulative compounds of the 
type "canons-and-laws" are fairly common in later Greek, if rare in the classical and 
Koine (Browning 1983,71, 87-89; cf. Smyth 1956,253), it is still just within the realm of 
possibility that the word originally meant something closer to "canon of/for the law" – a 
phrase that could refer to any type of regulative handbook (perhaps originally close to 
the sense of a table of penances?), just as apparently observed in the real Byzantine use 
of the term.  Pavlov (1874,39-42) briefly considered this suggestion in light of the fact 
that the Georgian translation of "Nomocanon" does in fact read "canon of/for the law" – 
as does, as Pavlov notes (p. 40), somewhat in passing, the Slavonic законуправило 
(and not законоправило), one of the oldest translations for νομοκανών (on this 
translation, Černyševa 1998,522-523; on Slavonic compounds, Vaillant 1963,1.215). 
Pavlov came to little firm conclusion about this possibility, but Beneshevich seemed to 
consider it an open question (Sbornik 105 n. 4). 
 
6) [from p. 49, n. 133] Athos Vatop. 555 (12th C), for example, is a highly unusual 
collection of extracts in 89 sections, many containing disjointed series of canons, 
apparently gathered around particular topics (although the beginning of the manuscript 
is lost – perhaps this is just an unusual appendix section?); Paris Cois. 364 (a. 1294) 
mixes many extracts from the synopsis  with the full texts of the canons, breaking the 
normal rule of completeness; Vienna hist. gr. 70 (14th C) seems to contain most of the 
normal components of a full canonical manuscript, but in a very confused order; the 
recently described Oxford Bod. gr. misc. f.4 seems to be a bizarre unraveling of the 
Coll50, with the canons extracted in sections.  See Paris supp. gr. 1089 (16th C) for an 
example of a highly extractive handbook-type collection of miscellaneous canons that 
seems to become more regular after the 15th C. 
 
7) [from p. 50, n. 138; also from p. 53, n. 146 and p. 217, n. 47] The Coll50 is 
extremely scrupulous about not omitting even one canon of its source corpus.  One 
could almost place each canon of its corpus on a card, rearrange those cards, and arrive 
at the Coll50.  Even divisions of canons are very limited (see Appendix B (7)). 
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 Until a definitive edition of Coll14 is produced, it will be impossible to identify 
with complete confidence those canons that are regularly missing in this collection's 
systematic references, in any recension.  In Kormchaya, witness to the oldest recension 
at present published, the following canons are not present in the systematic references 
(they are present in this recension's corpus): Antioch 12, Laodicea 38, Gangra 10, 
Theophilus 3, Basil 15, 16, and Carthage 34, 51, 52, 64, 67, 69, 74, 75, 77, 78, 82, 85, 
87, 88, 91-94, 97, 99-101, 105, 107-119, 127, and 134-138 (although these last 5 are not 
always numbered in the corpus, and probably should not be included; note also that this 
list of omissions is very similar to those made by Cresconius in his Concordia; see 
Zechiel-Eckes 1991,1.7).  Upon inspection of the variants in Kormchaya, RP and Pitra, 
Antioch 12, Laodicea 38, and Gangra 10 – canons which are unremarkable, and which 
do not suggest any particular reason for their omission – can all be accounted for, and 
we may tentatively presume that they have simply slipped out by mistake in the 
particular manuscripts privileged by Beneshevich.  As such, it is probably safe to 
assume that the Coll14 did originally tend to contain all conciliar canons, save those 
missing from Carthage. Theophilus 3 is more troublesome: it does not seem to occur in 
any variants in any of the modern editions.  Its content, however, seems unremarkable: 
it simply confirms a deposition and notes that deposed presbyter may appeal his 
deposition to the synod.  It could easily have been placed under chapter 9.5 or 9.6 – or 
9.14.  Its absence is perhaps a simple oversight. 
 The chief omissions, therefore, seem to be only in the newest material added, i.e. 
from material not present in the Coll50 corpus: the first letter of Basil, Carthage, and 
perhaps Theophilus.  (Most of these canons seem to be omitted because of their 
exclusively doctrinal or very local content.) In Jerusalem Pan. Taph. 24 and the 
Michael/Theodore recensions, however, they are all more or less added back into the 
collection in a separate chapter of title 14.  See the descriptions in Burgmann et al. 
1995,47, 106.  
 
8) [from p. 50, n. 139] Gratian's Decretum is the ultimate example, but all of the 
Gregorian collections are of this type (Fournier 1931,1.77: "les réformateurs 
subordonnent à leur programme le choix et l'ordre des canons"; descriptions in Fourner 
1931,2.3-54).  On the creative potentialities and realities of the later western systematic 
collections, see especially Mordek 1975,6-7, Pinedo 1963,291-292.  When precisely 
western systematic collections shift from at least notionally transmitting an older corpus 
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to actively building new corpora – i.e. starting to construct "canon law" as a more 
abstract set of valid norms, and thus choosing and selecting among the traditional texts 
– is difficult to pinpoint.  Western canon law historians do not tend to view this 
transformation as in need of explanation: it is simply part of the natural evolution of the 
tradition towards Gratian, and a normal function of the gradual increase in the papal 
exercise of its legislative authority. In light of the Byzantine experience, however, it is 
the single most peculiar aspect of western canon law: how does Gratian's Decretum, 
which looks like a selective "school-book" commentary on the corpus, in fact become 
the corpus? 
 
9) [from p. 51, n. 140] The traditional typology of collections as "chronological" and 
"systematic" should probably be abandoned.  The first term has already fallen under 
criticism in western canon law, and has increasingly been replaced with the better "non-
systematic" (so Fransen 1973; see also Mordek 1975,3). Both terms, however, are 
particularly problematic in the east.  First, no extant collection in the Greek east is ever 
"chronologically" arranged; every exemplum, by virtue of the Nicene prefacing, is 
explicitly and consciously not chronological; that's the point.  Every collection is thus 
"systematic" in the (relatively rare and confusing) usage of the term to describe a corpus 
collection that has undergone hierarchical source reorganization of some type (so, for 
example, Beneshevich speaks of the "systematic" Tarasian recension in Sbornik 260-
288, and so Sources Introductions; also Nelson 2008,305 speaks of the Dionysian 
collection of conciliar and papal materials as "systematic") . By the same token, as we 
have just noted, most eastern sources that are "systematic" in the more conventional 
usage of the term (i.e. employ a topical index and/or organization) are also 
"chronological" collections in that they still presume and transmit a full chronological 
collection.  In effect, then, they are simply indices to the chronological corpus.  A much 
better general typology, therefore, which Maassen partially employs, would be 1) 
"general" or complete corpus collections, which, whether with systematic paraphernalia 
or not, notionally convey a complete corpus structure (at a given time) faithfully, with 
little or no selection, interpolation or modification within each source; and 2) partial or 
handbook collections, which either give only an abbreviated or selected taste of the 
whole corpus, or are addressed to a specific question.   
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10) [from p. 51, n. 141] It is well recognized, of course, that the Antiochian corpus is a 
central source of the entire Christian tradition.  Schwartz and Maassen are well aware of 
this, and Cardinal Gasparri is often cited as noting the Antiochian corpus as antiquarum 
collectionum fere omnium quasi principium et fons (from his preface to the 1917 Codex 
Iuris Canonici; see for example Stickler 1950,3; Gaudemet 1985,76, also 41, 165).  
Similar is Fournier's concept of "ancien droit" (1931,1.3-126, esp. 12-21), and Ferme's 
"common substrate" of early law (1998,58).  For Selb this fact is self-evident: 1989,103-
104.  See also now Bucci 1992,94-98.  Nevertheless, the atomistic presentation of early 
canonical collections, especially after the 5th C, as a kaleidoscopic array of regional 
variation with little reference to their morphological and substantive similarity, and each 
with their own special modern name, tends to render the unity of canonical culture in 
the first millennium only vaguely perceptible in most modern surveys (e.g. Gaudemet 
1985; Reynolds 1986).  It is certainly not sufficiently emphasized.  This tendency is 
magnified by canon law historians of the high middle ages whose master narrative of 
the early middle ages seems to be always about "dissonance" moving to the "harmony"; 
certainly there is little sense that the earlier period possessed any kind of standard text 
structures.  See, for example, Brundage 1995,22-23, 43; 2008,97; Gallagher 2002,121-
122; Kuttner 1960. 
 
11) [from p. 58, n. 172]  The best example is Athos Pant. 234 (12th-13th C) which, 
without being a later synthesis of two manuscripts, is half biblical/theological 
manuscript, and half NC14 (Theodore recension).  Similarly Oxford Baroc. 194 (15th C) 
is essentially a grammatical manuscript with Zonaras appended.  BL Add Mss 34060 
(15th C) is a more marginal case: a fairly normal corpus structure may be found in the 
midst of "appendix" items that simply far exceed the normal degree of heterogeneity 
and quantity (including very miscellaneous historical, liturgical, and theological 
articles).  Note that these last two examples are rather late.  
Much more common are manuscripts of a variety of contents that, perhaps 
devoted to a specific task or theme (e.g. anti-heresy or anti-Latin treatises, or a set of 
sermons), happen to have small sections citing topical canons.  See for example Vatican 
gr. 572, 720. 
 
12) [from p. 60, n. 177] First, the rubrics of the thematic collections, read as wholes, do 
read as an abstracted summary of the canons.  However, the thematic collections 
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themselves are always explicitly written as thematic guides to the sources, not as 
developments beyond the sources, and the thematic rubrics are always accompanied by 
references to specific canons.  One never simply lists a series of anonymous rules 
following a particular heading: one lists all of the relevant canons by source.  Further, to 
anticipate the results of chapter four, the thematic rubrics themselves are exceedingly 
conservative and derivative restatements of the traditional canonical rules: they do not 
for the most part represent creative rationalized interpretation of the traditional rules.  
They do not thus "advance" the law beyond the traditional rules.  The instinct and 
"movement" of the thematic collections is always towards facilitating use of the 
traditional sources. 
The other main exception is the pre-6th C incarnations of the corpus as 
continuously numbered wholes.  Here the rules do seem to be presented as much more 
anonymous and abstracted, referable as "canon 166" or "canon 87".  However, even in 
these collections, the canons were still arranged by legislative source: Nicaea, Ancyra, 
Neocaesarea, etc.  The canons were not re-arranged or mixed in any way.  More 
importantly, in the two principal extant witnesses to this enumeration, Dionysius II and 
the Syrian London BL syr. 14528, the conciliar sources are still separated by headings, 
even introductions, and in BL 14528 both continuous and source numbering systems are 
present.4  Therefore the continuous enumeration runs through the different councils, but 
the individual identity of the councils is still very much present.  Certainly there was no 
difficulty in the 6th century in breaking the continuous collection back into its 
constitutive source parts.  
 
13) [from p. 61, n. 181] The idea of a "cleaning" (ἀνακάθαρσις) of the law, including 
processes of clarification, paraphrasing, and even pruning of obsolete material, does 
emerge in Byzantine secular law, although even here it perhaps implies mostly a 
movement of repristinization and renewal of older forms, not radical change (see 
Delineatio 81-87; Fögen 1987,152-153; Pieler 1989).  It is possible that a similar 
process was at times envisaged for the canons.  The best prospect is perhaps the Edict of 
Alexios I, a.1107 (text and commentary Gautier 1973; see Magdalino 1996 and now 
also Schminck 1998,367, where it is dated to 1092). This text seems to suggest some 
type of legislative review of the nomocanon (Gautier 1973,197), although it is far from 
clear that this texts is discussing anything more than renewing canons that have fallen 
                                                 
4 Delineatio 26; Lietzmann 1921,492; Schwartz 1933,3. 
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into disuse, or perhaps fallen out of the nomocanon (Gautier 1973,171, Schmink 
1998,368, esp. nn. 57, 58; also Macrides 1991,590). If the intent truly was to purge the 
older canonical material, it clearly failed.  As it turned out, the real Byzantine response 
to dealing with problems in the corpus was the commentaries – i.e. to add a new 
interpretative layer – and not the restructuring of the tradition itself (for the idea that this 
Edict may have stimulated the commentaries, Macrides 1991,590). 
 
14) [from p. 68, n. 207]  Nikodim Milaš thus considered that a very normal and 
unremarkable assertion of canonical fidelity in the concluding lines of the Tomos of 
Union 920 (RP 5.4-10; the passage at 10) effected an official recognition of the 883 
corpus (Milaš 1902,254).  The text (τοῖς ἐν καταφρονήσει τιθεμένοις τοὺς ἱεροὺς καὶ 
θείους κανόνας τῶν μακαρίων Πατέρων ἡμῶν...ἀνάθεμα) in fact suggests no such 
official confirmation.  Unfortunately, Milaš's "920" date was adopted by Charles de 
Clercq in his influential DDC article on Byzantine canon law (de Clercq 1937), as well 
as by Gaudemet in his RE article (Gaudemet 1965), with the result that it has been 
regularly asserted ever since (for example, Fonti 1.xvii; Morolli 2000,314; Nichols 
1992,417; Rhodopoulos 2005,84; innumerable encyclopedia articles).  S.V Troitsky 
seems to have first caught the error in the 1950s.  See Žužek 1964,25 n. 34, and now 
Historike 91-92. 
 
15) [from p. 70, n. 213] This reading goes back to the first Greek-language canonical 
manual, Δοκίμιον ἐκκλησιαστικοῦ δικαίου of Apostolos Christodoulos (Constantinople 
1896; cited at length in Christopoulos 1976,255-266), and is based upon a comparison 
of the concluding dispositive statements of Trullo 1 and Trullo 2.  The former, it is 
argued, is highly categorical, and affirms the absolutely unchangeable nature of 
dogmatic teaching.  The latter, it is claimed, is phrased in less categorical terms, and is 
aimed only at the illicit falsification of the canons.  The conclusion is therefore drawn 
the modification of the canonical tradition by a legitimate ecclesial authority – i.e. an 
ecumenical council, such as Trullo itself – is tacitly approved, while any change to 
doctrine completely forbidden.  Trullo itself does, it is noted, add new canons, and 
modifies older traditions. 
Although attempting to read clear legal-doctrinal distinctions into the highly 
ornate and rhetorical language of Byzantine legislation is inherently questionable (and, 
in any case, one of the key phrases in Trullo 1 on the unchangeability of dogmas, οὔτε 
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προστιθέναι τι οῦτε μήν ὑφαιρεῖν, from Deut 12.32, is applied to the canons in II Nicaea 
1), this reading is perfectly correct, and even helpful, inasmuch as Trullo is certainly 
establishing a hierarchy between doctrinal and canonical regulations, and there is no 
sense in Trullo 2 that the council is forbidding further canonical legislation per se – 
obviously the council itself engages in it, and so does II Nicaea.  Falsifications are 
indeed its principal target.  The problem is that this reading is usually made in the 
context of attempts to support modern plans to codify the Orthodox canons, which 
anachronistically read into Trullo the authorization of modern-like positivist authority, 
i.e. authority over the tradition so extraordinary as to be able to radically change the 
canonical tradition through omission, abrogation, and radical reorganization of the 
tradition.  But nothing could be further from the council's intention, content, or tone – or 
the whole tradition's development.  The council simply witnesses to what is always the 
Byzantine legislative "formula": confirm the older tradition in order to add – and only 
add – to it. Radical renovation of the established textual tradition is unheard of.  The 
council thus tacitly approves only a tentative and chary "traditional positivism", which 
allows for additions, and perhaps "neatening" of the tradition – but nothing further.   
 
16) [from p. 71, n. 218] It is now recognized, for example, that "private" collections, by 
embodying authoritative traditions, could continue to exercise considerable authority for 
their users whatever the official stance of the government towards them. The best 
examples are probably the so-called "rustic laws" (Pieler 1978,432-433), but also the 
Eisagoge (Pieler 1978, 457).  Similarly, "official" actions did not necessarily have much 
effect on the reception of a collection. The (iconoclast) Ecloga, for example, would 
continue to be copied despite the probable intention of the Prochiron  to "officially" 
replace it (Pieler 1978,452; or, alternatively, to replace the Eisagoge, so Schminck 
1986,64-65).  In general, it seems, anything old and traditional, and slightly numinous, 
tended toward the authoritative, whatever anyone said, or whatever reason could be 
proffered to the contrary – and whether "private" or "official".  "Official" recognition no 
doubt existed in this world, but it was not apparently particularly important or even 
necessary.  On this point cf. also Firey 2008, where it is argued that the development of 
canonical collections should be understood more in terms of imperial/papal reception 
than "official" promulgation or recognition. 
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APPENDIX B 
Appendix to Chapter 2 
(The following are supplementary notes, supplying further details, texts and examples 
for various points in the main text.  These notes are referred to in the main text and/or 
footnotes by appendix and note number.) 
 
1) [from p. 84, n. 8] Most fully preserved novels from the 5th C onwards have prooimia 
structures.  I have examined all those attached to the 6th C ecclesiastical laws, and a 
selection of those attached to other laws.  For all of these, and more, Hunger 1964 
remains a critical resource.  Other helpful, often more narrowly focused, examinations 
include Biondi 1952, Honig 1960, Lanata 1984. The prooimia of the novels of Leo, 
which are estimated to comprise two-thirds of the Novels' full text (Fögen 1995,1602; 
texts in Noailles and Dain 1944), have also been consulted.   
In addition, the following materials have been examined. 
A) Materials introducing late antique collections:  
 Connected with the Theodosian codification (texts in CTh):  
• CTh 1.1.5, 1.1.6 
• Novels 1 and 2 of the Theodosian novels 
• the full Gesta of the senate's reception of the CTh 
 Connected with the CJC (texts in CJ and Digest) 
• to the Codex: constitutions Haec, Summa, Cordi  
• to the Institutes: constitution Imperatorium 
• to the Digest: constitutions Deo auctore, Omnem, Tanta/Δέδωκεν 
B) Materials introducing Byzantine collections: 
 the prooimion to the Ecloga (ed. Burgmann 1983,160-167)  
 the prooimion to the Eisagoge (ed. Schminck 1986,4-11) 
 the prooimion to the Prochiron (ed. Schminck 1986,56-60)  
 the prooimion to the Basilica (ed. Schminck 1986,22; see also van 
Bochove 1997)  
 the general prooimion to Leo's Novels (ed. Noailles and Dain 1944,4-9) 
C) Other sections or structures of works consulted that I would consider broadly 
introductory in content include CTh 1; Digest 1.1-4 (and broadly book one); Institutes 
1.1-2; CJ 1; Eisagoge 1-10; and Basilica 1-6 
 
2) [from p. 85; also p. 27 nn. 2, 6; p. 147, n. 60] Major formal prologues preface four 
Byzantine canonical collections: 
Collection Introductory texts (and editions) 
Coll50, c. 550 Prologue: Οἱ τοῦ μεγάλου θεοῦ (Syn 4-7) 
(Epilogue: the "Apostolic epilogue" (see above pp. 87-88), used to 
conclude the last title, may be considered to function as the 
collection's epilogue.) 
Coll14 and later Prologue I (c. 580): Τὰ μὲν σώματα.. (Pitra 2.445-447) 
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recensions, c. 
580 and later 
Prologue II (883): Ὁ μὲν παρὼν πρόλογος... (Pitra 2.448-450) 
Prologue IIIa (1089): Γέγονεν οὕτω καὶ ταῦτα... (Longer version by 
the σεβαστός Michael) (Schminck 1998,360-361) 
Prologue IIIb (1092): Γέγονεν οὕτω καὶ ταῦτα... (Abbreviated 
version by the βέστης Theodore) (Schminck 1998, 359) 
Σύνταγμα κατὰ 
στοιχεῖον of 
Matthew 
Blastares, 
1334/5 
"Προθεωρία": Τὸ τῶν ἱερῶν καὶ θείων... (RP 6.1-30) 
This is the most comprehensive prologue in the tradition, borrowing 
extensively from earlier introductory material, and incorporating a 
synodal history. 
Ἐπιτομὴ 
κανόνων of 
Constantine 
Harmenopoulos, 
c. 1346 
"Προθεωρία": Τῶν κανόνων οἱ μέν εἰσι...(Leunclavius 1591,1.1 
unpaginated) = PG 150.45-50) 
Some smaller or supplementary collections also contain short prefaces: 
Collection Introductory texts (and editions) 
Coll87, c. 550 Epigraph: Ἐκ τῶν μετὰ τὸν κώδικα... 
"Πρόλογος": Εἰς δόξαν τοῦ μεγάλου θεοῦ....(Heimbach 1838,2.280 ) 
Σύνοψις τῶν 
θείων κανόνων 
of Arsenios of 
Philotheou, 
12th or 13th C? 
Short preface-heading: Παρακειμένων ἑκάστῳ καὶ τῶν 
ἁρομοζόντων... (Voellus and Justel 1661,2.749 = PG 133.9) 
The three classical 12th C commentaries contain introductory structures; those of 
Zonaras and Balsamon are particularly extensive. 
Collection Introductory texts (and editions) 
Aristenos, c. 
1130 
Epigraph:  Νομοκάνονον σὺν θεῷ... (Zachariä von Lingenthal 
1887,255-256) 
Zonaras, after 
1159 
Epigraph: Ἐξήγησις τῶν ἱερῶν καὶ θείων.. (RP 2.1) 
"Προοίμιον": Ἡ δήλωσις τῶν λόγων σου...(RP 2.1-2) 
Balsamon, in 
stages, c. 1177-
1193 
Introductory verses: 
  Ἄστερες ὡς πολύφωτοι... (RP 1.1-3) 
 Τὰς κανονκιὰς εὐσεβεῖς... (RP 1.3-4) 
Epigraph: Ἐξήγησις τῶν ἱερῶν καὶ θείων κανόνων... (RP 2:31) 
Prologue: Πείθεσθε τοῖς ἡγουμένοις ὑμῶν... (RP 2:31-33) 
"Ἐπίλογος":  Τὴν Μωσαϊκὴν ἀναμετρήσας πλάνην...(Horna 1903,201)
Two other introductory texts may be found in the manuscripts: 
Text Edition 
Verses prefacing Rome 
Vallic. F.10, 10th/11th C 
century 
Νόμος μὲν αὐτὸς ὡς κανὼν ὡς εὐθύτης... (Pitra 2.452 = 
Sbornik 244) 
Epilogue following 
conciliar canons in Oxford 
Baroc.26, 10th/11th C 
Ἰδοὺ προεγράφησαν οἱ τῶν ἁγίων ἀποστόλων... (Sbornik 
318-319) 
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The broader introductory structures of many manuscripts – i.e. sets of articles 
near the beginning of the manuscripts, usually accompanying or interwoven with the 
collection prologues and tables of contents – have yet to be systematically studied.1  We 
can tentatively suggest, however, that the most common introductory texts seem to be 
the Apostolic Epitome material, conciliar histories,2 hierarchical lists of sees (τάξεις 
προκαθεδρίας),3 and occasional doctrinal or liturgical articles.4   
Within the corpus itself, a number of sources contain prologues, epilogues, or 
identifiably "introductory" canons.5  These are Dionysius (epilogue); Gangra (synodical 
epistle, including epilogue); Antioch (synodical epistle); Gregory of Nyssa (prologue 
and epilogue); Basil (epistolary introductions to letters 188, 199, 218; canon 84 is also 
epilogue-like); Constantinople (προσφωνητικόν); Carthage 1 and 2 (and, more vaguely, 
the framing Apiarian dossier); Cyril 1; Chalcedon 1; Trullo (προσφωνητικὸς  λόγος and 
canons 1 and 2), and II Nicaea 1.  Similarly, Coll14 1.1-3, treating (1) theology; (2) 
which canons must be obeyed; and (3) the force of unwritten law – very much in 
imitation of the civil codices – may also be considered an "introductory" set of titles. 
In addition, in the manuscripts, the sources are usually prefaced by short 
epigraphical notes, generally mentioning the name of the synod, its place, and 
sometimes the number of canons in the source, the number of fathers in conciliar 
sources, and/or a date.  Judging from the current editions, and supplementary texts 
published by Beneshevich, these seem quite stable throughout the tradition, very often 
identical from manuscript to manuscript, although small variations and abbreviations 
may be found.6  Sometimes they may be found prefaced by short extended historical 
                                                 
1 See, however, the items noted for the recensions in Sbornik 131-132, 192-193, 244-246; these are quite 
typical.   
2 Burgmann in 1999,611 suggests that these are to be found in almost all canonical manuscripts (alhtough 
not always in the introductions); certainly they are very common. See the data in Sbornik, Sin and 
Munitiz 1974, 1978.  
3 See for example that of Vatican gr. 640 published in Beneshevich 1927,131-155; more broadly 
Darrouzès 1981. 
4 See for example those in Cambridge Univ. Ee iv 29, Escorial X.III.2, Milan Ambros. E. 94 supp., 
Oxford Rawl G.1.58, Paris gr. 1263, Vatican gr. 640. 
5 Sometimes the epistolary introductions could be removed, e.g. in Oxford Rawl G. 158 – although here 
they are later re-added to the manuscript by a later scribe in a separate section.  See also Sources Peter. 
6 For example, Sin Group A reads for Sardica "Canons of those gathered in Sardica after the fathers in 
Nicaea: in all, 21 canons", whereas Patmos 172 and Rome Vallic. F.10, from Beneshevich Kormchaya, 
omit "after the fathers in Nicaea" and add "The holy synod convened from different provinces in Sardica 
decreed the following ordinances."  Similarly, many manuscripts of the first recension in Sbornik list the 
Apostolic canons as "canons of the holy apostles", but elsewhere they read as "the ecclesiastical canons of 
the holy apostles" (Sin Group A) or "the canons of the holy apostles issued through Clement" (e.g. 
Vatican gr. 1980).  But such is the greatest extent of the differences.  Most epigraphs are virtually 
identical, varying at most by a few words.  Published epigraphs  include those for the multiple recensions 
of the Coll50 and Coll14 in Sin and Sbornik; in Beneshevich's Kormchaya; in RP; Pitra; and in Fonti.  In 
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prefaces or ὑποθέσεις; one set may be found in Beneshevich's Group A manuscripts of 
the Coll50, and the commentators provide another.7 
Individual canons may also be prefaced by summary rubrics.  Apparently fairly 
common in Latin canon law manuscripts,8 the frequency of these rubrics in Greek 
manuscripts seems to be much more modest.  From Beneshevich (Kormchaya, and 
descriptions in Sbornik and Sin), and much of RP, and my own examination of the 
manuscripts, they seem to be regular only in Carthage and II Nicaea.  Joannou, 
however, has systematically inserted rubrics into the entire corpus.  His principal source 
is Vienna hist. gr. 7, a rare reverse-index to the Coll50, published as the Index 
Vindobonensis by Beneshevich (Syn 191-223).9 He has re-added these rubrics in the 
intriguing belief – not unlikely – that this manuscript preserves rubrics originally 
present in the Antiochian corpus, as they are often very close to Dionysius' rubrics (their 
relationship with the very early rubrics in London BL Syr 14528 remains to be 
investigated).  Occasionally, however, the source of his rubrics is not entirely clear (e.g. 
Trullo, Hagia Sophia). 
 Finally, Michael Psellus' poem Περὶ νομοκανόνου καὶ τῶν τοπικῶν συνόδων 
(ed. Westerink 1992,77-80), must be mentioned because it is one of the very few extant 
descriptions of a canonical work, and it is intended to be introductory.  One other 
description, in prose, and much simpler, may be found in Paris gr. 1182, published by 
Heimbach in 1838,2.299-300; cf. also the description of the "Ten Synods" in Florence 
Laur. 5.22, published in Sbornik 83 n.3. 
 
3) [from p. 87, n. 21]  ταῦτα καὶ περὶ κανόνων διατετάχθω ὑμῖν παρ᾽ ἡμῶν, ὦ 
ἐπίσκοποι. ὑμεῖς δὲ ἐμμένοντες μὲν αὐτοις σωθήσεσθε καὶ εἰρήνην ἕξετε, ἀπειθοῦντες 
δὲ κολασθήσεσθε καὶ πόλεμον μετ᾽ ἀλλήλων ἀΐδιον ἕξετε, δίκην τὴν προσήκουσαν τῆς 
ἀνηκοΐας τιννύντες.  ὁ θεὸς δὲ ὁ μόνος ἀΐδιος ὁ τῶν ὅλων ποιητὴς ἁπαντας ὑμᾶς διὰ τῆς 
εἰρήνης ἐν πνεύματι ἁγίῳ ἑνώσει, καταρτίσει εἰς πᾶν ἔργον ἀγαθὸν ἀτρέπτους, 
ἀμέμπτους, ἀνεγλκήτους καὶ καταξιώσει τῆς αἰωνίου ζωῆς σὺν ἡμῖν διὰ τῆς μεσιτείας 
τοῦ ἠγαπημένου παιδὸς αὐτοῦ Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ τοῦ θεοῦ καὶ σωτῆρος ἡμῶν, μεθ᾽ οὗ ἡ 
δόξα αὐτῷ τῷ ἐπὶ πάντων θεῷ καὶ πατρὶ σὺν ἁγίῳ πνεύματι τῷ παρακλήτω, νῦν καὶ ἀεὶ 
καὶ εἰς τοὺς αἰῶνας τῶν αἰώνων. ἀμὴν. (ed. Metzger 1985,3.308-310) 
                                                                                                                                               
RP they are sometimes missing (e.g. Ephesus, II Nicaea) and often in footnotes (e.g. Ancyra, Nicaea, 
Chalcedon). 
7 Sin 33-67; RP 1-4. 
8 cf. Fransen 1973,17, 33. 
9  Discussion in Fonti 1.1.8-10; cf. also Fonti 2.1.xxiii-xxiv. On Vienna hist. gr. 7's contents, Sin 108-126. 
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 4) [from p. 90, n. 38; also from p. 91, n. 42] Oἱ τοῦ μεγάλου θεοῦ [c. 550] 
The disciples and apostles of our great God and Saviour Jesus Christ, and also those 
bishops and teachers of his holy church who succeeded them and were like them [οἱ 
μετ᾽ ἐκείνους καὶ κατ᾽ ἐκείνους]10 were entrusted to shepherd in holiness the multitude 
of those from the Gentiles and Jews who had departed from diabolical deception and 
tyranny and had of their own accord come in right mind and faith to the King and Lord 
of glory.  These men did not think it necessary, as the civil laws do, to harm wrong-
doers (for this seemed altogether common and very negligent), but instead were zealous 
to brave dangers readily for their flock and to turn about those who were going astray.  
Like the Good Shepherd they ran without hesitation after any that were wandering or 
veering from the straight path, and they struggled to draw up by all manner of means 
those that have already fallen headlong into the pit.  With great wisdom and skill they 
cut off with the knife of the Spirit that which was already putrid and very weakened, 
while that which was damaged and loosened [λύομενον] they bound with various soft 
medicines and rational dressings [δεσμοῖς λογικοῖς].  Thus by the grace and co-working 
of the Spirit they restored to their first health those who were ill. 
 In order that those who would succeed and be like them might preserve 
unharmed those ruled by them, each thrice-blessed generation [τούτων ἕκαστοι...οἱ 
τρισμακάριοι] has come together when the divine grace has ordained it, and each of 
their synods has gathered in assembly in order to issue certain laws and canons (not 
civil, but divine) on what ought and what ought not be done, thus reforming the life and 
manner of each. These canons bolster those who are journeying on the royal way, and 
penalize those who have fallen by the side. 
 Of old at various times laws and canons of the church have been issued by 
different men for different purposes and appropriate to different circumstances (for 
there have been ten great synods of the fathers after the apostles, and in addition to these 
Basil the Great ruled on many matters).  Naturally, because of this, the canons have 
                                                 
10 It is not entirely clear that κατ᾽ ἐκείνους should be translated in the sense "were like them", i.e. acted in 
a way "according to them", "following their manner".  A more likely meaning may be "those at their 
time" (so Zaozerski 106: после них и при них бывшие and Pitra 375 tam qui illorum temporibus, tam 
qui post illos fuere). But this sounds rather odd, especially in the order of the phrase "those who came 
after them and those at their time" – thus Pitra's reversing of it! –  and it makes little sense in this meaning 
later when it reappears in 4.14, if Beneshevich is right, with some of the MSS, to re-add the phrase here.  
The grammars do not seem to decide the question certainly, although the temporal meaning is probably 
more normal, especially with personal subjects (Kühner 1869,2.1.411-414; Schwyzer 1939,2.478-479; 
Smythe 1956,380). 
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been written by them in a scattered manner, as demanded by the emergence of matters 
at different times, and not in a subject-matter order, divided among chapters.  As a result 
it is altogether most difficult to find in one place the materials sought on one rule.  
Because of this, by the grace of our Lord and God and Saviour Jesus Christ, we have 
undertaken to gather together into one place their scattered regulations from different 
times, and we have divided them into fifty titles.  We have not preserved a numerical 
order and progression – joining, as it were, the first canon to the second, to the third, to 
the fourth, to the fifth, and so on – but rather, as much as possible, have harmonized like 
matters with like, and woven the same chapter together with the same, and so have 
made it easy for everyone, I think, to find without trouble that which they seek.   We 
have not been the only or first to have applied ourselves to this task, but have found that 
others have divided the material into 60 titles, neither joining the canons of Basil to the 
others, nor harmonizing like subjects to like in titles.  Because one [thus] finds many 
canons on one chapter and it is difficult to grasp all rulings on one subject, we have, as 
much as possible, made a clearer division of the canons by a juxtaposition of similar 
material, with, in addition, an inscription for each title which clearly indicates the 
content [δύναμιν] of the subsumed material. 
 The order of the synods after the apostles, and how many canons each issued, 
and how many also Basil the Wondrous composed, is easily determined from what 
follows – for thus presented it is clear and very easily discerned [εὐσύνοπτος] for those 
who wish to read it. 
 The holy disciples and apostles of the Lord issued through Clement 85 canons.  
After them were their successors, as is here below ordered. 
 The order of the synods. 
 1. Of the 318 fathers gathered in Nicaea in the consulship of the Illustrious Paul 
and Julian in the Alexandrian year 636 in the month of Desios before the 13th of the 
Calends of June: 20 canons. 
 2. Of the blessed fathers in Ancyra, whose canons were earlier than those of 
Nicaea, but which are placed second because of the authority, that is boldness 
[παρρησίαν], of the first ecumenical synod: 25 canons. 
 3. Of the holy fathers in Neocaesarea; this synod too was held earlier than 
Nicaea, and after Ancyra, but Nicaea, on account its honour, is placed before it: 14 
canons. 
 4. Of the fathers gathered in Serdica after the fathers in Nicaea: 21 canons. 
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 5. Of the fathers gathered in Gangra, by whom were issued 20 canons. 
 6. Of the fathers gathered in Antioch, by whom were issued 25 canons. 
 7. Of the fathers gathered in Phrygian Laodicea, by whom were issued 59 
canons. 
 8. Of the fathers gathered in Constantinople, by whom were issued 6 canons. 
 9. Of the fathers gathered in Ephesus, by whom were issued 7 canons. 
 10 Of the fathers gathered in Chalcedon, by whom were issued 27 canons. 
 There are also canons of the great Basil, 60 and 8 in number. 
 
5) [from p. 95, n. 53] Τὰ μὲν σώματα [c. 580] 
Bodies partake, as is fitting, of material nourishment, and so flourish and grow until 
they reach the set limits in measure and duration to these increases.  Likewise, the 
rational soul is watered and increased by kindred reason and grows spiritually: upon 
earth it seems to adhere to the body, but in many things it ascends towards higher 
visions [θεωρίας], and enters into the heavenly vaults, in no way subject to the limits of 
measure and duration.  There, above, it converses and lives with the light-bearing 
powers and enjoys those things which are truly good, and not those that are in shadows.   
Analogously it is proper here too [on earth] that the creator has allotted that 
which is limitless to the immortal part, and that which is perishable to the mortal.  
Therefore it is seemly that the always-moving element of the soul should ever accustom 
and attach itself to these limitless things, and not give opportunity to the soul to let go of 
genuine teachings and grasp hold instead of anything spurious.  For if she [the soul] is 
occupied with good words and actions she will acquire divine visions [φαντασίας] in 
sleep and in dreams. 
 Considering these things, and applying a saying of an ancient pagan sage to the 
divine decrees, "convinced that they are a discovery and gift of God, the dogma of 
prudent and God-bearing men, the correction of willing and involuntary sins, and a 
secure rule for a pious way of living that leads to eternal life", I have with zeal 
attempted to gather into one the God-befitting canons issued by the holy ten synods, 
which were convened at various times, and whose canons serve for the strengthening of 
the divine dogma and for sound teaching of all men.  I have placed the canons of each 
synod under the name of that synod.  Furthermore, I have included the canons called "of 
the Holy Apostles", even if some believe them to be doubtful for certain reasons.  I have 
also joined to the present work the sacred synod of Lybian Carthage that took place in 
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the time of Honorius and Arcadius of pious memory.  I have found that it decreed many 
things able to introduce much that is useful for life, even if some of them only refer to 
local matters and order and some are inconsistent with regulations issued both generally 
and specifically and the ecclesiastical order prevailing in the other dioceses or 
provinces.  (One of these is the definition that those enrolled in the clergy above the 
rank of readers must abstain in every way from their spouses lawfully wedded before 
their ordination.  Among us it is not by command, but by free choice it falls to each 
person to practice either abstention on account of God-loving ascesis or undefiled 
intercourse on account of the honour of marriage – in neither case liable to any sort of 
just reproach.) 
 I have also thought it good to make mention of the things piously spoken in 
personal letters, in questions and answers, by some of the holy fathers, and that are in a 
certain way able to provide a kind of canon [τινα τρόπον κανόνος τύπον παρέχεσθαι].  I 
am not ignorant that both the great Basil and Gregory thought it right that one ought to 
call and judge "ecclesiastical canons" only those regulations which have been decreed 
not by one person by himself but by common assent and with careful examination by 
many holy fathers gathered together in one place.  However, I have considered that the 
pronouncements of these teachers either concern things already spoken of in synods and 
so introduce something very useful for the clarification of those things that, apparently, 
seem to be hard to grasp for some; or they concern entirely new subjects which are in no 
way, in letter or meaning, present in the synodical enquiries and decisions – and I 
consider that those who have been so appointed judges of such things from the 
worthiness of their persons and from the spiritual light which according to the energy of 
God blazes forth in these men, that these are able to produce decisions that are not only 
unimpeachable but indeed extremely praiseworthy. 
 I have therefore brought together the content [τὴν δύναμιν] of all of the amassed 
material into fourteen titles, and divided each of these into different chapters. Under 
these I have then placed the regulations appropriate to each inquiry, making clear both 
the name of the sources where the regulations are found and the number through 
numerical figures.  In this way I have, I think, produced a collection that allows for the 
easy discernment of the content of the material [εὐσύνοπτον ὡς οἶμαι κατὰ δύναμιν τὸ 
σύνταγμα πεποίημαι].  The reason that I have presented the material in this form – I 
mean, with numerical references, and not placing the appropriate word-for-word text 
under each chapter – is that I did not wish (on account of the needs of different 
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inquiries) either to write out many times the same canon and make the work bloated for 
readers, or to cut up and divide one canon that pertains to multiple chapters (which has 
been done by some in the past) and to then become liable for such fractioning to the just 
charge of ill-blessed license among some [καὶ δικαίαν οὐκ εὐλόγου με τόλμης ἐπὶ τῇ 
τοιαύτῃ κατατομῇ παρά τισιν αἰτίαν ἀπενέγκασθαι]. 
 If anywhere I have found that the civil legislation is usefully related to such 
canonical writings I have arranged from it under appropriate chapters in a separate 
section of this book short and concise extracts of regulations.  In this way I have put 
together in a collection a brief exposition of those regulations in both the imperial 
decrees and the interpretations of the jurists that pertain to ecclesiastical good order and 
that serves as both an aide-mémoire and for the full discovery of these regulations by 
the reader.  If I achieve my goal to provide something useful first for myself, but also 
for others, may I, with God, helped by the prayers of the saints, receive the reward of 
my eagerness and zeal. 
 
Ὁ μὲν παρών [883] 
 The present prologue [i.e. τὰ μὲν σώματα] set forth as its goal to gather into one 
the canons issued from the time when the Christian teaching in the voices of the 
apostles unfolded into the whole world until the fifth synod.  The accomplishment of the 
things promised has been brought to a not unworthy conclusion.  It has brought together 
into one the canons that the fifth synod and the proceedings synods decreed, and, if the 
interval of this time has shown some other individuals among the sacred men to have 
arrived at such a height of virtue that they have been deemed trustworthy and their 
words have come to be recognized as equal in honour and order to the canons, it has not 
rejected their works as adulterating that which is appropriate to this present task. 
 The time after the fifth synod has brought forth not a few other novelties in life 
and has seen the convening of sacred synods for various reasons.  We, however, not 
wishing to inflict indignities upon the works of the ancients – a rash act which many 
have been frequently driven to by the lack of recognition for their own works and which 
is meant to give the appearance of wisdom to the theft of others' works [καὶ κλοπῇ τῶν 
ἀλλοτρίων ὀφρὺν ἀνασπάσαι σοφίας ἠπάτησεν] – have instead lifted up in admiration 
and praise those who have made a beginning of any good thing in life, and thus we 
recognize as honoured those whom we follow.  
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 Therefore, maintaining inviolate the preeminence of the labours of these men, 
indeed increasing them, we have attached to what has gone before the things that have 
come after.  What time has denied to them, we restore with addition (providing 
damages, as it were) [ταύτην αὐτοῖς ἡμεῖς τὴν πρσθήκην, ὡς ζημίαν, ἀποκαθιστῶντες] 
and we present to them this labour of love now complete with all that has transpired 
until the present. 
 The present book therefore contains all that the [first] prologue has described, as 
well as, in the same sequence, and in the same order of composition that those before us 
devised, the regulations which the sixth ecumenical council defined; and further those 
of the seventh ecumenical council, which holds the second place of those convened in 
Nicaea, and which condemned the iconoclastic madness and composed not a few 
ordinances of those that rectify the sacred way of life [τὴν ἱερὰν πολιτείαν].  In addition, 
it contains those regulations decreed afterwards by the first and second synod in 
Constantinople, which, when a certain strife was kindled, made the all-sacred temple of 
the apostles its hearing-chamber for these affairs.  Further, it contains those of a later 
synod which, convened for the common harmony of the church, sealed the synod in 
Nicaea, cast out all heretical and schismatic error, and added its canons to those of its 
brother synods. 
This here-mentioned labour of this book has also everywhere joined to the 
sacred writings certain legal excerpts – not neglecting their addition – which are in 
harmony with the sacred canons. 
 In order that one might know the year when the present material was added to 
the earlier, it is counted in thousands of years, increased six-fold, and exceeding even 
this, not stopping its course at three hundred more years, but driving on to the ninety-
first year – this is the year that brought forth this present work under the sun's rays. 
 
6) [from p. 97, n. 63]  οἱ δὲ νόμοι τὸ δίκαιον καὶ τὸ καλὸν καὶ τὸ συμφέρον βούλονται, 
καὶ τοῦτο ζητοῦσιν, καὶ ἐπειδὰν εὑρεθῇ, κοινὸν τοῦτο πρόσταγμ’ ἀπεδείχθη, πᾶσιν ἴσον 
καὶ ὅμοιον, καὶ τοῦτ’ ἔστι νόμος. ᾧ πάντας πείθεσθαι προσήκει διὰ πολλά, καὶ μάλισθ’ 
ὅτι πᾶς ἐστι νόμος εὕρημα μὲν καὶ δῶρον θεῶν, δόγμα δ’ἀνθρώπων φρονίμων, 
ἐπανόρθωμα δὲ τῶν ἑκουσίων καὶ ἀκουσίων ἁμαρτημάτων, πόλεως δὲ συνθήκη κοινή, 
καθ’ ἣν πᾶσι προσήκει ζῆν τοῖς ἐν τῇ πόλει.  Against Aristogeiton 1 16 (ed. Butcher 
1907). 
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7) [from p. 101, n. 72; also from p. 217, n. 48]  The divisions and repetitions in the 
Coll50 are quite limited (although in most cases there are variations across the 
manuscripts; the following is derived from the main text of Syn).  Nicaea 6 is divided 
between titles 1 and 7; Serdica 3 is divided between title 3 and 16, Serdica 11 is cited in 
full in title 3 and a  relevant extract in 47; the second part of Serdica 21 is cited in full in 
title 13 and the first part in title 48; Gangra 20 is cited with epilogue in 32 and without 
in 47; Antioch 2 is divided between titles 18 and 47; Basil 20 is repeated in full in titles 
32 and 41; and Basil 62 is repeated in full in 41 and 44 (because it contains the penalty 
referred to in Basil 63 in this last title).  In every case the divisions are very logical, and 
follow clean divides within the canons themselves (i.e. the canons address two different 
issues or contain two rules).  The only true repetition is Basil 20 (on the case of a 
woman who leaves her husband), which seems to have been repeated because of 
uncertainty about whether or not it refers to monastics in particular (because of the 
presence of the verb ἀναχωρέω), or is more general in scope – thus it is repeated under a 
monastic title, and a more generic marriage title. 
 
8) [from p. 105, n. 84] ...[the fifth and sixth council did not write canons] δι᾽ ὧν 
ἀποστήσονται οἱ λαοὶ τῆς χείρονος καὶ ταπεινοτέρας διαγωγῆς ἐπὶ δὲ τὸν κρείττονα καὶ 
ὑψηλότερον μεταθῶνται βίον· ἐντεῦθεν τε τὸ ἔθνος τὸ ἅγιον τὸ βασίλειον ἱεράτευμα, 
ὑπὲρ οὗ Χριστὸς ἀπέθανεν, ὑπὸ πολλῶν ἐξ ἀταξίας παθῶν διασπώμενον καὶ 
ὑποσυρόμενον καὶ κατὰ μικρὸν τῆς θείας μάνδρας ἀπορραγὲν καὶ διατμηθὲν καὶ τῇ 
ἀγνοίᾳ καὶ λήθῃ τῶν τῆς ἀρετῆς κατορθωμάτων ἀπολισθῆσαν καὶ ἀποστολικῶς εἰπεῖν 
τὸν υἱὸν τοῦ θεοῦ καταπατῆσαν καὶ τὸ αἷμα τῆς διάθκης ἐν ᾧ ἡγιάσθη κοινὸν 
ἡγησάμενον τὴν τοῦ πνεύματος ἐνύβρισε χάριν. (ed. Nedungatt and Featherstone 
1995,52.3-20) 
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APPENDIX C 
Appendix to Chapter 3 
(The following are supplementary notes, supplying further details, texts and examples 
for various points in the main text.  These notes are referred to in the main text and/or 
footnotes by appendix and note number.) 
 
1) [from p. 145, n. 53] The lack of extensive study of ὅρος comparable to that devoted 
to κανών makes speculation difficult.  Schwartz' suggestion (1936a,177 n.3; 193) is still 
perhaps the best: that the term ὅρος eventually become associated with doctrinal 
statements, and the need to distinguish doctrinal from disciplinary material meant that 
its continued use for the latter became inappropriate.  At Chalcedon there is also an 
instance in which ὅρος, in the midst of a heated debate, is explicitly distinguished from 
a κανών, although the nature of the distinction is far from clear (ACO 2.1.1.91; cf. Price 
and Gaddis 1.157 nn. 111, 112). Suffice to say that a qualitative difference does not 
seem to have been well established. 
The theory of Erickson 1991a and above all Ohme 1998, adopted by Hess 2002, 
discussed above, that the shift from ὅρος to κανών is part of larger change in 
fundamental legal thinking is intriguing, but not entirely convincing.  Ohme develops 
the theory with great subtly, but here we can offer only a few preliminary considerations 
that should make us prima facie nervous about embracing it too rapidly.   
First, to a degree to which Ohme and others do not take into account, ὅρος and 
κανών are very frequently used in Greek literature as synonyms, and often in hendiadys 
constructions.  A TLG search will reveal over a hundred such instances, including – to 
take a few examples – Demosthenes De coronoa 296; Aristotle Protrepticus Frag. 39.1; 
Dionysius Halicarnassensis De Lysia 18.4; Philo De Specialibus legibus 3.164; Gregory 
of Nazianzus Apologetica 35.477; Basil Sermon 13 (31.876).  Oppel 1937,28-29, 51-72 
thus tends to treat them as more or less synonyms.  Even in Roman law literature ὅροι 
and κανόνες (definitiones and regulae) are sometimes very nearly synonyms (Schulz 
1953,66-67, 173; Stein 1966,65-73 et passim; 1995,1553-1554)  (And note that ὅρος 
thus has its own perfectly "legal" valence, as does κανών. To try and plot κανών 
language as some type of further assimilation to Roman law language on purely 
terminological grounds is thus questionable.) To suggest then that calling a rule ὅρος in 
the 4th C, and κανών in the 5th C is indicative of a deeply significant and clear shift in 
fundamental legal theory –  or that a change in theory caused this terminological shift – 
is thus not an immediately likely proposition. Certainly any important formal source 
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distinction embedded in these terms would be surprising, and in need of very explicit 
proof.   
In fact, when we examine the canons, it is curious that in much earlier material 
ὅρος and κανών can be read very easily as synonyms in the same texts – for example in 
Carthage acta 1, Chalcedon 28, or much of Antioch.  Likewise, general, synthetic senses 
of ὁ κανών can easily be juxtaposed with more specific, positivistic senses of the term 
(e.g. in Gangra or Antioch, perhaps in Nicaea).  Both of these facts suggest a much 
looser, "messier" semantic world than Ohme's distinction requires.  
Further, it is not helpful that, as far as I am aware, no where is ὅρος explicitly 
distinguished from κανών as somehow a secondary expression or realization of the 
latter – or indeed, even explicitly defined as an episcopal enactment per se.  This 
relationship and distinction is only inferred from the fact that in the earlier material ὅρος 
tends to mean a more positive-like enactment, used for present legislation, and κανών 
tends to appear in more abstract, synthetic senses as "general tradition". Strictly, though, 
this only reveals the presence of these two concepts, i.e. of a concrete written rule and 
of a broader sense of normativity, and not an investment of a rigid and qualitative 
doctrinal legal-theoretical source distinction embedded in the very terms themselves – 
or in the relationship between the two.  It is perfectly possible for these concepts to exist 
together expressed by a more varied vocabulary.  In other words, the idea that specific 
rule enactments must remain anchored in broader narratives of normativity – the idea 
that ὅρος-κανών distinction is supposed to embody – does not require  ὅρος-κανών 
vocabulary.  As such, the disappearance of this language does not necessarily imply the 
loss of these concepts, and, thus, conversely, the loss of these concepts cannot be 
proposed as a reason for the shift from ὅροι to κανόνες, as Ohme's theory seems to 
wish.  
Finally, it is a little curious that such an unusually distinct and dogmatic 
conceptual-terminological division between positive legislative enactments (ὅροι) and 
traditional rules (κανόνες/ὁ κανών) existed in the 4th C but then seems to have so 
entirely dropped from view that only in the 20th C has it been recovered (for the later 
tendency to equate easily the two terms, see e.g. Zonaras RP 2.159; 3.306, 308).  More 
likely it never existed at all; or rather, was but one way at one time of indicating a basic 
concept – the embedness of church regulations in broader Scriptural and Apostolic 
traditions.  This is a concept that will always remain basic to church law. 
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2) [from p. 147, n. 59]  The Apostolic canons are among the most variable, existing 
without numbers in the oldest known Latin translation (the Fragmentum Veronese), and 
when enumerated often showing considerable variation in order and number of canons 
in the manuscripts – both within the Greek tradition, and across the Latin, Greek and 
Syrian versions (see Fonti 1.2.4-7; Metzger 1985,3.12; Pitra 1.43-44; Sin 63 n.2; 
Sources Apostles; Steimer 1992,92; Turner 1936,1.2.1.370-371).  Clearly gradual and 
varied processes of enumeration took place. 
Gradual processes of extending enumeration may be also inferred from the fact 
that some elements in the corpus exist in different parts of the tradition both with and 
without numbering.  The best examples are the additional acta extracts or decisions 
appended to Constantinople (canons 6 and 7), Ephesus (canons 7-9) and Chalcedon 
(canons 28-30), as well as the final canons in Carthage (135-138).  All evince 
considerable irregularity in the manuscripts and thematic indices, sometimes not 
enumerated at all (or simply not included), sometimes numbered differently.  Similarly, 
Gregory Thaum. seems to be cited as an undivided whole in the Coll14  (Title 13.13), 
although it is sometimes divided and enumerated in the corpus sections.  Likewise, 
Basil's "canons" beyond the three principal letters (after 86) tend to be cited in the 
Coll14 by epistle addressees, and not  numbers – despite (sometimes) possessing 
numbers in the corpus sections of the manuscripts.   
The letter constituting Constantinople 1-4, on the other hand, is a good witness 
for variation in post-production division and enumeration. The same text appears 
divided into only 3 canons in Dionysius (I and II, presumably following a Greek 
original; Historike 26), but four canons in the mainstream Greek tradition.   
Many of the other councils (Nicaea, Ancyra, Gangra, Laodicea, Serdica, 
Carthage, even Trullo, which can end up with 101-103 canons) also show slight 
variations in numbering and ordering, usually caused by different divisions of canons. 
No exhaustive study of corpus enumeration has yet to be produced, but these and 
many instances of variation are remarked passim in Fonti, Historike, Kormchaya, 
Sbornik, Schwartz 1936a (cf. also 1911,324-326), Sin, Sources and Turner 1936  
 
3) [from p. 147; also from p. 39, n. 66] The first two genres are by far the most 
dominant, and evince the most variation.   
The conciliar canons exist in three forms in the Greek manuscripts: 1) simple 
lists of regulations, with little or no introduction; 2) canons affixed to, or constituting, a 
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synodical letter; and 3) extracts of records of conciliar acta.  Ancyra, Neocaesarea,  
Nicaea, Laodicea, Chalcedon, II Nicaea and the two Photian councils belong to the first 
group; Cyprian, Gangra, Antioch, Constantinople 1-4 (and in appearance 5-7), Ephesus 
1-6, and Trullo to the second.  The only sustained examples of the last are the two 
"western" sources, Carthage and Serdica, much of which read as stenographic records of 
conciliar proceedings in the form Hess calls dixit-placet (εἶπεν-ἤρεσεν).1 Carthage, 
however, is quite varied, containing a variety of different conciliar forms and texts, 
including letters and resolutions, all framed by excerpts of conciliar minutes, and 
encompassed by a case dossier.  Also in the form of an acta record or decision (ψῆφος, 
διαλαλιά) are Constantinople 394 (acta); Ephesus 7- 9 (decisions and a synodical letter), 
Chalcedon 28-30 (a decision and two acta extracts). 
The Apostles may be regarded as either a proprietary "apostolic" genre – as the 
tradition seems to treat it – or as a variant of the first type of conciliar document (i.e. as 
an "apostolic council", as presented when part of Book 8 in the as Apostolic 
Constitutions)2. 
It is possible that some of the examples of the first two groups were originally in 
a form closer to the third, and what remains in the canonical collections reflects various 
levels of extraction from original parliamentary scaffolding.  There is no clear evidence 
of this happening on a regular basis, however, or even that they represent the results of 
real parliamentary processes.3  It is particularly interesting in this regard that in 
Chalcedon and II Nicaea, for which extensive acta are extant, the canons stand 
noticeably outside of the main body of record, precisely without much notable 
parliamentary framing or even discussion.  This suggests that they were composed as an 
independent list, perhaps by a special committee, and later approved.4  Trullo does not 
have extant acta beyond the subscription list and προσφωνητικὸς λόγος, and it is far 
from clear that they ever existed.5  In Protodeutera, for which no acta are preserved, the 
                                                 
1  Hess 2002,24-27, 61-89. 
2 See Metzger 1995,34-35; also Sources Apostles. 
3 cf. Hess 2002,69-72, who is more inclined to see canons with placuit, ἔδοξε, ὁρίζω or similar 
vocabulary, at least of the first wave, as the product of real editing from earlier parliamentary forms.  This 
is possible, and perhaps in some cases even likely, but there is little direct evidence of it. Placuit-like 
forms are quite generic Greco-Roman legislative forms, and cannot on their own be read as definitive 
evidence for a text's  earlier existence in a parliamentary record. 
4 On Chalcedon, and particularly on the idea that the 27 canons were composed by a small and separate 
committee, and perhaps never even formally approved, see Price 2005,1.81 n. 277, 3.92-93.  Certainly the 
canons do not seem to belong to any formal session, instead tacked on in various places in the different 
versions of the acta (Price 2005,1.xiv). The canons of II Nicaea likewise are simply tacked on to the final, 
eighth session of the council, with little comment; see Historike 314-317. 
5 The point is debated, see Gavardinos 42-49; Historike 285-286; Ohme 1990,25-27.  
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presence of small narrative resumptives among the canons also suggest that the rules 
were originally written as a complete separate composition, as they now stand.6   Only 
the three canons of Hagia Sophia may be found embedded in the council's acta, 
including with dixit-placet structures – although they were clearly pre-composed, "read" 
by the archdeacon.7 
One division in general style among the conciliar legislation is sufficiently 
prominent as to amount almost to a difference of genre:  the second wave legislation 
tends to be longer, more rhetorically elaborate, more inclined to scriptural and patristic 
citations, and more interested in lengthy justifications and explanations than that of the 
first wave.  It is at times almost homiletic in tone.8  This distinction is always more 
quantitative than qualitative, and admits many exceptions,9 but the first wave legislation 
is generally shorter, simpler, and plainer.    
The patristic material shows even more variation than the conciliar legislation, 
although most sources are letters or letter-like, and are written as responses to specific 
inquiries.  A key characteristic of these texts is that most, if not all, are consciously 
written to address specific disciplinary rule problems, and as such are expressly and 
specifically rule-texts.10  In this respect they are closely akin to the papal decretals, yet 
unlike much of the later patristic material that appears in western collections in the 8th 
C.  This latter represents the results of a processes of "mining" much more general 
doctrinal, exegetical, homiletical or other types writings of the fathers – not originally 
written as rule texts – for rule content.11 Such patristic rule-mining is much less evident 
in the eastern tradition, if not entirely unknown.12 The eastern pattern is 
                                                 
6 Fonti 1.2.458.19-459.2; 474.13-475.16. 
7 Mansi 17.494-500. 
8 Good examples include Trullo 45, 96; II Nicaea 2, 4; Protodeutera 10. 
9 For example, Nicaea 12,18, Constantinople 6, and Chalcedon 4 are quite long; Ephesus 8 is quite 
elaborate (although it is a formal ψῆφος).  Likewise, Trullo 15 and 58, both original canons, or Hagia 
Sophia 3, are quite short and concise. 
10  For example, Basil's three classical canonical letters to Amphilochius are each a series of rules, and 
each of his individual letters addresses a specific disciplinary matter as its primary concern; Peter is an 
oration "on repentance" but is nevertheless almost entirely written as a set of rules addressing specific 
problems; Gregory of Nyssa is a systematic exposition of penance that is likewise almost entirely taken 
up with reviewing traditional penitential rules; Theophilus is a series of administrative rulings; Timothy is 
a set of rules in the form of "answers"; and so forth.   
11 The earliest major example is the Hibernensis (c. 700; ed. Wasserschleben 1885, and see Sheehy 1989), 
although this activity does not seem to have become exceptionally common until the 11th C.  See 
especially Munier 1954; also Fransen 1973; Maassen 1871,348-382.  For the definitive western selection 
in Gratian, see Friedberg 1879,1.xxxi-xxxvii.   
12 For example, Peter 15 "from his treatise on Pascha"; the excerpts from Basil's On the Holy Spirit; the 
two Scriptural canon poems; perhaps Athanasius to Ammoun and Theophilus 1.  Most are comparatively 
late additions to the corpus.  See also the more marginal patristic appendix items in RP 4.389-391 and 
Fonti 2.187-191. 
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overwhelmingly to gather into the corpus more or less established and tradition
writings, unextracted, and un-edited; the western tradition is doing something more 
creative, scouring non-rule texts f
al rule-
or rules. 
                                                
The majority of the patristic material may be loosely termed episcopal letters, 
generally from a bishop to some type of underling or underlings, including new or less 
knowledgeable bishops, and in response to various difficulties or questions.13  In their 
manuscript prefaces, and/or in the Coll14 source listing ἐκ ποίων, they are usually 
termed either simply "letter" (ἐπιστολή)14 or, most often, "canonical letter" (ἐπιστολή 
κανονική)15 – when a term is supplied at all.16   One canon is presented as from a festal 
epistle (ἑορταστική)17, and one is termed encyclical (ἐγκύκλιος).18    
The tone of the letters can vary from brotherly and advisory (e.g. Dionysius), to 
paternal and didactic (the most common; e.g. Basil to Amphilochius, Gregory of Nyssa, 
Timothy, Athanasius to Rufinianus), to administrative (e.g. Theophilus 2-11), to 
excoriating and admonishing (e.g. Basil to Paregorios or to "his bishops"[= canons 88, 
90]).  Some are written in a relatively discursive, occasionally meandering style, with 
considerable explanation, justification and scriptural citation.19  Others read more as a 
straightforward citation of traditional rules,20 while at least one, Gregory of Nyssa, 
should be considered a small systematic treatise in the guise of a letter.  One source, the 
ὑπομνηστικόν of Theophilus, as its name suggests, is a much more technical registry of 
episcopal chancery administrative missals that briefly decide or provide for the decision 
of very specific matters referred to him (ὑπομνηστικά) in his jurisdiction.21 Theophilus 
13 and 14 are very similar in shape, as are Cyril 4 and 5.   Gennadius, although listed 
under the patriarch's name in the patristic material, is a general synodical encyclical 
subscribed by a Constantinopolitan ἐνδημοῦσα synod.  As such, it is the only specimen 
in the corpus of a genre that is quite important in the canonical tradition after the 9th C, 
(although Tarasios is close).   
 
13  Peter, Gregory Thaum., Gregory Naz. and Amphilochius are without addressees.  Cyril to Domnus of 
Antioch, although from one great see to another, is written as from a senior bishop to a junior. Tarasius, to 
pope Hadrian, is the only source written to a superior. 
14 Basil 86 to Amphilochius, Theophilus to Menas, Cyril to Domnus, Cyril to the bishops of Lybia and 
Pentapolis, Athanasius to Ammoun and Rufinianus. 
15 Dionysius, Gregory Thaum., almost all of Basil's epistles, Gregory of Nyssa, Theophilus to Aphyngios, 
Tarasios.   
16 In the manuscript prefaces one will often find a simpler form of τοῦ αὐτοῦ πρὸς... or τοῦ αὐτοῦ περὶ....  
This is especially true of Basil's letters, and some of Cyril and Theophilus. 
17 Athanasius 2. 
18 Gennadius. 
19 Chiefly Dionysius, Gregory Thaum., Peter, Athanasius, some of Basil, Gennadius, Tarasius. 
20 Much of Basil's three canonical letters to Amphilochius. 
21 See Dölger 1968,82. 
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A very few patristic canons are not letters, or at least, not clearly.  One formal 
ἐρωταπόκρισις, for example, has made its way into the corpus: the answers (ἀποκρίσεις 
κανονικαί) of Timothy to "various" bishops and clerics, given at the council of 
Constantinople 381.  This genre will see considerable development in the post-corpus 
material.22  Theophilus 1 is listed as a προσφώνησις, a public address.  Peter of 
Alexandria' lengthy and involved tract is presented as κανόνες φερόμενοι ἐν τῷ περὶ 
περὶ μετανοίας αὐτοῦ λόγῳ -- i.e. in a λόγος or treatise.23  Likewise Peter 15 is 
presented as an extract from his λόγος on Pascha (Peter 15).  Basil 91 and 92 are 
identified as from chapters 27 and 29 of his "writings" (γεγραμμένων) On the Holy 
Spirit.  The two canons in verse-form in the corpus, Gregory Naz. and Amphilochius, 
are presented respectively as ἐκ τῶν ἐνμέτρων ποιημάτων, and Amphilochius as ἐκ τῶν 
πρὸς Σελεύκον ἰάμβων. (Their verse form, exceptionally curious for "legal" texts, is 
undoubtedly mnemonic in intention.)  A few other examples of non-letters may be 
found in the common para-canonical patristic material just outside of the corpus proper, 
namely a few excerpts from John Chrsysostom's On the Priesthood and his exegetical 
works, as well as a short sermon of St Basil on the priesthood.24 
 
4) [from p. 155] For example, ἀποφαίνομαι (e.g. Dionysius 1, Gregory Nyss. 5), 
ψηφίζω (Chalcedon 28, a ψήφος), θεσπίζω (Trullo 1, 8, Hagia Sophia 1), τυπόω (Basil 
1, Trullo 3), νομοθετέω (Basil 18, 88 Trullo 12, 26, 36, Protodeutera 1), θεσμοθέω 
(Trullo 81), ἐπιτίθημι (Peter 5), τίθημι (Basil 8, Protodeutera 17), ἐκτίθημι (Basil 17, 
51), διατίθημι (Basil 18),  κρίνω (Basil 21, 24, 52, Gregory Nyssa 2, 5, Cyril 1), ἐκφέρω 
(Basil 81)  διορθόω (Basil 90), καταδικάζω (Gregory Nyssa 7), δικάζω (Cyril 1), 
συνοράω (Trullo 3, 28, 33, 37, 39, 54), βούλομαι (Trullo 75), or θεραπεύω (Trullo 96). 
 
5) [from p. 164] Other procedure-oriented instances of legalese include κινέω and κινέω 
παρὰ (in the sense of instituting a lawsuit, originally probably a direct translation of 
actionem or litem movere)25; παρανοχλέω or ἐνοχλέω (in the sense of impetrare, 
impetrating the emperor),26 ἀναφέρω/ἀναφορά (=suggestio/relatio),27 ὑπόθεσιν 
                                                 
22 Peges  250-255. 
23 Although this "treatise" is really an encyclical letter, a point clearer in the Syriac, where more of its 
original heading has been preserved. Sources Peter. 
24 RP 4.389-392. 
25 E.g. Nicaea 9; Carthage 19; Chalcedon 17.  See Avotins 1989,87-89.   
26 Antioch 11, 12. In these cases, however, it is quite possible that the terms are meant in their more 
generic sense of "bother, annoy", which does often fit the context (and the Dionysian translation of 
Antioch 11 and 12 uses molest- roots). 
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γυμναζείν (γυμνάζειν here as a calque of exercere, as in exercere 
actionem/iudicium/litem),28 ἐνίστασθαι τὰς κατηγορίας/τὴν κατηγορίαν 
(=institutere/deferre accusationem),29 ἐκδικέω (in its legal sense as "claim", i.e. as a 
translation for vindicare),30 πράγμα ἔχειν πρός τινα (πράγμα here as a technical legal 
denotation of the formal object of a case, in the sense of qua de re agitur);31 τὰ τῆς δίκης 
συγκροτεῖσθαι (to discuss the matter, perhaps similar to agitare causam);32 ἐκφέρειν 
ὅρον/ψῆφον/ἀπόφασιν (here I think akin to sententiam proferre);33 ἐμφανεία συνοδική 
(synodical court "appearance");34 and, in Ephesus 8, perhaps, a technical usage of 
διδάσκω (in a Greek and Roman sense of "teaching" the court one's position, here διὰ 
λιβέλλων).35 
Another more generic technical-legal term is (ἀ)κύρος/(ἀ)κυρόω, corresponding 
to the common Latin ratus/irritus of Roman law, i.e. the language of validity and 
confirmation.  Thus, for example, in Nicaea 4, we read of τὸ δὲ κῦρος τῶν γίνομένων 
δίδοσθαι...τῷ μητροπολίτῃ ἐπισκόπῳ.36  Not every instance of this term should be 
regarded as an assertion of a complex technical doctrine of validity (it can simply mean 
"approval" or "firm"), but a formal sense of "validate" or "ratify" is often strongly 
suggested.  In Serdica 15 it is paired with ἀβέβαιος, lending any even more categorical 
and "official" tone: ἄκυρος καὶ ἀβέβαιος ἡ κατάστασις ἡ τοιαύτη νομίζοιτο.  The term 
βέβαιος, firmus, can itself take on technical connotations.37  
Another obvious borrowing is the technical language of ἐκποίησις, the normal 
translation for alienatio.38  Likewise, a technical property phrase may be found in 
Protodeutera 8, προσκυρόω, to transfer ownership or assign, here found in a highly 
                                                                                                                                               
27 Mostly in Carthage, e.g. acta following canon 48, 64, 100; also somewhat more loosely in Chalcedon 
28.  See Roussos 1949,45. 
28 Chalcedon 9. See Avotins 1989,30-31; Berger 1953,462.   
29 Constantinople 6. Berger 1953,504; cf. Roussos 1949,176. 
30 Nicaea 9 (perhaps); Serdica 14; Basil 1.  See Pitsakis 1971,397; Roussos 1949,156. The term also has a 
more general legal sense of "exacting punishment for, avenging", as in Basil 2 ἐκδικεῖται οὐ μόνον τὸ 
γεννηθησόμενον, ἀλλὰ καὶ αὐτὴ ἡ ἑαυτῇ ἐπιλβουλεύσασα. 
31 In Serdica 3, 5, 14; Chalcedon 9. See Berger 1953,662, 676, and esp. Digest 50.16.23.   
32 In Chalcedon 9.  See Roussos 1949,408. 
33 Serdica 4, 5, 20. See Berger, 1953,701; Roussos 1949,164. 
34 See Avotins 1992, 79-80. 
35 Cf. διδασκαλικός Avotins 1992,63; Too 2001,111-113. 
36 Other examples may be found in Apostlic 76; Nicaea 15, 16; Antioch 13, 22, 23; Constantinople 1, 4; 
Ephesus 8; Chalcedon 6.  Trullo 1, 2, 72; II Nicaea 3, 12; Protodeutera 11   It often refers to the validity 
of an ordination, as well as the validity of decisions.  Sometimes, for example in Trullo 72 or 85, it 
reflects a civil law regulation (i.e. on validity of marriage or manumission). 
37 See in Basil 42; Chalcedon 30; Trullo 2, 37.  See Pitsakis 1971,393; Roussos 1949,103-104 
38 Cyril 2; II Nicaea 12. 
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legalistic phrase: τὸ δὲ νεουργηθὲν [monastery], ὡς μηδὲ τὴν ἀρχὴν μοναστηρίου 
δίκαιον ἀπειληφός, ὡς ἰδιωτικὸν τῷ ἐπισκοπείῳ προσκυροῦσθαι.   
The same council also contains one of the very few Latin loan words in the 
canons.  Thus in its first canon we read of the need βρεβίῳ ἐγκαταγράφεσθαι (register 
with an official list); the term is derived from brevis.39  The verb ἐγκαταγράφεσθαι also 
suggests "administrativese". 
 
6) [from p. 165] Many of the penal provisions and repeated subject designators ("if a 
bishop, presbyter, or deacon....") are the best examples of repetition of formulae, but 
more particular examples may also be cited, such as Protodeutera 12, where we find the 
ponderous repetition of (almost) the same phrase three times: τοὺς ἐν τοῖς ἐυκτηρίοις 
οἴκοις ἔνδον οἰκίας οὖσι λειτουργοῦντας ἢ βαπτιζόοντας κληρικούς... 
ἀποκεκληρωμένους εἶναι τοὺς ἐν τοῖς εὐκτηρίοις οἴκοις ἔνδον οἰκίας οὖσι 
λειτουργοῦντας... εἰς τὰς οἰκίας εἰσπίπτοντες ἅπτεσθαι τῆς λειτουργίας ἀποτολμῶσι...  
Other times a formula in repeated across a few canons.  For example, we read about 
actions committed διὰ νομιζομένην ἄσκησιν in Gangra 12 and 13, 17, 18.40   This 
stylization conveys a strong sense of precision and categorical force. 
A very simple legal stylization is the use of "aforesaid" phrases.  Common in the 
secular legislation, the best example in the canons is Chalcedon 28: ἔτι δὲ καὶ τοὺς ἐν 
τοῖς βαρβαρικῆς ἐπισκόπους τῶν προειρημένων διοικήσεων, χειροτονεῖσθαι ὑπὸ τοῦ 
προειρημένου ἁγιωτάτου θρόνου τῆς κατὰ Κωνσταντινούπολιν ἁγιωτάτης ἐκκλησίας· 
δηλαδὴ ἑκάστου μητροπολίτου τῶν προειρημένων διοικήσεων μετὰ τῶν τῆς ἐπαρχίας 
ἐπισκόπων χειροτονοῦτνος τοὺ τῆς ἐπαρχίας ἐπισκόπους καθὼς τοῖς θείοις κανόσι 
δηγόρευται· χειροτονεῖσθαι δέ, καθὼς ἔιρηται, τοὺς μητροπολίτας τῶν προειρημένων 
διοικήσεων...   This highly officious and official manner of writings again strongly 
conveys a concern for rule precision; it is fairly common.41 
 Another stylistic tendency, often combined with pleonasm, is the production of 
hyperbolic categoricals.  Ephesus contains a number of particularly good examples: in 
                                                 
39 See Avotins 1992,46. 
40  Other examples include the heavy repetition of "such and such bishop said" and πάλιν/ὁμοίως 
ὡρίσθη/ἤρεσεν in much of Carthage, the introductory περὶ... statements of Theophilus' ὑπομνήστικον, or 
even the repetition of "ἢ οὒ;"at the end of questions in Timothy 2, 4, 5, 7, 12, 15.  
41 For example, Laodicea 34; Antioch 4; Constantinople 394; Trullo 1, 2, 16, 19, 37, 39, 40, 41, 62; 
Protodeutera 16; Hagia Sophia 2.   A similar phenomenon may be found in Chalcedon 23, where the 
official (the Constantinopolitan ἔκδικος, i.e. defensor) who is to handle the expelling of vagrant clergy is 
mentioned twice, the second time with the precisionistic form "the same" (διὰ τοῦ ἐκδίκου...διὰ τοῦ αὐτοῦ 
ἐκδίκου).  
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canon 3 we read that μηδ᾽ ὅλως ὑποκεῖσθαι κατὰ μηδένα τρόπον ἢ χρόνον and in canon 
9 ἐδικαιώσαμεν καὶ ὡρίσαμεν δίχα πάσης ἀντιλογίας.   
 
7) [from p. 166 ] Chalcedon 27 condemns not only those who participate in seizure-
marriages, but those who are party to the plan: συμπράττοντας ἢ συναιρομένους.  II 
Nicaea 8 on fake Jewish conversions is quite careful to note that such Jews may not a) 
take communion; b) participate in prayer; or c) enter into a church.  Further, they may 
not baptize their children or either buy or possess a slave.  Hagia Sophia 3 officiously 
condemns anyone who strikes or imprisons a bishop without reason or for a contrived 
reason : εἴ τις...τολμήσειεν ἐπίσκοπόν τινα τύψαι ἢ φυλακίσαι ἢ χωρὶς αἰτίας ἢ καὶ 
συμπλασάμενος αἰτίαν.  Gangra frequently addresses in different canons slightly 
different circumstances for the same rule: canons 14-16, on familial duties, carefully 
moves through different types of kin, one after another; canons 1, 4, 9, 10, 14 all treat 
various detailed circumstances that emerge because of the ascetic disdain for marriage; 
something similar is evident with 5, 6, 9, 20 on church assemblies, and 7 and 8 on 
finances.42   
Another version of this type of comprehensive provisioning arises when 
extended series of "stacked" conditional clauses expand a rule with a variety of fairly 
specific additional possibilities.  Ancyra 18 is a good short example. The basic rule is 
that if certain bishops (εἴ τινες...) are rejected from his own church, they cannot interfere 
in other dioceses.  The canon continues, however, by noting that if (ἐὰν μέντοι...) such a 
bishop will accept a seat among the presbyterate, he is welcome to take such a position.  
But it then adds an even further clause that if (ἐὰν δὲ...) such bishops then engage in any 
seditious activity, they will be expelled. This phenomenon may be found throughout the 
corpus.43 
 
8) [p. 167] Trullo 49 may be trying to close a potential loophole when it cites, word for 
word, Chacledon 24, against the transformation of monasteries into secular habitations, 
but then also adds that monasteries may not be given to seculars either.  Canon 67, 
which repeats the food prohibitions from Acts 21:25, may be meant to supercede 
Apostolic 63, which included also a number of other food prohibitions from Leviticus 
17:14-15.  Canon 90 gives more precise indications of what exactly kneeling "on 
                                                 
42 Other similar examples include Apostles 22-24, 42-43, 72-73; Ephesus 1-6; Serdica 3-5. 
43 E.g. Apostles 74; Antioch 3; Constantinople 6 (a long example); Chalcedon 9; Timothy 4; II Nicaea 18, 
22; Protodeutera 16. 
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Sunday" means: from Vespers on Saturday night to Vespers on Sunday night.  Canon 
93, on the reception of heretics, is a word for word reproduction of Constantinople 7 
save that one more category of heretic is now added.  II Nicaea 6, on synods, slightly 
extends the provisions of earlier canons by adding punishments for governors who 
hinder yearly synods and for metropolitans who fail to call them.  Protodeutera 8 
extends Apostolic 22-24, on castration, to include those who order others to be 
castrated.   
 
9) [from p. 171] Gennadius is an extended example of trying to close a loophole, 
directed at the "sophistic"44 attempt by certain Galatian bishops to wriggle out of the 
Chalcedonian condemnation of simony, apparently by making distinctions regarding the 
time of the giving of the money.  Gennadius – in rather technical-legal fashion – is 
quick to plug this loophole with a fine example of legal tense-comprehensivity: ἀλλ᾽ 
οὐδὲ πρὸ τοῦ καιροῦ τῆς χειροτονίας, οὐδὲ μετὰ τὸν καιρὸν τῆς χειροτονοίας... οὐδὲ 
παρὰ τὸν καιρὸν...  He then formally renews Chalcedon 2 in a highly categorical way: 
ἔδοξε καὶ ἡμῖν αὐτὰ ταῦτα πάλιν ἀνανεώσασθαι...ὥστε δίχα πάσης ἐπινοίας καὶ πάσης 
προφάσεως καὶ παντὸς σοφισμοῦ τὴν...συνήθειαν...ἐκτεμεῖν.  Later he is also very 
careful to re-enumerate in a comprehensive way all of the possible subjects of this 
ruling (bishops, chorepiscopoi, periodeutai, etc.).   
A different type of sophistication is evident in Athanasius 3, the letter to 
Rufinianus.  Here sophisticated rule logic is not so much in evidence as a methodical 
clarification of a fairly technical rule on a specific subject (the reception of lesser clergy 
who had submitted to Arian leaders). Despite many rhetorical flourishes, Athanasius' 
answer moves very carefully through 1) the source of the ruling; 2) the reasons for the 
ruling and the nature of this formal exception, and 3) the criteria established by the 
ruling for its application.   
Other texts are notably "jurisprudential" simply because of their sophisticated or 
sustained conceptual reasoning.  Some instances are quite brief.  Apostolic 76, for 
example, explains that bishops may not appoint successors because the things of God 
may not become subject to inheritance.  This is far from a sophisticated jurisprudential 
rationale, but the presentation of the regulation as following directly from a general 
(divine) inheritance principle is striking.   Ephesus 1 similarly notes that apostate 
                                                 
44 The literal-technical reading being addressed is repeatedly characterized by the σοφισ- root (e.g. 
δεῖ...μὴ σοφίζεσθαι τὰ ἀσόφιστα;...οὐδὲ σοφιστικῆς δεόμενον ἐξηγήσεως). 
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metropolitans are not able to do anything against their bishops or participate in 
communion at all, "for already they have been cast out by the synod and are incapable 
of action" (ἤδη γὰρ ὑπὸ τῆς συνόδου ἐκβεβλημένος ἐστὶ καὶ ἀνενέργητος ὑπάρχει).  On 
the face of it this is perhaps little more than remarking the simple consequence of an 
earlier action, but it nevertheless suggests that expulsion entails a formal doctrinal-
conceptual consequence, namely a state of "anenergia".  One can thus perhaps detect a 
kind of doctrinal-conceptual architecture (and a proprietary one at that) underlying this 
canon: expulsion entails anenergia, and anenergia entails that metropolitans in such a 
state cannot do anything legitimately against their bishops. 
Some canons are notable for the jurisprudential method presumed.  Trullo 40, 
for example, on the age of monastic profession, engages in some explicit analogical 
argumentation: the church earlier lowered the age of admission to the female diaconate 
to forty, and so Trullo may now lower the age of monastic profession.45  A more minor 
form of such arguing may be found when secular regulations are presented as positing a 
lesser example for the church to follow "all the more" because of its spiritual nature (the 
a minori ad maius trope).46 
A final example of a more lengthy and sustained foray into jurisprudential rule 
thinking – too long to convey at length –  is Constantinople 394.  This is a record of a 
formal discussion, full of technical terminology and stylizations, on a fairly technical 
matter: how many bishops are required (a minimum requirement, another rather "legal" 
concern) to depose another bishop. The answer is arrived at through a careful weighing 
and discussing of various legal principles and traditions, and the decision even 
presented partially in terms of what is logical ("ἀκόλουθον... ἀκόλουθος...).  
 
10) [from p. 178, n. 180] Explicit non-canonical or non-scriptural authority references 
are made in three Trullan canons: in canon 16 John Chrysostom's Homily 14 on Acts 
(PG 60.116)  is invoked to re-interpret Neocaesarea 15; in canon 32 the appeal by 
Armenian apologists to the same father's Homily 82 on Mathew (PG 58.740) is rejected; 
in canon 64 Gregory Nazianzen's Oration 32 (PG 36.188) is cited in support of the 
rejection of lay teachers. Canon 32 also counters the Armenian reading of John 
Chrsysostom by referring to elements from his liturgy, as well as from the liturgies of St 
James and St Basil.  II Nicaea 2 cites Dionysius the Areopagite (Ecclesiastical 
                                                 
45 Similar examples of analogical rule-creation or modification may be found in Basil 9, 18, or Gregory 
Nyss. 8. 
46 Chalcedon 18; Trullo 7. 
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Hierarchy 1.4; PG 3.389); 16 cites Basil's Greater Asketikon (Regulae brev. tract. 39; 
PG 31.977); canon 19 makes another citation of Basil's non-canonical writings, this 
time his treatise On Fasting (4; PG 31.192); and canon 20 contains a vaguer reference to 
Basil's monastic regulations.  In Protodeutera 10 Gregory Nazianzen is cited loosely (cf. 
Oration 28; PG 36.45), almost in passing.  Earlier use of non-canonical material to 
support rulings may be found in Cyprian and Timothy 9 (both liturgical references). (All 
references from Fonti.) 
 
11) [from p. 179]  Even in the first-wave quite specific, sometimes intra-corporal 
references,47 are easily found. Nicaea 5 introduces its topic (Περὶ τῶν...) very clearly 
with the citing and affirmation of ἡ γνώμη κατὰ τὸν κανόνα τὸν διαγορεύοντα; Antioch 
1 refers to the Nicene ὅρος on Easter, and then elsewhere to τοὺς θεσμοὺς τοὺς 
ἐκκλησιαστικούς (canon 3), τὸν ἀρχαῖον ἐκ τῶν πατέρων ἡμῶν κρατήσαντα κανόνα 
(canon 9, perhaps the more general usage of "canon"), τὸν ἤδη πρότερον περὶ τούτου 
ἐξενεχθέντα ὅρον (canon 21), and τὸν θεσμὸν τὸν ἐκκλησιαστικόν (canon 23); 
Constantinople 2, on the privileges of Alexandria, Antioch and the Asian civil dioceses, 
is quick to assert its coherence with "the canons" – three times, in fact, twice with 
explicit mention of Nicaea; Constantinople 394 refers specifically to the Apostolic 
canons; Chalcedon 19, on holding synods twice a year, legislates κατὰ τοὺς τῶν ἁγίων 
πατέρων κανόνας, clearly intending Nicaea 5 or Antioch 20; Theophilus in his letter to 
Agathos, charges a certain Maximus with "not knowing the laws of the church", ἀγνοῶν 
τοὺς τῆς ἐκκλησίας νόμους; Basil 3 takes as a central point of discussion an ἀρχαῖος 
κανών, as does canon 4 (...ὥρισαν κανόνα..., here as a tariff) which goes on to discuss 
its matter in terms of a συνήθεια which Basil has "received" (κατελάβομεν); the 
Apiarian documents in Carthage are aimed at discerning the real rules of Nicaea; and so 
on.  "Renewal" canons are also not unknown.48   
In the second-wave material all of these type of references become more 
frequent, and occasionally canons are even cited by number,49 or, more often, quoted in 
part or even in full (sometimes explicitly "renewed").50  This full citation of material is 
                                                 
47 Explicitly, for example, in Constantinople 1, 2; Constantinople 394; Antioch 1; Chalcedon 28; Basil 88, 
Theophilus 12; Gennadius; Carthage 18c.   
48 For example, Chalcedon 2 and Gennadius. 
49 II Nicaea 16 refers to Chalcedon 2; Tarasios refers to Apostolic 29, Trullo 22, and Chalcedon 2; 
Protodeutera 8 to Nicaea 1, canon 9 to Antioch 5.  Earlier, Carthage will sometimes refer to previous 
synods by name, e.g. canons 34, 48, 86, 94. 
50 Trullo 3, 6, 11, 12, 14, 25, 26, 34, 36, 38, 49, 84, 87, 94; II Nicaea 3, 5, 6, 7, 12; Protodeutera 8-12. 
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even evident (or at least likely) in many first-wave sources.51 It represents a kind of 
ultimate traditionalization: new rules are physically built out of the old. The apogee of 
this type of rule-repeating is Tarasios, a long canonical florilegium on simony.  
 
12) [from p. 180] Another excellent example is the very earliest source in the corpus, 
Cyprian.  This "canon" frames its entire argument in traditional terms, beginning with a 
robust assertion of traditional authority: "We are persuaded regarding these things [the 
practices of re-baptizing heretics and schismatics] that you yourselves in doing these 
things have maintained the firmness of the canon of the Catholic Church" [τὴν 
στερρότητα τοῦ τῆς καθολικῆς ἐκκλησίας κανόνος κρατεῖν].  We then learn, a few lines 
later, that the central point of the letter is precisely to assure its readers that also 
Cyprian's opinion is not recent, but approved by his predecessors: "we present an 
opinion neither hasty nor established today, but that which has been long approved by 
our predecessors with much exactitude and care."  The rest of the letter is then a didactic 
argument for Cyprian's position with suitably extensive citations from traditional 
sources, especially Scripture.   
Ephesus 8, the elaborate ψῆφος on Cyprus, is also a traditional tour de force.  It 
thus begins its condemnation of Antioch's actions by noting directly that a πράγμα 
καινοτομούμενον has emerged "against the customs and canons of the holy fathers".  
Later the lack of an ἔθος ἀρχαῖον for Antioch's actions is noted disapprovingly while the 
actions of the Cypriote bishops are, on the contrary, "according to the canons of the holy 
fathers and ancient usage".  In the future, the decision continues, no bishop is to 
arrogate authority over a diocese that was not his "from the beginning".  If he does, he is 
to give it back "so that the canons of the fathers are not transgressed".  The final 
disposition concludes that every province is to retain the rights that pertained to 
according to the "custom prevailing from of old" (τὸ πάλαι κρατῆσαν ἔθος).   
 
13) [from p. 185] Serdica 1 concludes with a scathing assessment of the moral character 
and motivations of its subjects: "Whence it has come to pass that such persons burn with 
a flaming greed and are slaves to pretension so that they might appear to acquire greater 
authority".  Similar is canon 20, which contrasts at length characteristics of canonicity 
                                                 
51 It is perhaps most likely in some of the canons of Basil and Gregory of Nyssa which often read as 
simply conveying older rules, including those rules of Basil that begin with (or are) a simple rule 
statement, almost as if Basil he is conveying an established tradition (e.g. 2, 3, 5, 8, 25, perhaps most of 
Basil 51-84).  The best first-wave examples are, however, the literal doublets shared between the Apostles 
and Antioch (Sources Apostles).  Gennadius also contains explicit citations of earlier material.  
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(σωτηριωδῶς, ἀκολούθως, πρεπόντως, θεῷ ἀρέσαντα καὶ ἀνθρώποις) with the 
uncanonical (ἀναισχυντία, τύφῳ μᾶλλον καὶ ἀλαζονείᾳ ἢ τῷ θεῷ ἀρέσαι). In Antioch 1 
the strategy is to "pile" on harmful consequences of wrongdoing: "not only...but also...":  
ὡς οὐ μόνον ἑαυτῷ ἁμαρτίας ἀλλὰ πολλοῖς διαφθορᾶς καὶ διαστροφῆς αἴτιον 
γινόμενον, καὶ οὐ μόνον τοὺς τοιούτους καθαιρεῖ τῆς λειτουργίας ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς τούτοις 
κοινωνεῖν τολμῶντας.  More briefly and typically Trullo 7 characterizes deacons who 
sit above their position as αὐθαδείᾳ καὶ αὐτονομίᾳ κεχρημένους and as τολμήσει 
τυραννικῷ [χρηωμένους] θράσει.  In II Nicaea 8 Jews who feign Christian conversion 
do not just feign conversion but in so doing "mock" Christ (μυκτηρίζειν).  In II Nicaea 
9, the iconoclast writings are "childish playthings and maniacal ravings" – they are 
really pitiful, it seems!  
 
14) [from p. 189, n. 202] Ed. and commentary, Burgmann and Troianos 1979; also 
Pieler 1997,90; Schminck 2005; Troianos 1987.  It arranges excerpts from the 
Pentateuch under fifty topical titles (e.g. "On judgment and justice", "On theft", "On 
adulterers"). Although present in some canonical manuscripts as an appendix (see 
Sbornik 170) this collection seems to have originally had relatively little currency in the 
canonical tradition (more in the secular tradition, curiously). 
In the manuscripts, however, other small testimonia-type appendix articles may 
also be occasionally found in which Scriptural passages are gathered to illuminate some 
topic, such as clerical oaths.  One such collection is described for Paris supp gr. 843 in 
Sin 144; cf. also RP 4.415.  The full extent of such excerpt collections is not known; it 
does not seem great.   
 
15) [from p. 191]  In Serdica 1, cited above, a short analysis is offered of the 
psychology of bishops who transfer sees: the real motivation for the bishops is a 
burning lust for power, which leads them to be "enslaved" to the passion of 
covetousness. A similar analysis is evident in Trullo 45: the new nun has her monastic 
life, formerly bolstered by "untroubled thoughts", λογισμοῖς ἀκλινέσιν, disturbed by a 
"remembrance", ἀνάμνησιν, of the world she left.  As a result, her soul is troubled 
(ἐκταραχθῆναι) "as by waves churning and tossing this way and that".  Tears are 
expected, and then analyzed in some detail for their effect on observers.  Trullo 100 also 
engages in a short exposition on how easily bodily sensations (αἰσθήσεις) corrupt the 
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mind: "for the sensations of the body easily influence the soul" (ῥαδίως γὰρ τὰ ἑαυτῶν 
ἐπὶ τὴν ψυχὴν αἱ τοῦ σώματος αἰσθήσεις εἰσκρίνουσι).  
Related are references to the heart, grief and tears, which feature surprisingly 
strongly in some canons, and emerge as some of the most dramatic internal and 
emotional colouring in the corpus.  Tears, in particular, play a prominent role in the 
canons.  Most frequently they arise as a substantive gauge of true repentance in lapsi 
canons, penitential material, and penal-attenuation clauses/canons.52   Similarly, certain 
states of the "heart", as in Trullo 45, are also noted in the context of describing 
appropriate states of penance or sincerity.53   The pathos of grief and inner pain also 
occurs, as in Apostolic 52 (Christ is "grieved).54   
 
16) [from p. 191]  A good example is Apostolic 51.  Clergy who abstain from marriage, 
meat and wine not because of asceticism but βδελυρία, "abhorrence", have "forgotten" 
correct Scriptural doctrine: "forgetting that everything is 'very good' and that God made 
man male and female." Likewise Laodicea, normally very laconic, does not hesitate to 
tack on a few very short theological epexegetical comments, such as in canon 34, where 
heretic martyrs are to be avoided, "for these are not of God".  In canon 48 the 
metaphysical effect of chrismation is briefly mentioned: "because it is necessary that 
those enlightened are chrismated after baptism with the heavenly chrism and become 
partakers of the kingdom of God."  In Chalcedon 4 wandering monastics are to be 
confined "so that the name of God is not blasphemed".  Trullo 4 dramatically glosses 
the violation of a consecrated woman as "having corrupted the bride of Christ".  Trullo 
90 provides some brief liturgical commentary, explaining standing on Sunday to begin 
on Saturday evening "as in this way we celebrate all day and night the resurrection." II 
Nicaea 13, after noting that iconoclasm was caused "according to our sins", concludes 
with a lengthy and dramatic Scriptural exploration of the nature of the excommunication 
of those who have turned religious houses into taverns: "[they are excommunicated] as 
condemned by the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit and assigned to where 'the 
worm does not die and the fire is not quenched' [Isa. 66:24/Mark 9:44], because they 
have opposed the voice of the Lord saying 'Do not make my Father's house a house of 
trade' [John 2:16]." 
 
                                                 
52 E.g. Ancyra 5; Basil 27, 77; Nicaea 12; Ephesus 9.   
53 Also II Nicaea 8, Trullo 41, 89, Basil 10, 75. 
54 Also Cyril 1, 2; Basil 90; Ephesus 9. 
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17) [from p. 193]  In Laodicea 53, for example, Christians are to observe a "solemn", 
respectable manner, "as fitting to Christians" when present at weddings.  Similarly, 
Carthage 132 is centered on instructing bishops not to understand certain behaviour – 
the denial of a previous private confession of sin – as ἴδια ὕβρις, personal insult 
(Apparently the ubristic aspect of such behaviour is sufficiently important as to require 
its own regulation!)  At one point in the Appiarian acts the Africans are also keen to act 
"without any hubris", χωρίς τινος ὕβρεως, in their dealings with the pope.  Trullo 73, 
cited above, is directed towards guarding the honour, τιμή of the cross.  We are not to 
"insult" it (ὡς ἂν μὴ... ἐφυβρίζοιτο) by placing it on the floor and walking over it.  II 
Nicaea 16, on clerical clothing, is quite predictably concerned with the respectable 
appearances: clerics are to wear clothing that is suitably σεμνός, "solemn".   
A concern for reputation also appears in the legislation with some regularity. 
Thus Gregory Thaum. 1 instructs that a judgment on the suitable penance for a violated 
woman is to be made on the basis of her former reputation, i.e. whether or not a 
"disposition to porneia" (πορνικὴ ἕξις) was "suspected" (ὕποπτος), or if she was "clean 
of all suspicion" (καθαρός ἔξω πάσης ὑπονοίας).  Similarly, the treatment of lapsi 
priests in Ancyra 3 is moderated "if their previous way of life was found to be proper".  
Carthage 38 can casually note "certain honorable Christians" (ἔντιμοί τινες χριστιανοί) 
as among those who can chaperone visits with virgins and widows.  Even the church as 
a whole has a reputation which must be guarded – so Cyril 4, cited above, and Carthage 
44: virgins are to be commended into the care of older women "lest wandering all over 
they harm the reputation of the church" (ἵνα μὴ πανταχοῦ πλανόμεναι τὴν ὑπόληψιν 
βλάψωσιν τῆς ἐκκλησίας).  Nicaea 9 makes something of a principle of this: "the 
Catholic church requires that which is blameless" (τὸ γὰρ ἀνεπίληπτον ἐκδικεῖ ἡ 
καθολικὴ ἐκκλησία).   
Procedural legislation, in particular, is quite concerned with matters of 
reputation and status.  Thus Apostolic 74 direct that plaintiffs must be trustworthy 
(ἀξιοπίστοι); Constantinople 6 is quite concerned about reputations (ὑπολήψεις) and 
testing "persons" (δοκιμάζεσθαι χρὴ...τὰ πρόσωπα); Chalcedon 21 commands an 
inquiry into the ὑπόλυψις of plaintiffs; and Carthage 9 disallows accusations from the 
"many" who are "not of good way of life" (οὐκ ἀγαθῆς ἀναστροφῆς). 
 
18) [from p. 194]  Carthage 60 is something of a set-piece of shame-honour texturing.  
Heathen feasts must be eradicated during martyr festivals, as "...in these days, and it is 
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shameful to even say it, abominable dances are performed in fields and open spaces, 
with the result that the honour of house-mistresses and the modesty of innumerable 
other women who have gathered for the holy day are assaulted, so that the approach to 
the faith itself is fled from."  Many honour/shame motifs and topoi are combined here: 
public wrongdoing, dancing, women being assaulted, shameful insults – and all in the 
pronounced language of τιμή, αἰσχύνη, and ὕβρις.  
In Serdica 6 "name" and "face" become an issue: bishops are not be appointed to 
small villages lest the "name" and "authority" of the episcopate be belittled (ἵνα μὴ 
κατευτελίζηται τὸ τοῦ ἐπισκόπου ὄνομα καὶ ἡ αὐθεντία).   Similarly, in canon 11 
bishops are not to spend time in other dioceses lest, among other things, they happen to 
"shame and belittle the person of the bishop there" (καταισχύνειν καὶ κατευτελίζειν τὸ 
προσώπον τοῦ αὐτόθι ἐπισκόπου).  
"Scandal" emerges in Trullo 12, which explains the problem of married bishops 
precisely in that they are "a stumbling block [πρόσκομμα] to the people there and a 
scandal [σκάνδαλον]" (see Rom. 14:13).   This same scriptural image will reoccur in 
Trullo 47, II Nicaea 18 and 20 in similar "shame" situations.  Preserving honour also 
emerges as a central concern in Trullo 37, both with the phrase "we, guarding the 
honour and reverence [τίμιον καὶ σεβάσμιον] of the priesthood", and by casting the 
particularly problem at issue, barbarian invasions, as ἐπήρεια, "abuse", which has clear 
connotations of insult and affront. Protodeutera 12 is also quick to point out the 
scandalous and improper nature of illicit house liturgies: these are contrary to the 
church's "dignity of life" (τὸ σεμνὸν τῆς πολιτείας), and full of "much tumult and 
scandals" (πολλῆς ταραχῆς καὶ σκανδάλων). 
 
19) [from p. 201]  Basil 84, a reflection on what to do with impenitent sinners, is a good 
example of church order explicitly transacted against the backdrop of the final 
judgment.  Basil states that these people do not realize that the recent "wrath of God" 
has come upon the community as a means of scourging them their sins (μηδὲ συνῆκαν 
ὅτι διὰ ταῦτα ἦλθεν ἐφ᾽ ἡμᾶς ἡ ὀργὴ τοῦ Θεοῦ.)  In the end, one must separate from 
such persons so as not to be destroyed with them (μὴ τοίνυν καταδεξώμεθα 
συναπόλλυσθαι τοῖς τοιούτοις), for one must always keep in mind "the deep judgment 
and the fearful day of the Lord's retribution" (τὸ βαρὺ κρίμα καὶ τὴν φοβερὰν ἡμέραν 
τῆς ἀνταποδόσεως τοῦ Κυρίου).  One must try to save such persons (through the 
penitential system), but if this is not possible, "let us hasten to save at least our own 
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souls from eternal condemnation" (σπουδάσωμεν τὰς γοῦν ἑαυτῶν ψυχὰς τῆς αἰωνίου 
κατακρίσεως περισώσασθαι). 
Earlier, in canon 10, a similar eschatological-forensic context emerges quite 
strongly when the divine once more gets a decision referred to it.  Basil notes his 
frustration and uncertainty at a case involving a certain Severus, but grants him 
forgiveness on the basis of what he has heard, noting however that "since we are not 
judges of hearts, but we judge from what we hear, we will give vengeance/judgment to 
the Lord" (ἐπειδὴ δὲ οὐκ ἐσμὲν καρδιῶν κριταί, ἀλλ᾽ ἐξ ὧν ἀκούομεν κρίνομεν, δῶμεν 
τῷ Κυρίῳ τὴν ἐκδίκησιν).  Basil not only slightly hedges his own judgment, but reminds 
us that canonical process is ultimately taking place against the background of the final 
judgment.   
The final divine tribunal is also invoked in Cyril 2, but for a rather more prosaic 
purpose.  Cyril rejects the idea that bishops should have to give detailed accountings of 
all their expenses, for they will have to give a final accounting to the "judge of all": 
ἕκαστος γὰρ ἡμῶν τῶν ἰδίων καιρῶν δώσει λόγον τῷ πάντων κριτῇ. 
In II Nicaea 13, on turning sacred properties into public inns, divine juridical 
glossing emerges once again.  The relevant phrase, one of the longest and most forceful 
of such glosses in the corpus, reads: "[they are excommunicated] as condemned by the 
Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit and assigned to where 'the worm does not die 
and the fire is not quenched' [Isa. 66:24/Mark 9:44], because they have opposed the 
voice of the Lord saying 'Do not make my Father's house a house of trade' [John 2:16]". 
The eschatological reality of such canonical wrong-doing cannot be made more clear: it 
entails excommunication by the Trinity itself and a condemnation from Jesus' own 
mouth – completed with a picturesque Scriptural description of the results! 
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APPENDIX D 
Appendix to Chapter 4 
(The following are supplementary notes, supplying further details, texts and examples 
for various points in the main text.  These notes are referred to in the main text and/or 
footnotes by appendix and note number.) 
 
1) [from p. 206, n. 1] Only in the 12th C or 13th C does one other small handbook-like 
thematic collection emerge, the Synopsis of Arsenios, in 141 titles, apparently very 
local, and known only from one manuscript (Paris 1371, ed. Voellus and Justel 
1661,2.749-784 = PG 133.9-26; see Menebisoglou 1984,89-90; Peges 249, 301-302).  
In the 14th C two other thematic collections are produced, Blastares' Σύνταγμα κατὰ 
στοιχεῖον" (RP 6), and Harmenopoulos' Ἐπιτομὴ κανόνων (ed. Leunclavius 1591,1.1-71 
= PG 150.45-168) .  Both see considerable circulation, particularly the former, which 
becomes extremely popular in the post-Byzantine east (Pavlov 1902,75-76; Peges 297-
301; 302-303).  Even Blastares, however, never entirely supplants the earlier, and by 
then very ancient and traditional, thematic systems, particularly the Coll14, associated, 
of course, with the name of Photius since the 12th C. (Details of the Nachleben of the 
Coll14 and Coll50 in the 15-18th C are not, however, well known.) 
 
2) [from p. 217, n. 46]  For example, the Coll14 with a systematic corpus is found in 
Paris Cois. 36 or Vatican gr. 1142 (see Sbornik 307-313 on the last). Similarly, the 
Coll50 index can likewise be found without its systematic corpus, accompanying a 
straight corpus collection, for example in Rome Barb. 578 (see Sin 223 for other 
examples).  Note that in Cresconius the thematic index can also apparently become 
detached and added to other collections (Zechiel-Eckes 1992,1.205-225, 261-267; cf. 
Maassen 1871,817-818 on the systematic Hispana). 
 
3) [from p. 226, n. 65] Cresconius is formed mostly from a pre-existing set of rubrical 
index titles (from Dionysius II; see Zechiel-Eckes 1992,1.55; on Dionysius' index, see 
Firey 2008), and something similar may have been true of the Byzantine collections as 
well.  However, preliminary examination has not revealed any clear or convincing 
relation of the extant Byzantine synopsis rubrics (or those preserved in Vienna hist. gr. 
7, Syn 193-223) to the rubrics of the Coll50 or Coll14.  Further investigation with 
rubrics preserved in Latin and Syrian manuscripts would be worthwhile.  (I have also 
found no convincing way of extracting 60 formally similar rubric fragments from the 
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rubrics of the Coll50 – i.e. to demonstrate that the Coll50 may have been constructed 
from the old Coll60 rubrics.) 
 
4) [from p. 240, n. 84; also from p. 84, n. 9] Roman Law  This list includes both heavily 
reconstructed early materials as potential influences, direct or indirect – or at least 
illustrative of the possibilities of legal ordering – as well as better preserved later texts. 
 Twelve Tables (as per Crawford 1996,555-721 and, alternatively, Riccobono 
1941,21-75, the latter with trans. Johnson et al. 1961,9-18) 
 Q. Mucius Scaevola's Ius civilis and the related Sabinian order (as per Lenel 
1889,2.1257-1261, 1892, with analysis at 90-104; also, for the former, Liebs 
1976,223 and Watson 1974,142-144, and generally Schulz 1953,94-95, 157-158. 
The Sabinian order may be considered one of two fundamental "backbone" 
structures in Roman legal literature.) 
 Praetorian Edict (the other fundamental structure; as per Lenel 1889,2.1247-
1256; with reference to Schulz 1953,148-152) 
 the digesta orders (more or less the Edict order plus a selection of appended 
leges, as per Lenel 2.1257-1261, and with reference to Schulz 1953 passim.) 
 CTh  (mostly a modified digesta order; see especially Harries 1998, Matthews 
2000)  
 CJ  (similar to CTh/digesta) 
 Digest  (a kind of digesta order; see in particular Honoré 1978,139-186.)  Also 
considered is the order of the Digest described inTanta/Δέδωκεν, and the orders 
of the educational curricula in Omnem. 
 Institutes: Florentinus' (as per Schulz 1953,158-159); Marcian's (as per Schulz 
1953,172-173); Gaius' (ed. Seckel and Kuebler 1935); Justinian's. Related to 
Mucian/Sabinian order. 
Most of the standard source surveys consider briefly the order of many of the above 
structures; Schulz 1953 is particularly helpful throughout. The table of Mommsen in 
CTh vol. 1 (Prolegomena) xiii-xxvii is invaluable for considering the Edictal order in 
relationship to the CTh and CJ.  Soubie 1960 is also helpful for the order and structure 
of the Digest.   
 
Byzantine Law:  
 Athanasius of Emesa: Syntagma (ed. Simon and Troianos 1989) and Epitome 
(ed. Simon and Troianos 1979) (both novel collections) 
 Ecloga (discussion of order Burgmann 1983,7-8) 
 Nomos Mosaikos (ed. Burgmann and Troianos 1979)  
 Eisagoge 
 Prochiron  
 Basilica (order still mostly based on Edict, see Lawson 1930,494-500) 
 
Late Roman/Byzantine Ecclesiastical Law:  
The order of topics in CTh 16; CJ 1.1-13; NN. 5, 6, 7, 123, 131; Coll87; and the 
Tripartita. 
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Philosophical or literary legal discussions:  
 Plato Laws (ed. Burnet 1907 with reference the commentary of Schöpsdau 1993, 
2003, esp. the schematic 1993,95-98) 
 Cicero Laws (ed. Powell 2006 with reference to the commentary of Dyck 2004) 
 Plutarch's description of Solon and Lycurgus' legal activity in their vitae (ed. 
Lindskog and Ziegler 1957-1980) 
 Josephus Antiquities 4.197-292 (ed. Niese 1887-1892) and Against Apion 
2.164-219 (ed. Niese 1889,3-99). Both are re-organized presentations of the 
Mosaic law; see Atlschuler 1982/1983 and Geza 1982. 
 Philo On the Special Laws (ed. Cohn 1906,1-265; essentially the Pentateuchal 
laws re-organized under the headings of the Ten Commandments) 
 Dionysius of Halicarnassus Roman Antiquities 2.1-29 (ed. Jacoby 1885; here a 
description of Romulus' constitution and laws) 
 
Scripture  
 Exodus (particularly chs. 20-40, with 20-23, 25-31, 35-40 as regulative 
discourses interspersed with narrative; includes 20.22-23.33 the "Covenant 
Code" of modern scholarship)  
 Ten Commandments: Exodus 20:1-17; Deut. 5:6-21 
 Leviticus (as a whole, and as an extension of Exodus; the modern delimitation of 
17-26 as the "holiness code" does not seem especially obvious or relevant for 
our purposes) 
 Deuteronomy as a whole (particularly 12-26, perhaps with 4-11 as a lengthy 
introductory section; see esp. Tigay 1996,449-459, with schematic) 
 the Pentateuch as a whole  
 Matthew 5-7 (Sermon on the Mount) 
 Epistles with substantial structured regulative sections (including the 
"Household codes" of modern scholarship): 1 Corinthians; Colossians; 
Ephesians; Titus; 1 Timothy; 1 Peter.   
 
Apostolic Church Orders:  
 Didache (ed. Niederwimmer 1993) 
 Apostolic Tradition (ed. Bradshaw 2002; see at 15 for variant orderings) as well 
as its later forms, the Testament of the Lord (ed. Rahmani 1899), and the Canons 
of Hippolytus (ed. Bradsahw and Bebawi 1987)  
 Constitutiones ecclesiasticae apostolorum or "Apostolic Church Ordinances" 
(ed. Arendzen 1901) 
 Didascalia (ed. Funk 1905) 
 Apostolic Constitutions  (ed. Metzger 1985) 
Steimer 1992 provides the best overview of the Apostolic Church Order literature, with 
many further references to different versions and editions. 
 
5) [from p. 243, n. 94]  Their fortunes in the editions have varied. They are completely 
absent in Beveridge, and also (thus?) RP and the Pedalion; Pitra notes the presence of 
the first two in some MSS (Pitra 2.23, n.1; 2.45, n.1), but not the last, and does not 
include any in his main text; Beneshevich includes the first two in Kormchaya, without 
comment, but not the last; Fonti (and thus Nedungatt and Featherstone 1995) includes 
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them all without any textual notes at all, aside from asserting in his introduction that 
"the manuscripts divide the texts into three sections" (Fonti 1.98).  Ohme 2006,46 and 
Troianos 1992,10 mention them but don't  indicate that they are part of the manuscript 
tradition. 
Confusion seems to have been created by Laurent 1965, an influential article 
that speaks (20, n. 54) as if the rubrics were the invention of Pitra, a view that seems to 
find echo in Gavardinas 1998,58-59, Historike 290 and Troianos 1992,10.   
In my own examination of manuscripts, the first two rubrics are usually present, 
albeit sometimes in the margins, but not the third.  However, I was able to find the third 
in at least three manuscripts, Moscow Syn. 398, Patmos 205, and Vat. gr. 1980, the first 
and last of which are quite old (10th-11th C). Even here, of course, the rubrics may still 
represent later additions.   
A full resolution of the problem of the rubrics' originality will have to await 
Ohme's edition for the ACO, in preparation.  One reason for suspecting that they are 
original, however, is that they are strikingly accurate – especially by Byzantine 
standards. Canons 3-39 are all almost exclusively, and always primarily, addressed to 
the clergy; canons 40-49 form a very tight group of strictly monastic legislation; and the 
final section, 50-102, while more varied in subject, contain no canon that only addresses 
the clergy or monastics or both – they either lack a specific addressee, contain multiple 
addressees that include the laity, or are addressed exclusively to the laity.  Moreover, 
the divisions created by the rubrics are numerically quite neat (including the overall 
century, which, by dividing off canon 1 and 2, the rubrics make much clearer), 
suggesting that this was a schema being "composed to". 
 
6) [from p. 244, n. 95] This last pattern is broadly true of all the CTh and CJC material, 
which are headed by reasonably high status doctrinal, theoretical and high-office 
matters (i.e. CTh 1, CJ 1, Digest 1, Institutes 1.1-2) and where criminal material appear 
quite late (i.e. CTh 9, CJ 9, Digest 47-48 – the "libri terribiles" of Tanta 8a – and 
Institutes 4, covering delicts by wrongdoing generally, strictly criminal matters in 4:18).  
Within CTh and CJ the structures specifically dedicated to church matters (CTh 16, CJ 
1.1-13) likewise place heretics, pagans, and other disagreeable subjects noticeably after 
faith and cultic matters. The same pattern may be found in all of the Byzantine 
collections as well, especially in the tendency of placing a large criminal-penal section 
last or near-last, as in Ecloga 17, Nomos Mosaikos 42-50, Eisagoge 40, Prochiron  39, 
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Basilica 60, Novels of Leo 58-66; and faith/theory/high officers earlier, as Nomos 
Mosaikos 1-2, Eisagoge 1-9, Basilica 1-7, Novels of Leo 1-17.  This is also apparent in 
Plato's Laws (clearly starting with religious matters and high offices in 715e-768e and 
much later moving on to criminal material in 853d-910d), as well as Josephus 
Antiquities (4.199-213 vs. 4.266-291), and even the Didascalia, with its early books (1-
2) on general teaching and the hierarchy and its last on "schism". Indeed, such a pattern 
is true of the Ten Commandments (1-5 on the identity of God and cultic matters, 6-10 
on disciplinary and criminal matters) – and so thus also in Philo Special Laws 1-2 vs. 3-
4.   Cicero's Laws breaks off in book 3, but also begins with religious and cultic matters 
(2.8) before moving on to magistrates (3.1) – it thus at least started with high-status 
matters. The curious end-source "recovering" of more respectable topics is a much more 
tenuous phenomenon, but can perhaps be seen in CTh 16 (on religious matters), CJ with 
its last title on "dignities", and perhaps Digest 50.16-17 with its return to theoretical 
matters (general definitions and rules). The Canons of Hippolytus similarly conclude 
with Pascha.   
 
7) [from p. 246, n. 98]  It is particularly evident in almost all collections that begin with 
any type of theoretical and/or Amtsweisungen section, which lend the first part of the 
texts a fairly clear and logical structure rarely matched later in the collections.  Thus 
most of the extant secular Roman material, including the ecclesiastical sections or 
collections, as well as the Apostolic church orders, could be counted here.  Plato's Laws 
also contains a notably miscellaneous end section (broadly 932-958), and the 
Deuteronomic code loses much structure after 23:10 (until 25).  The reconstructions of 
the Twelve Tables likewise suggest a pattern of increasing disorder (tables 11 and 12). 
The Roman digesta pattern, and all sources more or less dependant upon it, also evinces 
this tendency in another way, by beginning by following the Edict rather carefully, but 
then gradually descending into somewhat more miscellaneous public law matters.  
Noailles and Dain 1944,xix likewise notes such a pattern for the 113 Novels of Leo 
(ordered until 66, with distinct subject groupings, then becoming quite miscellaneous).  
More examples could be offered. In many cases, Harries 1998,78 is no doubt correct 
when she notes a similar pattern in the CTh, and attributes it to patterns of later 
modification: "...the ancient habit with law-codes was to set down what mattered most 
first, in an organized system, and then add modifications later, as required."  This 
pattern of miscellanization, however, is too pronounced and widespread to attribute it 
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always to processes of later haphazard addition or modification.  It is also, I think, a true 
compositional, or at least editorial, tendency: the beginning must be carefully structured, 
not the end. 
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